

Studies in Byzantine Cultural History

MANAGING EMOTION IN BYZANTIUM

PASSIONS, AFFECTS AND IMAGININGS

Edited by

Margaret Mullett and Susan Ashbrook Harvey



Managing Emotion in Byzantium

Byzantinists entered the study of emotion with Henry Maguire's groundbreaking article on sorrow, published in 1977. Since then, classicists and western medievalists have developed new ways of understanding how emotional communities work and where the ancients' concepts of emotion differ from our own, and Byzantinists have begun to consider emotions other than sorrow. It is time to look at what is distinctive about Byzantine emotion.

This volume is the first to look at the constellation of Byzantine emotions. Originating at an international colloquium at Dumbarton Oaks, these papers address issues such as power, gender, rhetoric, or asceticism in Byzantine society through the lens of a single emotion or cluster of emotions. Contributors focus not only on the construction of emotions with respect to perception and cognition but also explore how emotions were communicated and exchanged across broad (multi)linguistic, political and social boundaries. Priorities are twofold: to arrive at an understanding of what the Byzantines thought of as emotions and to comprehend how theory shaped their appraisal of reality.

Managing Emotion in Byzantium will appeal to researchers and students alike interested in Byzantine perceptions of emotion, Byzantine culture and medieval perceptions of emotion.

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Studies in Byzantine Cultural History

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Experiencing the Last Judgement

Niamh Bhalla

Managing Emotion in Byzantium

Passions, Affects and Imaginings

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Passions, Affects and Imaginings

**Edited by
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Susan Ashbrook Harvey**

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Contents

<i>List of Illustrations</i>	vii
<i>List of Contributors</i>	xi
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	xvii
<i>List of Abbreviations</i>	xix
1 Introduction	1
MARGARET MULLETT	
2 Theorising Emotions: Methodological Tools for Research	36
MARIA G. XANTHOU	
3 The Neighbour's Unbearable Wellbeing: <i>Phthonos</i>/Envy from the Classical to the Modern Greek World	60
MARTIN HINTERBERGER	
4 Compassion and Healing in Early Byzantium	90
SUSAN WESSEL	
5 Managing Affect through Rhetoric: The Case of Pity	113
GEORGIA FRANK	
6 Epithet and Emotion: Reflections on the Quality of <i>Eleos</i> in the Mother of God Eleousa	137
ANNEMARIE WEYL CARR	
7 <i>Storge</i>: Rethinking Gendered Emotion apropos of the Virgin Mary	184
NIKI J. TSIRONIS	

vi	<i>Contents</i>	
8	An Early Christian Understanding of Pride ROBIN DARLING YOUNG	214
9	The Ascetic Construction of Emotions: <i>Lupe</i> and <i>Akedia</i> in the Works of Evagrius of Pontos ANDREW CRISLIP	240
10	<i>Katepheia</i>: From Heroic Failure to Christian Dejection AGLAE PIZZONE	266
11	Emotional Communities and the Loss of an Individual: The Case of Grief MARIA DOERFLER	292
12	Grief and Joy in Byzantine Art HENRY MAGUIRE	314
13	Liturgical Emotion: Joy and Complexity in a Hymn of Romanos the Melodist for Easter DEREK KRUEGER	347
14	<i>Apolausis</i>: Feelings at the Juncture between Body and Mind ALICIA WALKER	375
15	Poetry in Emotion: The Case of Anger FLORIS BERNARD	405
16	Power and Fear: Awe before the Emperor in Byzantium SERGEY A. IVANOV	427
	<i>Index</i>	443

Illustrations

CARR

- | | | |
|-----|---|-----|
| 6.1 | Mother of God Eleousa, new church of the Panagia Chryselousa, Fasoula, Cyprus. Photo credit: Sophocles Sophocleous | 138 |
| 6.2 | Mother of God Eleousa, Geroskipou, Cyprus, Ecclesiastical Museum of Paphos. Photo credit: author | 139 |
| 6.3 | Mother of God Eleousa, church of the Dormition, Nicaea (Iznik). Photo credit: T. Schmit, <i>Die Koimesis-Kirche von Nikaia</i> (Berlin, 1927) | 142 |
| 6.4 | Mother of God Eleousa, monastery of St Neophytos, Paphos, Cyprus. Photo credit: monastery of St Neophytos | 143 |
| 6.5 | Christ Philanthropos, monastery of St Neophytos, Paphos, Cyprus. Photo credit: monastery of St Neophytos | 144 |
| 6.6 | Mother of God Eleousa, church of the Panagia tou Arakou, Lagoudera, Cyprus. Photo credit: author | 146 |
| 6.7 | Christ Antiphonetes, church of the Panagia tou Arakou, Lagoudera, Cyprus. Photo credit: author | 147 |
| 6.8 | Mother of God Eleousa of Kykkos, church of the Panagia, Sia, Cyprus. Photo credit: author | 162 |

TSIRONIS

- | | | |
|-----|--|-----|
| 7.1 | Virgin Mary with a halo, fresco from a tomb at the necropolis in Tyre/Sour, ca 440 CE, National Museum of Beirut, Lebanon. Photo credit: Wikimedia Commons | 185 |
| 7.2 | Virgin Mary with the infant Jesus, sixth-century icon in Khanenko Museum, Kiev, Ukraine. Photo credit: Wikimedia Commons | 197 |
| 7.3 | Enthroned Virgin and Child, sixth-century mosaic on the north wall of the church of Sant' Apollinare Nuovo, Ravenna. Photo credit: Wikimedia Commons | 202 |

- 7.4 Virgin of Tenderness, seventh-century ivory, Walters Art Museum. Photo credit: Wikimedia Commons 204
- 7.5 Virgin of Vladimir, icon, ca 1100, in Tretyakov Gallery, Moscow. Photo credit: Wikimedia Commons 207

MAGUIRE

- 12.1 Mourning apostles from the fresco of the Koimesis, Kurbinovo, North Macedonia. Photo credit: Josephine Powell, photograph courtesy of Special Collections, Fine Arts Library, Harvard College Library 315
- 12.2 Captives, Battle Sarcophagus, Museo Nazionale, Rome. Photo credit: German Archaeological Institute, Rome, no. 61.1399 316
- 12.3 Peter's remorse after his denial of Christ, detail from an ivory casket, Museo Civico, Brescia. Photo credit: Hirmer Fotoarchiv 317
- 12.4 Advertisement for Special K cereal, illustrating *metanoia*. Photo credit: copyright Kellogg company, used with permission 318
- 12.5 Niobe bewailing her children? Sculpture formerly on the Golden Gate of Constantinople, Archaeological Museum, Istanbul. Photo credit: author 319
- 12.6 Lamentation, fresco at St Clement, Ohrid, North Macedonia. Photo credit: Josephine Powell, photograph courtesy of Special Collections, Fine Arts Library, Harvard College Library 320
- 12.7 Virgin Hodegetria, bilateral icon, Byzantine and Christian Museum, Athens. Photo credit: author 321
- 12.8 Crucifixion, bilateral icon, Byzantine and Christian Museum, Athens. Photo credit: author 322
- 12.9 Nativity, fresco at Karanlık Kilise, Göreme. Photo credit: Mustafa Uysun 323
- 12.10 Crucifixion, fresco at Karanlık Kilise, Göreme. Photo credit: Mustafa Uysun 323
- 12.11 Virgin and Child with Prophets and Saints, icon, monastery of St Catherine's, Sinai. Photo credit: reproduced through the courtesy of the Michigan-Princeton-Alexandria expedition to Mt Sinai 325
- 12.12 Lamentation, fresco at Nerezi. Photo credit: Conway Library, The Courtauld Institute of Art 328
- 12.13 An eros in a tree above a putto with a lion and a musician centaur, detail of a bone casket, Musée du Louvre, Paris. Photo credit: author 329

- 12.14 Crucifixion, fresco at the hermitage of St Neophytos, Paphos, Cyprus. Photo credit: copyright Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, Image Collections and Fieldwork Archives, Washington, DC 334
- 12.15 Virgin Arakiotissa flanked by angels bearing instruments of the Passion, fresco at Lagoudera. Photo credit: copyright Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, Image Collections and Fieldwork Archives, Washington, DC 335
- 12.16 Deposition of Christ, detail of wooden relief by the Maestro di Trognano, Castello Sforzesco, Milan. Photo credit: author 337
- 12.17 Virgin Eleousa, detail of diptych attributed to Bonaventura Berlinghieri, Uffizi Gallery, Florence. Photo credit: author 338
- 12.18 Crucifixion, detail of diptych attributed to Bonaventura Berlinghieri, Uffizi Gallery, Florence. Photo credit: author 339
- 12.19 Crucifixion, panel painting, Yale University Art Gallery, New Haven. Photo credit: author 340

WALKER

- 14.1 Personification of Apolausis, fragment of a floor mosaic from a bath in Narlidja (near Antioch), Dumbarton Oaks Collection, Washington, DC. Photo credit: copyright Dumbarton Oaks, Byzantine Collection, Washington, DC 383
- 14.2 Detail of fig. 14.1. Photo credit: copyright Dumbarton Oaks, Byzantine Collection, Washington, DC 384
- 14.3 Aphrodite Anadyomene, Roman marble statue from the Baths of Trajan, Cyrene (modern-day Libya) ca 150 cm (60 in), formerly in the collection of the Museo Nazionale Romano (Terme di Diocleziano), returned to Libya in 2008. Photo credit: ARCHIVIO GBB / Alamy Stock Photo Figure 384
- 14.4 Plan of the Bath of Apolausis, Narlidja (near Antioch) based on the original excavation drawing as published in R. Stillwell and G.W Elderkin (ed.) *Antioch-on-the-Orontes, III, the Excavations, 1937–1939* (Princeton: Publications of the Committee for the Excavation of Antioch and its Vicinity, Princeton University, 1941), plan 5. Photo credit: Antioch Expedition Archives, Department of Art and Archaeology, Princeton University 386
- 14.5 Personification of Soteria, fragment of an early Byzantine marble floor mosaic from a bath in Nalidja (outside Antioch), Hatay Archaeological Museum, Antakya, Turkey. Photo credit: Arco Images GmbH / Alamy Stock Photo 387

- 14.6 Detail of fig. 14.5. Photo credit: Arco Images GmbH / Alamy Stock Photo 388
- 14.7 Personification of Apolausis, fragment of a marble floor mosaic, early Byzantine, from a bath in Agios Taxiarches (south-west of Argos, Greece). Photo credit: copyright Hellenic Ministry of Culture and Sports, Ephorate of Antiquities of Argolis, Archaeological Museum of Argos 389
- 14.8 Detail of fig. 14.7. Photo credit: copyright Hellenic Ministry of Culture and Sports, Ephorate of Antiquities of Argolis, Archaeological Museum of Argos 390
- 14.9 Personifications of Apolausis and Ploutos, fragment of a floor mosaic, early Byzantine, attributed to the eastern Mediterranean (possibly Turkey or Syria), 134.6 x 83.8 cm (53 x 33 in), Museum of Fine Arts, Boston, Gift of George D. and Margo Behrakis, acc. no. 2006.848. Photo credit: copyright 2021 Museum of Fine Arts, Boston 394
- 14.10 Personifications of Luxury and Life, fragment of a floor mosaic, early Byzantine, eastern Mediterranean, possibly Emesa (modern-day Homs, Syria), 133 x 97 cm, Royal Ontario Museum, Toronto, 967.132. Photo credit: courtesy of the Royal Ontario Museum, copyright ROM 396

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Abbreviations

AbhGött, Philol.-hist. Kl.	Akademie der Wissenschaften, Göttingen, Philologisch-historische Klasse, Abhandlungen
ACW	Ancient Christian Writers
<i>AJP</i>	<i>American Journal of Philology</i>
<i>AmHR</i>	<i>American Historical Review</i>
<i>AnBoll</i>	<i>Analecta Bollandiana</i>
<i>AnzWien</i>	<i>Anzeiger der [Österreichischen] Akademie der Wissenschaften, Wien, Philosophisch-historische Klasse</i>
AOC	Archives de l'Orient chrétien
<i>ArtB</i>	<i>Art Bulletin</i>
BBOS	Birmingham Byzantine and Ottoman Studies
BTTT	Belfast Byzantine Texts and Translations
BiblEphL	Bibliotheca Ephemerides liturgicae
<i>BICS</i>	<i>Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies</i>
<i>BMFD</i>	<i>Byzantine Monastic Foundation Documents: A Complete Translation of the Surviving Founders' 'Typika' and Testaments</i> , ed. J. Thomas and A.C. Hero, DOS, 35 (Washington, DC, 2000)
<i>BMGS</i>	<i>Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies</i>
ByzAus	Byzantina Australiensia
ByzVind	Byzantina Vindobonensia
<i>BZ</i>	<i>Byzantinische Zeitschrift</i>
CCSG	Corpus christianorum, Series graeca
CCSL	Corpus christianorum, Series latina
CFHB	Corpus fontium historiae byzantinae
<i>CJ</i>	<i>Classical Journal</i>
<i>CPG</i>	<i>Clavis patrum graecorum</i> , ed. M. Geerard, 7 vols (Turnhout, 1974–98)
<i>CQ</i>	<i>Classical Quarterly</i>
<i>CR</i>	<i>Classical Review</i>
CSCO	Corpus scriptorum christianorum orientalium
CSHB	Corpus scriptorum historiae byzantinae

CSQ	<i>Cistercian Studies Quarterly</i>
CSS	Cistercian Studies Series
CW	<i>Classical World</i>
DOBSC	Dumbarton Oaks Byzantine Symposia and Colloquia
DOML	Dumbarton Oaks Medieval Library
DOP	<i>Dumbarton Oaks Papers</i>
DOS	Dumbarton Oaks Studies
FC	Fathers of the Church
FS	<i>Frühmittelalterliche Studien</i>
GCS	Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten [drei] Jahrhunderte
GOTR	<i>Greek Orthodox Theological Review</i>
GRBS	<i>Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies</i>
HTR	<i>Harvard Theological Review</i>
HZ	<i>Historische Zeitschrift</i>
IRAİK	<i>Izvestiia Russkogo arkheologicheskogo instituta v Konstantinopole</i>
JBAA	<i>Journal of the British Archaeological Association</i>
JBL	<i>Journal of Biblical Literature</i>
JEChrSt	<i>Journal of Early Christian Studies</i>
JHS	<i>Journal of Hellenic Studies</i>
JÖB	<i>Jahrbuch der Österreichischen Byzantinistik</i>
JRS	<i>Journal of Roman Studies</i>
JTS	<i>Journal of Theological Studies</i>
KCL	Publications of the Centre for Hellenic Studies, King's College London
LChrI	<i>Lexikon der christlichen Ikonographie</i> , ed. E. Kirschbaum et al., 8 vols (Rome, 1968–76)
LCL	Loeb Classical Library
LSJ	H.G. Liddell, R. Scott, H.S. Jones et al., <i>A Greek-English Lexicon</i> (Oxford, 1968)
MAPS	Memoirs of the American Philosophical Society
NT	<i>Novum Testamentum</i>
OCA	Orientalia christiana analecta
OCT	Scriptorum classicorum bibliotheca Oxoniensis = Oxford Classical Texts
ODB	<i>The Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium</i> , ed. A. Kazhdan et al., 3 vols (New York, 1991)
OECS	Oxford Early Christian Studies
OECT	Oxford Early Christian Texts
OLP	<i>Orientalia Lovaniensia periodica</i>
PBSR	<i>Papers of the British School at Rome</i>

PG	Patrologiae cursus completus, Series graeca, ed. J.-P. Migne (Paris, 1857–66)
PL	Patrologiae cursus completus, Series latina, ed. J.-P. Migne (Paris, 1844–80)
PO	Patrologia orientalis
<i>RAC</i>	<i>Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum</i>
<i>REB</i>	<i>Revue des études byzantines</i>
<i>RSR</i>	<i>Revue des sciences religieuses</i>
SAPERE	Scripta antiquitatis posterioris ad ethicam religionemque pertinentia
SC	Sources chrétiennes
SPBS	Society for the Promotion of Byzantine Studies
STAC	Studien und Texte zu Antike und Christentum
<i>TAPA</i>	<i>Transactions [and Proceedings] of the American Philological Association</i>
<i>TDNT</i>	<i>Theological Dictionary of the New Testament</i> , ed. G. Kittel, 10 vols (1932–79), tr. G.W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids, MI, 1964–76)
<i>TDOT</i>	<i>Theological Dictionary of the Old Testament</i> , ed. G.J. Butterweck and H. Ringgren, 10 vols (1973–2016), tr. J.T. Willis et al. (Grand Rapids, MI, 1974–)
Teubner	Bibliotheca scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana
<i>TheolSt</i>	<i>Theological Studies</i>
<i>TLG</i>	<i>Thesaurus Linguae Graecae</i>
TMM	The Medieval Mediterranean
TTH	Translated Texts for Historians
TU	Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur
<i>VChr</i>	<i>Vigiliae Christianae</i>
VChrSuppl	Vigiliae Christianae, Supplements
WByzSt	Wiener byzantinische Studien
<i>YCS</i>	<i>Yale Classical Studies</i>
<i>ZbLikUmět</i>	<i>Zbornik za likovné umětnosti</i>
<i>ZPE</i>	<i>Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik</i>



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1 Introduction

Margaret Mullett

At Dumbarton Oaks in the 1940s and 1950s, Milton Anastos began work on a magnum opus which he later called *The Mind of Byzantium*.¹ His idea was to amass and evaluate the knowledge of the Byzantines, the content of Byzantine minds, the mindset of their rulers. His project was never completed, though his extraordinary library, now at Notre Dame, South Bend, Indiana, is a very good indicator of what might have been used to produce that work.² Of course if it were to be attempted nowadays it would be very different: it would not be about content, but about process: how the Byzantines perceived, felt, dreamed, imagined and remembered, and how they thought about these domains of experience. So what has changed? Why would we write such a different book? Fundamentally what has changed is the neuroscience and the cognitive theory. The processes of the brain are now more knowable thanks to the important scientific breakthroughs of the second half of the twentieth century, notably the discovery of rapid eye movement (REM) sleep in 1953, and the development of brain imaging, positron emission tomography (PET) in the 1980s and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in the 1990s, so that it is possible to see a reflection of the activity of the brain when an event in the brain is induced.³ The study

1 S. Vryonis, 'Milton V. Anastos (13 July 1909–10 April 1997)', *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, 143.3 (1999), 444–50.

2 Anastos Library: Byzantine Studies at Notre Dame Expands Research Resources//Latest News//College of Arts and Letters//University of Notre Dame, accessed 26 August 2021.

3 Previously research was dependent on patients with brain lesions, which meant that it was not led by the research question but by the available lesion. For dream and REM sleep, see J.A. Hobson, *Dreaming: An Introduction to the Science of Sleep* (Oxford, 2002), 48–79; for brain imaging, see R. Passingham, *Cognitive Neuroscience: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford, 2016), 3–9.

of emotion, sense perception,⁴ imagination,⁵ decision-making,⁶ dream⁷ and memory⁸ can all gain from these advances, and in all these areas Byzantinists have been at work for at least twenty years.

During those twenty years views of the brain have moved a long way. The early excitement at the opportunity to discover which parts of the brain were ‘lighting up’, so as to reveal for example the workings of semantic memory in the hippocampus or fear in the amygdala, has given way to a realisation that the brain is not so simple. Far from nineteenth-century phrenology with each function being allotted its special place, scientists are now reluctant to ascribe any particular part of the brain or nervous system to a particular emotion⁹ and think rather of a network of neurons extending beyond the brain. There is no longer a belief in a tripartite brain in which the ‘reptile’ part deals with survival, a limbic area deals with emotion and the prefrontal cortex deals with cognition. Old certainties are disappearing in general: previously clear distinctions between mind and brain, body and mind, between cognition and emotion and between nature and nurture have been eroded.¹⁰ Increasingly it is believed that emotions are intricately connected to cognition and distributed over mind, body and environment. Emotions are both biological and cultural phenomena.

This is both good and bad news for Byzantinists. Often science has seemed to move so quickly and scientists have been so divided that humanities scholars have been discouraged¹¹ from attempting to use it to understand the thinking of, for example, Byzantines. The delighted sighting on the anatomy table in 2009 by Jan Plamper of an amygdala, ‘the inner sanctum of fear,

4 M. O’Shea, *The Brain: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford, 2005); for an early Byzantine contribution with awareness of cognitive science, see L. James, ‘Senses and sensibility in Byzantium’, *Art History*, 27 (2004), 522–37.

5 A. Abraham (ed.), *The Cambridge Handbook of the Imagination* (Cambridge, 2020); A. Pizzone, ‘Lady Phantasia’s “epic” scrolls and fictional creativity’, *Medioevo Greco*, 14 (2014), 167–87.

6 Passingham, *Cognitive Neuroscience*, 66–81; see the Münster project directed by Professor Michael Grünbart on Byzantine decision-making, ‘Kulturen des Entscheidens’, <https://www.uni-muenster.de/SFB1150>, accessed 13 September 2021.

7 Hobson, *Dreaming*; C. Angelidi and G. Calofonos (ed.), *Dreaming in Byzantium and Beyond* (Abingdon, 2014).

8 J.K. Foster, *Memory: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford, 2009); J.P. Small, *Wax Tablets of the Mind: Cognitive Studies of Memory and Literacy in Classical Antiquity* (London, 1997), which extends into late antiquity. See B. Neil and E. Anagnostou-Laoutides (ed.) *Dreams, Memory and Imagination in Byzantium*, *ByzAus*, 24 (Leiden, 2018).

9 But see G. Colombetti, *The Feeling Body: Affective Science Meets the Enactive Mind* (Cambridge, MA, 2014), 34, on some areas of specialisation for certain emotions: amygdala for fear, disgust in basal ganglia, subcallosal cingulate for sadness; this is not exclusive specialisation.

10 A key point was A. Damasio, *Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain* (New York, 1994).

11 For reasons, see B. McConachie, *Evolution, Cognition, and Performance* (Cambridge, 2015), 3–12.

the most basal point of the most fundamental of all feelings',¹² is quickly diffused by his awareness that our two amygdalae have subsequently, after the publication of Joseph LeDoux's bestselling 'two roads to fear' theory,¹³ also been associated with visual perception, smell and the ability of jazz musicians to distinguish improvisation from scored performance.¹⁴

But now on the one hand it seems that science and humanities have moved much closer together,¹⁵ and on the other hand there are more works by Byzantinists to lead the way. It has become more attractive for the humanities to make the effort to keep up. Thomas Habinek puts it well for classicists, and it is equally true for Byzantinists:

It's not that neuroscience provides definitive answers; rather, by articulating a model of thought and action radically different from those taken for granted by most scholars, neuroscience defamiliarises the ancient material, opening up new horizons of understanding, much as comparative ethnography and critical theory have done for previous generations of classicists. Neuroscience teaches us very little about the essential nature of the human organism, except that it is constantly changing through 'inhabited interaction' with the material universe. But it gives us excellent tools for understanding the constraints upon and characteristics of such interaction. In that sense it can't help getting inside the heads of humanists, metastasizing into our disciplinary bodies.¹⁶

12 J. Plamper, *The History of Emotions: An Introduction* (Oxford, 2012), 1.

13 J.E. LeDoux, *The Emotional Brain: The Mysterious Underpinnings of Emotional Life* (New York, 1996) argues that primary fear is elicited entirely subcortically by stimuli from the sensory thalamus to the amygdala (a 'quick and dirty' route). Secondary or 'cognitive' fear occurs when the amygdala is activated via the cortex and involves deliberation. For problems with the theory, see Colombetti, *Feeling Body*, 42; she says that it is 'based on an increasingly controversial view of the brain in which emotion and cognition are neurally distinct'.

14 Plamper, *History of Emotions*, 4.

15 McConachie, *Evolution*, 7, for a broader view of the 'two cultures'. There have been possible moments of convergence in the past, for example when William Reddy launched into the history of emotions not because of error but because of opportunity, an earlier opportunity. In 2001, Reddy argued in *The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions* (Cambridge, 2001), that there had been a revolution in the study of emotion in experimental cognitive psychology and a simultaneous one in anthropology, in that psychologists no longer believed that emotions are preprogrammed responses, but instead overlearned cognitive habits; and anthropologists had retreated from an insistence on cultural construction with worldwide variation of emotions; together they undercut any western common-sense view about emotions being entirely biological and indeed feminine. There was enough consensus to formulate a theory that emotions were largely, though not entirely, learned, that there are certain basic emotions that may be recognised worldwide through facial expression, but there is huge variation locally, and, it also becomes clear, over time.

16 T. Habinek, 'Tentacular mind: stoicism, neuroscience and the configurations of physical reality', in B.M. Stafford (ed.), *A Field Guide to a New Meta-Field: Bridging the*

Different schools of emotion science are attractive to humanities in different ways, and they are often explicitly welcoming. The componential approach associated with Klaus Scherer puts appraisal in a central position, indeed multiple stages of appraisal, emphasising the cognitive with clearly thought-out processes and components. Scherer's Swiss Center for Affective Sciences¹⁷ at the University of Geneva makes a clear invitation to humanities scholars. Psychological constructionists like James A. Russell and Lisa Feldman Barrett appeal through their flexibility, their rejection of the built-in and universal and their very constructionism. And they are able to cite humanities research in support of their own.¹⁸ The enactivists appeal to the humanities through their qualitative emphasis, their rejection of the idea of basic emotions and their concern for collective emotion. Giovanna Colombetti specifically lists 'not only psychology and neuroscience but history, anthropology, ethology, sociology, computer science, political science, education, literature and philosophy ... as disciplines making up the field'.¹⁹ A promising response is collaboration, as in the AHRC-funded History of Distributed Cognition project at Edinburgh.²⁰

Keeping up remains difficult. How can we be sure we are reading the right science? And will it still be the right science next year? Clearly, we cannot be certain, but in a series of lucid and learned articles, chapters and introductions to volumes Douglas Cairns has over the past twenty-five years provided a guide for anxious humanities scholars to discoveries and disagreements in emotions studies in very widely differing disciplines. To offer only a few examples, in 2003 'Iliadic anger' declares that biology and culture are a false antithesis, eschewing the 'us and them' approach of Leonard Muellner;²¹ in 2008 'Look both ways' tackles the issue of basic emotions and universality, supporting Paul Ekman against some critics and pointing out difficulties in the approaches of Anna Wiezbicka and David Konstan;²² in 2013 'A short history of shudders' stresses the fundamental importance of physical embodiment in the concept of emotion itself and makes the case for the study

Humanities – Neuroscience Divide (Chicago, 2011), 72. D. Cairns, 'Ethics, ethology, terminology: Iliadic anger and the cross-cultural study of emotions', in S. Braund and G. Most (ed.), *Ancient Anger: Perspectives from Homer to Galen* (Cambridge, 2004), 11–49, at 11, sees it more as a responsibility 'to become familiar with current research on the nature of emotion in other disciplines'.

17 <https://www.unige.ch/cisa/center/>, where 'neuroscientists, philosophers, psychologists, computer scientists, economists, and scholars from literature, the arts, and humanities work together with the common objective of understanding emotions and their roles in cognition and behavior'.

18 L.F. Barrett, *How Emotions Are Made: The Secret Life of the Brain* (London, 2017), 51, cites Mary Beard on smiling (or not smiling) in ancient Rome.

19 Colombetti, *Feeling Body*, xiii.

20 A History of Distributed Cognition, <https://www.hdc.ed.ac.uk>, accessed 18 October 2021.

21 D. Cairns, 'Iliadic anger'.

22 D. Cairns, 'Look both ways: studying emotion in ancient Greek', *CQ*, 50.4 (2008), 43–62.

of metonymy;²³ in 2017 the introduction to *Emotions in the Classical World* explores the cognitive-evaluative approach in classics and points out that not even the concept of emotion is transcultural.²⁴ And the introduction to *Emotions through Time* addresses Rüdiger Schnell's argument in *Haben Gefühle eine Geschichte?* that the history of emotions should be abandoned because we cannot access subjective psychological experience. Cairns argues, following psychological constructionists and enactivists, that many aspects of first-person experience are intersubjectively conditioned by conceptual knowledge, language and culture and therefore accessible; emotions are not uniquely subjective private experiences.²⁵

The Response from the Humanities

Social anthropology was very early in dialogue with psychology and philosophy,²⁶ and linguistics, sociology, political science and media studies have all become involved,²⁷ another challenge for the student of emotions. But the greatest impact of emotions research is to be found in history²⁸ and classical philology,²⁹ and we asked Maria Xanthou to trace how this happened; her essay appears below.³⁰ I shall here simply point to some developments in some other disciplines. All address issues not only of personal but also of interpersonal or collective emotions,³¹ or emotions studied across brain, body and environment.³²

23 D. Cairns, 'A short history of shudders', in A. Chaniotis (ed.), *Unveiling Emotions II: Texts, Images and Material Culture* (Stuttgart, 2013), 85–107.

24 D. Cairns and D. Nelis (ed.), *Emotions in the Classical World* (Stuttgart, 2017), 7–30.

25 D. Cairns, M. Hinterberger, A. Pizzone and M. Zaccarini (ed.), *Emotions through Time: From Antiquity to Byzantium* (Tübingen, 2022).

26 For example, C.A. Lutz, *Unnatural Emotions: Everyday Sentiments on a Micronesian Atoll and their Challenge to Western Theory* (Chicago, 1988); A. Scarantino, 'The philosophy of emotions and its impact on affective science', in L.F. Barrett, M. Lewis and J.M. Haviland-Jones (ed.), *Handbook of Emotions*, 4th edn (New York, 2016), 3–48.

27 For example, S.E. Pritzker, J. Ferigsen, and J.M. Wilce (ed.), *The Routledge Handbook of Language and Emotion* (Abingdon, 2020); K.J. Lively, 'The sociology of emotion', in *Handbook of Emotions*, ed. Barrett, Lewis and Haviland-Jones, 66–81; P. Hoggett and S. Thompson (ed.), *Politics and the Emotions: The Affective Turn in Contemporary Political Studies* (New York, 2012); K. Döveling, C. von Scheve and E.A. Konijn (ed.), *The Routledge Handbook of Emotions and Mass Media* (Abingdon, 2011).

28 Note the existence of B.H. Rosenwein and R. Cristiani, *What Is the History of Emotions?, What Is History?* (Cambridge, 2018), setting the history of emotions alongside cultural history, intellectual history, urban history, global history and so on.

29 Cairns and Nelis, 'Introduction', *Emotions in the Classical World*, 7: 'a substantial and thriving sub-discipline in the fields of Classics and Ancient History'.

30 36–59.

31 C. von Scheve and S. Ismer, 'Towards a theory of collective emotion', *Emotion Review*, 5.4 (2013), 406–13; C. von Scheve and M. Salmela (ed.), *Collective Emotions: Perspectives from Psychology, Philosophy, and Sociology* (Oxford, 2014).

32 M. Anderson, D. Cairns and M. Sprevak (ed.), *Distributed Cognition in Classical Antiquity*, *The Edinburgh History of Distributed Cognition* (Edinburgh, 2019).

The study of **literature and narratology** has benefited in the past twenty years from the science of emotions. Work on story-telling has shown that it lowers stress and increases empathy.³³ The affective psychologist and novelist Keith Oatley argues that fiction is all about emotion and asks why we take pleasure even in negative emotions. He regards fiction as useful as well as enjoyable because it helps us improve our mental models of ourselves and others.³⁴ Patrick Hogan pursues the issue deeper into narratology: human beings, he says have a passion for plots. He argues that story structures are fundamentally shaped and oriented by our emotion systems and looks for cross-cultural patterns.³⁵ Other scholars look at the interconnections between the emotions of individuals, whether through empathy³⁶ or through what is commonly called Theory of Mind. Lisa Zunshine argues that we read fiction because it engages our Theory of Mind and tests this hypothesis over the works of Virginia Woolf, the unreliable, male, narrators of *Lolita* and *Clarissa* and in the detective novel.³⁷ Others, even if less explicit about empirical work on emotion, insist on the collective and bodily nature of reading practices. In the case of late medieval Europe as embodied technologies, these are running the fingers or hands across a page, gesturing with hands or eyes or bodies while reading, aloud, to an audience, weeping, fainting, kissing the face of Christ in a illumination or thrusting fingers into a representation of the side wound of Christ.³⁸ This fits well with the concerns of scholars of distributed cognition, where examples that first spring to mind are counting on the fingers, using wax tablets or a cellphone or an abacus, all examples of brain-body-world collaboration in literacy and numeracy.

33 G. Brockington, A.P.G. Moreira, M.S. Buso, S.G. da Silva, E. Altszyler, R. Fischer and J. Moll, 'Storytelling increases oxytocin and positive emotions and decreases cortisol and pain in hospitalized children', *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America*, 118.22 (2021), <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2018409118>, accessed 11 September 2021.

34 K. Oatley, *Such Stuff as Dreams: The Psychology of Fiction* (Chichester, 2011); idem, *The Passionate Muse: Exploring Emotion in Stories* (Oxford, 2012).

35 P.C. Hogan, *Affective Narratology: The Emotional Structure of Stories* (Lincoln, NE, 2011).

36 S. Keen, 'Narrative empathy', in P. Hühn (ed.), *The Living Handbook of Narratology* (revised 2013), <http://www.lhn.uni-hamburg.de/article/narrative-empathy>, accessed 9 September 2021: 'narrative empathy is the sharing of feeling and perspective-taking induced by reading, viewing, hearing, or imagining narratives of another's situation and condition'.

37 L. Zunshine, *Why We Read Fiction: Theory of Mind and the Novel* (Columbus, OH, 2006). She defines it as the ability to explain people's behaviour in terms of their thoughts, feelings, beliefs and desires, and points to A. Gopnik, 'Theory of Mind', in R.A. Wilson and F.C. Keil (ed.), *The MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences* (Cambridge, MA, 1999), 838–41.

38 M. Amsler, *Affective Literacies: Writing and Multilingualism in the Late Middle Ages, Late Medieval and Early Modern Studies*, 19 (Turnhout, 2011), 101–47.

An influential study in **archaeology** equally insists on embodied emotion, and necessarily on the collective. Oliver Harris and Tim Flohr Sørensen wrote a challenging discussion article for *Archaeological Dialogues*, responding to the issues raised by Sarah Tarlow ten years before and her call for the use of empathy.³⁹ They agree with her that emotion remains ‘stubbornly underinvestigated’ in archaeology; they urge a move away from a view of emotions as internal immaterial phenomena to an appreciation of ‘how the encounter with the material world is inherently affective’. They propose and define four key terms: emotion, affective field, attunement and atmosphere and apply them to an affective reading of Mt Pleasant, Dorset, a late Neolithic/early Bronze age site with ditches, an enormous palisade and a clearly reconstructed building history. The aim is to find a rigorous way of reconstructing collective emotion from the material record alone. The discussion that follows looks for mundane rather than ritualised emotions, dialogue with psychological anthropologists, awareness of affective regimes and pursuit of specific emotions. It is a very purist approach, necessary in preliterate societies but useful in combination with other kinds of analysis when other source-material is available. And more comparative material is available for preliterate societies, see for example the ‘general comparative approach’ which explicates Palaeolithic rock paintings with help of the art of hunter-gatherers in Australia.⁴⁰

Again in the last twenty years, there has been a great openness to cognitive science in **performance studies**. Since the millennium various studies have appeared which move performance studies to a new phase. They apply cognitive theory and neuroscience research, largely with an enactivist approach,⁴¹ to the discipline of acting for the theatre,⁴² Shakespearian theatre and poetry,⁴³ somatic identity of actors and audience,⁴⁴ spectatorship,⁴⁵

39 S. Tarlow, ‘Emotion in archaeology’, *Current Anthropology*, 41.5 (2000), 713–46; and see her *Bereavement and Commemoration: An Archaeology of Mortality* (Oxford, 1999); O.J.T. Harris and T.F. Sørensen, ‘Rethinking emotion and material culture’, *Archaeological Dialogues*, 17.2 (2010), 145–63.

40 M.A. Abramiuk, *The Foundations of Cognitive Archaeology* (Cambridge, MA, 2012), 37–43, 112–21. Note that while he considers memory, learning, reasoning and perception there is no reference to emotion.

41 Colombetti, *Feeling Body*, traces enactivism back to F.J. Varela, E. Thompson and E. Roach, *The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience* (Cambridge, MA, 2016), and nods to them in her title; for a statement of principles see McConachie, *Evolution, Cognition, and Performance*, 21–26.

42 R. Blair, *The Actor, Image and Action: Acting and Cognitive Neuroscience* (London, 2007).

43 E.B. Tribble, *Cognition in the Globe: Attention and Memory in Shakespeare’s Theatre* (New York, 2011).

44 N. Rokotnitz, *Trusting Performance: A Cognitive Approach to Embodiment in Drama* (New York, 2011).

45 B. McConachie, *Engaging Audiences: A Cognitive Approach to Spectating in the Theatre* (New York, 2008).

actor training⁴⁶ and a cognitive ecology of the theatre.⁴⁷ More recently Bruce McConachie has published a wide-ranging enactivist study of the bio-cultural basis of performance, beginning with play, then ritual and then focusing on the significant role of affects and emotions in shaping the constraints and satisfactions of all performances.⁴⁸ He prefers enactivism to Theory of Mind,⁴⁹ in that there are many shared cognitive and affective processes which make bridging discrete minds unnecessary. He looks at the role of mirror neurons and sensorimotor coupling in the process of entrainment and the creation of empathy. He shows that not only are performance studies good for learning,⁵⁰ but they can also have an ethical dimension.⁵¹ In 2018 Peter Meineck published a startlingly original study of Athenian theatre based on distributed cognition and embodied emotions.⁵² He analyses the elements of the theatrical experience: theatrical setting and sky-space releasing dopamine, the ability of a mask to project emotions, the part played by kinaesthetic empathy and sensory mirroring in dance and gesture, the capability of music to affect emotions and mood and finally the effect of somatic sensory language and metre. Together, he argues, these features through dissociation, cognitive absorption, enhanced decision-making and empathy created the theatrical experience of fifth-century BCE Athenians. This work promises much beyond its present confines.

Byzantinists and Emotion

As Byzantinists, like classicists and archaeologists and unlike psychologists and social anthropologists, we cannot spend months listening and talking to our subjects or issue them with questionnaires or put them through a brain scanner. We can only deal with text,⁵³ images, objects, structures and landscape, and there are methodological issues with everything we find in our sources. Texts offer us both examples of emotions in the text, and cases of emotions elicited in the reader. Emotions in the texts may be emotives,

46 J. Lutterbie, *Towards a General Theory of Acting: Cognitive Science and Performance* (New York, 2011); N. Shaughnessy (ed.), *Affective Performance and Cognitive Science: Body, Brain and Being* (London, 2013).

47 E.B. Tribble and J. Sutton, 'Cognitive ecology as a framework for Shakespearean studies', *Shakespeare Studies*, 39 (2011), 94–103.

48 McConachie, *Evolution, Cognition, and Performance*.

49 On the grounds that it separates the two minds to be bridged.

50 M. Gazzaniga, *Learning, Arts and the Brain: The Dana Consortium Report on Arts and Cognition* (New York, 2008).

51 P. Kitcher, *The Ethical Project* (Cambridge, MA, 2011).

52 P. Meineck, *Theatrocracy: Greek Drama, Cognition, and the Imperative for Theatre* (Abingdon, 2018).

53 Anna Wierzbicka would say, and does very eloquently in *Emotions across Languages and Cultures* (Cambridge, 1999), 24–31, that we cannot discuss emotions without words, and that only by studying words can we go beyond words. Where she is less convincing is with her natural semantic metalanguage, a kind of script system for cross-cultural emotions.

emotion terms in narrative, emotional episodes in narrative, or emotionology; each brings its own opportunities and challenges. Emotives, so designated by William Reddy on the basis of J.L. Austin's performatives in speech-act theory,⁵⁴ express the emotion directly: 'I hate you', *'pheu'*, *'oimoi'*. It is up to us to determine whether they change the emotional temperature of the text or whether they are genre markers (for example 'I am about to launch into a lament'). Emotion terms in narratives lend themselves to philological analysis and to the study of metaphors and metonymy popularised by George Lakoff and Zoltán Kövecses, and honed in classics by Douglas Cairns.⁵⁵ Emotional episodes, in which we now realise predictive processing plays an important part,⁵⁶ can sometimes be tracked in a text. And this is where scripts come in, the opportunity to distinguish between apparent homonyms in a given language or equivalents in two. Robert Kaster adopted Silvan Tomkins's script theory⁵⁷ and married it to philological precision: instead of translating *phthonos* as jealousy we can spell it out: 'I am distressed because my friend got the job and I didn't'. Also in the text is emotionology (what texts say about what communities thought about emotions and their norms).⁵⁸ In Byzantium these are (1) philosophical and theological, originating in Plato and Aristotle and expressed in treatises, sermons by church Fathers and certain kinds of florilegia;⁵⁹ (2) ascetic as developed by Evagrius of Pontos and adopted by Cassian and Gregory the Great, ending in the concept of cardinal virtues and vices;⁶⁰ (3) rhetorical theory starting with Aristotle, finding practical application for rhetors in Menander and penetrating Byzantine schoolrooms through Hermogenes and Aphthonios

54 Reddy, *Navigation of Feeling*; J.L. Austin, *How to Do Things with Words: The William James Lectures at Harvard University in 1955* (Oxford, 1962).

55 G. Lakoff and M. Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By* (Chicago, 1980); Z. Kövecses, *Metaphor and Emotion: Language, Culture and Body in Human Feeling*, Studies in Emotion and Social Interaction (Cambridge, 2010); D. Cairns, 'Mind, body and metaphor in ancient Greek concepts of emotion', *L'Atelier du Centre de recherches historiques: revue électronique du CRH*, 16 (2016), <https://doi.org/10.4000/acrh.7416>, accessed 12 September 2021.

56 Episodes comprise antecedent conditions, psychological feelings and physiological responses, attempts to regulate the emotion, verbal expressions and physical actions and eventually resolution; alternatively encounter, appraisal, action, bodily activation, expression.

57 R.A. Kaster, *Emotion, Restraint and Community in Ancient Rome*, Classical Culture and Society (Oxford, 2005). Silvan Tomkins first presented his script theory to the XIVth International Congress of Psychology in Montreal in 1954; see V. Demos (ed.), *Exploring Affect: The Selected Writings of Silvan S. Tomkins* (Cambridge, 1995). See also Hinterberger, below, 62–67.

58 For the concept, see P.H. Stearns and C.Z. Stearns, 'Introducing the history of emotion', *Psychohistory Review*, 18 (1990), 263–91; and Xanthou, below, 38–40.

59 See D. Konstan, *The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks: Studies in Aristotle and Classical Literature* (Toronto, 2006); Hinterberger, below, 67–69.

60 See below Young, 231–6 and Crislip, 244–61.

and Byzantine scholia and commentaries⁶¹ and (4) medical theory, from Hippokrates to Galen and including some of Nemesios of Emesa, which sometimes deals with emotions as well as the longer-term phenomena like core affect and mood which fit more closely the theory of the humours.⁶² Where we can find this emotionology it can help in interpreting emotives, emotional episodes and emotional terminology in our texts.

But not every emotion in a text comes with a label, or in an image with a caption or is instantly readable in a landscape with inscriptions. Learning to detect emotion in mimesis or diegesis saves us from missing significance in narrative but opens us to the same kind of criticism that Tarlow's championing of empathy met from archaeologists before the refinements of Harris and Sørensen: we cannot trust our own reactions to text or image to assume the characters in the narrative are experiencing an emotion. We should however be able to read some emotions on faces if Ekman and his school are correct about universal emotions⁶³ – but what if an artist or patron chose not to represent an emotion even if the story calls for it?

But as well as emotion in the source we also need to consider emotion elicited in the reader or viewer. Much of Aristotle's discussion in the *Poetics* and much of modern criticism of Aristotle on emotion is about the reception, not the representation of emotion.⁶⁴ It is a major area of regulation of emotion: how a text or image can control its reception. And because an image or a text does not depict or describe emotion does not mean that it is not intended to elicit emotion. A classic case is the emotionless figures in the *Menologion* of Basil II: is *apatheia* expected from viewer as well as martyrs or is the viewer expected to contribute the emotion?⁶⁵

61 See, e.g., S. Braund and C. Gill (ed.), *The Passions in Roman Thought and Literature* (Cambridge, 1997); A. Pizzone, 'Emotions and λόγος ἐνδιόητος: πάθη in John Sikeliotēs' commentary on Hermogenes' *On Types of Style*', in *Emotions Through Time*, ed. Cairns et al., 141–56; and Frank, below, 113–20.

62 V. Nutton, *Ancient Medicine*, 2nd edn (Abingdon, 2013); P. van der Eijk, *Medicine and Philosophy in Classical Antiquity: Doctors and Philosophers on Nature, Soul, Health and Disease* (Cambridge, 2010); and see Walker, below, 78–81.

63 For P. Ekman's theory of basic cross-cultural emotions based on studies of facial expressions in humans, see 'Universals and cultural differences in facial expressions of emotion', in J. Cole (ed.) *Nebraska Symposium on Motivation 1971* (Lincoln, NE, 1972), 2007–283; for critique, see R. Adolphs and D.J. Anderson, *The Neuroscience of Emotion: A New Synthesis* (Princeton, 2018), 6–8; Barrett, *How Emotions Are Made*, 1–24. Colombetti, *Feeling Body*, 26–40, rejects some of these criticisms, yet, p. 40, rejects the idea of basic emotions as 'redundant and misleading, and affective scientists would be better off if they dropped it'. It is possible that narrower claims about the cross-cultural recognition of a limited number of emotions, if ethnocentrism can be avoided, may still hold.

64 S. Halliwell, *The Aesthetics of Mimesis: Ancient Texts and Modern Problems* (Princeton, 2002); D.L. Munteanu, *Tragic Pathos: Pity and Fear in Greek Philosophy and Tragedy* (Cambridge, 2011).

65 L. Brubaker, 'Originality in Byzantine manuscript illumination', in A.R. Littlewood (ed.), *Originality in Byzantine Literature, Art and Music*, Oxbow Monographs in Archaeology,

So methodology is as important as theory and the lessons of other disciplines: to understand display, to listen for the silences, to read the metaphors, to weigh words and phrases, to make use where possible of emic theory. And that work is already under way.

Work So Far

When this project began, around 2010, this section would have been very short. Yet we should acknowledge that Byzantinists were for once ahead of the game. Henry Maguire's work on sorrow in 1977 was a very advanced piece in the field, predating the work of Peter and Carol Stearns for example.⁶⁶ It connected with Margaret Alexiou's literary work on the ritual lament and built on the observations of David Winfield in 1968 on the representation of emotion in wall painting technique, that 'it is the figure's posture and the context in which he is placed in a Byzantine painting that suggest or symbolize his emotions'.⁶⁷ As well as setting gestures and expressions of sorrow in the wider context of Greek mourning, Maguire was also able to track the visibility of emotion over time, pointing to developments in the twelfth century which extended the cycle of passion events to include Deposition, Threnos and Entombment⁶⁸ and with them more demonstratively emotional actors: the Threnos at the church of Nerezi is an obvious case (fig. 12.12). He also saw another turning point in the early thirteenth century when scenes like the Koimesis, already emotional at Asinou,⁶⁹

50 (Oxford, 1995), 147–65; V. Cantone, 'Emotions on stage: the manly woman martyr in the *Menologion* of Basil II', in S. Constantinou and M. Meyer (ed.), *Emotions and Gender in Byzantine Culture*, New Approaches to Byzantine History and Culture (Cham, 2019), 141–55.

66 H. Maguire, 'The depiction of sorrow in Middle Byzantine art', *DOP*, 31 (1977), 123–74. Classicists would point out that W.W. Fortenbaugh, already aware of the cognitive evaluative approach, published *Aristotle on Emotion* in 1975; see Cairns and Nelis, 'Introduction', *Emotions in the Classical World*, 8, contrasting it with the work of W.B. Stanford eight years later.

67 M. Alexiou, *The Ritual Lament in Greek Tradition* (Cambridge, 1974); D.C. Winfield, 'Middle and later Byzantine wall painting methods: a comparative study', *DOP*, 22 (1968), 61–139, at 129–30.

68 For the Deposition at Nerezi see E. Dimitrova, *The Church of St Panteleimon at Nerezi* (Skopje, 2015), 24 and cover image; for the *Threnos* fig. 12.12 below; for the Entombment at Agioi Anargyroi, Kastoria see S. Pelekanides, *Καστοριά, 1, Τοιχογραφία, Πινάκες* (Thessalonike, 1953), pl. 17b. On the twelfth-century development see now N. Ševčenko, 'The service of the Virgin's Lament revisited', in L. Brubaker and M.B. Cunningham (ed.), *The Cult of the Mother of God in Byzantium: Texts and Images*, BBOS, 11 (Farnham, Surrey, 2011), 247–62.

69 See A. Weyl Carr and A. Nicolaïdēs (ed.), *Asinou across Time: Studies in the Architecture and Murals of the Panagia Phorbiotissa, Cyprus*, DOS, 43 (Washington, DC, 2012), 81, fig. 3.9.

gained participants and extravagant gestures of mourning, as at St Clement Ochrid.⁷⁰ Art historians remained in the van of this kind of work, refining and developing it in terms of a renewed emotional sensibility in the twelfth century⁷¹ and – from very different points of view – theatricality⁷² so that it is now a little-questioned feature of the cultural history of the twelfth century.⁷³ For example, art historians who demonstrate the increasing interest in the double-sided Kastoria icon seldom fail to note the anguished expression on the Theotokos's face, whether interpreted as fear, apprehension or proleptic grief.⁷⁴ Maguire's treatment made it possible also for other art historians to look at other emotions like *phobos* (fear) and its close analogue, awe.⁷⁵ Alexander Kazhdan had already in the *Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium* focused attention on fear,⁷⁶ and Maria Vassilaki contributed a short piece to a conference on fear in which she analysed both fear as represented in images (Transfiguration, St George killing the Dragon) and as elicited by images (the Last Judgement); she too believes that fear is represented in facial expression as well as gesture and body posture.⁷⁷ Two important recent essays consider awe/fear in the context of church architecture: Sharon Gerstel uses inscriptions on wall paintings in late Byzantine churches, often close to the sanctuary, to show how painting together with corporate prayer could forge

70 Maguire, 'Depiction of sorrow'; see already T. Velmans, 'Les valeurs affectives dans la peinture murale du XIII^e siècle', in V.J. Djurić (ed.), *L'art byzantine di XIII^e siècle, Symposium de Sopoćani* (Belgrade, 1967), 45–57.

71 A.P. Kazhdan and A. Wharton Epstein, *Change in Byzantine Culture in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries, The Transformation of the Classical Heritage*, 12 (Berkeley, 1985), 220–30, emphasising the 'empathy' of, e.g., Mesarites and at Kurbinovo.

72 R. Ousterhout, 'Women at tombs: narrative, theatricality, and the contemplative mode', in A. Eastmond and E. James (ed.), *Wonderful Things: Byzantium through its Art*, SPBS, 16 (Farnham, 2013), 229–46; A. Vasilerakis, 'Theatricality of Byzantine images: some preliminary thoughts', in A. Öztürkmen and E.B. Vitz (ed.), *Medieval and Early Modern Performance in the Eastern Mediterranean*, Late Medieval and Early Modern Studies, 20 (Turnhout, 2014), 385–98.

73 A.P. Kazhdan and A. Cutler, 'Emotions', *ODB*, 1 (1991), 691–92.

74 On the icon (but particularly the other side), see H. Belting, 'An image and its function in the liturgy: the Man of Sorrows in Byzantium', *DOP*, 34 (1980–81), 1–16; see the images and catalogue entries by Annemarie Weyl Carr on no. 72, in H.C. Evans and W.D. Wixom (ed.), *Glory of Byzantium: Art and Culture of the Middle Byzantine Era, AD 843–1261* (New York, 1997), 125–26; by E. Tsigaradas on no. 83, in M. Vassilaki (ed.), *Mother of God: Representations of the Virgin in Byzantine Art* (Milan, 2000), 484–85; by A. Strati on no. 246, in R. Cormack and M. Vassilaki (ed.), *Byzantium 330–1453* (London, 2008), 442; again by A. Strati on no. 52, in A. Drandaki, D. Papanikola-Bakirtzi and A. Tourta (ed.), *Heaven and Earth: Art of Byzantium from Greek Collections* (Athens, 2013), 131–32 and <https://www.nga.gov/features/byzantine/virginmanofsorrows.html>, accessed 14 September 2021; all comment on liturgy, performance and emotion.

75 On fear and awe see below, Ivanov, 430–34.

76 *ODB*, 2, 780–81.

77 M. Vassilaki, 'Απεικονίσεις του φόβου στη βυζαντινή τέχνη', in *Ο φόβος στην τέχνη και στη ζωή. Πρακτικά του ομόνυμου συνεδρίου που οργανώθηκε από την Πινακοθήκη Ε. Αβέρωφ και πραγματοποιήθηκε στο Μέτσοβο στις 30 Ιουνίου, 1 & 2 Ιουλίου 2006* (Athens, 2007), 76–85.

emotional communities, and Ravinder Binning on the Pantokrator brings together the dome inscription at Trikomo with a tale in Paul of Monemvasia about the Pantokrator in the dome of the Holy Apostles and the Canon *On the Second Coming*.⁷⁸ Ivan Drpić in his study of inscriptions on enkolpia and reliquaries focuses on the role of *pothos* (yearning, desire) in the relationship of patron with object and the holy person represented.⁷⁹

If art historians were happy to follow the lead of Henry Maguire, it took a little longer for textual scholars to face up to the challenges of emotions in our texts. The second major influential figure in our field is Martin Hinterberger, who after completing his work on autobiography in 1999 turned to a study of *phthonos* (begrudging envy) in Byzantine literature through a combination of philological rigour and methodological openness.⁸⁰ This happened just as Niki Tsironis completed a PhD on the Lament of the Virgin and began to pursue emotion in Byzantium through Orthodox theology, orality and cognitive theory.⁸¹ Hinterberger brought together a *table ronde* at the London Congress in 2006,⁸² which revealed the potential of emotions research in that it combined papers on the function of emotions, genre, approach, plus a single emotion (shamelessness) and a physical manifestation of emotion (laughter). He also wrote an overview in 2010⁸³ which has been a starting point for many.

But it is interesting that the early work of Winfield and Maguire is only picked up in literature by Hinterberger and Tsironis at the beginning of the millennium. Why this gap, when the Stearnses, Reddy and Rosenwein were forging the subdiscipline of the history of emotions, and work in classics was well under way? Is it because it appeared insufficiently rigorous, even

78 S.E.J. Gerstel, 'Images in churches in late Byzantium: reflections and directions', in S. Brodbeck and A.O. Poilpré with M. Stavrou (ed.), *Visibilité et présence de l'image dans l'espace ecclésial: Byzance et moyen âge occidental* (Paris, 2019), 93–120; R.S. Binning, 'Christ's all-seeing eye in the dome', in B.V. Pentcheva (ed.), *Aural Architecture in Byzantium: Music, Acoustics and Ritual* (Abingdon, 2018), 101–26.

79 I. Drpić, *Epigram, Art and Devotion in Later Byzantium* (Cambridge, 2016), 296–331.

80 M. Hinterberger, 'Tränen in der byzantinischen Literatur. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Emotionen', *JÖB*, 56 (2006), 27–51. See also idem, 'Φόβος κατασεισθείς: Τα πάθη του ανθρώπου και της αυτοκρατορίας στο Μιχαήλ Αταλειάτη. Το αιτιολογικό σύστημα ενός ιστοριογράφου του 11ου αιώνα', in V.N. Vlysidou (ed.), *Η αυτοκρατορία σε κρίση (:). Το Βυζάντιο τον 11ο αιώνα (1025–1081)* (Athens, 2003), 155–67.

81 N. Tsironis, 'Historicity and poetry in ninth-century homiletics: the homilies of Patriarch Photios and George of Nicomedia', in M.B. Cunningham and P. Allen (ed.), *Preacher and Audience: Studies in Early Christian and Byzantine Homiletics*, A New History of the Sermon, 1 (Leiden, 1998), 295–316; N. Tsironis, 'Emotion and the senses in Marian homilies of the middle Byzantine period', in L. Brubaker and M.B. Cunningham (ed.), *The Cult of the Mother of God in Byzantium: Texts and Images*, BBOS, 11 (Farnham, 2011), 179–96.

82 M. Hinterberger, 'Panel V.3: Emotions', in E. Jeffreys (ed.), *Proceedings of the 21st International Congress of Byzantine Studies, London 21–26 August 2006* (Aldershot, 2006), II, 165–69.

83 M. Hinterberger, 'Emotions in Byzantium', in L. James (ed.), *A Companion to Byzantium*, Blackwell Companions to the Ancient World (Chichester, 2010), 123–34.

subjective? Bedell Stanford in 1983 suggested that it was ‘perhaps because emotions are so subjective and so hard to define or perhaps because scholars prefer to discuss what goes on in the mind rather than what involves the heart’.⁸⁴ One might imagine that Febvre’s call in 1941, and the popularity of the *Annales* school’s study of *mentalité* in medieval studies in the 1970s and 80s might have made it more possible.⁸⁵ I can see the points where in my own work I might have stepped into the history of emotions: the identification of emotions as vital to letters in 1981; the development of one such emotion, *pothos*, in 1998; the assertion of the importance of emotions to networks and to friendship (a concept which brought David Konstan to emotions in classics); many hours in the Evergetis project discussing *logismoi*; work on body language and on men, women and eunuchs; work on lament and *consolatio*: any of these might have brought me sooner to emotions. It was teaching emotions as part of a gender course in Vienna in 2007 that made me see the centrality of emotions to everything human and their fascinating, yet elusive, nature. Meanwhile, what were we thinking about instead? The themes of international congresses and topics of national symposia in the period might suggest that gender and identity were much to the fore, but they pushed few of us in the direction of emotion. Yet the work of scholars like Panagiotis Agapitos, Christine Angelidi, Ingela Nilsson, Stratis Papaioannou, Titos Papamastorakis and Ruth Webb created a context in which emotion study might flourish.

However, the new millennium brought increased activity, much from early Christian and late antique studies, especially in the United States. Columba Stewart asked pertinent questions of Cassian and Evagrius and became involved in Sarah Coakley’s colloquium on ‘Emotions and Theology’;⁸⁶ a session on garbage at the 2008 meeting of the Society for Biblical Literature led scholars to the study of disgust;⁸⁷ hymnography brought Derek Krueger and Georgia Frank to joy and many other emotions.⁸⁸ Yannis Papadogiannakis has brought clarity and thoughtfulness to individual emotions (hope, shame, anger, fear), to patristic genres (lament, theological treatise,

84 W.B. Stanford, *Greek Tragedy and the Emotions* (London, 1983), 1.

85 L. Febvre, ‘La sensibilité et l’histoire: comment reconstituer la vie affective d’autrefois?’, *Annales d’histoire sociale*, 3 (1941), 5–20; and see Xanthou, below, 36–37.

86 C. Stewart, ‘Evagrius Ponticus and the “eight generic *logismoi*”’, in R. Newhauser (ed.), *In the Garden of Evil: The Vices and Culture in the Middle Ages* (Toronto, 2005), 4–34; idem, ‘Evagrius Ponticus and the eastern monastic tradition on the intellect and the passions’, *Modern Theology*, 27.2 (2011), 263–75.

87 B. Leyerle, *The Narrative Shape of Emotion in the Preaching of John Chrysostom*, Christianity in Late Antiquity, 10 (Oakland, CA, 2020), ix.

88 D. Krueger, *Liturgical Subjects: Christian Ritual, Biblical Narrative and the Formation of Self in Byzantium* (Philadelphia, 2014); G. Frank, ‘Singing Mary: the Annunciation and Nativity in Romanos the Melodist’, in T. Arentzen and M.B. Cunningham (ed.), *The Reception of the Mother of God in Byzantium: Marian Narratives in Texts and Images* (Cambridge, 2019), 170–79.

disputation) and to urban settings of personal and collective emotions.⁸⁹ The complexities of *penthos* led to revisions of Irénée Hausherr's classic study, with consideration of the relationship of *penthos* (grief, mourning) to *katanyxis* (compunction) to *charmolupe* (joyful grief) and *metanoia* (repentance).⁹⁰ And Martin Hinterberger continued to work on *phthonos* and other Byzantine emotions, culminating in the monograph of 2013.⁹¹

Collected volumes began to appear in which emotions might find a place, notably *Byzantium Matures: Choices, Sensitivities, and Modes of Expression Eleventh to Fifteenth Centuries*⁹² which had a remarkably wide brief in which affectivity was certainly one strand. Another such volume was *Experiencing Byzantium*, a symposium and volume organized by two young Newcastle archaeologists, which allowed treatment of space, senses and three trail-blazing pieces on emotions, two influenced by Harris and Sørensen.⁹³ Sophie V. Moore applied the theory to shrouding of the body and Vicky Manolopoulou to Byzantine *litai*, processions of the patriarchate in Constantinople. Both could benefit from collaboration with textual and art historical emotions scholars; both have much to teach them.⁹⁴ Georgia Frank's

89 E.g., 'Η ελπίδα ως συνσαίθημα στην πατερική σκέψη', in S. Zoumboulakis (ed.), *Για την ελπίδα* (Athens, 2020), 255–74; 'Dialogical pedagogy and the structuring of emotions in Maximus Confessor's *Liber Asceticus*', in A. Cameron and N. Gaul (ed.), *Dialogues and Debates from Late Antiquity to Late Byzantium* (London, 2017), 94–104; 'Prescribing emotions and constructing emotional community in John Chrysostom's Antioch', in S.-P. Bergjan and S. Elm (ed.), *Antioch: The Many Faces of Antioch; Intellectual Exchange and Religious Diversity (CE 350–450)*, Civitatum Orbis Mediterranei Studia (Tübingen, 2018), 339–60; 'Homiletics and the study of emotions: the case of John Chrysostom', in W. Mayer and C. de Wet (ed.), *Revisoning Chrysostom: New Perspectives, Theories and Approaches* (Leiden, 2019), 300–33.

90 I. Hausherr, *Penthos: The Doctrine of Compunction in the Christian East* (Kalamazoo, MI, 1982); H. Hunt, *Joy-Bearing Grief: Tears of Contrition in the Writings of the Early Syrian and Byzantine Fathers*, TMM, 57 (Leiden, 2004). On purely philological and literary aspects of katanyktic hymns and poetry, see A. Giannouli, 'Catanyctic religious poetry: a survey', in A. Rigo, P. Ermilov and M. Trizio (ed.), *Theologica Minora: The Minor Genres of Byzantine Theological Literature* (Turnhout, 2013), 86–109; eadem, 'Die Tränen der Zerknirschung. Zur katanyktischen Kirchendichtung als Heilmittel', in P. Odorico, P.A. Agapitos and M. Hinterberger (ed.), '*Doux remède...: Poésie et poétique à Byzance; Actes du quatrième colloque international philologique 'EPMHNEIA' Paris, 23–24–25 février 2006* (Paris, 2009), 141–55.

91 M. Hinterberger, *Phthonos: Mißgunst, Neid und Eifersucht in der byzantinischen Literatur*, Serta Graeca 29 (Wiesbaden 2013). As a monograph on a Byzantine emotion, though, it was beaten to publication by V. Burrus, *Saving Shame: Martyrs, Saints and Other Abject Subjects* (Philadelphia 2007).

92 E.g., M. Hinterberger, 'Ο φόβος, ανθρώπινη αδυναμία και κινητήρια δύναμη', in C.G. Angelidi (ed.), *Το Βυζάντιο ώριμο για αλλαγές. Επιλογές, ευαισθησίες και τρόποι έκφρασης από τον ενδέκατο στον δέκατο αιώνα* (Athens, 2004), 299–312.

93 C. Nesbitt and M. Jackson (ed.), *Experiencing Byzantium: Papers from the 44th Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies*, SPBS, 18 (Farnham, 2013).

94 S.V. Moore, 'Experiencing mid-Byzantine mortuary practice: shrouding the dead', in *Experiencing Byzantium*, ed. Nesbitt and Jackson, 195–210; V. Manolopoulou,

paper, 'Sensing Ascension in Early Byzantium',⁹⁵ showed how singing mixed emotions allowed congregations to more fully experience the drama of the Ascension. Another conference and volume which advanced the cause of Byzantine emotions was the Leventis colloquium on Greek laughter and tears, which combined the interests of Meg Alexiou and Douglas Cairns with a group of Hellenists that had a very unusual bias towards Byzantium: fifteen papers as against four ancient and three modern Greek papers. Nine were on laughter, seven on tears and six on both. More tears than laughter papers discussed emotions; many remained on a purely textual level.⁹⁶ It was clear that something systematic needed to be done about the study of emotion in Byzantium: brilliant individual pieces and eclectic volumes did not add up to recognition either in the classical emotions or history of emotion communities, still less to offers of collaboration from cognitive scientists. And without collaboration, it would be difficult for Byzantine emotion studies to mature.

Four projects attempted to make a statement and provide an opportunity for collaboration and visibility: as well as this present volume, three others were conceived of and published during very much the same period. At the 2015 Patristics Congress in Oxford, Yannis Papadogiannakis curated a panel on emotion which was enhanced by a seminar Blake Leyerle had held at Notre Dame on Chrysostom and emotion. There are papers (five) on Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nazianzos, Gregory of Nyssa, Evagrius, Cassian and the Shepherd of Hermas; there are thirteen on John Chrysostom, on awe, fear and love, laughter, consolation, *katanyxis*, friendship, gratitude, anger, grief, mourning and consolation. Few show overt awareness of the history of emotions, fewer of emotion science, but it is a useful and coherent collection.⁹⁷

Second, Stavroula Constantinou and Mati Meyer used panels at the Leeds International Medieval Congress in 2015 to look at the interplay of gender and emotion over the long span of Byzantium. They insisted on gender theory as well as emotions theory, and the result is a focused volume in which all contributors are on message; it of course gives most space to emotions considered gendered, so grief, courage and eros take pride of place. Art history is well represented. Both editors offer thoughtful essays at beginning and end, respectively.⁹⁸

'Processing emotion: litanies in Byzantine Constantinople', in *Experiencing Byzantium*, ed. Nesbitt and Jackson, 153–71.

95 G. Frank, 'Sensing Ascension in Early Byzantium', in *Experiencing Byzantium*, ed. Nesbitt and Jackson, 293–309.

96 M. Alexiou and D. Cairns (ed.), *Greek Laughter and Tears: Antiquity and After*, Edinburgh Leventis Studies, 8 (2017).

97 Y. Papadogiannakis (ed.), *Studia Patristica*, 83 ('Emotions') (2017).

98 S. Constantinou and M. Meyer, *Emotions and Gender in Byzantine Culture*, New Approaches to Byzantine History and Culture (Cham, 2019).

The third project is Emotions through Time, a Leverhulme network which ran from 2016 to 2017, an ambitious attempt conceived by Douglas Cairns and Aglae Pizzone to allow Byzantinists to profit from the achievements of classics in evolving methodologies for the study of emotions.⁹⁹ It comprised three workshops, a dissemination conference and a database of texts and images which will form the basis of a source-book on Byzantine emotion, provided by the members and invited speakers at the workshops. The volume brings together papers from all the workshops and the conference. A great strength is the focus on Byzantine theory of emotions; it includes art history papers and one on procession; it also extends the range of emotions (*oxycholia*, *ekplexis*, *thauma*) and the authors considered in detail.¹⁰⁰ It is published by Mohr Siebeck and races this volume to the finishing line. As we edit, a new flurry of emotions monographs has arrived on our desks: Andrew Mellas on *katanyxis* in the liturgy is an enactivist reading of Romanos, Andrew of Crete and Kassia. Maria Doerfler's masterly study of Old Testament narrative and late antique emotion elaborates on her paper below and also on the complex pedagogy of affect in an emotional community; and Blake Leyerle's synthesis on anger, grief, fear and zeal (plus awe, shame and disgust) in Chrysostom's sermons reveals the depth of his engagement with emotions and his skill in manipulating them in his flock.¹⁰¹

This Volume

This volume began life as one of three meetings planned by the editors while Director of Byzantine Studies and Senior Fellow at Dumbarton Oaks, respectively.¹⁰² My original interest, roused by teaching in Vienna, was a very simple one, to arrive at some sense of the constellation of Byzantine emotions. Susan Harvey's interest, informed by her work on the senses, particularly olfaction, and her work on lament, was compelled by the paradox of religious traditions that claimed to restrain emotions while at the same time ritually and rhetorically intensifying them. We took advice and started to put together a bibliography of works that had helped us. We invited four

99 Emotions through Time, <https://emotions.shca.ed.ac.uk/>, accessed 5 September 2021.

100 *Emotions through Time*, ed. Cairns et al.

101 A. Mellas, *Liturgy and the Emotions in Byzantium: Compunction and Hymnody* (Cambridge, 2020); M.E. Doerfler, *Jephthah's Daughter, Sarah's Son: The Death of Children in Late Antiquity*, *Christianity in Late Antiquity*, 8 (Oakland, CA, 2020); Leyerle, *Narrative Shape of Emotion*.

102 Colloquium, 12–13 December 2014, <https://www.doaks.org/research/byzantine/scholarly-activities/managing-emotion-passion-emotions-affects-and-imaginings-in-byzantium>, accessed 11 September 2021. The other events were a clinic on 'The (Mis)interpretation of Byzantine Dream Narratives', <https://www.doaks.org/research/byzantine/scholarly-activities/byzantine-studies-fall-workshop/byzantine-studies-fall-workshop>; and a symposium on the senses, published as S.A. Harvey and M. Mullett (ed.), *Knowing Bodies, Passionate Souls: Sense Perceptions in Byzantium*, DOBSC (Washington, DC, 2017).

speakers from Europe and four from the United States in accordance with the Dumbarton Oaks colloquium format and were able to add Henry Maguire's lecture, responses to each paper,¹⁰³ and reports by Aglae Pizzone and Elizabeth Potter, affiliated with two then current projects, Geneva's 'Language and Culture: Words and Languages'¹⁰⁴ and Oxford's 'The Social and Cultural Construction of Emotions: the Greek Paradigm',¹⁰⁵ respectively.

We asked two questions in particular: what are emotions? And why should we want to study emotion? The answer to the first was fairly brief if unsatisfactory. In fact, no one knows the answer to that question: 'everyone knows what emotion is until asked to give a definition. Then, it seems, no one knows'.¹⁰⁶ Cairns puts it well: 'Emotion is a contested term with no agreed definition and a particular history of its own'.¹⁰⁷

Why we should study emotions had many answers: because emotions are central to human activity,¹⁰⁸ because we are already doing it,¹⁰⁹ to correct error,¹¹⁰ to seize an opportunity¹¹¹ or to solve a problem.¹¹²

When we put the papers together we hoped to create a grid with as wide a span as possible. And we wanted to look at emotions in the context of Byzantine society, so each author had two tasks: to look at wider associations of emotions with one of the following themes: rhetoric, art, asceticism, liturgy, community, gender, poetry, power, philosophy; but also to undertake a case study of a single emotion. We have not achieved completeness or yet a convincing map of Byzantine emotion: we are lacking specific studies even

103 Almost all have found their way into the volume. Exceptions are Joel Kalvesmaki, Ioli Kalavrezou, and the much-missed Philip Rousseau. Dimiter Angelov's paper on *charmolupe* in a thirteenth-century court context was another loss.

104 The project at the Swiss Center for Affective Sciences, University of Geneva, involved Prof. Philippe Borgeaud, Prof. Klaus R. Scherer, Prof. Cristina Soriano, Dr. Anna Ogarkova and Dr. Aglae Pizzone; see <https://www.unige.ch/cisa/research/nccr-affective-sciences-archive/> www. They created a grid of 24 emotion words in four groups, across 29 languages and 142 emotion features grouped in five main and five secondary categories: (1) appraisal, (2) bodily reaction, (3) expression, (4) action tendency, (5) feeling; (a) intensity, (b) duration, (c) lasting impact, (d) cultural prevalence, (e) social acceptability.

105 Angelos Chaniotis' five-year ERC project from 2009 to 2013: <https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/230274>.

106 B. Fehr and J.A. Russell, 'Concept of emotion viewed from a prototype perspective', *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General*, 113 (1984), 464–86, at 464.

107 D. Cairns, 'Emotions', *Encyclopaedia of Ancient History*, 23 June 2017, <https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444338386.wbeah30086>, accessed 27 December 2019.

108 Cairns and Nelis, 'Introduction', *Emotions in the Classical World*, 8.

109 If we work on anything relational, emotions are the cargo carried by those relations; if we work on the self, emotions are the molecules of self-fashioning.

110 E.g. B.H. Rosenwein, 'Worrying about emotions in history', *AmHR*, 107 (2002), 921–45 and see Xanthou below, 38–40, 43–44.

111 E.g. Reddy in 2001.

112 The concepts of both emotional communities and scripts arise out of a need to solve the issue of Anglophone ethnocentricity, the idea of emotional episodes out of a realisation that emotions can be regarded as disposition or mood as well as event.

of the (so-called) basic emotions like surprise and disgust, as well as familiar emotions like shame, contempt, hate and hope (though they appear in other chapters). We are even lacking specific papers on the specifically Byzantine emotions: *katanyxis* (compunction), *akedia* (listlessness) and *charmolupe* (joyful grief). But what we do have is essays that touch on borderlines and clusters of emotions: in the range of sorrow, where *lupe* gives way to *penthos* or *akedia*; where *eleos* sits on a spectrum of sympathy and pity; what is the difference between *chara* and *apolausis* (joy and enjoyment). And we have some sense of diachronic change, though more papers are pre- rather than post-iconoclastic. This way we edge towards our final constellation, not in this volume nor in the next, but before too long.

The title of the volume underlines two important issues. One is terminology. Language has a large part to play in the study of emotion. Here we immediately hit a problem: do we talk about emotions in Greek or in translation? How do we talk to the psychologists and anthropologists if we insist on Byzantine Greek? But how can we reach the Byzantine sense of emotion if we do not use their words? And we should pause to consider the vocabulary of the topic itself. What is the difference between a passion and an emotion? What are affects, and what are imaginings?¹¹³ Two of these terms are common to twenty-first-century discourse, though ‘emotions’ tend to belong to a wider textual community of psychologists, anthropologists and historians;¹¹⁴ ‘affects’, I suspect, is common in social theory, though it comes out of cultural studies; for some scientists, it refers to a basic substratum of appetites, moods, kinaesthetic experiences.¹¹⁵ One view in religious studies suggests that affects are non-cognitive feelings and motivations, while emotions are feelings accompanied by cognitive judgements.¹¹⁶ ‘Passions’ and ‘imaginings’ are different in that they come directly out of Byzantine emotionology, in two major bodies of theory, rhetorical and ascetic, on the emotions we as Byzantinists have to work on: ‘passions’ are *τά πάθη* (*ta pathe*), and in rhetoric, as Stratis Papaioannou once memorably said, it is all about *pathos*. ‘Imaginings’ is one translation for *λογισμοί* (*logismoí*) in Evagrian ascetic theory, though others of course use ‘thoughts’ or ‘dark thoughts’ or ‘bad thoughts’ or ‘conceivings’ or ‘thinkings’. The argument against ‘imaginings’ is that one expects a *phantasia* word. The argument

113 T. Dixon, *From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of a Secular Psychological Category* (Cambridge, 2003), on ‘passions’, ‘sentiments’, ‘affections’, ‘emotions’ in English in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

114 We have seen the difficulty of defining emotion: any definition should encompass physical symptoms, appraisal, feelings, action tendencies and expression. Some disciplines can only reach some of these features but should not redefine the concept to fit.

115 Colombetti, *Feeling Body*, 20–24. See L.F. Barrett, *Seven and a Half Lessons about the Brain* (London, 2021), 104–5: ‘affect is not emotion’; for her affect is more like mood.

116 Stephen Bush: private communication in 2014 to Susan Harvey. He also suggests that since among philosophers and religious studies scholars there may not be complete agreement, the difference may be elided as do most contributors to this volume.

for it is that they are something that comes in from outside the individual and wreaks havoc,¹¹⁷ rather than something engendered internally in the thought processes of the human brain. There is a strong case for not translating ‘*logismoi*’. Classicists have been very happy to use ‘emotion’ for *pathos* though there is agreement that ‘*pathos*’ is broader than ‘emotion’. ‘Feelings’ are generally reduced to the subjective perception of an emotional event. ‘Empathy’ is not regarded as an emotion, not on the spectrum of sympathy, pity, compassion and so on, but a process and a skill: the ability to experience another’s emotion. As we look at theory and terminology, we need to be conscious of how Byzantium developed its own theory.

The other issue is of managing emotion. How did Byzantines manage emotion? What do we mean by ‘managing’ emotion? Not, surely, that emotions are potentially bubbling up and constantly need to be pushed down, what Barbara Rosenwein called the ‘hydraulic theory’.¹¹⁸ Nor is it a case of the prefrontal cortex controlling limbic and ‘lizard’ brains, or one side of the brain controlling the other.¹¹⁹ Rather it is a sense of something between control and negotiation in the relations between an individual and the emotional regime,¹²⁰ or perhaps a balance between evocation and restraint of emotional display.¹²¹ Elite Byzantines inherited a concern to manage this balance, not least where grief is concerned. Menander Rhetor at the end of the prescription for monody says, ‘This speech should not exceed 150 lines in length. Mourners do not tolerate long delays or lengthy speeches at times of misfortune or unhappiness’.¹²² The mask is lifted, the rhetor is walking cautiously in case the family should turn on him, and we realise that throughout the prescription he is aware, if not of the stages of grief, at least the timescale, and of degrees of relationship to the deceased; though it is not expressed in terms of an emotion, he is managing grief. Verbs like *θρηνεῖν* (*threnein*) and *πένθειν* (*penthein*) predominate over nouns, and the clear distinctions of English between loss and grief and mourning and tears and extreme mourning practices and lament are different in Greek. The prescription is certainly all about *pathos*. In *consolatio*, the rhetor must first arouse grief before providing consolation. In other cases, particularly in the law court, the rhetor’s job is to rouse emotions (pity or indignation)

117 Cf R. Padel, *In and Out of the Mind: Greek Images of the Tragic Self* (Princeton, 1992).

118 B.H. Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages* (Ithaca, NY, 2006), 13–14.

119 Barrett, *Seven and a Half Lessons*, Lesson 1: ‘You have one brain (not three)’, 13–28.

120 Reddy, *Navigation of Feeling*, 112–37, using Unni Wikan’s work on Bali, *Managing Turbulent Hearts: A Balinese Formula for Living* (Chicago, 1990): ‘pursuit of expression to modify feeling and pursuit of feeling to modify behavior’, 115.

121 See below, Maguire, 314, 326–36.

122 Menander Rhetor, Treatise 2.16, *On Monody*, ed.tr. D.A. Russell and N.G. Wilson (Oxford, 1981), 206.

rather than depress them, as Ruth Webb has seen so well.¹²³ Managing in this sense is also what the ascetic does in the face of the assault of *logismoi*, playing off one *logismos* against another, defeating other *logismoi* only to be vanquished by pride.¹²⁴

While we include a chapter on methodology, it was not imposed on the contributors; there was no party line. All the chapters in the volume address the issues of terminology and/or management, though they do it in very different ways: approaches range from enactivism to metonyms, scripts and emotional communities. Two consider the status of their emotion as emotion. Six touch on neuroscience, nine on the history of emotions; almost all deal with emotions close to but not identical with theirs; methods of control they highlight include condemnation and demonising, preaching, involving biblical models, offering alternatives for the will, developing specialist learned techniques in rhetorical theory or ascetic practice.

The Chapters

After **Maria Xanthou's** methodological survey of historical and philological approaches to the emotions, focusing on the history of emotions through emotionology, emotional regimes and emotional communities, **Martin Hinterberger** addresses the *longue durée* of Greek through the medium of the word *phthonos* (envy) and both lexicological and 'scripts' approaches. He justifies the linguistic study of emotion concepts as allowing access to the emotion, together with the analysis of modern English usage, not in a universalist spirit, but as a control with reference to modern psychology. He addresses management of *phthonos* through its literal demonisation in the mythology and ends with a plea for more nuanced studies of Byzantine emotion concepts.

Also beginning in the classical world, but addressing a positive emotion, **Susan Wessel's** is the first of a series of chapters on *eleos* and the nexus of concepts surrounding pity, compassion and sympathy. She contrasts the use of *eleos* in Greek and Roman law courts (in order to persuade listeners to reach a particular moral judgement) with both modern English usage and early Byzantine Greek, where sympathy with misery expects action to alleviate it. She regards words such as *eleos*, *splanchna*, *sympatheia*, *oiktirmos* and *agape* in the Greek of early Byzantium as approximating the semantic range of our English word 'compassion'. Her emphasis is on healing through tangible aid like charity for the poor and hospitals for the sick, but she also regards healing as reciprocal: practitioners of compassion underwent a

123 R. Webb, 'Imagination and the arousal of the emotions in Greco-Roman rhetoric', in S. Braund and C. Gill (ed.), *The Passions in Roman Thought and Literature* (Cambridge, 1997), 112–27. See now E. Sanders and M. Johncock (ed.), *Emotion and Persuasion in Classical Antiquity* (Stuttgart, 2016).

124 See below, Young, 231–36; and Crislip, 244–61.

transformation and rise in status at least as dramatic as the neediest recipients among them.

Georgia Frank also addresses the semantic range of *eleos*, *oiktos*, *elemosune*, *eusplanchnia*, *philanthropia*, but with a view to the rhetor's techniques of eliciting the right result in listeners. She looks at the cognitive, social, psychological and rhetorical effects of pity, as described in the rhetorical handbooks of antiquity, and in particular on *ethopoeia* or *prosopopoeia* (speech-in-character) and *ekphrasis* (description). She then applies this teaching, first, to homilies by Basil of Caesarea, John Chrysostom, Gregory of Nyssa and Gregory of Nazianzos; then, using Romanos's kontakion 'On Elijah', she examines the superior potential of hymnography both to replicate the techniques of homiletic and to take advantage of the possibilities of dialogue. These techniques together engage the congregation and evoke pity.

Is it possible to see *eleos* on a face in a Byzantine image? **Annemarie Weyl Carr** addresses the image of the Mother of God as Eleousa, the earliest and most pervasive of the epithets of qualification (as opposed to epithets of place) that appear on Byzantine icons of Mary: it appears on widely varied iconographic types, including those with and those without the Christ child. Though historians acknowledge that the epithet Eleousa is applied to a wide diversity of Marian images, the content they give to the term still presumes a visual type of poignant emotive tenderness. The chapter proposes a different avenue by which to approach the epithet's emotive content as a component of Marian images, and examines kanons, translated in an appendix, by John Mauropous, John Therakas and Theodore II Laskaris to show that Marian kanons are petitionary and that the *eleos* demanded of the Eleousa is the capacity of Mary to address the singer's need.

We return to the issue of mother-child intimacy with **Niki Tsironis'** essay on *storge*. She discusses the relationship of *storge* with other kinds of love in Byzantium, and in particular *philia* and *agape*, regarding it as both relational and reciprocal, rendering it as 'caring affection'. She first establishes that *storge* plays an important role in natural selection and is counted as a basic emotion by some neuroscientists; she then proceeds to ask, on the basis of modern research in neuroscience, whether it is gendered, and associated only with women. In Byzantium, she documents the broader use of *storge* to represent the love of friends and that of God for mankind, especially in the elaborate treatments by Romanos in his first kontakion on the Nativity, and by George of Nikomedeia in his homily on Good Friday.

With **Robin Darling Young's** essay, we come to a pair of papers which bear on a second body of theoretical material, the ascetic, which she puts in the context of Alexandrian philosophy. She suggests that what we call pride was in antiquity a spectrum of attitudes, from *megalopsychia* (positive) to *hyperphania* (negative) to *hybris* (extremely dangerous). When Byzantine authors discussed the word usually translated into English as pride, *hyperphania*, they generally located the discussion of pride in theological texts

of a moral variety: edifying tales or treatments of virtue and vice. She discusses whether *pathe* are best seen as emotions or whether we should consider that like all the *pathe*, pride was not as much a movement understood as an emotion as it was an affliction – either a form of acute and sudden suffering, or a long-lasting disease – with a treatment that was extensive, flexible and long lasting.

Andrew Crislip also deals with the ascetic theoretical material found in the writings of Evagrius of Pontos and applies it to sadness, the first of four papers which deal with the cluster of *pathe* which include *lupe*, *akedia*, *katepheia*, *skythropotes* and *penthos*. He notes that the expression and management of sadness, regarded as a dangerous passion, were controversial in the early Christian centuries and constituted an interesting counterpoint to the prevalence of pious sorrow in Middle Byzantine visual culture, which Henry Maguire has characterised as depicting sorrow more than any other emotion. The chapter explores this journey, pinpointing the influential psychology of the passions of Evagrius, who wrote extensively about *lupe* and about the related passion *akedia* (translated variously as listlessness, dejection, depression or sloth). It reveals important differences between the two emotions and also what is distinctive about early Byzantine approaches to *lupe* and *akedia*.

Aglæ Pizzone explores the diachronic development of two non-prototypical terms for sadness in Byzantine Greek: *katepheia* and *skythropotes*. In particular, she looks at the metaphors and metonymies underlying these emotion terms. Both, she argues, are related to physiological and behavioural aspects that belong not only to sadness but also to shame. By looking at changes from ancient to Byzantine Greek, by considering how generic constraints reshape folk emotion concepts and by mapping *katepheia* and *skythropotes* on to the interaction between sadness and shame, the chapter applies to Byzantine texts a methodology well developed in classics, enhanced by a strong emphasis on diachronic change, similar to that in Hinterberger's essay.

Maria Doerfler looks at *penthos* (both grief and mourning). She quotes Irénée Hausherr on three unworthy griefs, including the death of a loved one, and rejects his assertion that Byzantine grief was concerned with the realm of spiritual, not human, relations. She then turns to this separate but equally significant tradition of *penthos*, especially when a death was perceived as 'untimely', as in the case of children who failed to outlive their parents. She rejects also the 'grand narrative' whereby personal affection and grief is to be found first in the modern period, and shows how Byzantine authors drew upon biblical exemplars of grieving parents to allow emotional communities to grieve together in the hope of calling forth divine sympathy. The chapter sees the Syriac and Greek homilies and hymns dealing with biblical bereavement as a means of allowing a safe space for mourning in the early Byzantine church.

Henry Maguire ends this sequence of chapters on aspects of sorrow and begins another on joy. He first investigates the vocabulary and grammar of the language of emotion in Byzantine art, some still recognisable to us, others lost. Second, he looks at abandonment and restraint in representations of joy and grief. He asks why angels are sometimes seen weeping, and suggests that the tension between public display and interior feeling corresponds to the distinction between *ekphrasis* and *ethopoeia* in Byzantine rhetoric. In a third section he turns to the contemporary west and shows that at every stage of this evolution, Byzantine painters anticipated artists of the west; the artistic language of the emotions was cross-cultural. He also notes the time gap between literature and art, rejects any suggestion of wider changes in affective devotion, and concludes that there was a shift in what Byzantines asked of their cult icons.

Derek Krueger offers a reading of Romanos's kontakion 'On the Resurrection', 6 (Oxford 29) and shows that while the hymns of Romanos perform and cultivate penitential self-regard, focusing on *katanyxis*, they also encourage ebullience in response to God's acts of salvation, especially the incarnation and resurrection of Christ: Christ's greeting to the myrrhbearing women in the resurrection hymn commands a change of mood from grief at the crucifixion to 'gladness and happiness' in response to Christ's triumph over death. The chapter examines Romanos's liturgical rhetoric of joy to assess how the hymnographer transmits and elicits emotions appropriate to the liturgical moment and the lectionary's presentation of the biblical narrative of redemption, played out in a theatre for the emotions.

Alicia Walker looks not at joy but at enjoyment, *apolausis*, as embodied emotion. She asks whether it is indeed an emotion, noting its long history in philosophical and psychological writings on human experience: as a subcategory of pleasure, occupying an intriguing place between physical stimulation and satisfaction, on the one hand, and as a psychological response, on the other. She studies the relationship between art and emotion by delineating the role of art in guiding viewers to an effective management of an emotional response. She looks at personifications of Apolausis in early Byzantine baths and at the banquet, then traces the term *apolausis* in early Byzantine texts, setting the term most convincingly in Nemesios of Emesa's treatment of pleasure, *hedone*, and in the treatment of the good life in the Tabula of Ceres. She is thus able to set images of Apolausis alongside Nemesios in Byzantine emotionology.

The last two chapters address two remaining 'basic' emotions: anger and fear. **Floris Bernard** tackles anger, an emotion with clear physical characteristics but also social consequences: an anger event almost always establishes or alters a relation with another individual in a significant way. Anger is also the emotion which first comes to mind when the control of emotion is considered. He looks at poetry, taking the example of invective. First, he discusses the relationship between the representation of anger in the poems and the cognitive models by which humans generally perceive and express anger in their speech, through metaphor and metonymy. Second, he makes use of Rosenwein's concept of 'emotional communities' to describe

the normative frameworks and social motivations which caused a coherent group of people, the mid-eleventh-century literary elite, to represent and value emotions in a certain way. The exercise also alerts us to the sources of social cohesion within communities and strategies of self-expression.

And finally, **Sergey Ivanov** looks at fear in relation to power in Byzantium. Alexander Kazhdan believed that Byzantines lived in constant fear and this chapter asks whether he was right. Ivanov's first approach is lexicological: there is a rich range of fear words in Greek with a wider semantic range than in modern English. He also establishes the physical manifestations of fear in Byzantine texts. In a second section, fear before power is considered and identified as *se-bas* (awe). It is 'the emotion of a loyal subject who prostrates himself before the overwhelming might of a benevolent sovereign' and is distinguished from excessive or exaggerated fear of danger. The final section deals with overcoming fear and managing it oneself. In response to Kazhdan, Ivanov decides that however dominant fear was in the empire, the ability to manage it was also widespread.

The Future

At this stage so many questions still remain that we have not managed to answer. But there is great hope for the future, a sense that there has been an affective turn in Byzantine Studies, our own fashion for passion, so that now we may be able to extend the grid of emotion and cultural aspect to create a real conspectus of Byzantine emotion.¹²⁵ In particular, it should be possible to look at later periods and build on the achievement in late antiquity to look beyond iconoclasm. Students of classics and the western middle ages have also suggested that it is important to see how emotions tie into major changes in the society under study. So for us, key turning points like iconoclasm¹²⁶ and the events of 1204¹²⁷ may need special care – though it is notable that the biggest change detected so far is in the twelfth century, not traditionally one of the great crisis points in Byzantine history. We also need to form a firmer view of the Byzantines' own theory of emotions, their emotionology, particularly through medical theory and the now flourishing subdiscipline of history of medicine. It is to be hoped that we will soon be in a position to engage in other comparative study; we are ideally placed to

125 See for example the 21st annual Birmingham Graduate Colloquium, 2021, <https://gemuob.wordpress.com/category/annual-colloquium/>, which included papers on twelfth-century grave epigrams in Sicily, emotions in the Kievan Caves Paterik, crowd emotions in imperial ceremonies in Theophylact Simocatta, the origins of *katanyxis* and the emotions of eighteenth-century English Levant merchants in Cyprus.

126 With her work on George of Nikomedeia and Kassia, Niki Tsironis has made this area her own: see for example 'The body and the senses in the work of Cassia the Hymnographer: literary trends in the iconoclastic period', *Symmeikta*, 16 (2003), 139–57; 'Desire, longing and fear in the narratives of Middle Byzantine homiletics', *Studia Patristica*, 44 (2010), 515–20.

127 See, for a start, M. Angold, 'Laments by Nicetas Choniates and others for the fall of Constantinople in 1204', in *Greek Laughter and Tears*, ed. Alexiou and Cairns, 338–52.

look at comparisons with the medieval west, as Henry Maguire shows in this volume.¹²⁸ Might confrontations between crusaders and Byzantines make more sense seen through the lens of emotion? And our understanding of Byzantine relations with neighbours to the east might make more sense with a clearer idea of differences in theory and practice between Christian and Muslim societies, especially along the border.¹²⁹ Byzantinists have only just begun to take note of recent work on collective emotion and distributed cognition, though liturgists have already arrived there:¹³⁰ an obvious Byzantine parallel to the experience of fifth-century BCE Athenian theatre-going¹³¹ is procession, in which there has been considerable recent interest¹³² without as yet fully deploying this body of theory. The combination of *phobos*, *chara*, *lupe*, in the context of *katanyxis*, enhanced by kinaesthetic energy as participants walked,¹³³ sang,¹³⁴ stopped at stations¹³⁵ and danced¹³⁶ together on a historic route, in a monumental setting redolent of layers of history,¹³⁷

128 See below, 336–42.

129 The departments of Classics and Arab Studies at New York University collaborated in an Ancient Greek/Arab workshop on ‘Emotions across Cultures’ in February 2004 at NYU Abu Dhabi, <https://archive.nyu.edu/handle/2451/33966>.

130 G. Frank, ‘Crowds and collective affect in Romanos’ biblical retellings’, in G. Frank, S.R. Holman and A.S. Jacobs (ed.), *The Garb of Being: Embodiment and the Pursuit of Holiness in Late Ancient Christianity* (New York, 2020), 169–90; D. Krueger, ‘The transmission of liturgical joy in Byzantine hymns for Easter’, in B. Bitton-Ashkelony and D. Krueger (ed.), *Prayer and Worship in Eastern Christianities* (New York, 2017), 132–50.

131 As evoked in Meineck, *Theatrocracy*.

132 See the monograph of V. Manolopoulou, *Processing Constantinople: Art, Text and Archaeology* (forthcoming in this series); the London Institute of Classical Studies Colloquium, 6 June 2018, ‘Moving through time: procession from the classical past to Byzantium’, <https://ics.sas.ac.uk/events/event/15843>, accessed 13 September 2021, and the Dumbarton Oaks symposium of 12–13 April 2019, ‘Processions: urban ritual in Byzantium and neighboring lands’, with symposiarchs Leslie Brubaker and Nancy Ševčenko, <https://www.doaks.org/research/byzantine/scholarly-activities/processions>, accessed 13 September 2021.

133 On the emotional implications of moving in synchrony, see W.H. McNeill, *Keeping Together in Time: Dance and Drill in Human History* (Cambridge, MA, 1995).

134 The troparia chanted en route deserve more study. For the capacity of music to strongly affect emotions and mood, see Meineck, *Theatrocracy*, 154–79, drawing on S. Koelsch, ‘Music-evoked emotions: principles, brain correlates and implications for therapy’, *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences*, 1337.1 (2015), 193–201; and idem, ‘Emotion and music’, in J. Armony and P. Vuilleumier (ed.), *The Cambridge Handbook of Human Affective Neuroscience* (Cambridge, 2013), 286–303.

135 As in the *Typikon of the Great Church*, ed. J. Mateos, *Le Typicon de la Grande Église*, 2 vols, OCA 165–66 (Rome, 1962–63); and Constantine Porphyrogenetos, *Book of Ceremonies*, ed. G. Dagron and B. Flusin, *Constantin VII Porphyrogénète, Le Livre des cérémonies*, 6 vols (Paris, 2020).

136 L. Brubaker and C. Wickham, ‘Processions, power, and community identity: east and west’, in W. Pohl and R. Kramer (ed.), *Empires and Communities in the Post-Roman and Islamic World, c. 400–1000 CE*, Oxford Studies in Early Empires (Oxford, 2021), 121–87.

137 L. Brubaker, ‘Topography and the creation of public space in early medieval Constantinople’, in F. Theuvs, M. de Jong and C. van Rhijn (ed.), *Topographies of Power in the Early Middle Ages* (Leiden, 2001), 31–43.

in the open air,¹³⁸ led by sensual accompaniment of candles and incense and the flash of processional crosses,¹³⁹ flanked by participating spectators, offers its own dopamine, its own mirroring, entrainment and empathy. We can hope for more awareness of science and of advances in other disciplines; to publish in emotions journals¹⁴⁰ rather than Byzantine journals might be one way to encourage the inclusion of Byzantium in future at the big table of emotions scholars. And eventually, we shall achieve enough understanding to make the connections with other cognitive functions—memory, imagination, sense-perception, decision-making, dream—that will bring a study of the Byzantine mind that much closer.

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2 Theorising Emotions

Methodological Tools for Research

Maria G. Xanthou

Introduction

In 2017 the exhibition ‘A World of Emotions’, hosted by the Onassis Cultural Center in New York, marked a milestone in the history of emotions. It was the first thematic display of a wide array of ancient material artefacts that offered a coherent narrative and gave insight into the construction, perception and reception of emotions in ancient Greece.¹ Whether this is the end of the beginning or the beginning of the end is too early to say as research centres and publications on the history of emotions are still proliferating.² In 1941 Lucien Febvre (1878–1956), the chief proponent of the *Annales* School, officially launched ‘the history of emotions’ as a discipline in its own right.³ Since 1941 it has evolved into an increasingly productive and stimulating area of historical research. In the 1980s the ‘emotional’ or ‘affective’ turn was in full swing: historians interested in the history of society and men-

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2 The Amsterdam Centre for Cross-Disciplinary Emotion and Sensory Studies (ACCESS), <https://emotionsandsenses.wordpress.com/>; ARC Centre of Excellence for the History of Emotions (1100–1800), <http://www.historyofemotions.org.au/>; Center for the History of Emotions, Max Planck-Institute for Human Development, Berlin, <https://www.mpib-berlin.mpg.de/en/research/history-of-emotions>; Swiss Center for Affective Sciences, University of Geneva, <https://www.unige.ch/cisa>; Centre for the History of Emotions, Queen Mary University of London, <https://projects.history.qmul.ac.uk/emotions/>; Les Émotions au Moyen Âge (EMMA) <http://emma.hypotheses.org/>; An International Network for the Cultural History of Emotions in Premodernity (CHEP), <https://www.university-directory.eu/Sweden/The-International-Network-for-the-Cultural-History-of-Emotions-in-Pre-modernity.html>; The Emotions Project: The Social and Cultural Construction of Emotions; The Greek Paradigm, Oxford, <https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/230274>; Historia cultural del concimiento: Discursos, prácticas, representaciones, Centro de Ciencias humanas y sociales, Madrid, <http://cchs.csic.es/es/research-line/historia-cultural-conocimiento-discursos-practicas-representaciones>; M. Champion and A. Lynch (ed.), *Understanding Emotions in Early Europe* (Turnhout, 2015).

3 L. Febvre, ‘La sensibilité et l’histoire: comment reconstituer la vie affective d’autrefois?’, *Annales d’histoire sociale*, 3 (1941), 5–20.

talities in medieval Europe and in the western world focused on emotions. The resurgence of interest and the subsequent twenty-year study of the interaction between historical conditions and the manifestations of emotions in Greek, Roman and Byzantine texts, images and material culture have already yielded results. In this thriving discipline, the historian's task has been defined as follows: 'to examine the very diverse significance of emotions in society and culture in their broadest definitions (including religion, law, politics, etc.):'⁴ This promising area of historical research is based on the twofold approach of learning how emotions both are felt and perceived. Along these lines, the way emotions are perceived, i.e., feelings, and the way these feelings are experienced are regarded as external outcomes of cultural processes and constructions. In that sense, the study of emotions incorporates the key aspect of *longue durée*, which treats their social relevance and potency as culturally and ultimately historically fluctuating. As a result, many historians view emotions as just as fundamental a category of history as class, race and gender.⁵

The celebratory moment of the progress achieved so far underscores prospects for widening the research scope and for further sophistication of the tools we use to examine emotions and the past. After all, history of emotions involves all strands of recorded human activity, i.e., economic, political, social, religious, philosophical, scientific and artistic; it intersects with historical research on all social strata from top to bottom; and it spreads across diachronic and synchronic boundaries. The completed and ongoing research projects and their ensuing publications offer a reliable roadmap. At this point, I should stress that theories of historical research on emotions and their methodological tools are inevitably considered time-related cultural structures, as every theorist or group of theorists draws on the advances and setbacks of theirs and their peers' ideologies, contingent on revision and further sophistication. However, in modern research on emotions, three names keep surfacing: William Reddy, Barbara Rosenwein and Peter Stearns. At this point, and before delving any further into examining theories and their tools, I shall offer a brief account of these scholars' key concepts and their analytical tools.

4 A. Chaniotis, 'Unveiling emotions in the Greek world: introduction', in A. Chaniotis (ed.), *Unveiling Emotions: Sources and Methods for the Study of Emotions in the Greek World* (Stuttgart, 2012), 1.

5 P.N. Stearns and C.Z. Stearns, 'Emotionology: clarifying the history of emotions and emotional standards', *AmHR*, 90.4 (1985), 813–36; B.H. Rosenwein, 'Worrying about emotions in history', *AmHR*, 107.3 (2002), 824; A. Wierzbicka, 'The "history of emotions" and the future of emotion research', *Emotion Review*, 2.3 (2010), 269–73; S.J. Matt, 'Current emotion research in history: or, doing history from the inside out', *Emotion Review*, 3.1 (2011), 117–24; W.M. Reddy, 'Historical research on the self and emotions', *Emotion Review*, 1.4 (2009), 302–15; A. Przyrembel, 'Sehnsucht nach Gefühlen. Zur Konjunktur der Emotionen in der Geschichtswissenschaft', *L'homme*, 16 (2005), 116–24; R. Schnell, 'Historische Emotionsforschung. Eine mediävistische Standortbestimmung', *FS*, 38 (2004), 173–276.

Emotionology: Talking about Emotions in and Across Different Cultures and Different Times

Peter N. Stearns and Carol Z. Stearns published their manifesto in 1985, thus launching a new field for historical studies on emotions.⁶ They coined the term ‘emotionology’, adopting the linguistic pattern of -ology compounds, as in sociology or psychology, thus aiming at scholarly and scientific accreditation. According to the Stearnses, emotionology focused on ‘the attitudes or standards that a society, or a definable group within a society, maintains toward basic emotions and their appropriate expression’.⁷ With this term, the two social historians proposed a new tool for studying emotions, which laid the emphasis on distinguishing between social attitudes towards emotions and actual experience of emotion.⁸ For the Stearnses, the history of emotions was an extension of social history.⁹ The important distinction was between the individual experience of emotion and emotional norms, with the latter being the focal point of their research.¹⁰ In that sense, they drew attention to the collective emotional standards of a society, on the one hand, and the emotional experiences of individuals and groups on the other.¹¹ These standards were consolidated by institutions, which in their turn reflected and encouraged these attitudes in human conduct.¹² Hence, historians should direct their attention to the regulatory apparatus that governed the expression of feelings in society as a whole, or its elemental social groups.¹³ To put it simply, the Stearnses’ approach laid emphasis on what people thought about public manifestations of emotions, e.g., crying, getting angry in public or showing anger physically.¹⁴ In that sense, what people think about feelings, they will eventually actually feel.¹⁵

The Stearnses drew a clear line between emotion and emotionology, thus regarding them as distinct but mutually related analytical entities. Since emotionology focuses on the social norms, while emotions pertain to the actual emotional experience, the relation between them was renegotiated and rearranged as regards the range of feelings that historical actors experienced.¹⁶ The Stearnses realised that there was a discrepancy in the relation

6 Stearns and Stearns, ‘Emotionology’, 824, 830; P.H. Stearns and C.Z. Stearns, ‘Introducing the history of emotion’, *Psychohistory Review*, 18 (1990), 263–91.

7 Stearns and Stearns, ‘Emotionology’, 813.

8 Stearns and Stearns, ‘Emotionology’, 813; P.H. Stearns and C.Z. Stearns, *Anger: The Struggle for Emotional Control in America’s History* (Chicago, 1986); E. Sullivan, ‘The history of the emotions: past, present, future’, *Cultural History*, 2.1 (2013), 95.

9 J. Plamper, *The History of Emotions: An Introduction*, tr. K. Tribe (Oxford 2015), 58.

10 Plamper, *History of Emotions*, 57.

11 Stearns and Stearns, ‘Emotionology’, 813.

12 Stearns and Stearns, ‘Emotionology’, 813; Rosenwein, ‘Worrying about emotions’, 824.

13 Plamper, *History of Emotions*, 57.

14 Rosenwein, ‘Worrying about emotions’, 824.

15 Rosenwein, ‘Worrying about emotions’, 824.

16 Stearns and Stearns, ‘Emotionology’, 824–25; Plamper, *History of Emotions*, 57.

between the formal ideas of wider social values and actual feelings.¹⁷ This discrepancy also affects the appraisal of emotional experience in an independent and verifiable way.¹⁸ Jan Plamper offers an illuminating example: if in one period it had been socially acceptable for expressions of rage to take place in marital disputes, but not in a subsequent period, then a continuing feeling of rage, on a new historical occasion, may have turned into a feeling of guilt, accessible to historians through diaries.¹⁹ However, this variability sets a limit to historians who may be unable to investigate beyond emotionology, as most records of emotional expression, e.g., diaries, will be filtered by prevailing emotional standards.²⁰ An issue concomitant to this shift is the problem of sources, to which the Stearnses had already drawn attention. When the Stearnses launched their manifesto, which introduced their theory of emotionology, they used personal written sources, for example, diaries, autobiographies and belles-lettres. They also pointed to the careful use of socio-historical sources on the manifestations of public anger, such as strikes, demonstrations and revolutions, as evidence of emotion, while later they focused on self-help literature.²¹

The benefit of using emotionology as a tool is the facilitation of the distinction between emotional standards and emotional experience. According to the Stearnses, historians can fruitfully study social attitudes towards emotions, whereas this is not the case for the actual experience of emotion. An 'emotionologist' focuses on the discourse that a culture constructs and employs in everyday transactions in order to talk about particular emotions. Accordingly, s/he examines the regulatory apparatus that governs the expression of feelings in society as a whole, or its elemental social groups. The emotional norms to which this discourse responds are formed by social and educational institutions, such as kindergartens, schools, armies, religious entities, marriage and family. They are also subject to historical change. Historians should investigate the processes that underpin this change: they should explore how emotions are encrypted within everyday social life by the social and educational institutions, which valorise, marginalise, scientifically define or religiously encode them.²² Along these lines, historians should pursue research on the emotionology of a period and then consider, to the extent that this is possible, how contemporary expressions of emotion conform to or deviate from the dominant emotionological norms of that period. Regardless of how this tool might be refined, it comes with the following limitation: the Stearnses' emphasis on avoiding what they see as

17 Stearns and Stearns, 'Emotionology', 824–25, 827; Plamper, *History of Emotions*, 57–58.

18 Stearns and Stearns, 'Emotionology', 824–25.

19 Stearns and Stearns, 'Emotionology', 825; Plamper, *History of Emotions*, 57.

20 Stearns and Stearns, 'Emotionology', 825.

21 Stearns and Stearns, 'Emotionology'; Stearns and Stearns, *Anger*, 110–56.

22 Sullivan, 'History of the emotions', 95.

elite sources poses a hindrance to the application of their tool in historical periods other than the recent past.²³

William Reddy's Concepts of 'Emotive', 'Emotional Regime' and 'Emotional Navigation'

In his 1997 programmatic essay 'Against constructionism: the historical ethnography of emotions', William Reddy introduced the concept of 'emotive'. Based on J.L. Austin's theory of speech acts, this new term offered a performative equilibrium between the use of emotion for describing a condition of the world, and the subject's intention to influence this condition.²⁴ Reddy identified descriptive statements about the world, known as *constatives*, with universalism, and statements that change the world, known as *performatives*, with social constructivism.²⁵ The point of departure for his expounding this theory was a discrepancy created by the failure of language in describing the real world, on the one hand, and the elusiveness of the subject's intention to speak in a true way about one's feelings, on the other.²⁶ He also underscored the cognitive and evaluative significance of emotion, after rejecting its definition as an outcome of a 'residual, somatic, antirational domain of conscious life'.²⁷ In other words, his newly coined term aspired to overcome the discrepancy between language failure and intentional elusiveness in emotional representation. Reddy considered emotions as 'the real world anchor of signs', each of which is combined with a feeling. As a constitutive part of *langue*, feelings form the affective backdrop against which emotions generate *parole* as emotive statements or utterances. An emotive statement seems at first glance to have a real external referent, to be descriptive or constative. However, the 'external referent' to which an emotive appears to point is not passive in the formulation of the emotive, and it emerges from the act of uttering in a changed state. Emotives are influenced directly by and alter what they 'refer' to. In addition to their similarity to *performatives* and difference from *constatives*, emotives are understood as instruments for directly changing, building, hiding and intensifying emotions.²⁸ Feelings have an 'inner' dimension, which is never merely 'represented' by statements or actions. Our necessary failure to represent feeling defines our plasticity as individuals.²⁹ In that sense, emotives are self-transformative, as

23 Sullivan, 'History of the emotions', 95; Rosenwein, 'Worrying about emotions', 823–24.

24 J.L. Austin, *How to Do Things with Words* (Oxford, 1962); W.M. Reddy, 'Against constructionism: the historical ethnography of emotions', *Current Anthropology*, 38.3 (1997), 327–51, at 330–32; Plamper, *History of Emotions*, 252, 261.

25 Plamper, *History of Emotions*, 252.

26 Reddy, 'Against constructionism', 331; S. Howell, comments on 'Against constructionism', by W.M. Reddy, *Current Anthropology*, 38.3 (1997), 342.

27 Reddy, 'Against constructionism', 331.

28 Reddy, 'Against constructionism', 331.

29 Reddy, 'Against constructionism', 331.

the mere act of expressive utterance effects changes on what is felt.³⁰ Owing to their transient capacity, emotives can never entirely succeed because they can never adequately represent or perform emotions, thus setting limits on the plasticity of the individual.³¹ In Reddy's words, the concept of emotives is better suited to the fieldwork in anthropology than to dusty archives and libraries. It focuses on interaction and behaviour without ceding to them an all-powerful constructive role.³²

In his 2001 monograph *The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions*, Reddy gave an edge to 'emotives' by developing the concept of 'emotional regimes'.³³ Through 'emotives' Reddy attempted to bridge the dichotomy between social constructivism of fieldwork in anthropology and universalism of cognitive psychology.³⁴ Emotives serve as guides, facilitating the interaction between the personal and social sphere.³⁵ The constant interplay between these two spheres allows a new language to emerge, thus corresponding to a new emotional 'normative order', which is shaped by reigning systems of power.³⁶

Reddy's professed ambition was to bridge the gap between the social constructivism governing the anthropology of emotions and the universalism of cognitive psychology. In the wake of poststructuralist deconstruction, he reasserted the local validity of personal values, since everything is socially constructed.³⁷ According to Plamper, 'the question of whether emotions are social constructs or universal, and what the relationship might be between these two poles, addresses directly the epistemological heart of social anthropology and cognitive psychology'. Plamper suggests that if one adopts the expansive conception of culture of Clifford Geertz, which allows for no extra-cultural space, then there is no longer any possibility of an independent position from which differences between culturally formed expressions of emotion can be registered. He also adds that 'it becomes impossible to conceive how emotions might change over time; or rather, such change is so radically contingent that it admits of no analysis'.³⁸

30 L. Hunt, comments on 'Against constructionism', by W.M. Reddy, *Current Anthropology*, 38.3 (1997), 343.

31 L. Hunt, comments on 'Against constructionism', 343.

32 W.M. Reddy, reply to comments on 'Against constructionism', *Current Anthropology*, 38.3 (1997), 346.

33 Sullivan, 'History of the emotions', 96; Reddy, 'Against constructionism', 327–40; W.M. Reddy, *The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions* (Cambridge, 2004), 124.

34 Reddy, reply to comments on 'Against constructionism', 346; Plamper, *History of Emotions*, 252, 254.

35 Sullivan, 'History of the emotions', 96.

36 Reddy, 'Against constructionism', 331; Reddy, *Navigation of Feeling*, 124–30; Sullivan, 'History of the emotions', 96.

37 Plamper, *History of Emotions*, 254.

38 Plamper, *History of Emotions*, 256; see Reddy, *Navigation of Feeling*, 41.

Reddy emphasises that it is not possible to unambiguously define emotions. They cannot be clearly separated from one another, nor be reduced to a handful of basic emotions together with other emotions. From the perspective of psychology, it was likewise impossible to separate emotion from cognition, or emotions from reason.³⁹ An 'emotional regime' is the ensemble of prescribed emotives together with their related rituals and other symbolic practices.⁴⁰ Emotional navigation has to do with manoeuvring between different and conflicting emotional objectives.⁴¹

One criticism of Reddy's concept of 'emotional regime' is the implied close connection between an emotional and a political regime. Along these lines, he identifies the typical political regime with the modern nation-state. This is a blurry anachronism, as the concept of nation as a centralised state was invented from the eighteenth century onwards. Before this invention, the historical subject or actor belonged to several communities, which, in turn, identified with varieties and localisms.⁴² Another possible criticism is what has been called 'the charge of logocentrism'.⁴³ 'Emotives' were criticised for linguistic imperialism as they 'privilege words over other forms of emotional behavior', although in some cultures somatic manifestations of emotions, such as reddening, trembling and swelling, are considered more important than utterances.⁴⁴ A third, equally valid criticism is that 'emotives' fail to adequately reflect the social situation in which utterances are made. The feedback cycle set in motion by the utterance 'I am happy' in front of a psychotherapist, whom one pays to achieve happiness, differs from the life-altering effects of the same utterance in another social situation, e.g., when one defiantly replies 'I am happy' to one's mother, who has just accused one of being locked in an unhappy romantic relationship.⁴⁵ Since his theory will be measured against the empirical results it produces, one final criticism is that Reddy's kind of historical writing may seem one-dimensional: the philological nuances of the new cultural history, such as sensitivity to metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, genres and the rest, recede into the background in Reddy's history of emotions.⁴⁶

39 Plamper, *History of Emotions*, 254.

40 Plamper, *History of Emotions*, 257.

41 Plamper, *History of Emotions*, 258.

42 Plamper, *History of Emotions*, 262.

43 J. Plamper, 'The history of emotions: an interview with William Reddy, Barbara Rosenwein, and Peter Stearns', *History and Theory*, 49 (2010), 237–65, at 241.

44 Plamper, 'Interview with Reddy, Rosenwein, and Stearns', 241–43; B.H. Rosenwein, review of *The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions*, by W.M. Reddy, *AmHR*, 107.4 (2002), 1181.

45 Plamper, 'Interview with Reddy, Rosenwein, and Stearns', 242.

46 Plamper, *History of Emotions*, 264.

Barbara Rosenwein's Emotional Communities

Medievalists as a scholarly group have always stood at the forefront of innovative research in the history of emotions. However, Barbara H. Rosenwein, the scholar who paved the way for the history of emotions in the middle ages, revealed in an interview with Jan Plamper that she herself did not see the emotions in historical documents until she was alerted to look for them. According to Rosenwein, emotions are often hidden in the texts that historians use.⁴⁷ Her theory of emotions reacts to a conception of feelings called a 'pneumatic' or 'hydraulic' model. According to this model, emotions are conceived as psychic fluids filling up the mind or the body. In that sense, they may be easily understood as flux and/or flow residing within each person that can 'boil over', stagnate, 'break out', 'burst' or 'bubble over'.⁴⁸ According to Robert Solomon, 'prescientific' psychological thinking viewed 'the human psyche as a cauldron of pressures demanding their release in action and expression.'⁴⁹ The origin of the model is attributed to the medieval pathology of the humours,⁵⁰ which was developed by Hippocrates⁵¹ and adopted by Greek, Roman and Islamic physicians. Metaphors used in many languages point towards this hydraulic conception of emotions,⁵² but it can be traced even earlier. A ground-breaking innovation is the debunking of the hydraulic system of emotions, as represented by Darwinians, Freudians and psychologists, and more recently by Huizinga (1924), Elias (1976), Febvre (1939–41), Dulumeau and the Stearnses, and its replacement of the notion of feelings as internal fluid processes by the conceptualisation

47 Plamper, 'Interview with Reddy, Rosenwein, and Stearns', esp. 250.

48 Plamper, *History of Emotions*, 67; R. Solomon, *True to Our Feelings: What Our Emotions Are Really Telling Us* (Oxford, 2007), 142.

49 R. Solomon, *The Passions: Emotions and the Meaning of Life* (Indianapolis, 1993), 77–88, esp. 81.

50 N.G. Siraisi, *Medieval and Early Renaissance Medicine: An Introduction to Knowledge and Practice* (Chicago, 1990), 104–6; Rosenwein, 'Worrying about emotions', 834; Plamper, *History of Emotions*, 67.

51 *De natura hominis* = *On the nature of man*, 4.1–751: τὸ δὲ σῶμα τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ αἷμα καὶ φλέγμα καὶ χολὴν ξανθὴν καὶ μέλαιναν, καὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν αὐτῷ ἡ φύσις τοῦ σώματος, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἀλγεῖ καὶ ὑγιαίνει. ὑγιαίνει μὲν οὖν μάλιστα, ὅταν μετριῶς ἔχη ταῦτα τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλα κρήσιος καὶ δυνάμιος καὶ τοῦ πλήθους, καὶ μάλιστα μεμιγμένα ἢ ἀλγεῖ δὲ ὅταν τούτων τι ἔλασσον ἢ πλεόν ἢ ἢ χωρισθῇ ἐν τῷ σώματι καὶ μὴ κεκρημένον ἢ τοῖσι σύμπασι. ('The body of man has in itself blood, phlegm, yellow bile and black bile; these make up the nature of his body, and through these he feels pain or enjoys health. Now he enjoys the most perfect health when these elements are duly proportioned to one another in respect of compounding, power and bulk, and when they are perfectly mingled. Pain is felt when one of these elements is in defect or excess, or is isolated in the body without being compounded with all the others'.)

52 Plamper, 'Interview with Reddy, Rosenwein, and Stearns', 251; G. Lakoff, *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind* (Chicago, 1987), case study I.

of emotions as rational processes of cognition in the brain.⁵³ This notion comes from cognitive psychology and its offshoot, social constructionism.⁵⁴

Rosenwein's pioneering work on emotions produced some of the most fascinating and workable theoretical schemes so far devised. By and large, emotional communities are the same as social communities, e.g., families, neighbourhoods, syndicates, academic institutions, monasteries, factories, military units and princely courts.⁵⁵ In other words, emotional communities are, almost by definition (since emotions tend to have a social, communicative role) an aspect of every social group, large or small, in which people have a stake and interest.⁵⁶ Rosenwein's 'emocom'⁵⁷ strikes a balance between cognitive psychology and anthropological social constructivism, while at the same time it informs the agenda of the history of emotions with the notion of emotional communities forming a larger circle within which smaller circles exist. According to Rosenwein, the large circle is the overarching emotional community, tied together by fundamental assumptions, values, goals, feeling rules, and accepted modes of expression. Within this large circle, other smaller circles may also exist, thus representing subordinate emotional communities, partaking in the larger one and revealing its possibilities and its limitations.⁵⁸ She does not exclude the possibility that other large circles exist, either entirely isolated or intersecting with the first at one or more points. She considers emotional communities to be social communities with close relationships.⁵⁹ They can, however, also be 'textual communities', in which people are linked together through media, without ever meeting.

In general, Rosenwein's 'emocoms' are in some ways what Foucault called a common 'discourse': shared vocabularies and ways of thinking that have a controlling function, a disciplining function.⁶⁰ 'Emocoms' are similar to Bourdieu's notion of 'habitus': internalised norms that determine how we think and act, and that may be different in different groups.⁶¹ Sociologists speak of 'group styles', in which 'implicit, culturally patterned styles of membership filter collective representations' that may include 'vocabularies, symbols, or codes'.⁶² Through the term 'communities', Rosenwein stresses

53 Plamper, *History of Emotions*, 68.

54 B.H. Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages* (Ithaca, NY, 2006), 14–15.

55 B.H. Rosenwein, 'Problems and methods in the history of emotions', *Passions in Context: Journal of the History and Philosophy of the Emotions* 1.1 (2010), 1–32, esp. 11, <http://www.passionsincontext.de/index.php?id=557>, accessed 30 December 2017.

56 Rosenwein, 'Problems and methods', 12.

57 Rosenwein, 'Worrying about emotions', 827–28, 842.

58 Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities*, 24.

59 Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities*, 24.

60 Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities*, 25; Plamper, *History of Emotions*, 69.

61 Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities*, 25; Plamper, *History of Emotions*, 69.

62 Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities*, 25.

the social and relational nature of emotions.⁶³ The most important insight that she introduced into the history of emotions research agenda is that emotion communities are constituted by constellations or sets of emotions,⁶⁴ which, in turn, are reinforced, valorised or belittled through texts. Hence, she relates the social construction of ‘emocomms’ to literacy, a concept previously employed by Brian Stock in his theory of textual communities.⁶⁵ The term described how oral discourse effectively began to function within a universe of communications governed by texts.⁶⁶ According to Stock, for a textual community to exist, a written version of a text was not an essential requirement, but rather the presence of an individual, who having been versed in textual interpretation and having eventually mastered it, then used the text as a means to reform a group’s thought and action towards structuring the internal behaviour of its members and providing solidarity against the outside world.⁶⁷ Stock’s textual communities and Rosenwein’s emocomms converge at the point where their members have reached the stage of shared assumptions after they have entirely internalised the textual foundation of behaviour.⁶⁸ The documentation of emocomms is based on written sources pointing to an identifiable social community the members of which share common interests, e.g., cities, clerical and monastic circles, guilds and courts.⁶⁹ Rosenwein then compiled large-scale samples of written sources (dossiers) relevant to each group, such as conciliar legislation, charters, hagiography, letters, histories and chronicles.⁷⁰ In this context, she looked for narratives within which feelings have a place and tried to find common patterns within and across texts as sources. Her aim was to extract emotion from these texts by paying attention to pattern, narrative and the distinction of male from female.⁷¹ She also employed the associative method. For example, if a ‘known’ emotion word was used as a synonym for, or is frequently associated with, another word that is as yet not identified as signifying an

63 Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities*, 25.

64 Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities*, 26.

65 B. Stock, *The Implications of Literacy: Written Language and Models of Interpretation in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries* (Princeton, 1983), 7–8, 88–91.

66 Stock, *Implications of Literacy*, 3.

67 Stock, *Implications of Literacy*, 90.

68 Rosenwein, ‘Problems and methods’, 11; A. Lynch, ‘Emotional community’, in S. Broomhall (ed.), *Early Modern Emotions: An Introduction* (London, 2017), 4.

69 Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities*, 26; Plamper, ‘Interview with Reddy, Rosenwein, and Stearns’, 253; Plamper, *History of Emotions*, 69.

70 On Rosenwein’s methodology, see Rosenwein, ‘Problems and methods in the history of emotions’, 12–13; B.H. Rosenwein, ‘Thinking historically about medieval emotions’, *History Compass*, 8.8 (2010), 828–42; Plamper, *History of Emotions*, 253–54; Lynch, ‘Emotional community’, 4.

71 Rosenwein, ‘Problems and methods’, 11–13; Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities*, 26; Plamper, ‘Interview with Reddy, Rosenwein, and Stearns’, 254; Plamper, *History of Emotions*, 69.

emotion, that unidentified word may be considered an emotion.⁷² In this case, similar emotion words were assembled into dossiers. Sources presenting a canonical, normative position within the emocom, but coming from different times and places, were also included in the same dossier.⁷³ The discovery and analysis of the emocoms were facilitated through the texts, but also through the underpinning of words, gestures and cries that signify feeling.⁷⁴ To preclude any assumptions that an emotion word in the texts has a modern equivalent, Rosenwein examined the contemporary emotional theories of the emotional community.⁷⁵ Since emotions are not only conveyed by explicit emotion words, but also by second-hand means, for example, metaphors or figures of speech ('he exploded'), ironies and even silences, she examined borrowings and imagery in emotional language.⁷⁶ After having established the qualitative context of her research, she also took on the onerous task of counting particular emotion words.⁷⁷ Her goal was to establish their frequencies and to evaluate these frequencies quantitatively, having added the disclaimer that word-counts out of qualitative context are quite useless.⁷⁸ Another important caveat added by Rosenwein is the lack of written sources reflecting the lower classes. As she notes, the writings of the early middle ages echo only the voices of elites, especially clerical ones.⁷⁹ This disclaimer ties in well with the Stearnses's problem of sources.

The shared 'norms of emotional expression' upon which Rosenwein's emocoms are built bear some resemblance to the Stearnses's idea of emotionology as 'the attitudes or standards that a society, or a definable group within a society, maintains toward basic emotions and their appropriate expression'.⁸⁰ However, she objects to the grand narrative launched by Huizinga⁸¹ and taken up by the Stearnses,⁸² which may be summed up as follows: the history of the west is the history of increasing emotional restraint.⁸³ Hence, she focuses on evidence gleaned from textual factors, which may contradict or complicate the 'thick evidence' derived from studying emotional

72 Plamper, 'Interview with Reddy, Rosenwein, and Stearns', 254.

73 Rosenwein, 'Problems and methods', 13.

74 Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities*, 26.

75 Rosenwein, 'Problems and methods', 13–14; Plamper, 'Interview with Reddy, Rosenwein, and Stearns', 253–54; Plamper, *History of Emotions*, 69.

76 Rosenwein, 'Problems and methods', 17–19; Plamper, *History of Emotions*, 69–70.

77 Rosenwein, 'Problems and methods in the history of emotions', 15–16; Plamper, *History of Emotions*, 70.

78 Rosenwein, 'Problems and methods', 16; Plamper, 'Interview with Reddy, Rosenwein, and Stearns', 254; Plamper, *History of Emotions*, 70.

79 Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities*, 26.

80 Stearns and Stearns, 'Emotionology', 813; Lynch, 'Emotional community', 5.

81 J. Huizinga, *The Waning of the Middle Ages: A Study of the Forms of Life, Thought and Art in France and the Netherlands in the XIVth and XVth Centuries*, tr. F.J. Hopman (New York, 1924).

82 Stearns and Stearns, *Anger*, 21–23, 25.

83 Rosenwein, 'Worrying about emotions', 823–27.

culture.⁸⁴ She claims an ideological affiliation to William Reddy's term of 'emotional regimes' – as long as community dominates the norms and texts of a large part of society – which, in turn, require individuals to express normative emotions and to avoid deviant ones.⁸⁵ Notwithstanding, she admits that Reddy's concept of emotional regimes applies better in the modern period, with its state apparatuses of censorship, political and military monopolies, and economic control, all tied to state formation and hegemony.⁸⁶ According to Rosenwein, Reddy's theory posits a restrictive social binarism,⁸⁷ which is difficult for medievalists to tackle, between the norms of politically dominant (ruling class) and marginal emotional communities: it denies inclusive plurality and social interchangeability. Along these lines, the theory of emotional regimes does not accommodate the possibility of people having a way of carving out their own emotional communities and of margins often being the breeding grounds of historical change.⁸⁸ She further argues that emocomms are constituted by a co-existing variety of emotional 'constellations' or 'sets', which include and exclude privilege, and downplay particular emotions and versions of emotional life, which is virtually social life.⁸⁹ Accordingly, she believes that

emotions are above all instruments of sociability and as such they are not only socially constructed and "sustain or endorse cultural systems", but they also inform human relations at all levels, from intimate talk between husbands and wives to global relations.⁹⁰

Being the result of social interaction, the emotional give-and-take among people forms 'scripts' that lead to new emotions and readjusted relationships.⁹¹ According to her wider theoretical framework of interchangeability between dominance and marginality, many emotion words acquired explicit or implicit normative functions and were to be interpreted as 'emotional scripts', whose temporal change should be the central object of historical investigation.⁹²

84 Rosenwein, 'Problems and methods', 21; Lynch, 'Emotional community', 5.

85 Rosenwein, 'Problems and methods', 22; Reddy, *Navigation of Feeling*, 125.

86 Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities*, 23; Rosenwein, 'Problems and methods', 22–23.

87 For the term, see Lynch, 'Emotional community', 5.

88 B.H. Rosenwein, 'Modernity: a problematic category in the history of emotions', *History and Theory*, 53 (2014), 69–78, at 78.

89 Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities*, 26; Lynch, 'Emotional community', 5.

90 Rosenwein, 'Problems and methods', 19–20.

91 Rosenwein, 'Problems and methods', 20.

92 Plamper, *History of Emotions*, 70.

History of Emotions in Classics and Ancient History: The Birth of a Discipline

Emotions were never outside the scope of classics, ancient history, medieval and Byzantine studies as disciplines. However, this scope took on new focus when Gabriel Herman published his monograph on ritualised friendship. In his book, Herman studies the institution of guest-friendship (*xenia*), in its overt or covert existence, and the ways it acted as a powerful bond between citizens of different cities and between citizens and members of different social units.⁹³ Herman employed anthropological research tools and used thick evidence which pointed out that *xenia* was an important social institution in the classical era, despite the direct conflict it may have produced between aristocratic partners in this relationship and the ideology and practice of the city-state.⁹⁴ Since two social groups, not simply individuals, might strike a permanent and inheritable bond through *xenia*, they would share concomitant obligations of a nature similar to those imposed by kin relations. These obligations prescribed a wide variety of possible practical aids, for example, the dowering of daughters whose father had died, foster-parenting, a home and financial support in times of trouble or exile, lending of troops and political aid.⁹⁵ Confirmation of the bond took many forms in terms of ritualised procedures and was enacted through an extraordinary variety of trust-generating devices. Each device fulfilled a different function and bore distinct and highly pregnant designations: it may have involved a mediator, libations (*spondai*), a formal introduction, gestures of goodwill or gifts, good deeds or favours (*evergesia*), the swearing of an oath (*horkiai*), exchange of objects as pledge (*pista*, *pisteis*, *enechyra*), a ritual handshake (*dexia*).⁹⁶ Like any ritualised social practice, the initiation ritual involved, among other things, solemn pronouncements that acted as performative utterances, which conform with J.L. Austin's speech-acts theory,⁹⁷ since their use serves a social purpose.⁹⁸ Guest-friendship, once affirmed, was perpetual and could only be violated under the threat of social disapprobation and even divine retribution.⁹⁹ It is worth noting that the institution was not limited to city boundaries. Guest-friendship was used as a major device in building the ruling circles of great territorial empires such as the Persian

93 G. Herman, *Ritualised Friendship and the Greek City* (Cambridge, 1987), 6.

94 H. Foley, 'Ritual in ancient Greece', *Journal of Ritual Studies*, 6.2 (1992), 135.

95 Herman, *Ritualised Friendship*, 73–130; T.W. Gallant, review of *Ritualised Friendship and the Greek City*, by G. Herman, *CJ*, 85.4 (1990), 358; Foley, 'Ritual in ancient Greece', 135.

96 Herman, *Ritualised Friendship*, 49–52. Diomedes' and Glaukos's rediscovery of their affiliation through *xenia* is affirmed by an iconic handshake: *Iliad*, 6.233: χεῖρας τ' ἀλλήλων λαβέτην καὶ πιστώσαντο ('clasped each other's hands and pledged their faith'). Foley, 'Ritual in ancient Greece', 135.

97 Austin, *How to Do Things with Words*, 4–11.

98 Herman, *Ritualised Friendship*, 59.

99 Foley, 'Ritual in ancient Greece', 135; Gallant, review of *Ritualised Friendship*, 357.

empire (*syngeneis*), the Macedonian kingdom (*hetairoi*) and the Hellenistic kingdoms (*philoï*). The respective ruling circles were composed of a narrow core of kin and a wide periphery of guest-friends drawn from an astonishing variety of localities.¹⁰⁰

The merit of Herman's monograph lies in its emphasis on the significance of guest-friendship between elite members of different Greek cities and other imperial territories in the social life of the communities.¹⁰¹ The institution persisted throughout Greek history. Diverse social actors manipulated its effective agency in intra- or intercommunal contexts. For example, Persian kings and Hellenistic monarchs alike used it to form their ruling elites. Members of Greek elites forged alliances and power networks. Alkibiades, who has come down to history as a scheming opportunist, operated consistently in full alignment with the values of guest-friendship.¹⁰² As a social institution, based on rituals as trust-generating devices, guest-friendship elicited the conventional display of emotions. According to Herman, partners in a ritualised friendship were presumed to be bound by mutual affection. However, they were not supposed to love each other, but to behave as if they did, as is the case of Polykrates of Samos and Amasis of Egypt (Herodotos, 3.43). However, the expression of genuine feelings could not be excluded; for example, the case of Pindar and Thorax, his Thessalian *xenos* (Pindar, *Pythian*, 10.66: φιλῶν φιλέοντ'), when the choral poet describes his relation with Thorax as one of mutual friendship and love (loving and beloved).¹⁰³ And, although affection was not indispensable for a ritualised friendship to endure (Isocrates, 19.5), a further element of real emotional reciprocity was necessary for this relation to assume genuine intimacy.¹⁰⁴ Even the invocation of *xenia* in order to advocate a certain course of action could elicit emotional responses, as in the case of Klearchos's emotional appeal to the Greek soldiers, when the latter found out that they had been tricked into an attempt to overthrow the Persian throne.¹⁰⁵ According to Herman, the composition of epitaphs, poems and other literary pieces was aimed at expressing one's emotions towards one's *xenos* and spreading his renown. Pindar points to an explicit link between *xenia*, love and the duty to sing a *xenos*'s praise.¹⁰⁶ In his analysis, Herman combined the concepts of social practices and values, social networking, exercise of power, intra- and intercommunal relations, and emotional expressions. In that sense,

100 Herman, *Ritualised Friendship*, 8. An offshoot of Herman's monograph is Maria Fragoulaki's study on *Kinship in Thucydides: Intercommunal Ties and Historical Narrative* (Oxford, 2013).

101 Gallant, review of *Ritualised Friendship*, 357.

102 Gallant, review of *Ritualised Friendship*, 357.

103 Note the interplay between the meaning of friendship and love: Herman, *Ritualised Friendship*, 17.

104 Herman, *Ritualised Friendship*, 17.

105 Herman, *Ritualised Friendship*, 119–20.

106 Herman, *Ritualised Friendship*, 17, 120, 129.

he innovatively put into scholarly practice the concept of emotional communities well before the coinage of the term.

The next milestone in research on emotions in Classics was the publication, within the space of two years, of three monographs on the values and emotions of honour and shame.¹⁰⁷ As A.W.H. Adkins noted in his review of all three, ‘the publication of three books concerned with Ancient Greece, all containing the word “shame” in their titles, must suggest that the *Zeitgeist* is moving in its mysterious way once again’.¹⁰⁸ I shall briefly discuss D.L. Cairns’s book since this classical scholar’s contribution to the history of emotions still has the most enduring impact in classical studies. His monograph on *aidos*, a term of ancient Greek psychology and ethics, was the first full-length survey dedicated to an ethical value as well as an emotion.¹⁰⁹ It revisited the anthropological dichotomy between guilt- and shame-culture, as conceptualised by E.R. Dodds in 1951,¹¹⁰ and it aimed to collapse them into one concept.¹¹¹ It also provided a nuanced and updated discussion of the shame-honour pair of civic values, initiated by K.J. Dover in 1974.¹¹² In a nuanced discussion, Cairns argued against the distinction between shame as a response to external sanctions and guilt as a response to internal ones.¹¹³ Hence he held the distinction between societies ruled by conscience and societies ruled by shame as untenable, since both shame and guilt possess an internalised component, regardless of their being played out before a real or fantasy audience, or before oneself.¹¹⁴ He also explored at length the emotions of shame, remorse, self-reproach and fear of shame, their conceptualisation, and their association with anthropological conceptions of internal and external sanctions.¹¹⁵ Cairns delved into anthropological analysis when discussing the internalisation of sanctions during the upbringing of children. He also exposed the assumptions underlying the implicit contrast between shame- and guilt-cultures, which lies with the

107 N.R.E. Fisher, *Hybris: A Study in the Values of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greece* (Warminster, 1992); B. Williams, *Shame and Necessity* (Berkeley, 1993); D.L. Cairns, *Aidos: The Psychology and Ethics of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greek Literature* (Oxford, 1993).

108 A.W.H. Adkins, ‘Shame, honor, and necessity’ [review of *Hybris: A Study in the Values of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greece*, by N.R.E. Fisher; *Shame and Necessity*, by B. Williams; *Aidos: The Psychology and Ethics of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greek Literature*, by D.L. Cairns], *CJ*, 90.4 (1995), 451.

109 A.W.H. Adkins, review of *Aidos: The Psychology and Ethics of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greek Literature*, by D.L. Cairns, *Ethics*, 105.1 (1994), 181.

110 E.R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Berkeley, 1951), 17–63.

111 Adkins, ‘Shame, honor, and necessity’, 451.

112 K.J. Dover, *Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle* (Indianapolis, 1974), 217–42.

113 Cairns, *Aidos*, 27–47; M.J. Edwards, review of *Aidos: The Psychology and Ethics of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greek Literature*, by D.L. Cairns, *CR*, 43.2 (1993), 290.

114 Cairns, *Aidos*, 27.

115 Cairns, *Aidos*, 28–32.

forms of socialisation and personality development displayed in societies other than western ones, such as the Navajo, and the pattern of parent-child relationship that dominates societies like white, middle-class, Protestant America.¹¹⁶ He concluded that it is an unlikely and unjustified claim that there are societies in which internalisation of social and moral values does not take place, and that conscience is a phenomenon restricted to a very few cultural contexts.¹¹⁷

David Konstan gave new momentum to the history of emotions. In his study on friendship in the classical world,¹¹⁸ he explores friendship as a social construction and as a conception based on mutual affection, esteem and liberality.¹¹⁹ Throughout his monograph he offers a twofold argument. The first strand of his argument challenges the understanding of Greek and Roman friendship as a concept seamlessly embedded in economic and other functions.¹²⁰ According to Konstan, friendship in the classical world is to be understood centrally as a personal relationship predicated on affection and generosity rather than on obligatory reciprocity.¹²¹ Hence, his view on this issue ‘challenges prevailing assumptions about the nature of social relations in antiquity’.¹²² The second strand of his argument is that the semantic spectrum of the Greek word *philos* is narrower than has previously been thought.¹²³ In his study, Konstan emphasises the emotional aspects of friendship, as he argues that ancient friendship bears recognisable similarities to its modern counterpart, despite the manifold varieties exhibited over the 1,500 years or so of ancient Greek and Roman practices.¹²⁴ His anthropological approach employs a conceptual blueprint of friendship, which he streamlines accordingly to tie his story together. His conception places great emphasis on ‘mutual affection, esteem, and liberality’. Consequently, Aristotle’s definition and understanding of friendship serve as Konstan’s theoretical foundation, as it acts as an influential model within antiquity and as a vehicle for the modern scholar’s narrative construction. Aristotle was the first to offer a rigorous definition of human friendship in which persons are bound together first and foremost by a personal affinity, due in large part to the content of their character, in contrast to those who are friends for lesser reasons, due to usefulness or pleasure.¹²⁵ Aristotle’s

116 Cairns, *Aidos*, 32.

117 Cairns, *Aidos*, 32.

118 D. Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World* (Cambridge, 1997).

119 D.K. Glidden, review of *Friendship in the Classical World*, by D. Konstan, *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 37.2 (1999), 359–61, esp. 360.

120 Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World*, 5.

121 Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World*, 5.

122 Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World*, 5.

123 Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World*, 3; G. Herman, review of *Friendship in the Classical World*, by D. Konstan, *JRS*, 88 (1998), 181.

124 Glidden, review of *Friendship in the Classical World*, 359–61, esp. 359.

125 Glidden, review of *Friendship in the Classical World*, 360.

template binds well with Konstan's purpose since the modern classical scholar also considers character affinity as a primary instigation for human beings to relate with one another.¹²⁶

Ever since Konstan's ground-breaking monograph on friendship, publications of both collected volumes and journal articles on emotions have proliferated.¹²⁷ Konstan's work stood at the fore of the 'fashion for passion' in classical studies.¹²⁸ He used the study of emotions as a valuable tool for setting new trends and developing a deeper understanding of the Graeco-Roman world. One of his greatest contributions towards this understanding is his insight into the interaction between emotion and moral and social norms.¹²⁹ His research into pity, altruism, and forgiveness finally culminated in another monograph, entitled *The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks*.¹³⁰ In this book, he analyses extensively a set of twelve emotions taken to be basic to ancient Greek culture in the fifth and fourth centuries BCE.¹³¹ His assertion at the very outset of his investigation that Greek lit-

126 Glidden, review of *Friendship in the Classical World*, 360.

127 Cairns, *Aidos*; D. Konstan and N.K. Rutter (ed.), *Envy, Spite, and Jealousy: The Rivalrous Emotions in Ancient Greece* (Edinburgh, 2003); S. Braund and G. Most (ed.), *Ancient Anger: Perspectives from Homer to Galen* (Cambridge, 2003); M. Harbsmeier and S. Möckel (ed.), *Pathos, Affekt, Emotion: Transformationen der Antike* (Frankfurt am Main, 2009); P. Borgeaud, *Mythes, rites et émotions* (Geneva, 2009); A. Serghidou (ed.), *Dossier Émotions*, special issue of *Métis: Revue d'anthropologie du monde grec ancien*, n.s. 9 (2011); A. Chaniotis (ed.), *Unveiling Emotions: Sources and Methods for the Study of Emotions in the Greek World* (Stuttgart, 2012); A. Chaniotis and P. Ducrey (ed.), *Unveiling Emotions II: Emotions in Greece and Rome; Texts, Images, Material Culture* (Stuttgart, 2013); L. Fulkerson, *No Regrets: Remorse in Classical Antiquity* (Oxford, 2013); D.L. Cairns and L. Fulkerson (ed.), *Emotions between Greece and Rome*, BICS, 125 (London, 2015); R.R. Caston and A.R. Kaster, (ed.), *Hope, Joy, and Affection in the Classical World* (Oxford, 2016); D. Lateiner and D. Spatharas (ed.), *The Ancient Emotion of Disgust* (Oxford, 2017); D.L. Cairns and D. Nelis (ed.), *Emotions in the Classical World: Methods, Approaches, and Directions* (Stuttgart, 2017).

128 S. Goldhill, review of *Ancient Anger. Perspectives from Homer to Galen*, by S. Braund and G. Most, *CR*, 55.1 (2005), 178–79, at 178.

129 D. Cairns, review of *The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks: Studies in Aristotle and Classical Literature*, by D. Konstan, *JHS*, 127 (2007), 249; D. Cairns and D. Nelis, 'Introduction', in *Emotions in the Classical World*, ed. Cairns and Nelis, 9.

130 D. Konstan, *The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks: Studies in Aristotle and Classical Literature* (Toronto, 2006); D. Konstan, 'Pity and self-pity', *Electronic Antiquity*, 5.2 (1999), <https://scholar.lib.vt.edu/ejournals/ElAnt/V5N2/konstan.html>; D. Konstan, 'Altruism', *TAPA*, 130 (2000), 1–17; D. Konstan, *Pity Transformed* (London, 2001); D. Konstan, 'Translating ancient emotions', *Acta Classica*, 46 (2003), 5–19; Konstan and Rutter (ed.), *Envy, Spite, and Jealousy*, passim; D. Konstan and S. Kiritsi, 'From pity to sympathy: tragic emotions across the ages', *The Athens Dialogues E-Journal*, 1 (2010), http://www.panoreon.gr/files/items/1/163/from_pity_to_sympathy.pdf; D. Konstan, *Before Forgiveness: The Origins of a Moral Idea* (Cambridge, 2010).

131 His study *The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks* includes almost the whole gamut of human emotion: anger, satisfaction, shame, envy and indignation, fear, gratitude, love, hatred, pity, jealousy and grief: D. Konstan, 'The emotions of the ancient Greeks: a cross-cultural perspective', *Psychologia*, 48 (2005), 225–40, esp. 227; K. Drabinski, review of

erary sources constitute a rich corpus of linguistic data reveals his strong philological background and affiliation, which inform his study.¹³² Konstan bases his interpretation on Aristotle's thorough analysis of emotions and their arousal as means of persuasion in *Rhetoric*, Book 2 (Chapters 1–11).¹³³ Aristotle treats emotions as responses to the behaviour and intentions of others. This conception inscribes emotions into a highly competitive communal interaction.¹³⁴ Given the social context and life of emotions in ancient Greek culture, Konstan fully aligns with Aristotle's idea of emotion as an act of cognition, of judgement, an act which is generated and shaped by the acts and responses of the other.¹³⁵ In that respect, the embeddedness of emotions in Greek social, ethical and political life, advocated by Aristotle, entails their reliance on cognitive evaluation and judgement. If emotions are interpreted as cognitive-evaluative outcomes of social encounters, their efficacy entails a highly perceptive sense and evaluative awareness of others' emotions, motives and social relationships.¹³⁶ In this way, Konstan underscores Aristotle's perception of emotions as a dynamic force, which affects social interaction and, thus, shapes human judgement.¹³⁷ Hence Konstan views emotions as 'elements in complex sets of interpersonal exchanges, in which individuals are conscious of the motives of others and ready to respond in kind'.¹³⁸ His firm alignment with the cognitivists and his insistence on the embeddedness of Greek emotions in the competitive social environment, complemented by his focus on the subtle nuances of Greek words expressing different lexical meanings, extrapolate the function of emotions as scripts.¹³⁹ Though his approach is mainly lexical, by following Aristotle's

The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks, by D. Konstan, *Foucault Studies*, 8 (2010), 156; E. Sanders, review of *The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks*, by D. Konstan, *CR*, 57 (2007), 327–29, esp. 328.

132 Konstan, 'Emotions of the ancient Greeks: a cross-cultural perspective', 228; E. Sanders, *Envy and Jealousy in Classical Athens* (Oxford, 2014), 4.

133 E. Belfiore, review of *The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks*, by D. Konstan, *CW*, 101 (2007), 106.

134 Konstan, *Emotions of the Ancient Greeks*, 27; Konstan, 'Emotions of the ancient Greeks: a cross-cultural perspective', 237; Cairns, review of *Emotions of the Ancient Greeks*, 249; Belfiore, review of *Emotions of the Ancient Greeks*, 106–7.

135 Konstan, *Emotions of the Ancient Greeks*, 22; judgements are 'strongly conditioned by the social environment'; Drabinski, review of *Emotions of the Ancient Greeks*, 155.

136 Cairns, review of *Emotions of the Ancient Greeks*, 248.

137 Konstan, 'Emotions of the ancient Greeks: a cross-cultural perspective', 227–28, 237–38; Konstan, *Emotions of the Ancient Greeks*, 27–28; Cairns, review of *Emotions of the Ancient Greeks*, 248.

138 Konstan, *Emotions of the Ancient Greeks*, 28; Belfiore, review of *Emotions of the Ancient Greeks*, 106.

139 Cairns, review of *Emotions of the Ancient Greeks*, 249; Sanders, review of *Emotions of the Ancient Greeks*, 328.

sociological aspect of cognition Konstan anticipates the use of emotional episode theory in classical texts.¹⁴⁰

Conclusions: New Perspectives and Trends in the History of Byzantine Emotions

In his essay on history,¹⁴¹ published posthumously, *Clio: Dialogue de l'histoire et de l'âme païenne*, Charles Péguy noted a fundamental difference between research on ancient and modern history, based on two antithetical pairs, namely, first, the dearth or abundance of evidence, and second, the temporal remoteness from or vicinity to this evidence. Put more simply, writing about ancient history in modernity is marked by the dysfunctional relation between dearth of evidence and remoteness of the past on the one hand, while on the other hand writing about modern history is overwhelmingly characterised by the abundance of evidence and temporal vicinity.¹⁴² The birth of studies on the history of emotion in classics and ancient history was marked by what has been called the 'shadow of Aristotle'.¹⁴³ In the modern era, many classical scholars and historians have broached the topics of emotions like sadness, anger, love, pity, remorse and shame.¹⁴⁴ One

140 For the use of the theory of emotion scripts in classical texts, see R.A. Kaster, *Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome* (Oxford, 2005), 8–9; and Sanders, *Envy and Jealousy in Classical Athens*, 2–7; for the use of scripts in emotions research, see G. Lakoff and Z. Kövecses, 'The cognitive model of anger inherent in American English', in D. Holland and N. Quinn (ed.), *Cultural Models in Language and Thought* (Cambridge, 1987), 195–221; J.A. Russell, 'Culture and the categorization of emotions', *Psychological Bulletin*, 110 (1991), 426–50, esp. 442–44; P.L. Harris, 'Understanding emotion', in M. Lewis and J.M. Haviland-Jones (ed.), *Handbook of Emotions*, 2nd edn (New York, 2000), 281–92, esp. 285–88; R.A. Shweder and J. Haldt, 'The cultural psychology of the emotions', in *Handbook of Emotions*, ed. Lewis and Haviland-Jones, 397–414, esp. 405–6; J.A. Russell and G. Lemay, 'Emotion concepts', in *Handbook of Emotions*, ed. Lewis and Haviland-Jones, 491–503, esp. 496–99; D.L. Cairns, 'Look both ways: studying emotion in ancient Greek', *CQ*, 50.4 (2008), 43–63, esp. 46; A. Wierzbicka, *Emotions across Languages and Cultures: Diversity and Universals* (Cambridge, 1999); A.H. Fischer, *Emotion Scripts: A Study of the Social and Cognitive Facets of Emotions* (Leiden, 1991).

141 C. Péguy, *Clio: Dialogue de l'histoire et de l'âme païenne* (Paris, 1931).

142 J. Viard (ed.), *Les oeuvres posthumes de Charles Péguy* (Paris, 1969), 240: Quand il s'agit d'histoire ancienne, on ne peut pas faire d'histoire parce qu'on manque de références. Quand il s'agit d'histoire moderne, on ne peut pas faire d'histoire, parce qu'on regorge de références.

143 M. Tamiolaki, 'Emotions and historical representation in Xenophon's *Hellenika*', in *Unveiling Emotions II*, ed. Chaniotis and Ducrey, 17.

144 C.A. Barton, *Sorrows of the Ancient Romans: The Gladiator and the Monster* (Princeton, 1995); J. Perkins, *The Suffering Self: Pain and Narrative Representation in the Early Christian Era* (London, 1995); Braund and Most (ed.), *Ancient Anger*; P. Toohey, *Melancholy, Love, and Time: Boundaries of the Self in Ancient Literature* (Ann Arbor, MI, 2004); R.H. Sternberg (ed.), *Pity and Power in Ancient Athens* (Cambridge, 2005); Kaster, *Emotion, Restraint, and Community*; D. LaCourse Munteanu, *Emotion, Genre and Gender in*

should also take into account that these topics have also a historical component, which was emphasised by the main theorists, Peter and Carol Stearns, William Reddy and Barbara Rosenwein, whose views I discussed earlier. As Erin Sullivan put it,

In a set of interviews with Stearns, Rosenwein, and Reddy in 2010, Jan Plamper identified a desire among all three scholars to see the future of emotions history ‘not as a specialised field but as a means of integrating the category of emotion into social, cultural, and political history’.¹⁴⁵

In that respect, this integration promotes emotions history to a discipline in its own right, and the role of history is to apply intellectual rigour and scholarly method. So far methodological tools have acquired intellectual subtlety and practical sophistication. My brief account of methodologies in writing the history of emotions is aimed at offering an overview of previous experience, past achievements and recent developments on the one hand, and on the other hand, aims at proposing reliable methodological tools that can be applied and, thus, make a significant contribution towards research in the history of Byzantine emotions.¹⁴⁶

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Classical Antiquity (London, 2011); Fulkerson, *No Regrets*; J.T. Fitzgerald (ed.), *Passions and Moral Progress in Greco-Roman Thought* (London, 2008); Cairns, *Aidos*.

145 Sullivan, ‘History of the emotions’, 101.

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3 The Neighbour's Unbearable Wellbeing

Phthonos/Envy from the Classical to the Modern Greek World

Martin Hinterberger

Introduction

It is the aim of this paper to give a concise overview of Byzantine φθόνος (*phthonos*, approximately 'envy') and to highlight its importance for the Byzantine worldview, as well as, by extension, for our interpretation of Byzantine texts. I ought to clarify from the outset that my approach is based on the assumption, widely accepted among historians of emotions, that linguistic conceptualisation of emotions is an essential part of their experience and that, therefore, it is possible to access, at least to a considerable extent, emotions of the past through the careful examination of linguistic artefacts, i.e., texts.¹ Moreover, my research into Byzantine emotions is motivated both by an interest in the history of emotions or emotion studies and by a never-ending effort to achieve an understanding of Byzantine texts that is as complete and precise as possible.

Therefore, the primary aim of my investigation is to illuminate the Byzantine concept of *phthonos* as it is reflected in texts and to investigate what ideas Byzantines had about *phthonos* so that we can better understand what Byzantines meant when they wrote *phthonos*, why the word and concept are so frequent, why it was important to control it, and why the concept takes on such a strong argumentative force in the explanation and justification of major events in Byzantine history. As we shall see, the investigation of *phthonos* is related to the history of ideas and the history of religion, as well as to the social history of Byzantium. In analysing Byzantine *phthonos*, I shall also present the essential differences between Byzantine *phthonos* and 'envy' in modern European or western culture on the one hand, and the significant differences between Byzantine *phthonos* and ancient Greek *phthonos* on the

1 See D. Cairns, 'Emotions through time?', in D. Cairns, M. Hinterberger, A. Pizzone and M. Zaccarini (ed.), *Emotions through Time: From Antiquity to Byzantium* (Tübingen, 2022), 3–33, esp. 32: 'emotions are primarily concepts, concepts by which individuals and cultures make sense of their worlds and themselves'.

other hand. I am also interested in the survival of the Byzantine *phthonos* concept into early modern times.

Terminology and Methodology

Like sorrow or hate, the two English equivalents of Greek *phthonos*, envy and jealousy, belong to the category of human phenomena called emotions. Since the 1980s, the interest in emotion as an object of scientific research has spread from psychology and sociology to the humanities. Today, emotion studies are carried out in a broad range of disciplines, and emotions are the subject of fruitful interdisciplinary research in which diverse fields, such as neurosciences and philology, meet. Recently, emotions have been recognised as important factors for human moral judgement and behaviour, both in philosophy and in sociology. Generally, there is more and more emphasis on the importance of emotions for human life.

It goes without saying that emotions are a complex phenomenon. However, the various scientific and scholarly disciplines which explore emotions are far from agreed about what exactly emotions are.² Especially in the context of *phthonos/envy*, I agree with emotional psychologists who observe that it often makes more sense to speak of an emotional episode or scenario, i.e., a short narrative rather than an emotion per se.³ Emotional episodes begin with ‘antecedent conditions’ (perceptions and our interpretation of them) which arouse feelings, followed by verbal expressions and physical actions resulting from the emotion.⁴

For our present subject, it is important to note that emotions are not unvarying features of human life. Emotions are partly genetically predetermined, but they are also formed by the cultural environment in which they arise.⁵ Therefore, there are important synchronic differences, quite obvious when different modern cultures are compared; and emotions change over time.⁶ To which extent or in which respect they change, however, is not clear, but by the end of this chapter I hope to have shown that there are significant differences between Byzantine *phthonos* and modern English envy.

2 See, e.g., D. Cairns, ‘Look both ways: studying emotion in ancient Greek’, *CQ*, 50.4 (2008), 43–62, esp. 43–45.

3 W.G. Parrott, ‘The emotional experience of envy and jealousy’, in P. Salovey (ed.), *The Psychology of Jealousy and Envy* (New York, 1991), 3–30, esp. 4. See also E. Sanders, *Envy and Jealousy in Classical Athens. A Socio-Psychological Approach* (Oxford, 2014), 2 (with further bibliography).

4 Sanders, *Envy and Jealousy*, 2. See also Cairns, ‘Look both ways’, esp. 46.

5 See the particularly clear explanation in D. Cairns, ‘Ethics, ethology, and terminology: Iliadic anger and the cross-cultural study of emotions’, in S. Braund and G.W. Most (ed.), *Ancient Anger: Perspectives from Homer to Galen*, YCS, 32 (Cambridge, 2003), 11–49, esp. 12–13.

6 P.N. Stearns, ‘History of emotions: issues of change and impact’, in M. Lewis and J.M. Haviland-Jones (ed.), *Handbook of Emotions*, 2nd edn (New York, 2002), 16–29; S.J. Matt and P.N. Stearns (ed.), *Doing Emotions History* (Urbana, IL, 2014).

Since we are using the English language, a brief presentation of the meaning and usage of the English terms ‘envy’ and ‘jealousy’ will be necessary. By doing so, I am not presupposing any kind of diachronic continuity or emotional universalism, but when talking about Byzantine and ancient *phthonos*, an emotion which according to what we know today is akin to modern envy and jealousy, it is inevitable that we use these modern terms and so we need to know what they mean. Moreover, a careful analysis of these modern emotions may sharpen our awareness of the precise characteristics of *phthonos*.

We are in the fortunate position to have at our disposal an excellent study on ancient Greek envy recently published by Ed Sanders.⁷ Sanders’s book not only is a meticulous investigation of ancient Athenian *phthonos*, but it also provides a useful analysis of modern envy and jealousy. Sander’s basic methodological tool for his investigation into envy is the ‘scripts’ approach, a script being the abstract pattern resulting from the analysis of specific emotional scenarios, as mentioned above.⁸ This approach has several advantages; in particular, it provides descriptions of emotions without using emotional terminology, thus avoiding misunderstandings due to differing connotations of envy words in different languages, and it allows us to detect and identify envy where no envy word is used.

According to Sanders envy follows ‘from noting that you have something, I do not, and I feel a painful feeling on contemplating our relative positions’.⁹ Sanders distinguishes five different scripts which are covered by the term ‘envy’ in English, to each of which, for practical reasons, he assigns a label.¹⁰ For example, the label ‘covetous envy’ means ‘I feel a strong desire to act to deprive you of the good, and a weaker desire to obtain it myself’, whereas ‘begrudging envy’ means ‘I feel a strong desire to act to deprive you of the good, but have no desire to obtain it myself’ (the other labels are ‘covetousness’, ‘emulation’ and ‘emulative envy’). Jealousy differs from envy in a number of respects, but it has many similarities too. Its main characteristic is a perceived exclusive bond with some object or person, and it appears both in sexual and non-sexual situations. Being a blended emotion, jealousy frequently includes envy. Sanders distinguishes four jealousy scripts, labelled as ‘jealous of my position’, ‘possessive jealousy’, ‘sexual jealousy’

7 Sanders, *Envy and Jealousy*.

8 Sanders, *Envy and Jealousy*, 5. The scripts approach was fruitfully introduced into classics by Robert Kaster, see esp. R.A. Kaster, *Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome*, Classical Culture and Society (Oxford, 2005). On the ‘script’ as a methodological tool, particularly for the exploration of emotions of the past, see also Cairns, ‘Look both ways’, particularly 46.

9 Sanders, *Envy and Jealousy*, 8. The painfulness of envy is again underlined in J. Crusius, M.F. Gonzalez, J. Lange and Y. Cohen-Charash, ‘Envy: an adversarial review and comparison of two competing views’, *Emotion Review*, 12 (2020), 3–21.

10 Sanders, *Envy and Jealousy*, 31, Table 2.1. See also below, 65.

and ‘envy’ (the term ‘jealousy’ being frequently used instead of ‘envy’ in everyday language).¹¹

A full description of what modern envy precisely is according to psychology would be beyond the scope of the present paper.¹² It is, however, useful to point out certain characteristics that are of diachronic importance and therefore also useful for the study of Byzantine *phthonos*.

In comparison to other emotions, envy is a rather complex one. It is based on various judgements and on a thorough evaluation of social constellations (assessing hierarchies etc). Envy could be called an intellectual emotion. Therefore, it does not belong to the set of so-called basic emotions which are rather straightforward such as joy, sorrow or anger, the expression of which is supposed to be readily understood among representatives of different cultures.¹³ Consequently, this means that envy depends more than other emotions on the culture or society in which it arises. Furthermore, envy does not have clear bodily symptoms (such as laughter indicating joy, tears indicating sorrow, but also anger, agitated behaviour or blushing).

‘Envy stems from upward comparisons’.¹⁴ It thrives among peers, persons of the same or a similar social position. We do not compare ourselves with socially distant persons, but with our colleagues, school-mates, relatives, neighbours.¹⁵ Comparability is an essential precondition for envy. Today a typical situation triggering envy might be a dinner or cocktail party of colleagues (all academics) during which one of the invited persons unexpectedly announces his or her promotion to a leading position, such as head of school, or the election to a much coveted chair.

11 Sanders, *Envy and Jealousy*, 31, Table 2.2.

12 On modern envy, see, e.g., W.G. Parrot, ‘Envy’, in D. Sander and K.R. Scherer (ed.), *The Oxford Companion to Emotion and the Affective Sciences* (Oxford, 2009), 155–56; M.L. Kringelbach and H. Philipps, *Emotion: Pleasure and Pain in the Brain* (Oxford, 2014), 81–82 (jealousy, envy and *schadenfreude*); R.H. Smith (ed.), *Envy: Theory and Research* (Oxford, 2008). For a useful overview and a compelling discussion of unresolved questions, see Crusius, Gonzalez, Lange and Cohen-Charash, ‘Envy’. The classic study on modern envy remains G.M. Foster, ‘The anatomy of envy: a study in symbolic behavior’, *Current Anthropology*, 13 (1972), 165–202. See also P. Salovey (ed.), *The Psychology of Jealousy and Envy* (New York, 1991); and S.L. Hart and M. Lagerstee (ed.), *Handbook of Jealousy: Theory, Research and Multidisciplinary Approaches* (Chichester, 2010). For a concise overview of modern research on envy (and jealousy), see Sanders, *Envy and Jealousy*, 13–32.

13 E.g., P. Ekman, *Emotions Revealed: Understanding Faces and Feelings* (London, 2003); D. Evans, *Emotion: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford, 2001), 5. A critical assessment of the concept of basic emotions is provided by Cairns, ‘Look both ways’, particularly 43–47. See also P. Ekman and D. Cordaro, ‘What is meant by calling emotions basic’, *Emotion Review*, 3 (2011), 364–70.

14 Crusius, Gonzalez, Lange and Cohen-Charash, ‘Envy’, 7.

15 Very few people would envy the British Queen (and not only because her job maybe is not really enviable). Interestingly, in Byzantium, too, there is practically no mention of *phthonos* directed against the *basileus*; see M. Hinterberger, *Phthonos: Mißgunst, Neid und Eifersucht in der byzantinischen Literatur*, Serta Graeca, 29 (Wiesbaden, 2013), 171–72.

Furthermore, envy is one of the seven cardinal sins. Yet envy occupies a special place among them. Envy is the only sin which does not consist in the transgression of a legitimate measure (as, for example, fornication opposed to legitimate conjugal sex) and the only one not providing any kind of pleasure.¹⁶ Rather, envy is most unpleasant, and it appears to be absolutely evil.

It has been noted that envy results from perceived inferiority or superiority respectively and that it also has to do with the issue of desert/deservingness. Envy often positions itself as a moral emotion, as righteous indignation about undeserved superiority. The envious person argues that the target's possession of a good is wrong or not fair, while disinterested observers believe that the envious person's inferiority is deserved. Before we turn to the investigation of the Byzantine concept of *phthonos*, we should briefly turn our attention to *phthonos*-related terminology.

Greek Emotional Terms

In ancient Greek, the major *phthonos*-related terms are (in order of their chronological appearance) *nemesis*, *phthonos* and *zelos* (as well as their derivative adjectives and verbs). The term *zelotupia* makes its first appearance only in the fourth century BCE. In Byzantine Greek, *phthonos* continues to be the most frequent term, followed by *baskania*, *zelos* and *zelotupia*. Alongside these words, decidedly classicising terms such as *nemesis* are sometimes used. In Byzantine Greek, the usage of a specific term strongly depends on the text's stylistic level. *Baskania* seems to have been regarded as a high-style synonym of the stylistically rather neutral *phthonos*, whereas in demotic or low-style texts a preference for *zelos* is noticeable. In Early Modern Greek, we observe that new terms have developed: *zelophthonia*, *zel(e)ia*, *zouleia* (together with the adjective *zeliar(es)/zouliar(es)*) are used alongside the older terms *zelos* and *pht(h)onos*. *Baskania* in the sense of *phthonos* has virtually vanished.¹⁷ In twenty-first-century Standard Modern Greek, we finally have three basic envy-related nouns, *zelia*, *phthonos* and *zelotupia*. A fourth term, *zelophthonia*, is only rarely used. *Baskania* is exclusively used in the sense of the 'evil eye'.¹⁸ Through the centuries, from the fifth century BCE on, *phthonos* has been the central envy-term in the Greek language. But we now need to see whether its semantics are as stable as the term itself.

16 J. Sabini and M. Silver, 'Envy', in R. Harré (ed.), *The Social Construction of Emotion* (Oxford, 1986), 167–83.

17 On the terminological development, see Hinterberger, *Phthonos*, 18–60. On early modern terms, see also E. Kriaras, *Λεξικό της μεσαιωνικής ελληνικής δημόδου γραμματείας 1100–1669* (Thessalonike, 1967–).

18 See G.D. Babiniotis, *Λεξικό της Νέας Ελληνικής Γλώσσας. Με σχόλια για τη σωστή χρήση των λέξεων*, 2nd edn (Athens, 2002), 709 and 352.

Semantics

Ed Sanders established twelve different scripts for ancient *phthonos*:¹⁹

- a ‘begrudging refusal’: I have a desire to stop you from doing something you wish, which is mildly detrimental to myself
- b ‘odious, hateful’: I have taken an invidious dislike to someone for something they have done
- c ‘spite/malice/Schadenfreude’: I feel pleasure that someone I have an invidious dislike for has come to some harm
- d ‘censure’: I disapprove of someone for something (re money or political power) they have done that is objectively wrong
- e ‘*phthonos theon*’: I, a god, wish to strike down someone excessively fortunate
- f ‘begrudging envy’: I feel a strong desire to act to deprive you of the good, but have no desire to obtain it myself
- g ‘covetous envy’: I feel a strong desire to act to deprive you of the good, and a weaker desire to obtain it myself
- h ‘rivalry’: I want something that someone else wants too, and currently neither of us has
- i ‘begrudging sharing’: I have a non-limited good/quality, and I do not wish someone else to have it too
- j ‘jealous of my position’: I have an exclusive relationship with something I possess, and do not want a rival to possess a similar good
- k ‘possessive jealousy’: I have an exclusive relationship with something I possess, and do not want to lose it to a rival
- l ‘sexual jealousy’: I have an exclusive sexual/romantic attachment to someone, and I do not want to lose him/her to a rival

Five out of these twelve *phthonos* scripts (f, g, j, k, l) are identical with modern envy or jealousy scripts.²⁰

The general meaning of Byzantine *phthonos* is, ‘I do not want someone else to have a specific good or advantage’. According to my own categorisation, five specific scripts can be distinguished, based principally upon the questions of whether, first, the *phthoneros/envier* possesses the good; and second, if he does not possess the good, whether he wishes to obtain it or not.²¹ With the exception of script (α), in all other scripts the good which arouses *phthonos* is not at the envier’s disposal:

19 Sanders, *Envy and Jealousy*, 46, Table 3.1.

20 Sanders’s script ‘emulative envy’ is covered by ancient *zelos* (cf. Sanders, *Envy and Jealousy*, 46), and in my view the same is true for ‘emulation’ as well. Both scripts correspond to what in other studies is called ‘benign envy’; see Crusius, Gonzalez, Lange and Cohen-Charash, ‘Envy’.

21 Hinterberger, *Phthonos*, 20–28.

- (α) I do not want someone else to have a good which is at my disposal (usually this is an ‘unlimited’ good, i.e., I would not lose anything if I shared this good with someone else, except my exclusive position) (cf. Sanders’s modern and ancient ‘jealous of my position’ and ancient ‘begrudging sharing’).
- (β) I do not wish another person to obtain or to keep a good which I do not wish to obtain, even to the detriment of my own interests (cf. Sanders’s ‘begrudging envy’).
- (γ) I do not wish someone to have a good which currently is in his possession and which I desire to obtain for myself (cf. Sanders’s ‘covetous envy’).
- (δ) I do not want someone else to have the favour or affection of a third person whose favour or affection I myself seek to obtain or am afraid to lose to the rival; cf. modern jealousy (cf. Sanders’s ‘rivalry’ and ‘possessive jealousy’).
- (ε) I do not want someone to have a specific good and therefore destroy it, without any special relationship between me and the other person; blind aggression and irrational destruction, resentment (special case of β) above; primarily of the devil or fate) (cf. Sanders’s ‘*phthonos theon*’).

Although for my categorisation of Byzantine *phthonos* I chose a slightly different approach, the result of my investigation can easily be compared with Sanders’s findings for ancient *phthonos* and modern envy. Byzantine *phthonos* scripts to a large extent overlap with their ancient counterparts. All five Byzantine scripts are more or less identical with ancient ones. The most conspicuous changes are the disappearance of any ‘positive’ aspect of *phthonos* (in ancient Greek the meaning ‘indignation’, ‘censure’) and the transformation of *phthonos theon* into satanic *phthonos*.

Sanders’s last ancient *phthonos* script is ‘sexual jealousy’. I am not in a position to judge whether or not sexual (or romantic) jealousy as we understand it today did exist in antiquity, but I tend to agree with David Konstan that it did not.²² And I believe that the same is true for Byzantium. Byzantine texts record a limited number of emotional episodes which come close to the ‘sexual jealousy’ script. If, however, we regard a deep emotional attachment that goes beyond the purely sexual relationship, as essential for what we call ‘sexual or romantic jealousy’, then, I am afraid, it barely existed. In all cases I know, nothing coming close to ‘affection’ is even mentioned.²³ Moreover,

22 D. Konstan, ‘Before jealousy’, in D. Konstan and N.K. Rutter (ed.), *Envy, Spite and Jealousy: The Rivalrous Emotions in Ancient Greece*, Edinburgh Leventis Studies, 2 (Edinburgh, 2003), 7–27, and idem, *The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks: Studies in Aristotle and Classical Literature* (Toronto, 2006), 219–43. See, however, Douglas Cairns’s judicious critique of Konstan’s approach in Cairns, ‘Look both ways’, 53–56.

23 M. Hinterberger, ‘Zelotypia und Phthonos: Eifersucht in der byzantinischen Literatur’, in *Ἐξemplon: Studi in onore di Irmgard Hutter*, 1 = *Néa Póμη*, 6 (2009), 11–36.

almost always the Byzantine emotional term used for these episodes is *zelotupia* ('rivalry', although sometimes in combination with *phthonos*). Persons experiencing *zelotupia* in Byzantine texts are concerned about their social status, which is threatened by a sexual rival, and not about the alienation of the affection of their husband, wife or lover.

Both in ancient and Byzantine *phthonos* the most frequent script is what Sanders calls 'begrudging envy'. By using the qualifier 'begrudging', Sanders makes sufficiently clear what he means. My objection, however, is that among modern envy scripts, the begrudging one is not the most representative of the overall concept 'envy'; it is in fact rather rare. In my understanding, modern 'envy' is more connected with the desire to obtain a good than with the desire to prevent someone else from obtaining a good, whereas 'begrudging' is the most significant feature of ancient and Byzantine *phthonos*. For this reason, I would prefer to speak about *phthonos* when referring to the envious emotion of the Greek past. In German, there exists the beautiful word *Mißgunst*, but it is rarely used in everyday speech, if at all, and therefore quite artificial. Nevertheless it expresses very well the essence of Greek *phthonos*, much more than *Neid* or 'envy'.

In early modern times, the meaning of *phthonos* did not change significantly. The composite noun *zelophthonia*, however, indicates that terminology had changed, *zeleia* also covering *phthonos*. It is interesting to note that the Modern Greek language nowadays uses the term *phthonos* to designate exclusively the 'begrudging' emotion, already dominant in ancient and Byzantine 'envy'. Modern Greek *phthonos* covers only a single script, namely 'begrudging envy', while *zeleia* covers the 'begrudging envy' script and various others.²⁴

Byzantine *Phthonos* Emotionology

Among the textual sources providing information about Byzantine *phthonos* we can largely distinguish between general treatments of the topic and texts which record the occurrence of a specific *phthonos* episode.

Basil of Caesarea's homily 'Concerning *phthonos*' (fourth century) is the most influential treatise about this passion. During the following centuries, it remained the most important guide, was excerpted and reworked.²⁵ In texts such as Basil's homily, we find theoretical descriptions of *phthonos* and definitions which subsequently were reproduced in various lexica and anthologies. Already at the beginning of his homily, Basil gives the following definition:²⁶

24 Babinotis, Λεξικό της Νέας Ελληνικής Γλώσσας, 709 and 1879.

25 Hinterberger, *Phthonos*, 62–69, and idem, 'Basil of Caesarea and Gregory of Nazianzus speaking about anger and envy: some remarks on the Fathers' methodology of treating emotions and modern emotion studies', *Studia Patristica*, 83 (2017), 313–41.

26 Basil, *Concerning phthonos*, 1, PG 31:373A.

λύπη γάρ ἐστὶ τῆς τοῦ πλησίον εὐπραγίας ὁ φθόνος.

For *phthonos* is (mental) pain/distress about the neighbour's wellbeing.

This passage was incorporated almost verbatim into the *Souda*, an influential tenth-century 'encyclopaedia'.²⁷ Another definition which again is to be found in the *Souda* and echoes an ancient saying, recorded also by Basil, runs as follows²⁸:

φθόνος: νόσημα ψυχῆς ἀνθρωπικὸν καὶ ἐσθίον ψυχὴν, ἣν ἂν καταλάβῃ, ὥσπερ ἰὸς τὸν σίδηρον.

Phthonos is a human disease which eats up the soul afflicted by it, as rust does iron.

Generally, a lot of useful information on various emotions can be obtained from the so-called sacro-profane florilegia which contain ancient and Byzantine statements on the nature of *phthonos* and other emotions.²⁹ Since late antiquity, florilegia collected aphorisms by famous personalities or short excerpts from texts under various headings, often of a moralising character. To a certain extent, these florilegia provided guidance for the correct management of emotions.

Chapter 38 of John Stobaios's *Anthology* (fourth/fifth century), relying on older late antique collections, is dedicated to *phthonos* and contains about sixty entries, mostly from authors of the classical and Hellenistic periods. An eighth-century florilegium, the so-called Pseudo-Maximos, combined Stobaios and a pre-existing Christian florilegium (ascribed to John of Damascus), discarding some of Stobaios's material not compatible with Christian mentality, for example, sayings which presented *phthonos* as a positive emotion (Sanders's 'censure').³⁰ Apart from such minor adaptations, the general picture of *phthonos* as a painful and destructive emotion that has to be

27 *Souda*, Φ 509.1, ed. A. Adler, *Suidae Lexicon*, 5 vols (Leipzig, 1928–38, repr. Stuttgart, 1967–71), vol. 4, 742.

28 *Souda*, Φ 510.1–2, ed. *ibid.*: 'Ὡσπερ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἰοῦ τὸν σίδηρον, οὕτως ἔλεγε τοὺς φθονεροὺς ὑπὸ τοῦ ἰδίου ἥθους κατεσθίεσθαι'. ('As iron by rust, he (i.e., Kleitarchos) said, envious men are eaten up by their own character'.) On this saying, which Diogenes Laertios ascribes to Antisthenes, but which in most Byzantine collections appears as belonging to Kleitarchos, see E. Milobenski, *Der Neid in der griechischen Philosophie*, Klassisch-Philologische Studien, 29 (Wiesbaden, 1964), 17–18. This ancient aphorism is reflected in Basil, *Concerning phthonos*, 1, PG 31:373A: 'Ὡσπερ γὰρ ἰὸς σίδηρον, οὕτως ὁ φθόνος τὴν ἔχουσαν αὐτὸν ψυχὴν ἀναλίσκει' ('For like rust (consumes) iron, *phthonos* consumes the soul that has it'), and appears in various florilegia, e.g. in Pseudo-Maximos, *Common Places* (8th/9th c.), 47.31 (38), ed. S. Ihm, *Ps.-Maximus Confessor: Erste kritische Edition einer Redaktion des sacro-profanan Florilegiums Loci communes, nebst einer vollständigen Kollation einer zweiten Redaktion und weiterer Material*, Palingenesia, 73 (Stuttgart, 2001), 795.

29 See M. Hinterberger, 'Emotions in Byzantium', in L. James (ed.), *A Companion to Byzantium* (Chichester, 2010), 125–26, and *idem*, *Phthonos*, 89–94.

30 Hinterberger, *Phthonos*, 92.

controlled that these late antique and Byzantine florilegia offer, is strikingly stable. One observes, however, that in the *sententiae* of ancient provenance, *phthonos* is primarily treated as a social problem, while in excerpts from Christian texts it appears as a moral issue concerning the individual soul. Moreover, slander as the most significant manifestation of *phthonos* gains importance over the centuries.

It is, however, difficult to assess how deeply such collections influenced people's ideas and general concepts of *phthonos*, or to what extent they still reflected, be it only approximately, the actual experience of *phthonos*. They clearly constitute texts which demonstrate how one should feel and control one's emotions instead of representing how one really experienced a specific emotion, which means that florilegia constitute emotionology, not emotions, according to Peter Stearns's terminology.³¹ In any case, via these florilegia a considerable stock of ancient statements about *phthonos* was integrated into Byzantine culture, and through Byzantium into the early modern Greek world. For instance, one of those collections mentioned above served as the primary source for the chapter on *phthonos* in the *Salvation of the Sinners*, an edifying compilation published in 1641 by Agapios Landos, a prolific, learned monk.³² There, we still find reflections of the ancient sayings on *phthonos*, as for example the notion of *phthonos* eating the envious person up from the inside.³³ The *Salvation of Sinners* became a popular folkbook and was re-edited numerous times until the twentieth century.

Emotional Episodes

These definitions and *gnomai* about *phthonos* are important, but more insight, particularly concerning the social aspects of the emotion, is to be gained from the analysis of emotional episodes. Such episodes are primarily to be found in narrative texts, often as subplots. It is such episodes that provide the necessary data for the reconstruction of the various *phthonos* scripts, the meaning of *phthonos* I mentioned above. Moreover, these stories provide insight into the social circumstances or initial situations which generate *phthonos* (that is, the social status of participants of the episode, the event that triggers *phthonos*), and how *phthonos* manifests itself, how

31 Stearns, 'History of emotions', 16–29.

32 Basic information on the author and his work is provided by G. Kechagioglou, *Πεζογραφική ανθολογία. Αφηγηματικός γραπτός νεοελληνικός λόγος*, vol. 1: *Από το τέλος του Βυζαντίου ως τη Γαλλική επανάσταση* (Thessalonike, 2001), 330–31.

33 Agapios Landos, *Salvation of the Sinners*, 64–65, ed. N. Glykys (Venice, 1766; 1st edn A. Isyllianos, 1641): Καὶ καθὼς τὸ σκωλήκιον ἐκεῖνο, ὅπου κρᾶζουσι βότρυδα τρώγει τὰ πολύτιμα ἱμάτια, καὶ τὰ ἀφανίζει ὀλότελα, οὕτω καὶ ὁ Φθόνος ἐσθίει καὶ κατατῆκει τὸν φθονερόν. ('And as the worm called *votrida* (apparently a kind of moth) eats the precious garments and destroys them entirely, in the same way *phthonos* eats and consumes the envious'.) I am indebted to Despoina D. Kostoula, the specialist on Agapios Landos, for having provided me (many years ago) with photocopies of this early printing.

the envious person reacts to the event. Generally, *phthonos* is elicited by the perception of another person's advantage or good. Usually, the other person belongs to the same group of peers as the envier. In order to destroy the envied one, the envious person slanders or denounces the envied one; the most frequently used Greek terms being *diabole* and *sukophantia*. But the reaction may also be violent, in the form of a bodily aggression or an attack through poison or magic.

A typical example is provided by Theodoret of Kyrrhos's *Church History* (middle of the fifth century), where, characteristically in terms of the importance the Byzantines ascribed to *phthonos*, the Arian controversy is explained as the result of envy.³⁴

Κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον Ἄρειος τῷ μὲν καταλόγῳ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ἐντεταγμένος, τὴν δὲ τῶν θεῶν γραφῶν πεπιστευμένος ἐξήγησιν, ἰδὼν τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον τῆς ἀρχιερωσύνης ἐγχειρισθέντα τοὺς οἰάκας, οὐκ ἦνεγκε τοῦ φθόνου τὴν προσβολήν, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τούτου νυττόμενος ἀφορμὰς ἐρίδος ἐπεζήτει καὶ μάχης, καὶ τὴν μὲν ἀξιάπεινον τοῦ ἀνδρὸς πολιτείαν θεώμενος οὐδὲ συκοφαντίαν ὑφαίνειν ἠδύνατο, ἡσυχίαν δὲ ὁμῶς ἄγειν αὐτὸν ὁ φθόνος ἐκόλυε.

In this year, when Arius, who was among the priests and responsible for the explanation of the Holy Scripture, saw that Alexander was entrusted the helm of the archbishopric, he could not bear envy's attack, but stirred up by it he was seeking grounds for a quarrel and fight. In the face of the man's (i.e., Alexander's) praiseworthy conduct, he was not able to weave an intrigue against him, but envy did not permit him to be in tranquility either.

In the above episode, characteristic traits of most *phthonos* episodes can be observed: *phthonos*, like other passions, is presented as attacking the human being from outside. This attack is triggered by the visual perception of a peer's distinction (here the election to archbishop). Thus the attacked person is unable of resisting *phthonos*'s blow or incapable of controlling the overwhelming emotion. The means of choice for assailing the envied, though not available in this specific case, would be false accusations, slander, or an intrigue. Equally characteristic for the argumentative power of *phthonos* is the fact that, apparently, followers of Arius told the same story with reversed roles, namely, that Alexander forced Arius into exile because he envied him for his popularity with the inhabitants of Alexandria.³⁵

The same constituent elements as in the passage above appear in an episode in the *Life of Nicholas of Myra*, the famous so-called *Praxis de*

34 Theodoret of Kyrrhos, *Church History*, 1.2.9, ed. L. Parmentier and G.C. Hansen, *Theodoret: Kirchengeschichte*, GCS, Neue Folge, 5 (Berlin, 1998), 6.14–20.

35 Sozomenos, *Church History*, 2.27.2.6–8, ed. J. Bidez and G.C. Hansen, *Sozomenus: Kirchengeschichte*, GCS, 50 (Berlin, 1960), 88.12–14.

stratelatis, where envy emerges among soldiers, here in the version which was part of Symeon Metaphrastes' *Menologion* (end of the tenth century)³⁶:

Οἱ μέντοι στρατηλάται [...] ὅσα παρὰ τοῦ βασιλέως ἐντέταλτο αὐτοῖς, τελεσάμενοι, ἄσμενοι πρὸς τὸ Βυζάντιον ἐπανήκον. τούτοις ὑποδοχὴ φιλότιμος καὶ πολυτελής πρὸς τε τοῦ βασιλέως καὶ τῶν ἐν τέλει γίνεται, καὶ τοῦ λοιποῦ περὶ τὰ βασιλεία διῆγον ἀπόβλεπτοι καὶ περιφανεῖς, καὶ πολλή τις ἦν ἡ περὶ αὐτοὺς θεραπεία. οὐκ ἔμελλε δὲ ταῦτα οἴσειν ὁ φθόνος οὐδὲ βασκάνων ὀφθαλμοῖς φορητὰ γενέσθαι. ὅθεν καὶ προσελθόντες τινὲς τῶ ἐπάρχῳ τῆς πόλεως, ἅτε παρευδοκιμούμενοι παρ' αὐτῶν, δεινὴν πλέκουσι κατ' ἐκείνων συκοφαντίαν [...].

The generals after having executed the emperor's orders [...] gladly returned to Constantinople. They were received by the emperor and the senate with honour and splendour and subsequently lived in the palace, being respected and illustrious, and they received a lot of attention. *Phthonos*, however, should not be able to bear this, nor should envious eyes tolerate this. As a result, some people approached the eparch (i.e., governor) of the City, because they had been marginalised by them, and knitted a slanderous intrigue against them [...].

Again we encounter promotion within a certain hierarchy as the triggering event. After the generals' successful campaign and their reception into the imperial court, *phthonos* is generated among other members of the imperial court, probably other soldiers or generals, whose standing or reputation in the palace is 'outdone' or 'surpassed' (*pareudokimoumenoi*) by the three generals who have become 'respected' and 'illustrious'. In this case, too, the envious persons slander the envied ones.

Success inevitably leads to *phthonos*. It is this causal association, deeply rooted in the Byzantine mindset, that partly explains the lack of autobiographical texts (necessarily containing personal achievements) in Byzantine literature. In the face of menacing *phthonos*, speaking of oneself positively, even if this was done without arrogance, was perceived as too dangerous. In numerous remarks, Byzantines declare that they prefer to keep silent in order to avoid *phthonos*. The few autobiographers who overcame the inhibition to present their lifetime achievements did so by banning *phthonos* through apotropaic formulae (such as ἐρρέτω φθόνος, 'Away with you, *phthonos*!').³⁷

Malicious scheming and insidious attacks are the envier's hallmark. Any form of intrigue appears to be motivated by *phthonos*. According to Prokopios (sixth century), such a deadly plot was, for instance, executed by the

36 Symeon Metaphrastes, *Life of Nicholas*, c. 20–21, ed. G. Anrich, *Hagios Nikolaos: Der heilige Nikolaos in der griechischen Kirche*, 2 vols (Leipzig, 1913–17), vol. 1, 255.9–19.

37 Hinterberger, *Phthonos*, 127.

general Aetios.³⁸ He became full of *phthonos* when a more prestigious command was entrusted to his colleague Bonifatius. As a result, Aetios slandered Bonifatius at the imperial court, sending at the same time treacherous warnings to Aetios to beware of the empress's ill will and thus prompting Bonifatius to actions that corroborated Aetios's previous accusations against him. In an equally crafty manner, described in great detail by Niketas Choniates (beginning of the thirteenth century), John Kamateros, *logothetes tou dromou* under Manuel I, schemed against Theodore Styppaiotes when he falsely accused the latter before the emperor and on the other hand induced him to act suspiciously.³⁹ In the end, Styppaiotes was blinded for high treason – the typical fate suffered by victims of *phthonos* from the middle Byzantine era on – and Kamateros succeeded him in the highly regarded office of *epi tou kanikleiou*.⁴⁰

In all the examples mentioned above, the envious person seeks to destroy the envied one in order to step into his place or to regain lost glory. In all cases, we observe 'covetous envy'. But frequently Byzantine *phthonos* is not at all covetous. Envy is, as we have already said, begrudging. The envied person should not receive or keep a certain good, not because the envious person wishes to obtain it, but just because the envier does not want the other one to have it. Symeon the New Theologian (tenth to eleventh century) presents the case of someone who has obtained a leading position out of *phthonos* and only for the sake of preventing another person from acquiring this position. The holder of the position did not desire it himself, but he could not bear the thought that someone else should obtain it.⁴¹

38 Prokopios, *Wars*, 3.3, 14–18, ed. J. Haury and G. Wirth, *Procopii Caesariensis Opera omnia*, Teubner (Leipzig, 1963), vol. 1, 320.23–321.21.

39 Niketas Choniates, *History*, 14.5.1–12, ed. J.-L. van Dieten, *Nicetae Choniatae Historia*, 2 vols, CFHB, 11.1–2 (Berlin, 1975), vol. 1, 110.20–115.46.

40 For more details, see Hinterberger, *Phthonos*, 153 and 410. On intrigue, see generally P. von Matt, *Die Intrige: Theorie und Praxis der Hinterlist* (Munich, 2006). On intrigue in connection with envy, see C. Lauer, 'Die Emotionalität der Intrige: Variationen im höfischen Roman', in M. Baisch, E. Freienhofer and E. Lieberich (ed.), *Rache – Zorn – Neid: Zur Faszination negativer Emotionen in der Kultur und Literatur des Mittelalters* (Göttingen, 2014), 187–207, as well as F.N.M. Diekstra, 'The art of denunciation: medieval moralists on envy and detraction', in R. Newhauser (ed.), *In the Garden of Evil: The Vices and Culture in the Middle Ages*, Papers in Mediaeval Studies, 18 (Toronto, 2005), 431–54.

41 Symeon the New Theologian, *Katechesis*, 18.8–27, ed. B. Krivochéine and J. Paramelle, *Syméon le Nouveau Théologien: Catéchèses*, 3 vols, SC, 96, 104, 113 (Paris, 1963–65), vol. 2, 266–68:

Ἀδελφέ, εἰ λαοῦ καὶ ποιμνῆς ἡγούμενος κατεστάθης, σκόπησον καλῶς καὶ ἀνάκρινον σεαυτὸν ποίῳ λογισμῷ καὶ ἐκ ποίου τρόπου εἰς τὴν τοιαύτην κατέστης ἀρχήν. Εἰ μὲν οὖν εὐρήσεις σεαυτὸν κἄν ψιλῷ λογισμῷ ἐνθυμηθέντα, ὅτι διὰ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων τιμὴν ταύτη ἐπέδραμες ἢ διὰ προεδρίαν ἢ διὰ δόξαν, εἴτε ὡς μὴ καταδεξαμένου σου παρ' ἑτέρου ἄρχεσθαι ἀδελφοῦ διὰ τὸ οἴεσθαι μὴ εἶναι σου εὐλαβέστερον ἢ λογιώτερον ἕτερον, ... εἴτε καὶ κατὰ φθόνον – ὡς ὅτι οὐκ ἤθελες, ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ γένηται ὁ δεῖνα ὁ ἀδελφός – ἐσπούδασας τοῦ γενέσθαι σύ, ... γινώσκων γίνωσκε ὅτι οὐ κατὰ Θεὸν ἐγένετό σου ἡ πρόβλησις.

The fact that *phthonos* thrives among groups of peers (e.g., clergymen, soldiers, court officials in the above episodes) is an important feature. In this way, the advantage obtained by one member of the peer group, even if seemingly insignificant, nevertheless is apt to trigger *phthonos*. No social group appears to have been immune to this evil, even among slaves *phthonos* is a strong motive for criminal actions. The *Life of Basil the Younger* (tenth century) provides a telling example for *phthonos* among such a group of low social standing:

τούτω δὲ τῷ Θεοδώρῳ διὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ ἀρετὴν πλεον τῶν ἄλλων προστεθειὸς ὁ δηλωθεὶς κύριος αὐτοῦ, πάντα τὰ ὑπάρχοντα αὐτοῦ ἐν ταῖς χερσὶν αὐτοῦ παραδίδου, καὶ πολλὴν ἔσχε παρ' αὐτοῦ τὴν τιμὴν τε καὶ εὐνοίαν, ὅθεν ἐκ τούτου πληγεὶς ὁ ῥαδιουργὸς καὶ μισόκαλος ὄφις πολλὴν τὸν ἐκ τοῦ φθόνου κονιορτὸν ἐπήγειρε κατὰ τοῦ Θεοδώρου. φθόνησαντες γὰρ αὐτὸν οἱ σύνδουλοι αὐτοῦ κακὰ κατ' αὐτοῦ ἀεὶ ἐτέκταινον [...] εἷς ἐξ αὐτῶν [...] φθόνῳ φερόμενος κατὰ τοῦ Θεοδώρου [...] προσέρχεται λάθρα ἐπαιοῖδ' ἑνὴν λίαν περιέρῳ καὶ πονηρᾷ γυναικί [...].

His aforementioned master, who was attached to this Theodore more than to the others because of his virtue, entrusted into his hands all his possessions, and Theodore received from him great honour and goodwill. As a result the crafty serpent who hates the good was wounded and out of *phthonos* stirred up a great dust storm against Theodore. For his fellow slaves, who became full of *phthonos* against Theodore, were always devising wicked deeds against him [...] One of them, however [...] since he was imbued with *phthonos* against Theodore [...] went secretly to a sorceress, a most meddlesome and wicked woman [...].⁴²

In this episode of the fictitious *Life of Basil the Younger*, the envious slave obtains magic nails from the sorceress which make his fellow-slave (*sundoulos*)

Brother, if you have become leader of the people and the flock, contemplate well and examine yourself to what end and how you have got into this office. If then you find yourself as having thought even with a tiny bit of your thinking that you run after it either for the honour of men, or for the sake of precedence, or for the sake of glory, or because you could not tolerate to be ruled by another brother since you believed that he is not more pious nor more learned than you are [...], or that out of *phthonos* you sought to achieve (this position) yourself – that is that you did not want to (assume this office), but (you merely wanted to assume it) lest brother N. assume it [...] (in all these cases) you should know, yes, you should know that your appointment did not happen in God.

42 *Life of Basil the Younger*, 3.3.1–13, ed. D.F. Sullivan, A.-M. Talbot and S. McGrath, *The Life of Basil the Younger: Critical Edition and Annotated Translation of the Moscow Version*, DOS, 45 (Washington, DC, 2014), 280; translation *ibid.*, 281, slightly adapted. Strangely, although this *Life* is largely recognised as being fictitious, all persons mentioned have been incorporated into R.-J. Lilie et al. (ed.), *Prosopographie der mittelbyzantinischen Zeit, Erste Abteilung* (641–867), *Zweite Abteilung* (867–1025), (Berlin, 1999–2013).

Theodore fall severely ill and almost kill him, before he is saved through the saint's intervention.

Fertile ground for the appearance of *phthonos* was provided by the imperial court, the army, the monastery, or intellectual circles.⁴³ These social milieus of course correlate with the most important categories of written sources Byzantinists have at their disposal. We may therefore infer that *phthonos* thrived simply everywhere in all parts of Byzantine society. Why was it omnipresent? One explanation could be that *phthonos* was deeply rooted in Byzantine religion, and closely connected to Scripture.

***Phthonos* Stories in Scripture**

In Byzantium, *phthonos* typically is strongly linked to certain standard situations and to a specific set of stories (neither is the case in ancient Greek literature). The stories most frequently referred to feature biblical personalities. These biblical *phthonos* stories were not only ubiquitous because of their being part of Scripture, but also because they were constantly retold in numerous modernised versions (such as chronicles, Old Testament paraphrases, commentaries, catenae), and because they were used as *exempla* when a text referred to a specific *phthonos* episode, mostly in order to condemn the destructive character of *phthonos* and to dissuade people from yielding to its disruptive force.

Abel, Joseph, David and Jesus appear as *the* classical victims of *phthonos*. Abel was slain by Cain because his offerings to God were accepted, whereas Cain's own offerings were rejected (cf. Gen 4:1–8).⁴⁴ Joseph was sold as a slave by his brothers after they had originally planned to kill him (cf. Gen 37). The envy of Joseph's brothers was triggered by their father's clear preference for Joseph and the latter's unrestrained display of his special talents. In both stories, it is *phthonos* within the family, between siblings, in relation to the father, the heavenly and the biological one. Nowadays, both stories are interpreted as containing a combination of envy and jealousy.⁴⁵

The other two stories are based on different constellations. According to Byzantine interpretation, David was persecuted by Saul out of *phthonos*, because after the Jewish army's victory David was more acclaimed than King Saul himself (cf. 1 Kings 18:6). In Byzantine tradition, the Jewish high priests are seen as having delivered Jesus to the Romans out of *phthonos*, aroused by Jesus's miracles, which they themselves could not perform (cf.

43 See Hinterberger, *Phthonos*, 140–82.

44 See also A. Kim, 'Cain and Abel in the light of envy: a study in the history of the interpretation of envy in Genesis 4:1–16', *Journal for the Study of Pseudepigrapha*, 12 (2001), 71–77.

45 See, e.g., the story of Joseph in F. Lelord and C. André, *La force des émotions: Amour, colère, joie* (Paris, 2003), 79–80.

Mk 15:10).⁴⁶ These biblical stories, together with the *Tale of Belisarios* which will be treated below, form the core of what I should like to call the Byzantine mythology of *phthonos*.

The stories based on Scripture are supplemented by stories propagated through hagiography, such as John Chrysostom's biography, or the tale of the three generals/*stratelatai*, the famous miracle performed by St Nicholas already mentioned. Historiographical or chronographical texts are less important in this respect, although they provide the perhaps most famous *phthonos* story, the tale of Justinian's general Belisarios, on which the only literary text dedicated in its entirety to *phthonos* is based (see below). Alongside the persons mentioned in Scripture, the betrayed and slandered general is the typical victim of *phthonos*.

Different aspects of *phthonos* are highlighted in different categories of texts. Whereas the florilegia provide insight into *phthonos* from the envious person's point of view, most narrative texts present the victim of *phthonos*, the envied person. The former focus more on how *phthonos* feels (for example, 'being eaten up from the inside'), the latter on how it manifests itself in the social setting. *Sententiae* such as those collected in florilegia, however, were occasionally quoted when a *phthonos* episode was presented in a narrative, thus explicitly linking a specific occurrence of *phthonos* to an already established interpretative pattern.

φθόνος οὐκ οἶδε προτιμᾶν τὸ συμφέρον

In one of the oldest parts of the *Triodion*, the *akolouthia* for Great Wednesday, or Wednesday of Holy Week, the statement φθόνος οὐκ οἶδε προτιμᾶν τὸ συμφέρον (freely translated, '*phthonos* is unable to recognise his own profit/good') appears.⁴⁷ In the context of the particular *sticherion*, the statement refers to Judas's *phthonos*, triggered by the harlot's offering of precious *myron*, 'ointment', and his subsequent betrayal of Christ (see Jn 12:1–8, cf. also Mk 14.3–9, another important biblical *phthonos* episode, less frequently referred to than the four

46 See also A.C. Hagedorn and J.H. Neyrey, "'It was out of envy that they handed Jesus over'" (Mark 15:10): the anatomy of envy and the Gospel of Mark', *Journal for the Study of the New Testament*, 69 (1988), 15–56.

47 *Old Sticherarion*, ed. G. Wolfram, *Sticherarion antiquum Vindobonense: Codex theol. gr. 136 Bibliothecae Nationalis Austriacae phototypice depictus*, Monumenta Musicae Byzantinae, 10 (Vienna, 1987), fol. 208r:

Ὦ τῆς Ἰουδα ἀθλιότητος· ἐθεώρει τὴν πόρνην φιλοῦσαν τὰ ἴχνη, καὶ ἐσκέπτετο δόλω, τῆς προδοσίας τὸ φίλημα, ἐκείνη τοὺς πλοκάμους διέλυσεν, καὶ οὗτος τῷ θυμῷ ἐδεσμεῖτο, φέρων ἀντὶ μύρου, τὴν δυσώδη κακίαν· φθόνος γὰρ οὐκ οἶδεν προτιμᾶν τὸ συμφέρον. Ὦ τῆς Ἰουδα ἀθλιότητος· ἀφ' ἧς ῥύσαι ὁ Θεὸς τὰς ψυχὰς ἡμῶν (normalised spelling).

Oh the wretchedness of Judas! He saw the harlot kissing (Christ's) feet and thought in guile, the kiss of treachery; she loosened her hair and he was bound in his anger, offering stinking evil instead of ointment. For *phthonos* is unable to recognise his own profit. Oh the wretchedness of Judas! From which God may rescue our souls.

episodes mentioned above). Because of its prominent place in Scripture and because it succinctly summarises one of *phthonos*'s main characteristics, the locution φθόνος οὐκ οἶδε προτιμᾶν τὸ συμφέρον developed into the most frequently used *gnome* concerning *phthonos*. Therefore, it was incorporated into florilegia (such as the so-called *Melissa*, an eleventh-century collection directly deriving from Pseudo-Maximos), where it is ascribed to Solomon (or simply to 'a wise man' or to a 'Father' in other texts).⁴⁸ This *gnome*, the original author of which remains unknown, refers both to the destructive force of *phthonos* directed against the envied person and its self-destructing character. It thus succinctly captures the essence of human envy in Byzantium, 'I do not wish another person to obtain a good which I do not wish to obtain, even to the detriment of my own interests', a combination of self-destructiveness and social evil. This *gnome* was frequently quoted and remained popular for a considerable time span, until long after the official end of Byzantium. Let us turn to the diachronic use of this maxim in Greek literature.

As a quotation, φθόνος οὐκ οἶδε προτιμᾶν τὸ συμφέρον appears for the first time in Michael Attaleiates' *History* (composed around 1080), in a manner which suggests that it was already firmly established as common *phthonos* wisdom. In the year 1054, during the reign of Emperor Constantine Monomachos, the Byzantine army set out to attack the Petchenegs at Preslav.⁴⁹ Basil Synkellos, at that time governor of the province of Bulgaria, ordered his troops to abandon the camp of the general commander Michael Akolouthos,

48 I am indebted to Gerda Wolfram for extensively discussing the textual history of this part of the *Triodion* with me.

49 Michael Attaleiates, *History*, 5, ed. I. Pérez Martín, *Miguel Atalates, Historia; Introducción, edición, traducción y comentario*, Nueva Roma, 15 (Madrid, 2002), 29.18–30.3:

ὁ δὲ τῶν Βουλγάρων σατράπης φθόνῳ κατεστρατηγημένος καὶ δόλῳ [...] προφάσεως ἐκ τοῦ βασιλικοῦ δραζάμενος ὀρισμοῦ, οὐκ ἀνίει τὴν φυγὴν ἀσύντακτον προτρεπόμενος καὶ τὸ συνοῖσον τοῖς πᾶσι τὸ ἑαυτοῦ προτιθέμενος βούλημα, ἵνα μὴ, φησὶν – ἐπεπιθύριζε γὰρ πρὸς τοὺς παρόντας λαθραίως – τοῖς ὅπλοις τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἡγεμονίας μέγας ὁ παρά βασιλέως δόξη πεμφθεὶς καὶ τοσοῦτον ἔργον κατωρθώκως ἐπιφημισθῆ καὶ καταγάγοι τὸν θρίαμβον. ἔλαθε δὲ τὸ «ξίφος ὠθῶν» ὡς ὁ λόγος «καθ' ἑαυτοῦ» καὶ τήνδε τὴν γνώμην ἀληθιζομένην δεικνὺς ὅτι «φθόνος οὐκ οἶδε προτιμᾶν τὸ συμφέρον» σκοπῶν γὰρ ὅπως ἐτέρου τὴν νίκην ἀφαρπάσῃ, περὶ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ σωτηρίας ἀπροόπτως οὐ διεσκόπησεν.

Overpowered by *phthonos* and guile, the governor of Bulgaria, with the pretext of the imperial order, incessantly incited disorderly flight and suggested his own wish as if being in the interest of all, lest – for he secretly whispered so to those present – through the weapons of his command the emperor's envoy become great and be acclaimed and celebrate a triumph for having achieved such a great success. Yet unknowingly he "pushed the sword against himself", as the proverb has it, and demonstrated how true the sentence is that says, "*Phthonos* is unable to recognise his own profit". For aiming at taking victory away from someone else, he unexpectedly forfeited his own salvation.

On this episode, see M. Hinterberger, "Φόβῳ κατασεισθεὶς". Τα πάθη του ανθρώπου και της αυτοκρατορίας στον Μιχαήλ Ατταλειάτη. Το αιτιολογικό σύστημα ενός ιστοριογράφου του 11ου αιώνα, in V.N. Vlysidou (ed.), *Η αυτοκρατορία σε κρίση (:). Το Βυζάντιο τον 11ο αιώνα (1025–1081)* (Athens, 2003), 155–67, esp. 164.

the emperor's special envoy, because Basil was unwilling to provide troops and resources for another person who would thus excel and win fame and the emperor's favour. In the wake of the subsequent chaotic retreat of the Byzantine army, Basil himself was caught by the enemies and killed. Basil's behaviour confirms the meaning of φθόνος οὐκ οἶδε προτιμᾶν τὸ συμφέρον, namely, that *phthonos*, blind to the envious person's own gain, not only destroys the common good but also leads directly to the envier's death.

In Constantine Manasses' *Chronicle* (composed around 1140), it is Justinian's famous general Belisarios who appears as the victim of *phthonos*:

Ἦν τοῦτο τὸ στρατήγημα λαμπρότερον τῶν πρώην / καὶ μέγας Βελισάριος
ἦν ἐπὶ στρατηγίαις· / ἀλλὰ γὰρ ταῦτ' οὐκ ἤρεσε τῷ φθόνῳ τῷ κακίστῳ. /
ἔνθεν πικρὸν ἐνέβλεψε τοῦ στρατηγοῦ τῷ κλέει / καὶ πάσαις ἤλασεν ὀρμαῖς
κατὰ τῆς τοῦτου δόξης· / ὁ φθόνος γάρ, ὡς λέγουσιν, οὐκ οἶδε τὸ συμφέρον.
[..] φθόνῳ καταστρατηγηθεὶς τῷ χαλεπῷ θηρίῳ, / ἄτερ στρατοῦ καὶ μαχητῶν
καὶ φαρετροφορίας / πέπτωκε πτόμα δύσκλητον, ἐπάξιον δακρύων.

This campaign was even more splendid than the previous ones and Belisarios excelled in his leadership. But the most evil *phthonos* did not like this, and therefore looked bitterly on the general's fame and charged with all his power against his glory. For *phthonos*, as they say, does not know his (own) profit. [...] Having been overpowered by *phthonos*, this bad beast, without army and warriors and arrows, he fell in an unbearable manner, worthy of tears.⁵⁰

Belisarios's brilliant victories arouse the *phthonos* of his colleagues who slander him in front of the emperor, depriving thus the empire of its most valiant military leader. Perhaps already in Manasses' times, Belisarios's fictionalised lifestory had become the symbol of *phthonos*'s destructive force. In the late fourteenth century, the *Tale of Belisarios*, a story in political verse, was entirely dedicated to the presentation of this topic, with various subsequent versions, until the post-Byzantine version of Emmanuel Limenites (end of the fifteenth century) and the early modern rhyming poem (with at least six printed editions published in Venice during the sixteenth century).⁵¹

Byzantine *phthonos*, like modern envy in general, is a passion that thrives among co-workers (as we have already seen above), destroying each other or at least the common good and welfare of the state. The same constellation, though not among generals, but high court officials and members of the clergy, is described in two post-Byzantine texts.

Under the heading φθόνος οὐκ οἶδε προτιμᾶν τὸ συμφέρον, George Sphrantzes (1401–78), writing after the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in the 1470s, when referring to an incident of the year 1429 denounces

50 Constantine Manasses, *Chronicle*, 3180–93, ed. O. Lampsidis, *Constantini Manassis Breviarium Chronicum*, 2 vols, CFHB, 36.1–2 (Athens, 1996), vol. 1, 174.

51 *Tale of Belisarios*, ed. W. Bakker and A.F. van Gemert, *Ιστορία τοῦ Βελισσαρίου*, Βυζαντινὴ καὶ Νεοελληνικὴ Βιβλιοθήκη, 6 (Athens, 1988, 2nd edn 2007).

his fellow ambassador's obstructive actions, which led to the failure of the mission to the Ottomans they had undertaken together.⁵² The reason Sphrantzes gives for his colleague's behaviour is the same as in the above case of Basil Synkellos: Iagros wanted to thwart Sphrantzes from accomplishing a successful embassy by which the latter would gain imperial recognition and attain a higher position in the court hierarchy than Iagros. It is in the same vein that popular *Laments on the Fall of Constantinople* refer to *phthonos*, rivalry and lack of collaboration among Byzantine dignitaries as major causes for the City's conquest by the Ottomans.⁵³

With the end of the Byzantine Empire, the most important environment for envious rivalry, the imperial court, disappeared, too. Rivalry among colleagues in the service of central institutions, however, did not abate, but continued particularly among the patriarchal clergy, as Theodore Agallianos's telling account (composed in 1463) of the internal strife inside the Orthodox Church under the first patriarchs under Ottoman suzerainty attests.⁵⁴

Even the comparatively unpretentious church administration of seventeenth-century rural Macedonia provided fertile ground for the development of *phthonos*. An example of rare frankness about the internal machinations, the priest Papasynadenos, writing in ca. 1640 the so-called *Chronicle of Serres*, presents *phthonos* as having pretty much the same characteristics as it had in Byzantine times.⁵⁵ Papasynadenos's office, a fairly

52 George Sphrantzes, *Chronicle*, 20.5, ed. R. Maisano, *Giorgio Sfranze: Cronaca*, CFHB, 29 (Rome, 1990), 66:

Ἦς δὲ ἔφθασα εἰς τὴν Πόλιν, ἐδόθη μοι συναποκρισιάριος Μάρκος Παλαιολόγος ὁ Ἰαγρός ὁ ὕστερον πρωτοστράτωρ, τότε δὲ πρωτοβεστιαρῆτης, πλέον ἀνατεθείς εἶναι κατὰ τῆς δουλείας μου ἢ ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς· οὐκ οἶδα δὲ ἄλλο τι αἴτιον, ἀλλ' ἦ τὸ 'φθόνος οὐκ οἶδε προτιμᾶν τὸ συμφέρον'.

When I arrived in Constantinople, I received as co-envoy Mark Palaiologos Iagros, the later *protostrator*, at that time *protovestiarites*, who was appointed to be against my job rather than for it; I don't know another reason than "Envy is unable to recognise his profit".

53 M. Hinterberger, 'Ο φθόνος στη δημόδη λογοτεχνία', in E. Jeffreys and M. Jeffreys (ed.), *Αναδρομικά και Προδρομικά: Approaches to Texts in Early Modern Greek; Papers from the Conference Neograeca Medii Aevi V*, Exeter College, University of Oxford September 2000, *Neograeca Medii Aevi*, 5 (Oxford, 2005), 227–40, esp. 237.

54 See Hinterberger, *Phthonos*, 325–33. On Agallianos's text, see also M. Angold, 'Memoirs, confessions and apologies: the last chapter of Byzantine autobiography', *BMGs*, 37 (2013), 208–25.

55 Papasynadenos, *Advices and Memories*, 30.12–29, ed. P. Odorico, *Conseils et mémoires de Synadinos, prêtre de Serrès en Macedoine (XVIIe siècle)* (Paris, 1996), 130 (referring to events of the year 1638):

Τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ, Φεβρουαρίῳ 1θ', ἐπῆγα εἰς τὸ μοναστήρι Σκάλιτζα χάριν προσκυνήσεως, καὶ ὁ Παπακομνιανὸς ἔχοντας τὸν φθόνον διὰ τὸ ὀφίκιον, τί ἐκατόρθωσεν; Ἐπῆγεν εἰς τὸν ἀρχιερέα καὶ λέγει τον· Ἄδespoτά μου, νὰ ἡξεύρης τὸ πὼς καθολικὰ ἔμαθα ἀπὸ καλοῦς ἀνθρώπου ὅτι ὁ Παπασυνάδης πάγει ἀπὸ χώρα εἰς χώραν εἰς τοὺς παπάδες καὶ σὲ ἔκαμε ἀναφορὰν καὶ πάγει κατὰ τὴν Πόλιν. Μόνον ἰδὲς τὸ γληγορότερον τί θέλεις νὰ κάμης; Καὶ ἔτζι ὁ ἀρχιερεὺς ἐπίστευσέν τον [...] καὶ με ἀφόρισεν καὶ με ἀναθεμάτισαν οἱ πάντες καὶ με

well-paid position inside the church administration, aroused the *phthonos* (τὸν φθόνον διὰ τὸ ὀφίκιον) of another priest who slandered Papasynadenos before the metropolitan of Serres. Temporarily, Papasynadenos not only lost his post, but was entirely excluded from the church community.

The Devil's *Phthonos* and God's *Phthonos*

One of the most striking and innovative features of Byzantine *phthonos* in comparison with ancient, but also modern Greek, *phthonos* is its markedly superhuman dimension. The devil's *phthonos* against mankind provides another biblical *exemplum*. According to Byzantine understanding, the devil had been persecuting mankind since its creation out of *phthonos* because man had obtained a privileged relation with God whereas the devil had been banned from his former position close to God (Byzantine authors disagree as to whether the devil's *phthonos* against humankind was the cause of his fall or its consequence).⁵⁶ Basil of Caesarea is one of the earliest theologians who explicitly describes *phthonos* as the devil's motive for actions:⁵⁷

δοχεῖον ὡν πάσης κακίας ἐδέξατο καὶ τοῦ φθόνου τὴν νόσον καὶ ἐβάσκηεν ἡμῖν τῆς τιμῆς· οὐ γὰρ ἤνεγκεν ἡμῶν τὴν ἄλυπον ζωὴν τὴν ἐν τῷ παραδείσῳ. [...] ἐκ ζηλοτυπίας ἡμῖν εἰς ἔχθραν ἀντικατέστη. ὁρῶν γὰρ ἑαυτὸν ἐκ τῶν ἀγγέλων καταρριφέντα, οὐκ ἔφερε βλέπειν τὸν γῆϊνον ἐπὶ τὴν ἀξίαν τῶν ἀγγέλων διὰ προκοπῆς ἀνυψούμενον.

Being the vessel of all evil, he received also the disease of envy and he begrudged us the honour. For he could not bear our life in paradise free of sorrow [...]. Out of jealous rivalry he rose against us in hostility. For seeing himself thrown out of the angels' (place), he could not bear seeing the earthly one (i.e., man) lifted up to the dignity of angels because of his (moral) progress.

ἄργησεν καὶ ἀπὸ τὰ εἰσοδήματα καὶ ὀφίκιον. [...] Βλέπεις, ὦ ἀδελφέ μου, τί κατόρθωσεν ὁ φθόνος ὁ ὀργισμένος; Λέγει τις σοφός· 'φθόνος γὰρ οὐκ οἶδε προτιμᾶν τὸ συμφέρον'. Φύγωμε, ἀδελφέ, τὸν φθόνον.

On 19 February of the same year, I went to the monastery of Skalitza, on a pilgrimage. And what did Papakomnianos, having *phthonos* (against me) because of (my) office, achieve? He went to the metropolitan and told him: "My lord, you should know that I have learnt with certainty from good people that Papasynadenos is going from town to town to the priests and he reported you and he is going to Constantinople. Only see as soon as possible what you will do". And thus the metropolitan believed him and [...] excommunicated me and everybody anathemised me. And he suspended both my incomes and my office. [...] Do you see, brother, what infuriated *phthonos* achieved? A wise man says, "For *phthonos* is unable to recognise his own profit". Let us, brother, flee *phthonos*.

On Papasynadenos's text, see also Kechagioglou, *Πεζογραφικὴ ἀνθολογία*, 349.

56 See Hinterberger, *Phthonos*, 189–204.

57 Basil of Caesarea, 'That God is not the author of evil', 8, PG 31:348A–B.

In the following centuries, the conviction that Satan was driven to his invidious attack against humankind by *phthonos*, is reflected in numerous texts, such as the *Palaia*, a ninth-century paraphrase of the Old Testament:

Πλασθεὶς δὲ ὁ ἄνθρωπος παρὰ θεοῦ καὶ ἡ αὐτοῦ ὁμόζυγος Εὐὰ ἐτέθησαν παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ τρυφᾶν τὸν μπαράδεισον (sic). ὁ δὲ ἀντικείμενος φθόνῳ ληφθεὶς καὶ ἐνδυσάμενος τὸν ὄφιν ἦλθεν συντυχάνων τῇ Εὐὰ [...].

When man and his spouse Eve were created by God, they were put by God to relish paradise. But the Opponent, taken by *phthonos*, came in the disguise of the serpent, saying to Eve [...].⁵⁸

But this satanic *phthonos*, too, has ancient or at least late antique roots. The Christian figure of the devil slowly emerged during the first centuries of our era. The devil's connection with *phthonos* which is only very loose in Scripture (see Wisdom 2:24),⁵⁹ gradually developed and reached its final form during the fourth and fifth centuries, when the devil's *phthonos* was firmly established, not only as the cause of humanity's expulsion from paradise and its concomitant condemnation to death but also, by extension, as the ultimate cause for any evil in human life.

In this development, the pre- or non-Christian belief in an almighty superhuman force called *Phthonos*, which indiscriminately destroyed human good fortune and well-being, was of major significance. This *Phthonos*, attested since the late Hellenistic period possibly resulted from the older *phthonos theon*, and it is omnipresent during late antiquity, especially in inscriptions. *Phthonos*, or the devil, thus originally belongs to a common worldview of late antique men and women, without any clear attachment to a specific religion.⁶⁰ It took several centuries for this envious power to acquire distinctively Christian characteristics, directly linked to the holy texts of Christendom. As with many other fundamental features of the Christian religion, the figure of the devil is profoundly informed by originally non-Christian ideas. Characteristically, when reading references to *Phthonos* in late antique texts, it is often impossible to decide if we have before us a pagan mindset or its already Christianised version.⁶¹

In comparison to both the *phthonos theon* and the abstract superhuman power *Phthonos*, the Byzantine satanic *phthonos* differs in that, first, it has nothing to do with the transgression of moral norms that provoked

58 *Palaia*, ed. A. Vassiliev, *Anecdota Graeco-Byzantina: Pars prior* (Moscow, 1893), 189–90.

59 See A. Crislip, 'Envy and anger at the world's creation and destruction', *VChr*, 65 (2011), 285–310.

60 See M. Hinterberger, 'Phthonos: a pagan relic in Byzantine imperial acclamations', in A. Beihammer, S. Constantinou and M. Parani (ed.), *Court Ceremonies and Rituals of Power in Byzantium and the Medieval Mediterranean*, TMM, 98 (Leiden, 2013), 51–65, esp. 62 (with further literature).

61 Hinterberger, *Phthonos*, 237.

the *phthonos theon* – it is not a retribution; and second, it is not entirely irrational, as the Hellenistic *phthonos* was. Unlike the latter, which struck people indiscriminately, without specific motivation, as a negative power responsible for pretty much every kind of evil and misfortune, the devil's *phthonos* had a 'history'. The devil begrudged humans their outstanding position in the creation and his special relationship with God – both of which the devil had forfeited. Accordingly, he persecuted man with his destructive *phthonos*. I believe it is this story, which provided an explanation for the occurrence of evil in the world, integrating the force of evil in a narrative framework and presenting it with a motive for its actions, that made the 'devil's *phthonos*' such a successful concept.

In contrast to the devil, God was regarded as *aphthonos*, as absolutely free of *phthonos*, reflecting much older ancient philosophical views according to which *phthonos* was entirely incompatible with the divine. Plato declared in *Phaidros* 267a 6f: φθόνος γὰρ ἕξω θείου χοροῦ ἴσταται ('For *phthonos* is foreign to the divine'), a passage which was cited by Christian theologians in order to support their argument⁶² or is reflected in their writings, as in Gregory of Nazianzos:

μακρὰν γὰρ τῆς θείας φύσεως φθόνος, τῆς γε ἀπαθοῦς καὶ μόνης ἀγαθῆς.

For *phthonos* is far from divine nature, the only passionless and only good one.⁶³

Most interestingly, (early) Byzantines knew of a 'counter-story' to the story of the devil's envy, comparable to the two stories told about Arius and Bishop Alexander. According to this story, God had forbidden Adam and Eve to eat from the tree of knowledge out of *phthonos*. This story, which is supposed to reflect very old views circulating among the early Christians, possibly of Gnostic origin, is normally embedded in the devil's discourse, the words he said to Eve (and Adam) in order to persuade them to eat the forbidden fruit.⁶⁴

In this story, therefore, the envious devil makes up a story about God's *phthonos* and, thus slandering God, destroys mankind. See for instance (Pseudo-)John Chrysostom:

ἐφθόνησεν (sc. ὁ θεὸς) ὑμῖν, ἐβάσκανεν μείζονος τιμῆς [...] βάσκανός ἐστι (sc. ὁ θεὸς) καὶ φθονερός, φθονεῖ τῶν μειζόνων ὑμῖν ἀγαθῶν.

62 See, e.g., Athanasios of Alexandria, 'Against the gentiles', 41, PG 25:81C–84B.

63 Gregory of Nazianzos, Oration 28, 11.13–14, ed. P. Gallay, *Grégoire de Nazianze, Discours 27–31 (discours théologiques)*, SC, 250 (Paris, 1978), 122.

64 See also T. Onuki, 'Der Neid in der Gnosis', in G. Theißen and P. von Gemünden (ed.), *Erkennen und Erleben: Beiträge zur psychologischen Erforschung des frühen Christentums* (Gütersloh, 2007), 321–42, esp. 334–36, and Crislip, 'Envy and anger', 300–2.

(Satan says to Eve:) Out of *phthonos*, (God) begrudged you greater honour [...]. He is full of *phthonos*, he begrudges you greater goods.⁶⁵

Another example is the dialogue poem by Ignatios the Deacon (ninth century) in which the story of Adam is retold:

(ΟΦΙΣ) Τί δὴ πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἶπεν ὁ πλάσας, γύναι;
Μὴ τοῦδε προσψάυσητε τοῦ φυτοῦ μόνου,
ὡς μὴ θεοὶ γένησθε βασικίνας ἔφη.
(Serpent) ‘What did the creator tell you, woman?
Only not to touch the fruit
lest you become gods, he told you out of *phthonos*’.⁶⁶

Obviously, these two manifestations of superhuman *phthonos* are in essence human *phthonos*. God’s *phthonos* follows script (α) of Byzantine *phthonos* (‘I do not want someone else to have a good which is at my disposal’), while the devil’s *phthonos* can primarily be identified with script (β) ‘I do not wish another person to obtain or to keep a good which I do not wish to obtain’ (any more).

In the history of Byzantine ideas, however, God’s envy is a marginal subject which, at least during the middle and late Byzantine era, did not play a significant role. The devil’s *phthonos*, on the contrary, always was closely associated with the general concept of *phthonos*. The devil was the one who had envied humankind from the very beginning, he was the *diabolos* per se, the ‘accuser’, and the ‘first slanderer’.⁶⁷ And it was due to the devil’s instigation that evil men became envious.⁶⁸ In this way, the envious devil uses envious persons in order to destroy virtuous men, as in the case of saints Sergios and Bakchos

Φθόνῳ δὲ τοῦ μισοκάλου καὶ πονηροῦ δαίμονος εἰς τινὰς τῶν ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ τῶν γεντιλίων ἀναφερομένων σχολῇ ἐνσκήψαντος, οἵτινες ὀρῶντες αὐτοὺς εὐδοκίμως ἐν ταῖς βασιλικαῖς ἀγλαῖς ἀναστρεφομένους καὶ προκόπτοντας ἐν τῇ στρατείᾳ, πολλὴν τε παρρησίαν πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα ἔχοντας, οὐ δυνάμενοι ἄλλως τὰ τῆς βασκανίας ἐπίχειρα εἰς αὐτοὺς διαπράξασθαι, διαβάλλουσιν αὐτοὺς πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα ὡς ἄτε χριστιανοὺς ὑπάρχοντας.

65 Pseudo-John Chrysostom, ‘On fate and providence’, Oration 2, PG 50:754.51–755.4.

66 Ignatios the Deacon, *Verses on Adam*, 55–57, ed. C.F. Müller, *Ignatii Diaconi tetrasticha iambica* 53, *versus in Adamum* 143 (Kiel, 1886), 29.

67 Theodoret of Kyrrhos, *A Cure of Greek Maladies*, 3.100–1, ed. P. Canivet, *Théodoret de Cyr: Thérapeutique des maladies helléniques*, 2 vols, SC, 57.1–2 (Paris, 1958), vol. 1, 199–200, esp. 200.5–6 (= *Souda*, Σ 151, ed. Adler, vol. 4, 329–30).

68 See the excerpt quoted above, p. 73.

Out of *phthonos* the demon, who hates the good and is evil, invaded some men who belonged to the same *schola gentilium*. When these men saw (Sergios and Bakchos) living gloriously at the imperial court and making a career in the army and having obtained familiarity with the emperor, they could not achieve the ends of *phthonos* except by denouncing them as Christians.⁶⁹

We observe various common features with the passages analysed above, particularly with the *De stratelatis* episode in the *Life of Nicholas*. Here too fellow soldiers (belonging to the same military unit) experience *phthonos* when seeing Sergios and Bakchos being honoured in the imperial palace and advancing in the military hierarchy. A particularly strong incentive for *phthonos* is the close relationship with the emperor (*parresia*). And again, the envious persons resort to wicked accusation in order to destroy the envied ones. In this case, the accusation is not wrong (Sergios and Bakchos indeed are Christians), but it is made with an evil purpose, and therefore it is qualified as *diaballein*.

The Argumentative Power of *Phthonos*

Given this all-threatening presence of *phthonos* and its connection to the devil, which presented envious men more than other sinners as the devil's servants, it is not at all surprising that this concept acquired also a powerful argumentative force. Any kind of accusations were usually explained away as purely motivated by *phthonos*: already the very act of accusing someone aroused the suspicion of being motivated by *phthonos*, even in legal documents. *Phthonos* therefore is a standard motive in polemical literature and in any controversy, for instance in Theodore Agallianos's already mentioned apology before the *Synodos endemousa* in 1463 directed against his rivals and accusers.⁷⁰

Phthonos developed a particular significance in texts intended to justify the rebellious past of an emperor. In such texts, the hero is threatened by the *phthonos* of villains and accordingly forced to commit illegal acts, such as rebellion against the ruling emperor. According to these narratives, the future emperor had no choice other than to rise against his predecessor. Otherwise he would have lost his life. Anna Komnene (1083–ca. 1150) presents her grandmother, Anna Dalassene, as using the *phthonos* motive in this way, in order to justify her son's and the author's father's actions against Nikephoros Botaneiates (1078–81), or rather against the evil men in his entourage who had control over the emperor:

69 *Old Passion of Sergios and Bakchos*, c. 2, ed. I. van den Gheyn, 'Passio antiquior SS. Sergii et Bacchi', *AnBoll*, 14 (1895), 377.

70 See above, note 54.

ἡ δὲ Δαλασσηνὴ πρὸς αὐτοὺς “εἶπατε” φησί, “πρὸς τὸν αὐτοκράτορα· οἱ παῖδες οἱ ἐμοὶ δοῦλοι εἰσι πιστοὶ τῆς σῆς βασιλείας καὶ προθύμως ἐξυπηρετοῦντες αὐτῇ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν οὐκ ἐφείσαντο οὔτε ψυχῶν οὔτε σωμάτων ἀεὶ προκινδυνεύοντες ἐκθύμως ὑπὲρ τοῦ σοῦ κράτους. ὁ δὲ κατ’ αὐτῶν φθόνος μὴ φέρων τὴν εἰς αὐτοὺς εὐνοϊάν τε καὶ κηδεμονίαν τῆς σῆς βασιλείας μέγαν τὸν κίνδυνον κατ’ αὐτῶν καθ’ ὥραν ἐξήρτυεν· ὡς δὲ καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς αὐτῶν ἐξορύττειν ἐμελέτησαν, τοῦτο αἰσθόμενοι καὶ μὴ φέροντες τὸν τοιοῦτον ἄδικον κίνδυνον τῆς πόλεως οὐχ’ ὡς ἀποστάται ἐξῆλθον, ἀλλ’ ὡς δοῦλοι πιστοὶ ἅμα μὲν τὸν ὑπόγυον ἀποδιδράσκοντες κίνδυνον, ἅμα δὲ καὶ τὰ κατ’ αὐτῶν μελετώμενα τὸ κράτος σου ἀναδιιδάζοντες καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς σῆς βασιλείας ἐξαίτησόμενοι βοήθειαν”.

But Dalassene said to them: ‘Give the emperor this message: “My sons are the faithful servants of your imperial majesty and have willingly served you at all times, sparing neither their lives nor their bodies, and have always been the first to risk everything for your empire. But the *phthonos* (directed) against them, which could not endure your majesty’s kindness and solicitude for them, caused them to stand in great and hourly peril; and when finally their enemies planned to blind them, they got wind of it, and as they could not endure such undeserved peril they left the city, not as rebels but as your trusty servants, firstly, in order to escape this imminent danger and secondly, to inform your majesty of the plotting against them and to ask for your majesty’s help”’.⁷¹

In a similar way, Michael Choniates emphasises *phthonos* as the important force behind Andronikos Komnenos’s ascension to the throne.⁷² In

71 Anna Komnene, *Alexiad*, 2.5.5, ed. D.R. Reinsch and A. Kambylis, *Annae Comnenae Alexias*, CFHB, 40.1 (Berlin, 2001), 67, tr. E.A. Dawes, *Anna Comnena: The Alexiad* (London, 1928), 54 (slightly adapted).

72 Michael Choniates, Oration 10 (‘Address to the traitor Demetrios Drimys’), 29, ed. S.P. Lampros, *Μιχαὴλ τοῦ Ἀκομινάτου τοῦ Χωνιάτου τὰ Σωζόμενα*, 2 vols (Athens, 1879–80, repr. Groningen, 1968), vol. 1, 169.20–170.19:

Ἡς (sc. ἀρετῆς) ἔδει γενέσθαι καὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους μάρτυρας ἀπαραγράπτους μὲν ἄτε δὴ πολεμίου φύσει, κηρύζοντας δὲ τὰληθὲς ὡς μὴ προληφθέντας φθόνῳ καὶ οὕτω Ῥωμαίους ἑτερογλώσσους συμφθέγγεσθαι πάντας κράτιστον εἶναι πάντων ἐπ’ ἀρετῇ τὸν μέγαν Ἀνδρόνικον, καὶ παρὰ τοῦτο πάντων μὲν κρατέειν δίκαιον, πάντεσσι δ’ ἀνάσσειν ἄξιον, κἂν τὸ φθονοῦν συγγενὲς ἀπηρέσκετο, τὸ τοῦ λόγου, διδῶκον ἀκίχητα καὶ μηδὲν τι πλεον ἐξανύον, ὅτι μὴ διὰ τῆς ἐπηρείας τὴν παρὰ πάντων ἀνάρρησιν δέξασθαι καὶ λαμπρότερον ἀποδειχθῆναι καὶ τοῦ βασιλείου στέμματος ἀξιώτερον· οἷς μὴ μόνον ἐκ γένους εἰς τοῦτο καὶ ἀρετῆς δεδικαίωται, [...] ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς ἀμυθήτων πόνων καὶ μεγάλων ἀγώνων ἔπαθλον κατεκτήσατο κατ’ ἐκείνους τοὺς λίαν φθονηθέντας δι’ ἀρετὴν, Ἰωσήφ, φημί, καὶ Δαυὶδ, οἱ μετὰ πολλὰ τοῦ φθόνου παλαίσματα [...] τὰ τῆς βασιλείας ἐνεδήσαντο στέμματα. Μᾶλλον δὲ ὡς ὁ δεσπότης Χριστὸς, φύσει ὦν βασιλεὺς, πολλὰ πρότερον πεπονθὼς διὰ φθόνον, εἶτα εἰσελθεῖν εἰς τὴν δόξαν αὐτοῦ λέγεται, οὕτω καὶ οὗτος ὁ τοῦ Κυρίου χριστὸς [...].

Also the barbarians had to become unexceptional witnesses of his virtue, unexceptional because they are enemies by nature and because they would announce truth

this speech, addressed to the governor of Hellas Demetrios Drimys during Andronikos's short-lived reign (1183–85) when Choniates was metropolitan of Athens, Andronikos appears as threatened by his relatives' *phthonos*, whereas foreigners are not biased against him through *phthonos* and therefore acknowledge his virtue. Like the famous victims of *phthonos* in Scripture he is unjustly persecuted. In particular, Choniates adduces the examples of Joseph and David who, like Andronikos, finally overcame *phthonos* and became kings. This comparison with mythical victims of *phthonos* takes on almost grotesque dimensions when at the end Andronikos, who was famous for his brutal and inhuman rule, is juxtaposed with Jesus Christ (ὡς ὁ δεσπότης Χριστὸς, φύσει ὦν βασιλεὺς, πολλὰ πρότερον πεπονθῶς διὰ φθόνον).

To Conclude

Byzantine *phthonos* is 'begrudging envy', threatening rivals and competitors, but also a self-destructive emotion. This Byzantine destructive *phthonos* seems to have been particularly fostered by two supremely influential social structures: first, the hierarchy of the imperial court and the administrative apparatus dependent on it, and second, the ecclesiastical administration and, gradually gaining significance, the patriarchal hierarchy. Through the latter, which outlasted the end of Byzantium, numerous aspects of Byzantine *phthonos* survived into the early modern era. In Byzantium, *phthonos* is closely connected to a kind of mythology, its significance and force being supported by religion through religious texts.

Phthonos is just one Byzantine emotion (*pathos*). It may be the most characteristic or most powerful one, but in order to better understand the Byzantine mindset, the mapping of other emotions is still needed. The field of Byzantine emotions is open to further fruitful research, providing the opportunity not only to illuminate the Byzantines' psychology but also to contribute significantly to the history of emotions in general and in consequence to the history and a better understanding of the human being.

since they are not biased by *phthonos*, and thus all foreigners (had) to agree with the Romans that the great Andronikos is the best concerning virtue and that for this reason it is rightful that he rules over all and that he is worthy to rule over all (= Homer, *Iliad*, 1.288), even if this displeases the envious relatives who make "vain efforts", as the proverb says (cf. Homer, *Iliad*, 17.75), and do not achieve anything more than that because of this malice he receives the acclamation from everybody and that he appears as even more splendid and worthier of the imperial crown; he has a right to this (throne) not only because of his descent and virtue, but also because he gained it as a reward for his indescribable efforts and great struggles, like those who had suffered *phthonos* because of their virtue, I mean Joseph and David who after many battles with *phthonos* [...] received their imperial crowns. Rather like Lord Christ, an emperor by nature, who is said to have suffered a lot before because of *phthonos*, (but) then entered his glory, in the same way he the anointed one by Christ [...].

Furthermore, it is hoped that it has become clear that the meaningful interpretation of Byzantine texts frequently depends on a nuanced interpretation of Byzantine emotion concepts.

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4 Compassion and Healing in Early Byzantium

Susan Wessel

Many who observed his constant and unquestioning pity for the needy were often moved to sell many of their possessions and to bring the money and offer it to this kind-hearted servant of God.

Leontios of Neapolis, *John the Almsgiver*, 26

Compassion is an elusive concept among the early Byzantine Christians. The lack of precision lies in the fact that no single Greek word incorporates all its nuances. Such words as σπλάγχνα (*splanchna*), ἔλεος (*eleos*), συμπάθεια (*sympatheia*) and οἰκτιρμός (*oiktirmos*) describe a range of the feelings, actions and circumstances consistent with the common understanding of the English word ‘compassion’, meaning ‘suffering together with another’. The English usage often further suggests a hybrid emotion combining experience with feeling and action. After identifying that another human being is suffering, we act ‘compassionately’ when we sympathise with the misery and then alleviate it. This definition is included among several in the *Oxford English Dictionary*, such that ‘compassion’ refers to, ‘The feeling or emotion, when a person is moved by the suffering or distress of another, and by the desire to relieve it’.¹

Although similarities exist between the early Byzantine Greek and the current English usage, the words that are used are not synonymous. The range of meaning for each of the Greek words mentioned above – *splanchna*, *eleos*, *sympatheia* and *oiktirmos* – prevents my settling on a straightforward definition. The challenge this presents at the outset leads eventually to a deeper appreciation of the nuanced meanings that signify the phenomenon of compassion in the early Byzantine world. Once this challenge has been identified and addressed, it is possible, first, to identify the ideal of compassion as it was preached and championed, and then to extrapolate from that ideal its practical and theological consequences.

1 *Oxford English Dictionary*, s.v. ‘compassion’, *OED Online*, accessed 20 June 2021.

The English meaning of compassion, as articulated above, involves feeling sympathy for the suffering of another human being and then acting appropriately and mindfully to alleviate it. Healing is implicit in the action required to assuage the pain. Likewise in the Greek, I plan to show that the semantic range for the words I have highlighted here – when interpreted in the relevant theological and social context – envisages healing taking place when we identify emotionally with human suffering. Although the mechanics of Byzantine healing have received much scholarly attention, less attention has been given to the various ways in which compassion and healing are intertwined. I shall address this gap by contextualising the phenomenon of compassion with respect to its meaning and consequences for the early Byzantine Christians.

Definitions and Usage

The words *splanchna*, *eleos*, *sympatheia* and *oiktirmos* appear countless times in the early Byzantine corpus, and with different nuances of meaning, depending on the context. The examples offered here illustrate the semantic possibilities relevant for determining what compassion meant, and what its consequences were, for the development of compassion as a Christian virtue. It is worth mentioning that the meaning of each of the words is far from unequivocal and that the immediate context is always decisive. The various samples I have selected from the literature show merely the range of options for, and the depth of meaning available to, the early Byzantines.

The most embodied word the ancient and Byzantine Greeks used to denote what we generally mean by ‘compassion’ was the word *splanchna*. In the classical world, its literal meaning evoked graphic images of entrails and organs. In the sacrificial feasts, the *splanchna* were the inward parts, the liver, heart, lungs and kidneys that participants reserved from the animals and ate prior to the sacrifice. Around the same time, the word was also used metaphorically to indicate the physical location of feelings and affections. For Aristophanes, *splanchna* described the seat of anger,² while for Aeschylus it expressed the depths of sadness and despair.³ Gradually the embodied feeling the word described was used to convey feelings of love, as in Dionysios of Halikarnassos,⁴ and of pity, as in the Septuagint, where even ‘the tender *splanchna* of the wicked are cruel’.⁵

Following this trajectory, the early Christians used the word *splanchna* to indicate feelings of mercy, as Paul said to the Philippians, ‘How I long

2 Aristophanes, *Frogs*, line 844, ed. K. Dover, *Aristophanes, Frogs* (Oxford, 1993), 160.

3 Aeschylus, *Libation Bearers*, line 413, ed. A.F. Garvie, *Aeschylus, Choephoroi* (Oxford, 1986), 19.

4 Dionysios of Halikarnassos, *Roman Antiquities*, 11.35.4, ed. C. Jacoby, *Dionysii Halicarnasei Antiquitatum Romanorum quae supersunt*, vol. 4 (Stuttgart, 1967), 172.

5 Prov 12:10.

after all of you in the tender *splanchna* of Christ Jesus'.⁶ By the time of the Gospels, the Pauline usage had been integrated into the Christian imagination and the word had acquired a complex, emotional dimension. The reason for the shift lies not only in the metaphorical transformation that took place in the Greek but also in the incorporation of Hebrew concepts into the Christian usage. As Henri Nouwen has suggested, the Hebrew word for compassion, *rachamin* – which was related semantically to the word *rechem*, meaning 'womb' – conveyed the all-encompassing embrace of the mercy of Yahweh.⁷ Using a similarly embodied metaphor as the Greek word *splanchna*, the Hebrew word imbued 'mercy' with a deep-seated physicality.

While the connection between the Greek and the Hebrew was probably already there in the letters of Paul, the implications of such an embodied metaphor were not fully explored until the Gospel accounts of Jesus's healing miracles. We are told numerous times – twelve to be exact – that Jesus felt *splanchna* in his gut before he healed. According to the Gospel of Matthew (14:14), Jesus felt *splanchnon* before he healed the sick from among the crowds that came before him. Likewise, after feeling *splanchna*, Jesus miraculously fed, with bread and fish, the crowds that he feared would collapse from hunger on their journey home (Mk 8:2). Such accounts as recorded in the Gospels suggest that the actions of Jesus were not merely the result of an ethical obligation. They were the manifestation of a profound emotional response to the misery he witnessed.

In the classical texts of the Graeco-Roman world, the word ἔλεος (*eleos*), meaning 'pity' or 'mercy', was never synonymous with σπλάγχνα (*splanchna*). It did not evoke the embodied feeling of shared misery. Its connection with suffering was rooted instead in a general sense of moral accountability. People were the objects of *eleos* in the context of large-scale social wrongs. It was the desired response to outrageous behaviour that scorned social convention and ignored the plight of thousands in favour of personal gain. Its limits were drawn according to society's understanding of ethical responsibility. The *Iliad* described the god Apollo criticising Achilles for casting pity aside as he dragged Hector's lifeless body behind his chariot.⁸ Demosthenes used the same word to call into question the hypocrisy of government officials who stole from the treasury while failing to show *eleos* for the overburdened taxpayers.⁹ The Athenian orator Antiphon urged the court to withhold *eleos* for a woman who had deliberately murdered her husband. It was reserved for those who had suffered an involuntary accident, being available only when the conditions for righteous behaviour had been met. Each of these

6 Phil 1:8.

7 D.P. McNeill, A. Morrison and H.J.M. Nouwen, *Compassion: A Reflection on the Christian Life* (New York, 1983), 16.

8 Homer, *Iliad*, 24.44, ed. T.W. Allen, *Homeri Ilias*, 3 vols (Oxford, 1931), vol. 3, 336.

9 Demosthenes, Oration 24 ('Against Timocrates'), 111.2, ed. S.H. Butcher, *Demosthenis orationes*, vol. 2.1 (Oxford, 1907, repr. 1966), 734–35.

examples demonstrates that *eleos* was administered according to a socially constructed moral ideal.

The emotional dimensions of *eleos* were implicit in the processes of reaching a moral judgement. In Aristotle, for instance, the feeling of pity was stirred among jurors in the law court when suffering was perceived to be undeserved, or when they feared that they were vulnerable to similar misfortunes. It was the job of the lawyer to persuade an audience by evoking pity for his client.¹⁰ For Euripides, however, *eleos* was upheld as the only proper response to the outrageous suffering Orestes endured after killing his mother. The enormity of his actions had moved him beyond the sphere of human judgement and into the realm of the incomprehensible tragic. Under such circumstances, weighing the scales of justice was neither a necessity nor even an option, amid the immediacy of his emotional needs.

The semantic range and nuance found in the classical texts are also present among the early Christians. As in the Septuagint, where ‘God loves mercy and truth’,¹¹ Christians often used the word to evoke the mercy God has shown for the weakness of the human condition. Yet there was more to the word than the limitless generosity of divine goodness. Implicit in divine mercy was the same underlying sense of retributive justice that the classical texts and the Septuagint implied. It involved reaching a fair judgement, imposing the appropriate remedy, and then foregoing punishment in favour of forgiveness. Divine mercy encompassed all three dimensions, not just clemency. Gregory of Nazianzos captured the multi-faceted nature of *eleos* when he contrasted the anger of God that ‘is forced by us’ with the natural inclination of his mercy.¹² Because the wrath of God was always possible, God’s mercy depended upon reaching the moral judgement that punishment was unnecessary. The tension between the chastisements of an angry God and administering the *eleos* appropriate to God’s nature left ample room for moral accountability to flourish. Gregory explored this avenue when he said, ‘Let us have mercy on ourselves, and open a road for our Father’s righteous affections’. The existential uncertainty implicit in the tension between the possibility of wrath and the hope for mercy served to motivate ethical actions.

With the advent of Christ, this tension subsided. There was no trace of retributive justice driving the *eleos* of God. Christ had voluntarily emptied himself, had assumed the suffering of the human condition, and had died the redemptive death of the Passion. The intermingling of human suffering with divine transcendence meant that Christ was synonymous with *eleos* in its purest form. He was the conduit through which the *eleos* of God was transmitted to human beings in order to heal them. Clement of Alexandria

10 C. Rapp, ‘Aristotle on the moral psychology of persuasion’, in C. Shields (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Aristotle* (Oxford, 2012), 589–611, esp. 605–8.

11 Ps 83.

12 Gregory of Nazianzos, Oration 16 (‘On his father’s silence’), 14, PG 35:953.

made the point by drawing out the theological implications of two similar-sounding words: ἔλαιον (*elaion*), meaning ‘oil’ and ἔλεος (*eleos*). Noticing the references to ‘oil’ (*elaion*) and to ‘ointment’ (μύρον, *muron*) in Luke 7:46,¹³ he interpreted the oil that is used for anointing as a symbol of Christ, the anointed, who bestows *eleos* on humanity.¹⁴ Whereas *elaion* signified the purity of Christ, anointed by the Holy Spirit, *muron*, being adulterated, signified the betrayal of Judas.

With Athanasios, the *eleos* of Christ applied not only to Christ’s limitless love for humanity in general. It also bestowed blessings that had practical consequences in the lives of individuals and that were intimately connected with healing. For instance, *eleos* had the miraculous power to cure those suffering from illness. The *Life of Antony* recounted the story of a girl suffering from a putrid discharge from her ears, eyes and nose. Her parents believed in the miracle stories they had heard about Jesus, especially his cure of the woman suffering from a flow of menstrual blood. Hoping for a similar cure from the famous Antony, they asked to accompany a group of monks who were traveling to see him. When they arrived at the mountain, the parents waited with the monk Paphnutios, while the others went to Antony. Although the monks implored him to see the girl, he refused: ‘Go’, he said,

and if she be not dead, you will find her healed, for the accomplishment of this is not mine that she should come to me ... but her healing is the work of the Saviour, who in every place shows his *eleos* to those that call upon him.¹⁵

As the intermediary between Christ and human beings, Antony pointed to, but did not take credit for, the inherent healing powers in the *eleos* of Christ. Being such an intermediary, he prayed to unleash Christ’s *eleos* on behalf of those who were suffering.¹⁶

The passage is significant for the way in which it connects *eleos* with the process of healing. Whereas the pagan gods, such as Asklepios, had healed because it was their function to do so, Jesus healed in service of his divine

13 Lk 7:46–47 (‘You did not put oil on my head, but she has poured ointment on my feet. Therefore, I tell you, her many sins have been forgiven – as her great love has shown. But whoever has been forgiven little loves little.’)

14 Clement of Alexandria, *Pedagogue*, 2.8.61–62, ed.tr. C. Mondésert and H.-I. Marrou, *Clément d’Alexandrie, Le pédagogue*, vol. 2, SC, 108 (Paris, 1965), 124–26.

15 Athanasios, *Life of Antony*, 58, ed. G.J.M. Bartelink, *Athanase d’Alexandrie, Vie d’Antoine*, SC, 400 (Paris, 1994), 290–92. See R.J.S. Barrett-Lennard, *Christian Healing after the New Testament: Some Approaches to Illness in the Second, Third and Fourth Centuries* (Lanham, MD, 1994), 184–94. On the development of Antony as a holy man, see generally D. Brakke, *Demons and the Making of the Monk: Spiritual Combat in Early Christianity* (Cambridge, MA, 2006), 23–47, esp. 34.

16 He healed by praying to Christ, whose *eleos* then flowed freely. Athanasios, *Life of Antony*, 84, ed. Bartelink, 352–54.

mission.¹⁷ His healing was a sign and confirmation of his messianic call.¹⁸ It meant that the kingdom of God was breaking through, and wreaking havoc upon, the evil acts and entities of this world. Yet Jesus's healing was not merely a sign, for it also alleviated real human suffering, first, by treating physical illness, and then by restoring those who had once been outcasts to full participation in sacramental and familial life. Such healings served a multi-dimensional purpose in the context of Jesus's ministry. They ushered in the kingdom of God, assuaged pain and suffering, and re-enacted the compassionate mercy of God and of Christ's act of divine emptying when the Word became flesh.

Healing was, therefore, intimately connected with compassion. Eusebios reported Dionysios of Alexandria as saying that the Christians who cared for those stricken by the plague were joyful, in spite of the fact that they themselves often became sick and died. The pagans – who lacked the Christians' dedication to compassionate care – fled the city and pushed the sick into the streets even before they were dead while treating the unburied corpses as dirt.¹⁹ Gary Ferngren has remarked, 'The divine compassion is mirrored in a human compassion for others, which becomes the basis of ethics and a means of reclaiming the *imago Dei* in humans'.²⁰ Even though Hippocrates had said that the doctor's lot was to harvest sorrows of his own from the misfortunes of others, the ideal of compassionate care among the pagans did not extend beyond the mechanics of the doctor-patient relationship. Whereas this same Hippocratic principle can be found among such early Christians as Gregory of Nazianzos (who apparently 'found consolation that his [deceased] brother Kaisarios would no longer feel personal grief at the misfortunes of others), healing in the context of the imitation and enactment of divine compassion was the ideal.²¹

Not everyone was as confident as Athanasios in the power of *eleos* to flow freely, and without impediment, in order to heal the sick and the needy. Some of the early Christians grappled with the implications of the pagan philosophical usage and its reception into the Christian context. Those who did so were committed to exploring its moral psychological dimensions with respect to human beings, and its theological dimensions with respect to God and the Incarnation. They were acutely aware that *eleos* was an emotional response to human suffering and, as such, posed certain risks and challenges to those who upheld emotional equanimity as a Christian virtue. For instance, Augustine, early in his career, had worried that the wise man, committed to suppressing such emotions in the name of tranquillity,

17 O. Temkin, *Hippocrates in a World of Pagans and Christians* (Baltimore, 1991), 97.

18 G.B. Ferngren, *Medicine and Health Care in Early Christianity* (Baltimore, 2009), 45.

19 Eusebios, *Ecclesiastical History*, 7.22,10, PG 20:689B; Ferngren, *Medicine and Health Care*, 150.

20 Ferngren, *Medicine and Health Care*, 102.

21 Temkin, *Hippocrates*, 247.

might be burdened with the feeling of pain when he exercised compassion. He concluded that the word *miser cordia* ('compassion') might still be used to describe the wise man's assistance to the needy, even in the absence of his pain. By the end of his life, Augustine would come to reject the possibility that such a wise man might exist who was capable of being compassionate without feeling strong emotions: 'It should not be assumed that there are in this life such wise men as I have described. Indeed I didn't say, "since they be so wise", but "even if they be so wise"'.²²

More than half a century earlier, Basil of Caesarea had already recognised *eleos* as a *πάθος* (*pathos*) that arose in the context of sympathetic feeling (*συμπαθής*, *sympathes*) for the plight of the human condition.²³ His insight was based on the observation that Scripture everywhere connected the righteousness of God with compassion (*οἰκτιρμός*, *oiktirmos*).²⁴ Because the divine *eleos* was always just, its actions – the embodiment of righteousness – were also innately compassionate. Imbued with such compassion, divine mercy modelled the human response to suffering. This connection between feeling and action implied that compassionate emotion was displayed appropriately when Christians cared for and healed the material and emotional needs of suffering human beings.

Whereas Basil pondered the significance of 'mercy' as an action and emotion that God modelled for ordinary Christians to imitate, Clement was sceptical about its emotional potential for our moral development. Even more than his predecessors, Clement was drawn to the moral psychology of the philosophers, who had described joy and pain as passions (*πάθη*, *pathe*) of the soul.²⁵ Whereas joy entailed rejoicing on account of something good, pain (*λύπη*, *lupe*) was the result of pity (*eleos*) for someone whose suffering was undeserved. The problem for Clement was to make sense of the fact that Scripture had often ascribed human emotions to God, whom he knew to be impassible. Unlike Basil, Clement was rather uncomfortable with the idea of *eleos* as an emotion ascribed to God. If 'joy' and 'pity' were passions, as the philosophers seemed to say, then Scriptural passages depicting God feeling pity and joy posed a theological challenge. Because God was not subject to change, God did not feel emotions in the same way as human beings. The error, according to Clement, lay in our taking our own *pathe* as a point of departure for understanding the will (*βούλημα*, *boulema*) of the *ἄπαθος*

22 Augustine, *Retractations*, I, 7.4, ed. A. Mutzenbecher, *Sancti Aurelii Augustini Retractio-num libri II*, CCSL, 57 (Turnhout, 1984), 20.

23 Basil of Caesarea, *Homilies on the Psalms*, 114, PG 29B:489B. See generally S.M. Hildebrand, *Basil of Caesarea* (Grand Rapids, MI, 2014), 21.

24 Basil of Caesarea, *Homilies on the Psalms*, 114, PG 29B:489A.

25 Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata*, 2.16., ed. L. Früchtel, O. Stählin and U. Treu, *Clemens Alexandrinus*, vol. 2: *Stromata, Buch I–VI*, GCS, 15 (Berlin, 1985), 151. Clement is referring to the Stoics, although he does not name them. On Clement's use of Greek philosophy in the *Stromata*, see A. Le Boulluec, *Alexandrie antique et chrétienne: Clément et Origène; deuxième édition revue et augmentée* (Paris, 2012), 116–18, 121–23.

(*apathos*) God. The solution he proposed went as follows: through the Incarnation, Christ appropriated for himself the joy we feel at the prospect of our salvation but did so without undergoing change. This meant that Christ's joy was not fully his own. It was rather a feeling he shared in our delight over the possibility of our spiritual transformation. (By the fourth century such a cautious interpretation of Christ's emotional life was reserved to account for his feelings of abandonment on the cross.)

Clement's treatment of *eleos* was different from the way he handled 'joy'. Reconsidering his earlier definition of *eleos* as a *pathos*, he suggested that the *eleos* that God showed for humanity was beyond the scope of, and in no way analogous to, the flux of human emotions. Unlike joy, pity was not among the emotions Christ had assumed in becoming a human being, because, for Clement, genuine pity was not really a human emotion at all. Whereas human *pathe* – including joy and pity – were unstable and self-referential, the *eleos* of God emanated from God's unlimited goodness, making its bounty suitable only to God. Whereas human beings bestowed the blessings they received from God in merely a qualified fashion, i.e., according to their innate benevolence, a sense of ethical obligation, and the nurturing bonds of relationships, God pitied human beings purely out of goodness. This made the *eleos* of God operate differently from our human attempts at imitating divine generosity, for 'the mercy of God is rich toward us, who bear no relation to God'.²⁶ The gap between the human experience of suffering, the human expression of charity meant to alleviate such suffering and the divine beneficence was nearly unbridgeable.

Such a limited sense of the possibility for human emotion to emulate and reproduce divine compassion also influenced Clement's view of Christ. Whereas bodily sufferings are necessary for the ordinary man, because of the 'economy', to maintain bodily life, Christ does not need the automatic, bodily impulses to maintain his (always real) bodily life, and, therefore, he is without suffering.²⁷ The impassibility of Christ was thereby protected at the expense of his having assumed a fully human set of challenges and priorities. It implied that Christ did not truly heal human suffering because he himself did not experience it. Rather, healing took place, for Clement, in the context of an individual ascetic practice dedicated to quieting the passions; it was roughly disengaged from addressing the real communal suffering of the body of Christ.

Clement's successors found a different way to appropriate the pagan philosophical tradition into a distinctly Christian moral psychology. Moving beyond the particulars of our internal structure, they related the path of our emotional life to the composition of the cosmos. Doing so allowed them to articulate how sympathetic feelings bring healing to the recipients of our

26 Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata*, 2.16, ed. Früchtel, Stählin and Treu, 152.

27 Cf. Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata*, 6.9.71, ed. Früchtel, Stählin and Treu, 467.

compassionate acts. For example, to convey the sense of fellow-feeling for the suffering of another human being, the word *συμπάθεια* (*sympatheia*), and its cognates, was often used. Its meaning was rooted in classical philosophy, where it described the natural affinity between the body and the soul, as well as the sympathetic vibration of musical chords²⁸ and of heavenly bodies. It should come as no surprise that classically educated Christians were aware of this semantic range and used the word accordingly. For Gregory of Nyssa, for example, *sympatheia* described the natural affinity of the universe.²⁹ Yet the same word also described the mutual feeling of grief among Christians when a prominent bishop died.³⁰ Like Clement, Gregory was concerned with the potential for uncontrolled emotions to erupt into something irrational. The loss of composure implied to sceptics that there was something to be ashamed of. Gregory's task was to convince people that grief was supposed to be shared in a manner consistent with the common experience of loss. Just as strangers had mourned the death of the patriarch Joseph, Christians were to grieve in common for their bishop. The shared emotional experience was supposed to heal the community's emotional pain.

The word *sympatheia* took on a sense of urgency when Gregory used it to describe his ministry to those with dire material needs. The problem he addressed was the apathy and disgust of Christians who cared little, and did even less, for the outcasts of Roman society. Maintaining equanimity in the face of human suffering was hardly on his mind. His challenge was to provoke Christians to feel an emotional affinity with those outside their social class. Like the natural *sympatheia* of the universe, everyone and everything was profoundly connected in the ways that Gregory explored. Christians were supposed to let their compassionate (*sympathes*) care for one another shine forth radiantly in actions rather than words.³¹ They were not to be like the priest and the Levite who, without compassion (*ἀσύπαθος*, *asympatthos*), had left the man dying on the roadside. They were to feel pity (*οἰκτός*, *oiktos*) for the diseases of another human being. Finally, they were to understand that their sympathy (*sympatheia*) toward the unfortunate profited the healthy by contributing to their redemption. The fellow-feeling for the plight of suffering humanity, on the one hand, healed the sick by tending to their

28 Polybios, *Histories*, 21.28.9, ed. T. Büttner-Wobst, *Polybii Historiae*, Teubner, vol. 4 (Leipzig, 1904), 58.

29 Gregory of Nyssa, 'Against Fate', PG 45:152C. On Gregory's cosmology, see generally A. Marmodoro, 'Gregory of Nyssa on the creation of the world', in A. Marmodoro and B.D. Prince (ed.), *Causation and Creation in Late Antiquity* (Cambridge, 2015), 94–110; on Plotinus's notion of sympathy, adapted from the Stoics, see D.M. Hutchinson, 'Consciousness and agency in Plotinus', in *ibid.*, 150–70, esp. 152–53.

30 Gregory of Nyssa, 'Funeral oration on Meletios', PG 46:853B.

31 Gregory of Nyssa, 'On loving the poor', sermon 2, ed. A. van Heck, *Gregorii Nysseni opera*, vol. 9.1 (Leiden, 1967), 111–27, at 119; for a translation of the sermons, see S.R. Holman, *The Hungry are Dying: Beggars and Bishops in Roman Cappadocia* (New York, 2001), 199–203.

material and emotional needs and, on the other, healed the moral sickness of the physically healthy by remaking their souls in the image and likeness of God.

Sympatheia also conveyed the sense of feeling emotional pain deeply and sincerely. For John Chrysostom, the issue was not the expression of shared emotion, but rather its authenticity. He contrasted those who expressed their sorrows publicly with those who mourned at home in private.³² True sympathy entailed the authentic expression of private emotions, while public displays were synonymous with sport. He had in mind the insincerity of professional mourners who wept as part of their craft. The emotional theatre of such displays had nothing to do with genuine affection. Because it took place in public, Chrysostom did not trust it to overcome the temptation to serve the individual need for social praise. The passion was not the problem, only the insincerity of the public spectacle. He did not think that Christians should pretend to share in another person's suffering.

Sometimes Christians used the word *oiktirmos* and its cognates to indicate mercy, pity and compassion. It appeared much less frequently than *eleos*. In Clement, *oiktirmos* and *oikteiresis* indicated the gentle mercy of God.³³ Although in classical texts the cognate οἶκτος (*oiktos*) is found, Clement was most likely influenced by its use in Scripture. The most significant precedent occurred in Paul's letter to the Philippians. Along with the word *splanchna*, *oiktirmos* described the compassion of Christ as a model for Christians to emulate in their relationships with one another. The passage is worth quoting in full because it shaped the significance of compassion as an emotion of healing among the early Christians.

If there is, therefore, any exhortation in Christ, if any consolation of love, if any fellowship of the Spirit, if any tender mercies (*splanchna*) and compassion (*oiktirmos*), make my joy full, by being like-minded, having the same love, being of one accord, of one mind; doing nothing through rivalry or through conceit, but in humility, each counting others better than himself; each of you not just looking to his own things, but each of you also to the things of others. Have this in your mind, which was also in Christ Jesus, who, existing in the form of God, didn't consider equality with God a thing to be grasped, but emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men. And being found

32 John Chrysostom, 'Homilies on the Epistle to the Philippians', Homily 3.4, PG 62:203–4. On mapping Christian boundaries, see generally C. Shepardson, *Controlling Contested Places: Late Antique Antioch and the Spatial Politics of Religious Controversy* (Berkeley, 2014), 95–98, 101–4.

33 Clement of Alexandria, *Pedagogue*, 1.9.87.2, ed. H.-I. Marrou and M. Harl, *Clément d'Alexandrie, Le pédagogue; livre I*, SC, 70 (1960), 264.

in human form, he humbled himself, becoming obedient to death, yes, the death of the cross (Phil 2:1–8).

Paul was concerned that members of his community had forsaken humility to become rivals with one another.³⁴ In imitation of Christ's *splanchna* and *oiktirmos*, they were supposed to model their relationships on the humility Christ had shown when he assumed the lowliness of human flesh. In making this connection between Christ and community, the passage established two significant points: first, that the divine emptying of the Incarnation was profoundly compassionate, and, second, that people should emulate Christ's selflessness by forming like-minded relationships in the context of a Christian community. Though Paul never used the word *sympatheia*, there is a sense in which he longed for the ideal of mutual affinity – a single heart and mind – to govern the Philippians. Where this mutual feeling flourished, rivalries would cease and love would flourish.

The Classical Antecedent and Its Reception

In discussing the various definitions of *eleos*, I mentioned Aristotle, for whom *eleos* was a *pathos* that influenced the judgements of those who listened to orators in the law courts.³⁵ Because *eleos* was a *pathos*, it was accompanied by the emotions of pleasure and pain. Such emotive responses presumably signalled to the audience whether the argument, which had stirred the reaction, was persuasive. It told the listeners which life stories were morally worthy of their merciful consideration. Yet *eleos* was not synonymous with virtue and did not function as such among the classical orators. It was rather a *pathos*, one of two modes of persuasion, the other being ἦθος (*ethos*),³⁶ that the orator used to influence an audience. Not until the early Christians did the *pathos* of *eleos*, as well as the other Greek words discussed above, become a virtue in its own right. In doing so, *eleos* expanded its meaning well beyond the sphere of legal persuasion to encompass the moral formation of Christians.

Aristotle is worth highlighting, nonetheless, because his understanding of *eleos*, and of how it was evoked, influenced the early Byzantine perception

34 On community discord in the Pauline churches, see T.D. Still, 'Organizational structures and relational struggles among the saints: the establishment and exercise of authority within the Pauline assemblies', in T.D. Still and D.G. Horrell (ed.), *After the First Urban Christians: The Social Scientific Study of Pauline Christianity Twenty-Five Years Later* (New York, 2009), 79–98.

35 Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 2.1.8–9 (1378a), ed. W.D. Ross, *Aristotelis Ars rhetorica* (Oxford, 1959), 70–71.

36 The *ethos* the orator displayed consisted of three qualities: φρόνησις (*phronesis*), ἀρετή (*arete*) and εὐνοία (*eunoia*). See *ibid.*, 2.1.5 (1378a), ed. Ross, 70.

of compassion.³⁷ For Aristotle, *eleos* was a feeling of pain aroused either by the sight of undeserved evil, or by the recognition that evil may, at any time, strike the listener or one of his friends.³⁸ The first possibility emphasised that pity entailed a judgement, while the second acknowledged the implicit fear that results from seeing your own potential for human misery in the suffering of another. This identification between ‘self’ and ‘other’ generally occurred among those who were similar in ‘age, character, habits, position or family’.³⁹

Aristotle thought that certain types of people were more prone to feeling pity than others. Among those less likely to feel pity were those who considered themselves exceptionally fortunate and, therefore, beyond pity’s reach. At the opposite end of the spectrum were those whose personal suffering left them too preoccupied to commiserate with another human being. Pity was generally available only to those who were sensitive to, and knowledgeable in, the vicissitudes of life. It included the aged, the timid and weak, the wise and educated, as well as everyone with parents, wives and children. It carved a middle ground between the courageous who dismissed the possibility of their future suffering and the excessively fearful who were often too anxious about their own safety to feel pity for another. The person capable of pity recognised that the suffering he witnessed in others was also a possibility for himself.

Aristotle developed this taxonomy of pity to help orators write speeches, not to dictate moral behaviour. When the early Christians turned to Aristotle, however, they blurred the lines of distinction between pity being described as a capricious state capable of influencing judgements and as a morally virtuous emotion with inherent possibilities for shaping the Christian life. The intellectual sleight of hand was the result of years of classical training, which the early Christians combined with theological insight into the meaning and consequence of the Incarnation. Such elite Christians as Gregory of Nazianzos and Basil of Caesarea had used the rules of rhetoric they learned in Athens to persuade their congregations that certain emotional states were appropriate moral responses to human suffering. Such emotions (*pathe*) as *eleos*, *sympatheia*, *oiktirmos* and *splanchna* were no longer merely modes of persuasion, but desirable virtues to strive for in light of Christ’s compassionate self-emptying and redemptive suffering on the

37 See generally J. Dow, *Passions and Persuasion in Aristotle’s Rhetoric* (Oxford, 2015), 131–44; for Aristotle’s understanding of the emotions in the *Poetics*, see generally D.L. Munteanu, *Tragic Pathos: Pity and Fear in Greek Philosophy and Tragedy* (Cambridge, 2013), 238–50; see also D. Konstan, *Pity Transformed* (London, 2001), 49–74, 128–36.

38 Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 2.8 (1385b), ed. Ross, 91.

39 *Ibid.*

cross.⁴⁰ A few examples will suffice to confirm, nonetheless, how influential Aristotle's observations about *eleos* were among the early Christians.

Three themes that appear prominently in Aristotle's treatment of *eleos* emerge later among the early Christians. First is the notion that sympathy is more likely felt for and among those who come from a similar family and social background. Although the early Christians agreed with the underlying principle, they interpreted 'similarity' according to a new set of priorities. People were similar because of the inherent sameness of their human nature. Perhaps the early Christians had learned from the Stoics that the wise man holds only virtue as an ideal because he knows that relationships and social status are fleeting. Made in the image of God, every human being, from the downtrodden to the privileged, has the potential to radiate an innate dignity.

Gregory of Nazianzos articulated this idea in the context of his oration 'On loving the poor', which he delivered c. 366/7 to publicise the fundraising effort for the philanthropic complex built by his friend, Basil of Caesarea.⁴¹ In it he addressed the problem of the truly destitute, those whose gruesome physical condition and abject poverty made them the outcasts of Byzantine society. It seems that most Christians found it easier to ignore the plight of the destitute than to respond to their suffering. Gregory tried to remedy the situation by emphasising the various ways in which these outcasts were fundamentally the same as everyone else. They had the same share of nature; they were made of the same clay; they were knit together with bones and sinews and clothed with skin and flesh; they had the same portion of the image of God; their soul had put on the same Christ; they had been entrusted with the same guarantee of the spirit; they shared the same laws, prophecies, testaments, liturgies, sacraments and hopes; and finally, Christ died for them who were fellow heirs of the life in heaven.⁴² This new way of thinking was supposed to heal these once-despised outcasts by making them objects of Christian charity and by reintegrating them into community life.⁴³

The second Aristotelian theme that Christians developed in the context of compassion had to do with the imminence of catastrophe. For Aristotle, the realisation that fortune could change in an instant was supposed to be tempered with courage. When held in moderation, it was conducive to feeling pity. For the early Christians, though, fear revealed the truth of our uncertain trajectory. It was rather to be embraced than avoided. As the apostle Paul told the Thessalonians, death shall come 'as a thief in the night (1 Thess

40 I have discussed this further in my *Passion and Compassion in Early Christianity* (Cambridge, 2016).

41 J.A. McGuckin, *St. Gregory of Nazianzus: An Intellectual Biography* (Crestwood, NY, 2001), 145–55.

42 Gregory of Nazianzos, Oration 14 ('On loving the poor'), 13, PG 35:873B/C.

43 Gregory of Nyssa made a similar argument in 'On loving the poor', sermon 2, ed. van Heck, 117.2–5.

5:1). John Chrysostom elaborated upon this idea when he said, 'God made the future uncertain, that we may spend our time in the practice of virtue, because of the uncertainty of expectation'.⁴⁴ The challenge for his congregations was to accept that some people suffered blindness, leprosy, poverty, servitude and the ravages of war, while others enjoyed good fortune. There was no observable pattern to the cycle of misery. The resulting inequity that people saw, experienced and feared, was supposed to motivate them to cultivate a virtuous life. It was never meant to question the justice of the overarching *eleos* of God. In light of this uncertainty, the possibility of their future suffering was supposed to humble even the most self-satisfied members of the congregations. At the very least, it encouraged people to practise charity in case they found themselves in a similar plight.

Finally, the early Christians were influenced by the Aristotelian idea that pity involved making some sort of judgement about the quality and authenticity of the suffering they witnessed. For Aristotle, the judgement had to do with determining whether the misfortune was undeserved. Presumably, this meant that orators were supposed to craft the stories they told in a way that supported the case they were trying to make. Depending on the context, it would have been to their advantage to show that suffering was deserved in some cases, and undeserved in others, and they would have constructed their argument accordingly. For the early Christians, the highest ideals governing their judgements involved the way in which they viewed the composition of the Christian community and its relationship to the body of Christ. It was less about individual deliberation in the context of justice than it was about re-imagining the bonds of corporate identity. Preachers used the rhetorical tools of persuasion to insist that the so-called outcasts of Byzantine society were really among its most cherished members. As the living representatives of Jesus's healing ministry to the marginalised poor, they were the archetypal members of the body of Christ.

More often than not, ordinary Christians failed to embrace this ideal of inclusion into the sacramental life of the church. They judged the suffering people with whom they came into contact as if they themselves were jurors in a law court, deciding who was, and was not, worthy of receiving charitable aid. Yet the time of the law courts had passed. John Chrysostom acknowledged this failure of the Christian imagination among his congregations when he mocked their disparaging and dismissive response to human suffering: 'It makes me gasp that this fellow, young as he is and healthy, having nothing, wants to be fed in idleness; he is surely a slave and runaway,

44 John Chrysostom, *Homilies on the Acts of the Apostles*, Homily 23, PG 60:183. Expectations were, of course, rooted in assumptions about what kind of bodily suffering was considered normal among late antique Christians. Along these lines, see E.-J. Graham, 'Disparate lives or disparate deaths? Post-mortem treatment of the body and the articulation of difference', in C. Laes, C.F. Goodey and M.L. Rose (ed.), *Disabilities in Late Antiquity: Disparate Bodies, A capite ad Calcem* (Leiden, 2013), 248–74, esp. 254–58.

and has deserted his master'.⁴⁵ The challenge for the preacher was to identify the moral failing and then to remedy it by undermining the premise of the argument. This involved showing the audience, first, that the judgements they made merely rationalised their stinginess, and, second, that their own moral weakness rendered their criticism unjust and invalid. Likewise, Gregory of Nyssa addressed his congregations by normalising the same grotesque physical conditions they had marginalised. For example, he removed the extreme suffering the lepers endured from the theatre of the grotesque and placed it squarely within a medical context.⁴⁶ Newly conceived as a physiological condition, leprosy was now a more serious version of the humoral imbalances from which most people suffered.⁴⁷

The classical art of persuasion had given way to the new ideals that the early Christians envisaged. Moral deliberation about the relative worth of people was no longer valid, as it had been in the law courts. The only legitimate moral judgement for Christians to reach was that the outcasts and the destitute were genuine members of the body of Christ. They were meant to conclude that the human beings suffering in their midst were made in the image of God, were the objects of Jesus's ministry, and were among those targeted in Christ's redemptive suffering. Preachers crafted their arguments to evoke this response, which, by its very nature, combined feeling with compassionate action. The consequence for the sick and the outcast was their physical and emotional healing in the context of their restoration to the sacramental life of the church.

Healing in Christ and Christ-Like Healing

We have seen that Christ's emptying himself was the prototypical act of compassion. Whether it was explicitly stated, the Incarnation was the underlying motivation and justification for preachers attempting to shape the moral integrity of their congregations. It was an act of humility profoundly committed to compassionately healing humanity of its transgressions. In imitation of this act, Christians were expected to invert the mechanisms of wealth and civic pride, by divesting themselves of the trappings of social status that had previously secured their place in the world. They were supposed to remodel their identity according to the new priorities of social rank that valued humility over reputation and generosity to the poor over public munificence. Apart from securing a place in this newly imagined social hierarchy, what did Christians get in return for their efforts?

45 John Chrysostom, *Homilies on the Gospel of St Matthew* 35, PG 57:409; see R. Finn, *Almsgiving in the Later Roman Empire. Christian Promotion and Practice* (313–450) (Oxford, 2006), 20–21.

46 Gregory of Nyssa, 'On loving the poor', Sermon 2, ed. van Heck, 120.25–28.

47 This was one among many ways of making sense of illness. See A.T. Crislip, *Thorns in the Flesh: Illness and Sanctity in Late Ancient Christianity* (Philadelphia, 2013), 30–34.

Intimately connected with the compassionate act of the Incarnation was also its capacity to heal. Although they sound like disparate prospects, the one emotional and the other medical, compassion and healing were really two sides of the same coin. Compassion not only prompted affective engagement with the plight of human suffering, but had social consequences as well. It altered relationships, subverted existing power structures and restored outcasts to community life.⁴⁸ Preachers promised that those who modelled their lives according to the divine emptying of the Incarnation would enjoy not only their elevated rank in the social hierarchy of inversion. Self-identification according to these newly articulated ethical commitments also promised to heal the faults of the human condition.

The relationship between compassion and healing, as well as its contribution to the moral life, was contested in the realm of Christ's humanity. This is because the composition of the human being Christ had become shaped the quality of his human experiences.⁴⁹ Authentic humanity was central to the feeling of commiseration that made sympathy come alive. Without it, there was no emotional connection to human suffering and no possibility for divine healing. Compassion and healing were so mutually connected that one could not flourish without the other.

Apollinaris, the bishop of Laodikeia, implicitly challenged this ideal by rejecting the authenticity and richness of Christ's emotional life. An ardent opponent of Arianism, he supported the unity of Christ and the full divinity of Jesus by tinkering with the sort of human being Christ had become. Instead of assuming a complete human mind, the Christ that Apollinaris envisioned was governed by the divine logos. Although this sounds implausible in light of subsequent Christian intellectual history, the suggestion was reasonable enough at the time. A friend of such prominent bishops as Athanasios and Basil of Caesarea, Apollinaris was respected, at least for a while, for his dedication to the anti-Arian cause. He was one of the first theologians to have given a systematic answer to what it meant for the Word to become flesh.

The christological model Apollinaris proposed was built on his understanding of the constitution of the human person.⁵⁰ From Paul's first letter to the Thessalonians (1 Thess 5:23) he had learned that human beings consist of a physical body, a life-animating soul and a rational mind. One reality

48 In examining the role of monasticism in the development of large-scale health care, Andrew Crislip has observed that 'traditional Greco-Roman society did not have a sick role or at least did not have a well-defined sick role ... The sick were held blameworthy for their condition and responsible for their recovery'. A.T. Crislip, *From Monastery to Hospital: Christian Monasticism and the Transformation of Health Care in Late Antiquity* (Ann Arbor, MI, 2005), 70. Preachers addressed this stigmatisation of the sick.

49 G. O'Collins, *Christology: A Biblical, Historical, and Systematic Study of Jesus* (Oxford, 2009), 234–37.

50 For an overview of Apollinaris and Christology, see generally M. Edwards, *Catholicity and Heresy in the Early Church* (Abingdon, 2009), 152–55.

formed out of three constituents, the human person was a whole that could not be pulled apart. When the Word became flesh, Apollinaris thought it formed a new whole that substituted the divine logos for the rational mind. While the new organism was thoroughly divine, the model for its transformation retained the unity and self-sufficiency of the three-fold person. The ethical implications were clear. This picture of the interrelationship of the logos with human beings presented Christians with a model of the divine life to emulate. Yet it did not integrate the human characteristics Christ shared with, and the divine characteristics he imparted to, human beings. Nor did it account for the gospel depictions of Jesus's human experiences.

The challenges this model posed for understanding how to bridge the chasm between humanity and the divine were especially acute in Alexandria. Due to his association with Athanasios, some of Apollinaris's treatises had apparently circulated under his friend's name. Cyril of Alexandria relied on these pseudonymous works, unwittingly repeating some of the same language Apollinaris had used, to construct his own view of the incarnate Word.⁵¹ Although Cyril spoke of 'one nature' and of 'one hypostasis', he did not intentionally reproduce what had by that time become the so-called heresy of Apollinaris. Cyril insisted, as he always had, on the full humanity of Christ. When the Word became flesh it became a complete human being, not simply a unified organism, as it had been for Apollinaris. The different model Cyril deployed accounts for the different result. Rather than the biological model of Apollinaris, Cyril used a grammatical model to interpret the christological implications of the Nicene Creed and of Paul's letter to the Philippians (2:1–8, quoted above). The one nature Cyril spoke of was not the compound entity imagined by Apollinaris. It was rather the single logos, the exegetical subject, which became the predicate 'flesh', a fully formed human being. This was Cyril's way of protecting the authenticity of Christ's humanity while maintaining his divine integrity. The paradox of a divine-human Word enabled the Word to heal.

Gregory of Nazianzos and the other Cappadocian theologians had also explored the consequences of the Apollinarian model. Like Cyril, Gregory was committed to preserving Christ's full humanity over against the divine-human entity that Apollinaris had proposed. For Gregory, though, the model he chose was thoroughly soteriological. If the underlying assumption of the biological model was its autonomous wholeness, then the appeal of the soteriological model was its fluid boundaries. In contrast with the self-sufficiency of a Christ governed only by the divine, the flexibility of Gregory's approach permitted the range of divine and human qualities to intermingle – with great effect – in the person of Christ. Whereas Apollinaris

51 For a discussion of the Apollinarian forgeries, see generally A. Tuilier, 'Remarques sur les fraudes des Apollinaristes et des Monophysites: notes de critique textuelle', in J. Dummer (ed.), *Texte und Textkritik: Eine Aufsatzsammlung*, TU, 133 (Berlin, 1987), 581–90. See also E. Mühlberg, *Apollinaris von Laodicea* (Göttingen, 1969).

constructed a divine model for Christians merely to emulate, Gregory made it clear that healing takes place in the divine-human conjunction. The human mind that Apollinaris rejected for its potential to diminish the Godhead, Gregory welcomed for its capacity to heal: ‘that which [Christ] has not assumed, he has not healed, but that which is united to his Godhead is also saved’.⁵² He was saying that Christ assumed a human mind in order to heal the part that gives ‘motion to the body, which is also that which suffers’.⁵³ The suffering would not have been healed without the authenticity of Christ’s human experiences.

Gregory described the healing mechanism that took place in Christ using the word *θεραπεύω* (*therapeuo*). A medical word that means quite literally ‘to heal’ (*therapeuo*) was chosen by Gregory in place of the theological word *σώζω* (*sozo*), meaning ‘to save’. The reason he did so is clear. To diminish the logical appeal of Apollinaris’s biological model, Gregory showed how medical science was consistent with the processes of salvation. Relevant in this regard is the ancient principle, ‘like heals like’, which was well established in science and in natural philosophy. Along these lines, the physician Hippocrates is credited with saying, ‘By similar things a disease is produced and through the application of the like is cured’.⁵⁴ Gregory reinterpreted the principle according to his own Christian priorities: instead of ‘like heals like’, he said that ‘like is sanctified in like’.⁵⁵ In the context of salvation, this meant that Christ had assumed the fullness of the human condition, including humanity’s fallen mind and its sinful flesh, in order to heal it. As Gregory put it, ‘mind is mingled with mind, as more closely related, and through it with flesh, being a mediator between divinity and carnality’.⁵⁶

The method of healing that Gregory articulated was self-consciously holistic. It saw the human person as an integrated being composed of body, soul and spirit.⁵⁷ The incarnational model envisaged by his adversary, Apollinaris, had compromised this unity. Its highest aspiration was to heal only part of the person, much like a physician who cured a man’s foot, while leaving his ailing eye unattended. Such a limited approach failed to acknowledge the extensiveness of humanity’s sickness. Because all of Adam

52 Gregory of Nazianzos, Letter 101 (to Cleodnius), 32, ed. P. Galloway, *Grégoire de Nazianze, Lettres théologiques*, SC, 208 (Paris, 1974), 50. See A. Hofer, *Christ in the Life and Teaching of Gregory of Nazianzus*, OECIS (Oxford, 2013), 123–31.

53 Gregory of Nazianzos, Letter 101, 34, ed. Galloway, 50.

54 For a general discussion of Hippocratic medicine among the early Christians, beginning with Clement of Alexandria, see Temkin, *Hippocrates*, 126–45.

55 Gregory of Nazianzos, Letter 101, 51, ed. Galloway, 58.

56 Gregory of Nazianzos, Letter 101, 49, ed. Galloway, 56.

57 See D. Krueger, ‘Healing and the scope of religion in Byzantium: response to Miller and Crislip’, in J.T. Chirban (ed.), *Holistic Healing in Byzantium* (Brookline, MA, 2010), 119–30, at 127; on the psychosomatic unity of the Byzantine person, see also J.T. Chirban, ‘Holistic healing in Byzantium: understanding the importance of epistemologies and methodologies’, in *ibid.*, 37–69.

fell, his entire nature must be united to the whole nature of Christ in order to trigger the healing process. The principle ‘like heals like’ required this perfect correlation.

Gregory’s incarnational model combined the compassionate emptying of Christ with the healing properties of the Godhead. Compassion and healing involved feeling the suffering of another, in the case of human beings, and assuming the completeness of that suffering, in the case of Christ. The implications were developed in the seventh century by Maximos the Confessor, who envisaged a kind of hypostatic transformation between Christ and human beings. It functioned something like this: the union between the divine and human natures in Christ made Christ capable of the divine and human action recorded in the gospels. Yet this was not the end of the interchange. A similar exchange of properties took place within human beings in their healing encounter with divinity. The mutual reciprocity rendered human beings capable of divinisation, on the one hand, and of Christ-like compassion, on the other. As Maximos said:

And if the poor person is God, on account of the condescension of God who became poor for our sake and who compassionately received into himself the sufferings of each person and suffered mystically ‘until the end of time’ always in proportion to the suffering in each because of God’s goodness, then clearly for all the more reason will he be God who, on account of his love for humanity, thoroughly cures through himself in divine fashion the distress of those who suffer and shows that he has by disposition the same power according to the proportion of saving Providence that God has.⁵⁸

Maximos was drawing on ideas that reached back to the Gospel of Matthew, where Christ was intimately connected with the poor (Mt 25:40). This familiar refrain among the early Byzantine preachers, who saw the human experiences of Jesus replayed in the experiences of the destitute and outcast, challenged apathetic Christians to rethink their social commitments. The poor person they neglected embodied Jesus’s human and Christ’s redemptive suffering on the Cross. It guided the moral life of Christians and it healed fallen humanity. When Jesus’s suffering was compared to that of the poor it meant that the poor person was not only a worthy object of compassion but also a means of salvation. The poor who reflected the paradox of divine-human suffering were similarly endowed with the Christ-like capacity to heal those who acted compassionately on their behalf. Inviting the unwashed poor into their homes was one way in which preachers urged their congregations to expand their compassionate reach to include the unsavoury poor.⁵⁹

58 Maximos the Confessor, *Mystagogia*, PG 91:713.

59 John Chrysostom, *Homilies on the Epistle to the Colossians*, Homily 1, PG 62:304.

In addition to assuaging poverty, donors helped themselves by triggering the healing mechanism implicit in those whose suffering made them authentic representations of Jesus's suffering as a human being.

There was also a sense in which embracing the most extreme outcasts of Roman society promised to imbue Christians with the same sympathy that had connected the earliest disciples with the suffering of Christ. John Chrysostom spoke of this connection in his exegesis of 2 Corinthians 1:6 ('If we are distressed, it is for your comfort and salvation; if we are comforted, it is for your comfort, which produces in you patient endurance of the same sufferings we suffer'). The importance of the passage for Chrysostom lay in its commitment to affective commiseration as a vehicle of salvation. As he put it, 'Your salvation comes not through believing only, but also through suffering and enduring the same things with us'.⁶⁰ Reliving Christ's suffering in the context of the world was the means by which Christians imitated his sympathy.

One of the most striking representations of sympathy, and its connection to the Incarnation, occurs in Leontios of Neapolis's seventh-century biography of John the Almsgiver.⁶¹ His compassionate embrace of the poor, as recorded in the text, was consistent with, and the culmination of, prior hagiographic depictions that need no rehearsal here. Suffice it to say that John's experiences not only incorporated and elaborated upon this tradition but also confirmed the acceptance of compassionate sympathy as a full-fledged virtue. When John was a fifteen-year-old boy living in Cyprus, he apparently dreamed of a young woman whose 'countenance outshone the sun' and who promised to bring him into the presence of the king. The king she had access to was no earthly king, nor was she an ordinary woman: 'I caused him to put on man's nature on earth, and bring salvation to men'.⁶² John soon came to realise that the woman was the personification of either *sympatheia* or *eleemosune*: 'For it was certainly sympathy with, and pity for, mankind that made our Lord become incarnate in our flesh'.⁶³ As a result of his vision, he offered his cloak to a man he found shivering with cold.

The episode suggests that by the seventh century the ideals of *sympatheia* and *eleemosune*, of 'healing' and 'compassionate action', were connected explicitly with the principles and mechanisms of the Incarnation. The personification of the compassionate virtues John the Almsgiver imagined was really the outward manifestation of the same virtues he had brought to life in his ministry. Whereas such early Christians as Gregory of Nazianzos

60 John Chrysostom, *Homilies on the Second Epistle to the Corinthians*, Homily 2, PG 61:391–92.

61 V. Déroche, *Études sur Léontios de Néapolis*, *Studia Byzantina Upsaliensia*, 3 (Uppsala, 1995), 270–96.

62 Leontios of Neapolis, *John the Almsgiver*, 8, ed. H. Gelzer, *Leontios' von Neapolis Leben des heiligen Johannes des Barmherzigen* (Freiburg i. Br., 1983), 16.1–2.

63 *Ibid.*, 8, ed. Gelzer, 16.6–7.

and John Chrysostom had articulated arguments persuading their congregations to pursue such ideals, the exploits of John the Almsgiver made them a living reality. The sympathy and pity that Christ displayed in the Incarnation were also the virtues that John the Almsgiver exhibited in his healing encounters with the poor. Just as John embodied the paradigm of the compassionate Christ, he himself became such a paradigm for others to emulate. As his biographer said, 'For many who observed his constant and unquestioning pity for the needy were often moved to sell many of their possessions and to bring the money and offer it to this kind-hearted servant of God'.⁶⁴ Gone was any hint of the moral judgement that earlier Christians had borrowed from Aristotle to determine whether suffering was legitimate. In its place, the poor to whom John ministered were accepted as the embodiment of Christ and as the legitimate recipients of his Christ-like care.

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64 Ibid. 26, ed. Gelzer, 54.3–7.

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5 Managing Affect through Rhetoric

The Case of Pity

Georgia Frank

In Byzantium, emotions were readily imagined, performed and managed through crafted speech. Take Nikephoros Basilakes, a teacher of rhetoric in twelfth-century Constantinople, for instance. He composed a series of exercises, or *progymnasmata*, to train orators in the delivery of impromptu speeches. His ‘sample case’ of fables, maxims and praise speeches draws from a panoply of myth, history, Homeric epic, Greek tragedy and the Bible. He devotes more than half of the collection to invented speeches, in which mythical and biblical figures express their deepest fears, frustrations and desires. These situational monologues, or *ethopoeiai*, typically address ‘what X would say when Y occurred’, unleashing a flurry of emotions. The patriarch Joseph, upon his release from prison, recalls the mixed emotions he had elicited in others: ‘envy banished me ... hatred at home drove me away ... love marched against me’.¹ The man born blind, whose sight was restored by Jesus, senses lingering despair beneath his newfound joy. A personified Hades fears aloud that Lazarus’s corpse might escape his clutches in the underworld.² Even gods resort to *cris de coeur*: a love-struck Zeus upon seeing his latest beloved turned into a cow, rails against Aphrodite for inflaming him with love, and rues Hera’s ‘tremendous jealousy (βαρύζηλον, *baruzelon*)’.³ Impassioned speeches such as these – still standard exercises in twelfth-century Byzantine rhetorical education – created an immersive theatre of the emotions.

Basilakes’ handbook provides a useful starting point for reflecting on the role of pity in rhetoric during the Byzantine period. For centuries, teachers

1 Nikephoros Basilakes, *The Rhetorical Exercises*, 2, ed. tr. J. Beneker and C.A. Gibson, *The Rhetorical Exercises of Nikephoros Basilakes: Progymnasmata from Twelfth-Century Byzantium*, DOML, 43 (Washington, DC, 2016), 150–51. I would like to thank Susan Ashbrook Harvey, Margaret Mullett, Austin Lillywhite and other members of Cornell University’s Society for the Humanities ‘Fabrication’ seminar for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this essay. Needless to say, all errors remain entirely my own.

2 Nikephoros Basilakes, *Rhetorical Exercises*, 9–10, ed. Beneker and Gibson, 188–201.

3 Nikephoros Basilakes, *Rhetorical Exercises*, 18.1, ed. Beneker and Gibson, 252.

of rhetoric had developed a broad assortment of methods to make audiences feel powerful emotions. Pity, in particular, was an important goal for many of these speeches. Rhetorical handbooks catalogued techniques, verbal as well as non-verbal, for stirring pity sufficient to ensure a desirable verdict in a courtroom or to promote charity. The rhetorical handbooks that shaped early Byzantine education also influenced preaching.

This essay explores some of the ways ancient rhetorical handbooks instructed orators to instil fellow-feeling or vulnerability. Two types of rhetorical tools, in particular, were important for arousing pity: invented speech and vividness.⁴ Invented speech, sometimes called speech-in-character or personification (*prosopopoeia*), made an absent character present or a mute object or concept speak. Vividness (*enargeia*), the effect of bringing someone or something 'before the eyes', refers to a virtue of description and a powerful device in invented speech. Both techniques were essential in courtrooms, where the voice of the victim or the accused might sway a conviction or an acquittal. The second part of the paper illustrates mechanics of pity-making in some examples from early Byzantine homilies, such as sermons by Basil of Caesarea and Gregory of Nazianzos. Hymnography, particularly its dialogical forms, also employed these devices to arouse pity in congregations. Thus, in the final section of the paper, we turn to a metrical sermon by Romanos the Melodist, whose kontakion 'On Elijah' probes the nature of divine pity and the dangers of prophetic pitilessness. As this paper suggests, both invented speech and vividness drew the pitiable closer to audiences, creating a social, sensory and situational proximity designed to promote pity.

Before turning to the role of pity in rhetoric, however, a few working definitions are in order. Pity, compassion, empathy and sympathy all connote a type of fellow-feeling, aroused when one feels pain at the suffering of another. Whereas compassion, empathy or sympathy is triggered by any suffering, whatever its cause, pity is limited only to suffering deemed to be undeserved. Because pity implies some judgements about deserts, some modern philosophers have taken issue with its inherent condescension or contempt.⁵ Many prefer 'compassion' to describe a more democratising and

4 On speech-in-character, see Ailiios Theon, *Progymnasmata*, 10, ed. L. Spengel, *Rhetores Graeci*, 9 vols (London, 1854–56), vol. 2, 115–18, tr. G.A. Kennedy, *Progymnasmata: Greek Textbooks of Prose Composition and Rhetoric* (Atlanta, 2003), 47–49. Later rhetorical exercises differentiated between varieties of speech-in-character. According to Aphthonios the Sophist, there are *proposopoiia* (personification), *ethopoeia* (characterisation of known characters) and *eidolopoiia* ('apparition-making') and other modes of making the dead speak: *Progymnasmata*, 11, ed. H. Rabe, *Aphthonii Progymnasmata* (Leipzig, 1926), 34–36, tr. Kennedy, *Progymnasmata*, 115–17. On the connection between *enargeia* and the emotions, see R. Webb, *Ekphrasis, Imagination and Persuasion in Ancient Rhetorical Theory and Practice* (Farnham, 2009), 88–101.

5 S. Tudor, *Compassion and Remorse: Acknowledging the Suffering Other* (Leuven, 2001), 102–5. Yet even compassion smacks of condescension, as Lauren Berlant observes, 'There is nothing clear about compassion, except that it implies a social relation between spectators

non-judgemental response to another's suffering. Yet, when dealing with any social and economic hierarchy, it is arguably fitting to preserve the translation 'pity'. Pity (or compassion), then, stands for a host of Greek terms from a shared semantic field, including *eleos* (ἔλεος) and *oiktos* (οἶκτος), as well as *eleemosune* (ἐλεημοσύνη), *eusplanchnia* (εὐσπλαγχνία) and *philanthropia* (φιλανθρωπία).⁶ When speaking of pity, tragedians might favour using *oiktos*, whereas orators preferred *eleos*.⁷ Yet the various terms all pointed to an emotion that involved some pain at the perception of another's undeserved suffering; this essay therefore treats them as synonyms.

The Rhetoric of Pity

As Aristotle defined pity (*eleos*) in the *Rhetoric*, it is

a kind of pain about an apparent evil, deadly or painful, that befalls one who does not deserve it; an evil that one might expect also to come upon himself or one of his friends, and when it seems near.⁸

and sufferers, with the emphasis on the spectator's experience of feeling compassion and its subsequent relation to material practice'; see 'Introduction: compassion (and withholding)', in L. Berlant (ed.), *Compassion: The Culture and Politics of an Emotion* (New York, 2004), 1–13, esp. 1. On the condescension and reinscribed hierarchies implied by pity in other historical periods, see F. Mirguet, *An Early History of Compassion: Emotion and Imagination in Hellenistic Judaism* (Cambridge, 2017), 24–37; M. Nussbaum *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions* (Cambridge, 2001), 301–3; S. McNamer, *Affective Meditation and the Invention of Medieval Compassion* (Philadelphia: 2010), 8–11, 212 n. 43; D.M. Scott, *Contempt and Pity: Social Policy and the Image of the Damaged Black Psyche (1880–1996)* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1997).

6 S. Wessel, *Passion and Compassion in Early Christianity* (Cambridge, 2016), 22.

7 R.H. Sternberg, 'The nature of pity', in R.H. Sternberg (ed.), *Pity and Power in Ancient Athens* (New York, 2005), 15–47, esp. 22–24; D. Konstan, *Pity Transformed* (London, 2001), 53–54; D. Konstan, *The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks: Studies in Aristotle and Classical Literature* (Toronto, 2006), 201–18; J.F. Johnson, *Acts of Compassion in Greek Tragic Drama* (Norman, OK, 2016), 12, citing W. Burkert, *Zum altgriechischen Mitleidsbegriff* (PhD diss., Universität Erlangen, 1955), 35–42. On the Christian association of *splanchna* with heartfelt mercy, and eventually with divine mercy, see H. Köster, 'σπλαγχνον', *TDNT*, vol. 7, 548–59, esp. 549, 552. Cf. R. Bultmann, 'ἔλεος', *TDNT*, vol. 2, 477–87, esp. 485–87; idem, 'οἰκτίρω', *TDNT*, vol. 5, 159–61; cf. U. Dahmen, 'רחם', *TDOT*, vol. 13, 437–54. In later centuries, the terms remained interchangeable. For instance, the sixth-century Christian hymnographer Romanos the Melodist used three different terms to connote pity in a single stanza of his sung sermon 'On Noah' (2.15.2–4): God is referred to as *ὁ πανοικτίρμων* (*ho panoiktirmon*, the all-merciful one) as well as *ὁ οἰκτίρμων* (*ho oiktirmon*, merciful one), followed by adjacent pity terms: who 'pitied with compassion' (εὐσπλαγχνιᾷ ἠλέησεν, *eusplanchnia eleesen*), ed. J. Grosdidier de Matons, *Romanos le Mélode, Hymnes*, 5 vols, SC, 99, 110, 114, 128, 283 (Paris, 1964–81), here: vol. 1, 120. All citations from Romanos refer to hymn, stanza and line of this edition.

8 Aristotle, *The Art of Rhetoric*, 2.8.2 (1385b): ἔστω δὴ ἔλεος λύπη τις ἐπὶ φαινόμενῳ κακῷ φθαρτικῷ ἢ λυπηρῷ τοῦ ἀναξίου τυγχάνειν, ed. tr. R. Kassell and J.H. Freese, rev. G. Striker, *Aristotle, Art of Rhetoric*, LCL, 193 (Cambridge, MA, 2020), 220–21.

Here pity is less a reflex than the result of a series of judgements: Was this evil deserved? Could this happen to me or someone I love? Does it ‘cut close’, as we might say? All these questions represent judgements about its significance, desert, proximity and potential to upend one’s own well-being.⁹ Unlike empathy, which connotes an instinctual co-suffering, whatever the cause, pity results from cognitive moves. As philosopher Martha Nussbaum characterises this complex emotion, pity is warranted when the suffering is serious, undeserved and runs counter to one’s own goals and ends for human flourishing.¹⁰

Pity also connotes that the pitied depends on the pitier, who has the power to allay the suffering of the pitied. As the *Rhetoric to Alexander* explains, to advocate on behalf of the pitiable, ‘one must show that those whom one wishes to render pitiable ... have suffered or are suffering or will suffer wrongly, *unless the hearers help them*’.¹¹ Here, pity invites comparisons to the past and future, as the change in fortunes may prompt some memory of former well-being or some fear of future vulnerability to misfortune. Such temporal comparisons are more easily grasped when the pitier and the pitied have similar social or economic status. We are inclined to feel pity for those who resemble us in age, character, habits, rank and birth. To pity the stranger requires more effort and awareness, but it is possible to achieve greater proximity – say, socially, geographically, temporally – through imagining their plight and understanding their circumstances.¹² For this reason, orators recognised the importance of enlisting the imagination so as to arouse pity for those who were removed in space, time and social ranks.¹³ As Aristotle notes,

since sufferings are pitiable when they appear close at hand ... gestures, voice, dress, and dramatic action generally, are more pitiable; for they

9 Konstan, *Pity Transformed*, 46–49.

10 Martha Nussbaum refers to this consideration as a ‘eudaimonistic judgment’, insofar as ‘this person, or creature, is a significant element in my scheme of goals and projects, an end whose good is to be promoted’ (*Upheavals of Thought*, 321). Sympathy, by contrast, does not meet all these conditions. For instance, one may feel sympathy for the loss or suffering of another person, even when that suffering is deserved or not serious. On the dynamics of pity in history and tragedy, see D.L. Munteanu, *Tragic Pathos: Pity and Fear in Greek Philosophy and Tragedy* (Cambridge, 2012); E. Allen-Hornblower, *From Agent to Spectator: Witnessing the Aftermath in Ancient Greek Epic and Tragedy* (Berlin, 2016), 25–29.

11 Pseudo-Aristotle, *Rhetoric to Alexander*, 34.4–6, quoted in Konstan, *Emotions of the Ancient Greeks*, 204.

12 On the importance of the imagination in generating emotions, see Mirguet, *Early History of Compassion*, 11–13.

13 R. Webb, ‘Sight and insight: theorizing vision, emotion, and imagination in ancient rhetoric’, in M. Squire (ed.), *Sight and the Ancient Senses* (Abingdon, 2016), 205–19; eadem, ‘Imagination and the arousal of the emotions in Greco-Roman rhetoric’, in S.M. Braund and C. Gill (ed.), *The Passions in Roman Thought and Literature* (Cambridge, 1997), 112–27.

make the evil appear close at hand, setting it before our eyes as either future or past.¹⁴

Pity, then, was performative insofar as it set suffering ‘before our eyes’ so that audiences might confront more keenly the sinews of human interdependence and the vagaries of moral luck.¹⁵ One experienced what philosopher Steven Tudor calls a ‘moral interruption’, whereby pity recalibrates one’s sense of self, yet not so far as to shatter it.

Even though Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* remained largely unknown to early Byzantines before the ninth century,¹⁶ the text belonged to a widespread tradition of training orators to generate pity through persuasion. Already in the fifth century BCE, the orator Thrasymachos of Chalcedon composed a treatise (now lost) simply called *Eleoi*, or ‘Pities’.¹⁷ In Roman times, Cicero’s *On Invention* counted no fewer than sixteen methods for arousing pity, an effect he called *conquestio*.¹⁸ Such ‘commonplaces’, as he called them, aimed to show the power of fortune over all people and the weakness of humans to withstand it. Reversals were key to these rhetorical tactics. For instance, by contrasting previous prosperity with current evils or decrying ignoble acts unbefitting the wrongdoer’s station in life, an orator aimed to make his audience feel a surge of pity. The arc of a painful life beset with troubles past, present and future – such as a bereft parent’s loss of future pleasures when a child’s life is cut short – suggests that cruel contrast was the weapon of choice. With its reliance on mental images, *conquestio* re-fashioned audiences into eyewitnesses and mourners as they imagined their own loved ones in a similar situation. The ninth ‘topic’ or method Cicero suggested was to address some beloved ‘mute and inanimate’ object, such as ‘a horse, a house, or a garment’ as a technique to push the audience toward a similar sense of loss. Whatever the means of *conquestio* chosen by the speaker, Cicero insisted on brevity. Quoting the rhetorician Apollonios,

14 Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 2.8.14 (1386a), ed.tr. Kassell, Freese and Striker, 224–27. For a critique of how proximity runs the risk of moral myopia, indifference and parochialism, see P. Bloom, *Against Empathy: The Case for Rational Compassion* (New York, 2016).

15 K.J. Dover, *Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle* (Berkeley, 1974), 195–201.

16 As T.M. Conley, ‘Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* in Byzantium’, *Rhetorica*, 8 (1990), 29–44, notes, of the hundreds of manuscripts from the 9th through the 14th century that include works by Aristotle, very few include the *Rhetoric*. Students of rhetoric in early Byzantium were more inclined to rely on compilations under the names of Hermogenes, Aphthonios and Menander Rhetor. See also T.M. Conley, ‘The alleged “Synopsis” of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* by John Italos and its place in the Byzantine reception of Aristotle’, in G. Dahan and I. Rosier-Catach (ed.), *La Rhétorique d’Aristote: Traditions et commentaires de l’antiquité au XVII^e siècle* (Paris, 1998), 49–64.

17 P. O’Sullivan, ‘Thrasymachus’, in M. Ballif and M.G. Moran (ed.), *Classical Rhetorics and Rhetoricians: Critical Studies and Sources* (Westport, CT, 2005), 368–71.

18 Cicero, *On Invention*, 1.106–9, ed.tr. H.M. Hubbell, *Cicero, On Invention: The Best Kind of Orator; Topics*, LCL, 386 (Cambridge, MA, 1949), 156–61.

Cicero warned, ‘Nothing dries more quickly than tears’.¹⁹ Unlike revenge, pity is a dish best served hot.

Appealing to pity, then, had an enlivening effect: it conjured for audiences the past, its objects and future repercussions. And it set up a moral framework by which to ponder life-altering events beyond one’s control. These tactics were not without their critics. Many orators cautioned against the cheap sentiment of such gestures, weeping and silent displays.²⁰ Even in courtrooms where women and children were prohibited from speaking, their imagined presence could sway juror-judges. To some, the techniques were craven and manipulative. Many orators warned audiences to resist such shameless theatricality and thereby banish pity.²¹ Aristophanes parodied the ridiculous excesses of such appeals to pity in an exuberant monologue by a jury member.²² Socrates emphatically refused to stoop to any emotional displays at the sentencing phase of his trial.²³

- 19 *Rhetoric to Herennius*, 2.31.50: ‘The appeal to pity must be brief ... for nothing dries faster than a tear’, quoted in J. Connolly, ‘The new world order: Greek rhetoric in Rome’, in I. Worthington (ed.), *A Companion to Greek Rhetoric* (Malden, MA, 2007), 139–65, esp. 148. Cf. Cicero, *On Invention*, 1.109, ed. Hubbell, 162–63: ‘But when the emotions have been aroused it will be advisable not to linger over the *conquestio*. For as the rhetorician Apollonios said, “Nothing dries more quickly than tears”’.
- 20 On Attic courtroom appeals to pity, see D. Konstan, ‘Rhetoric and emotion’, in *Companion to Greek Rhetoric*, ed. Worthington, 411–25; C. Cooper, ‘Forensic oratory’, in *Companion to Greek Rhetoric*, ed. Worthington, 203–19; S. Johnstone, *Disputes and Democracy: The Consequences of Litigation in Ancient Athens* (Austin, 1999), 109–25; V. Bers, *Genos Dikanikon: Amateur and Professional Speech in the Courtrooms of Classical Athens* (Washington, DC, 2009), 77–93; E. Sanders, ‘Generating goodwill and friendliness in Attic forensic oratory’, in R.R. Caston and R.A. Kaster (ed.), *Hope, Joy, and Affection in the Classical World* (New York, 2016), 163–81; K. Apostolakis, ‘Pitiable dramas on the podium of the Athenian law courts’, in S. Papaioannou, A. Serafim and B. da Vela (ed.), *The Theatre of Justice: Aspects of Performance in Greco-Roman Oratory and Rhetoric* (Leiden, 2017), 133–56; P.A. O’Connell, *The Rhetoric of Seeing in Attic Forensic Oratory* (Austin, 2017), 30–31, 35–36, 43–44, 59.
- 21 Apostolakis, ‘Pitiable dramas’, 135, cites examples of exposed wounds and bared breasts to heighten pity for the accused. More generally, D.N. Walton, *Appeal to Pity: Argumentum ad Misericordiam* (Albany, 1997), 44–47; L. Rubinstein, ‘Evoking anger through pity: portraits of the vulnerable and defenceless in Attic oratory’, in A. Chaniotis and P. Ducrey (ed.), *Unveiling Emotions II: Emotions in Greece and Rome; Texts, Images, Material Culture* (Stuttgart, 2013), 135–65; E. Sanders, ‘“He is a liar, a bounder, and a cad”: the arousal of hostile emotions in Attic forensic oratory’, in A. Chaniotis (ed.), *Unveiling Emotions: Sources and Methods for the Study of Emotions in the Greek World* (Stuttgart, 2012), 359–87.
- 22 Aristophanes, *Wasps*, 548–58, 568–73, discussed in Bers, *Genos Dikanikon*, 80–81.
- 23 Plato, *Apology*, 34d3–36b8, discussed in both Bers, *Genos Dikanikon*, 77–78, and Walton, *Appeal to Pity*, 46–48; cf. T. Lewis, ‘Identifying rhetoric in the *Apology*: does Socrates use the appeal for pity?’, *Interpretation*, 21 (1993–94), 105–14. On strategies for counteracting appeals to pity, see Quintilian, *Institutes of Oratory*, 4.1.13–14, ed. tr. D.A. Russell, *Quintilian, The Orator’s Education*, 5 vols, LCL, 124–27, 494 (Cambridge, MA, 2001), here: vol. 2, 186.

One of the most detailed surviving guides to managing pity is the third-century CE treatise *Art of Rhetoric* by Apsines of Gadara.²⁴ It outlines the many ways to arouse, sustain and plead for pity before judges. Drawing familiar examples from Homer and the Greek tragedies, Apsines recommends many ways of stirring pity (ἐλεον κινεῖν): by appealing to undeserved suffering (as for a leader sent into exile or a rich man reduced to poverty), by describing dashed hopes and by contrasting past glory with present misfortune.²⁵ He also exhorted orators to demonstrate the pervasiveness of the suffering lodged in the soul, in the body, as well as in the loss of external goods.²⁶

Two rhetorical devices, in particular, are vital to Apsines' advice on stirring pity: description (*ekphrasis*) and speech-in-character (*ethopoeia*).²⁷ A silent victim's physical appearance and circumstances could be described with vivid precision (*enargeia*). The orator could further instil pity by creating imagined speech for a victim. Apsines asks, 'What would he say upon having this throat slit?' Or, 'What could the virgin say as she was raped?' A speech addressed to the belongings of the deceased could stir pity. A father could address an image (*eikon*) or garment of his slain child. Apsines outlined ways to describe in detail a slow and agonising death by poisoning or wounds suffered by the slain victim.²⁸

Vivid imagined speeches and descriptions could equally inoculate audiences against appeals to pity. The fourth-century orator Libanios crafts descriptions not only of the crime but also anticipated the defendant's appeals to pity. The murderer, Libanios anticipates, 'will cry and exhibit his children and beg you not to make them orphans'.²⁹ Libanios addresses the murderer directly in this speech, rebuffing any claims to unjust suffering and insisting that punishment is deserved. As he reminds his audience in one sample speech: 'Imagine yourselves at the murder scene. Picture this man standing over a victim with his sword, and the person he has caught is supplicating you'. If the murderer is unswayed by his victim's appeals to pity, on what grounds can he now expect pity from his own jury?³⁰ Libanios draws his audience into rhetorical proximity by which to form their own judgements about who deserves pity and who does not. Through vivid description and

24 Apsines, *Art of Rhetoric*, 15–47, ed.tr. M.R. Dilts and G.A. Kennedy, *Two Greek Rhetorical Treatises from the Roman Empire* (Leiden, 1997), 75–239, esp. 206–35. Valuable commentary also in M. Patillon (ed.), *Apsinès, Art rhétorique; Problèmes à faux-semblant*, Collection des universités de France, série grecque, 410 (Paris, 2001), LXXV–LXXVII.

25 Apsines, *Art of Rhetoric*, 19 (non-desert), 20–21 (dashed hopes), 28 (past/present), ed. Dilts and Kennedy, 208–11, 210–11, 216–17.

26 Apsines, *Art of Rhetoric*, 23, ed. Dilts and Kennedy, 214–15.

27 Apsines, *Art of Rhetoric*, 32, ed. Dilts and Kennedy, 220–21.

28 Apsines, *Art of Rhetoric*, 40, ed. Dilts and Kennedy, 228–29.

29 Libanios, *Progymnasmata*, 27 (murderer), ed.tr. C.A. Gibson, *Libanios's Progymnasmata: Model Exercises in Greek Prose Composition and Rhetoric* (Atlanta, 2008), 155.

30 Libanios, *Progymnasmata*, 27, ed.tr. Gibson, 157.

speech in character, he allows his audience to imagine the voice of the victim and to avoid leniency toward the murderer.

Rhetorical exercises, or, *progymnasmata*, were an important laboratory of emotions in early Byzantine education.³¹ By the fifth century CE, teachers of rhetoric relied on anthologies of rhetorical writings, that contained manuals by Aphthonios and Hermogenes, as well as works attributed to Hermogenes (*On Invention* and *On the Method of Forcefulness*).³² Through sample speeches and gestures, orators learned how to draw attention to circumstances by bringing them before the eyes. They effected the proximity to see for oneself, yet inserted sufficient moral distance to cast judgement.³³

Such proximity also applied to inanimate objects. When addressing an image or garment of the dead, speech itself drew the dead back into the realm of the living. The tools of *rhetorical* proximity – vivid description (*ekphrasis*) and speech-in-character (*ethopoeia*) – conjured up the victim. Rhetoric bridged potential chasms of time, space, status, rank, or gender.

The Preacher's Voice

Christian audiences were also attuned to such rhetorical devices. Hagiographers and martyrologists used similar techniques to describe the excruciating sufferings of the saintly.³⁴ As Paul Blowers observes, 'Late ancient preachers reworked tragic pity as a powerful inducement to benevolence and almsgiving'.³⁵ That 're-scripting' of tragic pity required 'new casts of tragic characters';³⁶ among these *dramatis personae* were martyrs, the destitute poor and the diseased.

31 A convenient compilation and translation of these rhetorical exercises appears in Kennedy, *Progymnasmata*. On boys' (and some girls') experiences of these exercises, see R. Webb, 'The *Progymnasmata* as practice', in Y.L. Too (ed.), *Education in Greek and Roman Antiquity* (Leiden, 2001), 289–316; Webb, *Ekphrasis*, 14–17, 40–42; R. Criore, *The School of Libanius in Late Antique Antioch* (Princeton, 2007), 30–32.

32 E. Jeffreys, 'Rhetoric', in E. Jeffreys, J. Haldon and R. Cormack (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Byzantine Studies* (Oxford, 2008), 827–37, esp. 829. On the persistence of rhetorical handbooks and the embeddedness of rhetorical devices in hagiography and other lay Christian literatures of Byzantium, see E. Jeffreys, 'Rhetoric in Byzantium', in *Companion to Greek Rhetoric*, ed. Worthington, 170–77.

33 Konstan, *Emotions of the Ancient Greeks*, 212–13, distinguishes between pity and emotional identification: whereas the former involves judgements, the latter need not.

34 On the impact of the Second Sophistic on Greek Christian homilies, see J. Leemans, 'Introduction', in J. Leemans, W. Mayer, P. Allen and B. Dehandschutter (ed.), *Let Us Die That We May Live: Greek Homilies on Christian Martyrs from Asia Minor, Palestine and Syria (c. AD 350–AD 450)* (London, 2003), 3–52, esp. 26–35.

35 P. M. Blowers, 'Pity, empathy, and the tragic spectacle of human suffering: exploring the emotional culture of compassion in late ancient Christianity', *JChrSt*, 18 (2010), 1–27, esp. 17. On the theatre as an incubator for emotions, see Augustine, *Confessions*, 3.2–3, discussed in Blowers, 'Pity, empathy', 2; and A.W. Carr's chapter in this volume.

36 Blowers, 'Pity, empathy', 16–19.

However much early Christians redefined *whom* to pity, the tool kit of persuasion contained well-worn implements. Vivid description remained a powerful device for stirring pity. Preachers described in heightened detail the plight of beggars. In the homily ‘I will tear down my barns’, Basil of Caesarea did not hesitate to subject his rich congregants to an *ekphrastic* shaming. He used the detailed description of opulent settings so as to shock his well-off congregants into seeing the dehumanising effects of extreme poverty. In this sermon on a parable from the Gospel of Luke (12:16–21), Basil leads the audience into a poor man’s hovel and follows his gaze as the beggar surveys his miserable belongings until his eye lands on his children. When the man realises his scant material possessions amount to nothing of value, he confronts the awful reality of deciding which of his children he shall sell in order to buy food for the rest. To expose this excruciating choice, Basil invents an internal monologue for this desperate parent: ‘What kind of beast shall I become? How can I forget the bond of nature?’, the man asks himself.³⁷ Basil combines *ekphrasis* and *ethopoeia* to bring the poor before the eyes of the rich. Because abject poverty makes the pitied unrecognisable, Basil shames the rich for their obtuseness and greed. His tirade against the pitiless rich is direct: ‘Tears do not move you, groans do not soften your heart, but you remain adamant and unbending’, he berates the congregation.³⁸ John Chrysostom, by contrast, understood the real barrier of pity to be disgust. As Susan Wessel astutely observes, disgust may seem instinctive and non-cognitive, but for Chrysostom, it invites cognitive judgements about the worthlessness of the sufferer.³⁹

That ‘putting before the eyes’ drives Gregory of Nyssa’s second sermon, ‘On loving the poor’.⁴⁰ Gregory opens with a celestial vision of the divine throne encircled by angels, then plunges the audience into horrors of urban misery, including the sight of crippled bodies strewn about the streets. Their bodies, he says, ‘utterly spent from suffering sickness’, have wooden fingernails, deformed feet: they are now four-legged beasts.⁴¹ Their animal-like appearance and gait are cast as cruel inversions of the human form: hands

37 Basil, ‘I will tear down my barns’, 4.12–22, ed.tr. Y. Courtonne, *Saint Basile, Homélie sur la richesse* (Paris, 1935), 25, tr. C.P. Schroeder, *St. Basil the Great, On Social Justice* (Crestwood, NY, 2009), 59–71, esp. 64. Commentary in D.R. Boyd, ‘Translation of *Homilia in divites* by Basil of Caesarea, with annotation and dating’ (PhD diss., Temple University, 2014).

38 Basil, ‘I will tear down my barns’, 4, ed. Courtonne, 25.30–27.1, tr. Schroeder, 65.

39 Wessel, *Passion and Compassion*, 92. On pity’s wider effects, see S. Wessel, *On Compassion, Healing, Suffering, and the Purpose of the Emotional Life*, Reading Augustine (London, 2020), 22–23.

40 ‘On loving the poor’, sermon 2 (= *De pauperibus amandis, oratio duo*; CPG 3170), ed. A. van Heck, in W. Jaeger (ed.), *Gregorii Nysseni opera*, vol. 9.1 (Leiden, 1967), 111–27, tr. S.R. Holman, *The Hungry Are Dying: Beggars and Bishops in Roman Cappadocia* (New York, 2001), 199–206.

41 ‘On loving the poor’, sermon 2, ed. van Heck, 113–14, tr. Holman, 200–1.

serve as feet, knees become heels and ankles are their toes. As the audience recoils in disgust, Gregory chides them, ‘No, you do not pity a being of your own race’.

As Susan Wessel has observed, preachers in antiquity used various means to draw audiences closer to misery, while remaining aware of the tendency to recoil in horror: they ‘understood that people feel disgust, empathy, pleasure, pain, despair, love and other emotions too diffuse to name, when they witness the suffering of others’.⁴² Gregory of Nazianzos implored his audiences to hear ‘those who harmonise a pitiful symphony in lamentations’.⁴³ By these efforts, Gregory of Nazianzos might ‘assimilate the lepers into [his listeners’] imaginative worlds’ and, with any luck, into their moral universe.⁴⁴

For Gregory of Nyssa, those imaginative worlds included angels, the utterly bodiless, as a vehicle for calling attention to the deformed bodies of lepers. He reminds his congregation that angels in their bodiless purity may very well feel disgust at the sight of human embodiment, yet they touch humankind anyway. Or, God might have recoiled at the thought of assuming ‘stinking and unclean’ flesh, but did so to effect a ‘total cure of your ills by his touch’.⁴⁵ Touch, here, is a tool of proximity. It counters the urge to recoil in disgust and triggers feelings of likeness: ‘Remember who you are and on whom you contemplate: a human person like yourself, whose basic nature is no different from your own’.⁴⁶ Such abjection attracts a divine gaze – even touch – and thereby unleashes celestial pity.

To combat pitilessness, preachers often dissected disgust. In an oration on the poor, Gregory of Nazianzos described the spiral of poverty and infirmity. Crippled by disease and the fear of illness, these pitiable ones are regarded with disgust and contempt by the very people who should feel pity and thereby alleviate suffering.⁴⁷ Gregory describes their plight to his audience in this way:

There lies before our eyes a dreadful and pathetic sight, one that no one would believe who has not seen it: human beings alive yet dead,

42 Wessel, *Passion and Compassion*, 15.

43 Wessel, *Passion and Compassion*, 42–43.

44 Wessel, *Passion and Compassion*, 15: ‘truly seeing the poor and becoming aware of their plight could change how people think, feel, and act’.

45 ‘On loving the poor’, sermon 2, PG 46:476, tr. Holman, 201.

46 Ibid. On touch’s power to collapse the boundary between past and present, as well as between present and past, see R. Schneider, *Performing Remains: Art and War in Times of Theatrical Reenactment* (Abingdon, 2011), 35.

47 Gregory of Nazianzos, Oration 14 (‘On loving the poor’), 9, PG 35:857–909, tr. M. Vinson, *St. Gregory of Nazianzus, Select Orations*, FC, 107 (Washington, DC, 2003), 39–71, esp. 44–45. On the transferral of shame in such an appeal, see J.A. McGuckin, ‘St. Gregory of Nazianzus on the love of the poor (Oration 14)’, in N. Dumitrescu (ed.), *The Ecumenical Legacy of the Cappadocians* (New York, 2016), 139–57, esp. 153.

disfigured in almost every part of their bodies, barely recognisable for who they once were and where they came from.⁴⁸

This ‘pitiful wreckage’, barely recognisable as human forms, still ‘keep calling out the names of their mothers and fathers, brothers, and places of origin: “I am the son of so-and-so. So-and-so is my mother. This is my name. You used to be a close friend of mine”’.⁴⁹ In this poignant description, Gregory conflates the deformed physical body with a maimed social body. The man finds himself unrecognisable to kin, who are deaf to his appeal to kinship. Gregory achieves *enargeia* through concrete details of speech and appearance to make the man’s suffering audible and visible to Gregory’s audience. Like the courtroom defendant’s parading of family before jurors, the beggar names his kin in an appeal to pity.

These brief examples show how preachers such as Basil, Gregory of Nyssa and Gregory of Nazianzos performed the plight of the pitiful as a way to awaken audiences from the slumber of pitilessness. Like courtroom orators and tragedians, preachers highlighted the nagging fact of vulnerability. Pity, as Gregory of Nyssa reminded his congregation, was the only way to stay afloat in an unpredictable world. He warns, ‘Insofar as you sail on tranquil waters, hold the hand of the unfortunate who have suffered shipwreck. You all sail on the same sea, prone to waves and tempests’.⁵⁰ Here, unmerited suffering lurks in the ‘reefs, underwater breakwaters and other dangers of the ocean’ which sailors fear.⁵¹ These underwater menaces, unseen until it is too late, trigger the passer-by to notice the undeserved suffering of those hobbling across dry land. Gregory continues,

Insofar as you are floating, healthy and safe, on the calm sea of life, do not arrogantly pass by those who have shipwrecked their vessel on the reefs. What assurance do you have of always following your way on tranquil waters?⁵²

The extended hand like the humanising gaze joined the pitier to the pitied. Working against disgust’s tendency to distance, pity tugged suffering into view. Both invented speech and vivid description – not to mention a bracing slap of interpellation – illustrate the rhetorical mechanics for making pity.

48 Gregory of Nazianzos, Oration 14.10, PG 35:869, tr. Vinson, 45.

49 Ibid.

50 Ibid.

51 Ibid.

52 Ibid. Cf. John Chrysostom, *Sermons on Genesis*, 5.3, ed. tr. L. Brottier, *Jean Chrysostome, Sermons sur la Genèse*, SC, 433 (Paris, 1998), 272, tr. R.C. Hill, *St. John Chrysostom, Eight Sermons on the Book of Genesis* (Boston, 2004), 92–93, who likens the desperation of beggars at nightfall to the exertions of the shipwrecked to reach port before dark. On this metaphor, see L. Brottier, ‘Le port, la tempête et le naufrage: sur quelques métaphores paradoxales employées par Jean Chrysostome’, *RSR*, 68 (1994), 145–58.

By simulating vision and touch, preachers positioned audiences to genuinely pity. John Chrysostom warned against craving the sight of others' suffering. Such voyeurism made the poor and maimed display their suffering to entertain the pitier.⁵³ Rather than gawk at suffering, or worse yet, avert the gaze in disgust, audiences were invited to behold a highly curated depiction of misery. As Richard Finn describes this representation, 'the poor were to be dramatised, even heroised'. Warning against mistaking vividness for reality, Finn points out it was 'the indefinite poor' whom preachers depicted.⁵⁴ Finn's caveats notwithstanding, we must resist the temptation to regard rhetorical handbooks as compendia for tropes and gimmicks. As I have suggested here, their methods illumine the mechanisms through which pity's tragic players were recast for Christian audiences. Using techniques from forensic oratory and rhetorical handbooks, preachers ironically offered up models of divine and angelic pity as a way, in Finn's words, to 'heighten visibility' of the lowly poor.⁵⁵

In early Byzantium, preaching played a considerable role in defining an early Christian culture of compassion.⁵⁶ A significant part of that endeavour was rehumanising the poor by rendering their presence visible and audible. Chrysostom chides his congregation that upon departing the church they

go off, seeing the clusters of the poor [...] with a glance at them as though they were pillars and not human bodies we pass them by pitilessly (ἀνηλεῶς; *aneleos*); with a glance at them as though they were lifeless statues (ἀνδριάντας ἀψύχους; *andriantas apsuchous*) and not breathing human beings (ἐμπνεόντας ἀνθρώπους; *empneontas anthropous*).⁵⁷

As preachers saw their responsibility, it was better to make the poor visible in the sermon and avert their wrath in dream time. As Chrysostom explained, one could scurry past the beggar ignoring his cries. Yet, at night, as one drifted into slumber, indifferent to the laments as if ignoring the cries of a wild dog, that same beggar might return to torment one's dreams, 'filthy, clad in rags, weeping and wailing, censuring our severity'.⁵⁸ Chrysostom's fine line between human and animal voices calls to mind Finn's astute observation that 'not all visibility is a virtue, and Christian preachers ... had to tread a careful line between the need to make the poor visible and the

53 Wessel, *Passion and Compassion*, 95.

54 R. Finn, 'Portraying the poor: descriptions of poverty in Christian texts from the late Roman empire', in M. Atkins and R. Osborne (ed.), *Poverty in the Roman World* (Cambridge, 2006), 130–44, esp. 131, 144.

55 Finn, 'Portraying the poor', 131.

56 On the transformation of Greek and Roman conceptions of pity by Christian writers, see Blowers, 'Pity, empathy'; Konstan, *Pity Transformed*, 105–24; R. Finn, *Almsgiving in the Later Roman Empire* (Oxford, 2006); Wessel, *Pity and Compassion*, 24.

57 Chrysostom, *Sermons on Genesis*, 5.3, ed. Brottier, 270, tr. Hill, 91.

58 Chrysostom, *Sermons on Genesis*, 5.4, ed. Brottier, 274, tr. Hill, 95.

need to make them attractive as recipients of alms'.⁵⁹ Whereas the sermons discussed so far relied on invented monologues and vivid mental images, early Byzantine hymnography suggests that dialogue, too, had the power to instil pity.

Divine Ruses and Releasing Pity

Some of the most vivid portrayals of emotions in early Byzantium appear in the sung sermons by the sixth-century preacher Romanos the Melodist. Performed on the eve of feast days, these metrical songs (or *kontakia*) retold biblical stories in two dozen or so stanzas. One notable feature of Romanos's *kontakia* is the refrain at the end of each stanza. It is likely that the congregations would have joined the preacher in singing this refrain, effecting a dialogue between the congregation and the preacher.⁶⁰

Many of Romanos's saints and biblical characters stirred pity, chief among them the lamenting Mary the mother of Jesus, the mother of the forty martyrs of Sebasteia, as well as the leper, the woman with the issue of blood and others whom Jesus healed. Romanos's most poignant investigation of pity, however, appears in the hymn on the prophet Elijah, one of Romanos's longest *kontakia* (33 stanzas). This retelling combines the story of the drought (1 Kings 18:1–46), Elijah's sojourn in the wilderness where he was fed by ravens (1 Kings 17:6) and his stay with a widow at Sarepta in Phoenicia (1 Kings 17:7–16), including his miraculous provision of flour and oil and the resuscitation of her son who had died from the famine. Although early Christian writers were fascinated by Elijah's wondrous deeds,⁶¹ Romanos prefers instead to focus on these three episodes from the prophet's career as a way to probe the workings of pity and, perhaps more importantly, the inner logic of pitilessness.⁶² Rather than showcase the partnership between God and Elijah, this *kontakion* instead puts them at odds.

Elijah is consumed with rage at the lawlessness he sees and at God's refusal to punish the wrongdoers.⁶³ Unable to abide God's pitying stance toward the lawless ones, the prophet takes it upon himself to 'judge on the

59 Finn, 'Portraying the poor', 144, notes that saints' lives provided an even more detailed picture of poverty.

60 T. Arentzen, 'Voices interwoven: refrains and vocal participation in the *kontakia*', *JÖB*, 66 (2016), 1–10.

61 Elijah is the fourth most cited biblical character in the New Testament (after Moses, Abraham and David). See E. Poirot, *Les prophètes Élie et Élisée dans la littérature chrétienne ancienne* (Turnhout, 1997), 307.

62 For a useful anthology of patristic writers on Elijah, see translations by the Carmelites of the Monastery Saint-Rémy-les-Montbard, *Le saint prophète Élie d'après les Pères de l'Église*, *Spiritualité orientale*, 53 (Bégrolles-en-Mauges, 1992).

63 Romanos, *Hymns*, 7.1, ed. Grosdidier de Matons, vol. 1, 308, tr. J. Peden, 'Romanos's *kontakion* On Elijah', in M. Mullett (ed.), *Metaphrastes, or, Gained in Translation: Essays and Translations in Honour of Robert H. Jordan*, *BBTT*, 9 (Belfast, 2004), 143–56.

creator's behalf'.⁶⁴ Elijah taunts God: will 'the only true lover of humankind (ὁ μόνος φιλόανθρωπος, *ho monos philanthropos*)' be 'importuned by just a few tears'?⁶⁵ To test this idea, Elijah hatches a plan: he binds God to an oath to inflict a punishing drought in the land and thereby blocks God from showing pity (*eleos*). God soon realises, however, that he is unable to withstand 'repentance and welling tears'. Still, he is duty-bound to honour Elijah's oath, however agonising it is for God to withhold pity. Although God warned that he would not be able to 'withhold ... [his] compassions from men', Elijah insists that the oath prevail until repentance atones for the sin and allows God to open the skies and let the rain fall.⁶⁶ God finds himself in a bind between 'opening up his *splanchna* of mercy to his suppliants' and honouring the oath.⁶⁷

Like a courtroom orator trained to resist pathetic courtroom appeals to pity, Elijah too withstands those begging for mercy. Even God devises ruses to awaken Elijah's pity. Convinced that the prophet's hunger would 'bring the punishment to an end', God afflicts Elijah with the hunger suffered by others.⁶⁸ Even as Elijah's growling stomach begins 'to plead on nature's behalf', Elijah remains 'like unfeeling stone'.⁶⁹ This vocal stomach poses another challenge for God, who risks starving his cherished prophet. Incapable of breaking Elijah's pitilessness, God relents and feeds the prophet. After all, the capacity to pity is predicated on having one's own basic needs met. God's next ruse is to command the ravens to provide Elijah with food. That the pitiless prophet is nourished by ravens is fitting: as Romanos explains, ravens are compassionless creatures, 'as they never bring food to their nestlings as [one ought] to children, but they are nourished from above'.⁷⁰ As

64 Romanos, *Hymns*, 7.3, ed. Grosdidier de Matons, vol. 1, 310.

65 The irony of the question would not have escaped Romanos's audience, who would have recognised words from the refrains of the kontakion on Christ's presentation in the temple (ὁ μόνος φιλόανθρωπος, ed. Grosdidier de Matons, vol. 2, 172–97) and the kontakion on the healing of the leper (ὁ φιλόανθρωπος, ed. *ibid.*, 360–79). L.W. Countryman also notes the tension this refrain sets up: 'the God to whom Romanos turns Elijah's attention is characterized here not in terms of power but of love' ('A sixth-century plea against religious violence: Romanos on Elijah', in D.E. Aune and R.D. Young (ed.), *Reading Religions in the Ancient World: Essays Presented to Robert McQueen Grant on his 90th Birthday* (Leiden, 2007), 289–301, esp. 290. I thank Dr Susan Holman for directing my attention to D. Constantelos, 'Liturgy: Eastern Christian', in W.M. Johnston (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Monasticism* (Chicago, 2000), vol. 1, 783–84, whose translation is preferable to Peden's and comes closer to the nuances of pity, as discussed in C. Mulard, *La pensée symbolique de Romanos le Mélode* (Turnhout, 2016), 261.

66 Romanos, *Hymns*, 7.4–5, ed. Grosdidier de Matons, vol. 1, 312, tr. Peden, 147.

67 Romanos, *Hymns*, 7.6, ed. Grosdidier de Matons, vol. 1, 314, tr. Peden, 148.

68 Romanos, *Hymns*, 7.7, ed. Grosdidier de Matons, vol. 1, 314, tr. Peden, 148.

69 Romanos, *Hymns*, 7.8, ed. Grosdidier de Matons, vol. 1, 316, tr. Peden, 148. John Chrysostom chides the pitiless who pass by beggars as if they were inanimate statues or pillars rather than fellow humans (*Sermons on Genesis*, 5.1, ed. Brottier, 270, tr. Hill, 91).

70 Romanos, *Hymns*, 7.9, ed. Grosdidier de Matons, vol. 1, 316–18, tr. Peden, 149; cf. Job 38:41; Ps 146 (147); Lk 12:24.

God explains to Elijah, these ‘haters of their children are suddenly ... zealous towards you and are now transformed. They have been revealed as ministers of my pity by providing you with food’.⁷¹ Unable to bear any longer the cries of infants or the bellowing of starving beasts, God begs Elijah to let go of his anger. Yet Elijah remains unmoved and, worse yet, even more vindictive.

God’s next ruse turns from non-human animals (if one counts the animality of a growling stomach) to human ones. God sends Elijah to a starving gentile widow in the town of Sarepta, in the hopes that he might be ‘disgusted’⁷² by the non-Jew’s meagre food and thereby turn to God for (licit) sustenance. On the verge of starvation herself, the widow is eager to feed her guest even if doing so means her own children may starve. As Romanos sees it, her selflessness is not what stirs pity, it is her voice: ‘At the widow’s voice, [Elijah] was shaken and began to sympathise (συνέπασχε, *sunepasche*)’.⁷³ He realises, ‘the widow is pining away and is more afflicted than I’.⁷⁴ Unlike the ravens or the stomach, human speech triggers the type of cognitive evaluation that leads to pity. The prophet vows to ‘consider mercy’ and ‘accustom [his] nature to delight in pity [as God] abides pitiful’.⁷⁵ Yet, at this point, Elijah’s pity is predictably proximate: he feels it for the widow in his presence. Although God provides food to Elijah and the widow, the prophet remains ‘totally unmoved by pity and [...] inflexible’.⁷⁶ He cares for the widow, as he neglects starving others.

It takes a fourth ruse to complete the progression from pitilessness to pity. God kills (if briefly) the widow’s son. This temporary yet didactic death aims to draw Elijah closer to witness the widow’s tears and suffering. The grieving mother lashes out at Elijah for ‘craftily exacting a life for some flour and oil’. Having caused the deaths of so many, did he really need to take her son’s life as well? ‘Pricked by these words as by goads and shamed by the wailing widow’, Elijah fails to calm her with words, and he ‘lament[s] unceasingly ...

71 Romanos, *Hymns*, 7.10, ed. Grosdidier de Matons, vol. 1, 318, tr. Peden, 149. Syriac and Greek interpreters of these stories were familiar with a tradition that God deliberately chose ravens to feed the prophet, since these birds have a reputation for hating their own young and withholding food from them. Isho‘dad of Merv, Bishop of Hadatha (c. 850 CE) described the raven as a ‘wild and merciless bird’ that has ‘no natural love for its young and does not feed them’, ed.tr. C. Van den Eynde. *Commentaire d’Iso‘dad de Merv sur l’Ancien Testament*, vol. 3: *Livres de Sessions*, CSCO, 229–30/Scriptores Syri, 96–77 (Louvain, 1950), 117–18 (text), 138–40 (tr.). On the extraordinary sympathy attributed to the pelican in Ps 101:7 in patristic commentary, cf. T. Nicklas and J.E. Spittler, ‘Christ and the pelican: function, background and impact of an image’, *Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses*, 92 (2016), 323–37, esp. 334–36.

72 Romanos, *Hymns*, 7.14, ed. Grosdidier de Matons, vol. 1, 322, tr. Peden, 150.

73 Romanos, *Hymns*, 7.15, ed. Grosdidier de Matons, vol. 1, 322, tr. Peden, 151.

74 Romanos, *Hymns*, 7.15, ed. Grosdidier de Matons, vol. 1, 322, tr. Peden, 151.

75 Romanos, *Hymns*, 7.16, ed. Grosdidier de Matons, vol. 1, 324, tr. Peden, 151.

76 Romanos, *Hymns*, 7.18, ed. Grosdidier de Matons, vol. 1, 326, tr. Peden, 151.

looking up to heaven'⁷⁷ and cries out to God, whose 'constraint of pity (ἀνάγκη εὐσπλαγχνον; *ananken eusplanchnon*)' finally prompts Elijah to pity.⁷⁸

In a courtroom, demonstrable rage could move an audience to show mercy. Likewise, the widow's frustration stirs the prophet as well as God. As God admits:

I am suffering the pangs of childbirth and longing for the cancellation of the punishment. I am eager to give food to all the hungry – for I am the All-Pitying One. Seeing the floods of tears I am moved as a father, I am full of pity for those who are wasting away.⁷⁹

By portraying God as a birthing mother *and* a pitying father, Romanos gives the prophet (and, by extension, the audience) a hyper-paradigm of pity. In the end, God rewards the prophet's pity by removing him to the heavens. In Elijah's place, God, as Christ incarnate, replaces him as pitier-in-chief: 'As the All-Pitying One, I will come down to men, having become Man'.⁸⁰

As modern interpreters have pointed out, God's ruses were stock in Jewish, Syriac and Greek Christian interpretation of these biblical episodes.⁸¹ Romanos, however, centred pity in the cross-hairs of all the divine ruses. Romanos has a penchant for biblical characters who undergo some change of heart or come to realise some awful truth in the course of the kontakion. As with his portrayal of Jonah, the sinful woman, Death personified, or Satan, audiences follow the transformation of Elijah's fears and concerns. Romanos's inventive use of interior monologue and deliberative dialogue heightens the audience's ability to eavesdrop, identify and sing along with the refrain, an important device by which the audience participates in and engages the unfolding drama.⁸² In the kontakion on Elijah, Romanos leverages a long exegetical tradition to endow the prophet with a powerful voice⁸³ and the suffering with an even louder outcry capable of swaying God and eventually his prophet.

77 Romanos, *Hymns*, 7.22, ed. Grosdidier de Matons, vol. 1, 330, tr. Peden, 153.

78 Romanos, *Hymns*, 7.23, ed. Grosdidier de Matons, vol. 1, 330, tr. Peden, 153.

79 Romanos, *Hymns*, 7.24, ed. Grosdidier de Matons, vol. 1, 330, tr. Peden, 153.

80 Romanos, *Hymns*, 7.31, ed. Grosdidier de Matons, vol. 1, 338, tr. Peden, 155.

81 Poirot, *Les prophètes Élie et Élisée*; G.A.M. Rouwhorst, 'The biblical stories about the prophet Elijah in early Syriac-speaking Christianity', in A. Houtman, T. Kadari, M. Poorthuis and V. Tohar (ed.), *Religious Stories in Transformation: Conflict, Revision and Reception* (Leiden, 2016), 165–88. On the Latin Christian reception of Elijah, see A. Canelis (ed. tr.), *Ambroise de Milan, Élie et le jeûne*, SC, 611 (Paris, 2020), 1–46.

82 On the performative dimensions of Romanos's refrains, see Arentzen, 'Voices interwoven'; and G. Frank, 'Crowds and collective affect in Romanos's biblical retellings', in G. Frank, S.R. Holman and A.S. Jacobs (ed.), *The Garb of Being: Embodiment and the Pursuit of Holiness in Late Ancient Christianity* (New York, 2020), 169–90.

83 John Chrysostom, 'On Elijah and the widow', (CPG 4387), notes the 'terrible voice of the prophet', PG 51:337–48; cf. *Le Saint Prophète Élie*, 35 note a.

To highlight Elijah's pitilessness, Romanos draws the voices of the suffering ones ever closer. As the rhetorical teachers advise, it is difficult to pity those in the far past or in distant places.⁸⁴ Romanos understands that challenge. Thus, he narrows that temporal gap.⁸⁵ Romanos employs direct address to specific biblical characters⁸⁶ and invented speech – Elijah's, God's, the woman's – to highlight the extent of the prophet's unrelenting pity.

Whereas the Cappadocians, like Greek and Roman orators before them, relied on the sense of sight to provoke pity for the destitute,⁸⁷ Romanos pairs the spectacles of suffering⁸⁸ with a 'sound cloud' of witnesses. This aural strategy creates a 'surround sound' effect of voices that can move God and (eventually) the prophet. It is worth noting who populates this aural landscape: as Elijah calls out to God, he 'casts un pitying (ἀσπλαγχνίαις) words'⁸⁹ and 'rag[es] (θυμούμενος)'.⁹⁰ Eventually, Elijah, the one who 'constrained all by his word',⁹¹ is undone by the 'wailing of the widow' and finally 'laments' and 'cries'. Only the

84 S. Newman, 'Aristotle's notion of "bringing-before-the-eyes": its contributions to Aristotelian and contemporary conceptualisations of metaphor, style, and audience', *Rhetorica*, 20 (2002), 1–23, esp. 8–10; on proximity as a condition for pity, cf. Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 2.8 (1386a14), ed. tr. Kassell, Freese and Striker, 224–25.

85 D. Krueger, *Liturgical Subjects: Christian Ritual, Biblical Narrative, and the Formation of the Self in Byzantium* (Philadelphia, 2014), 72, 76.

86 On the narrator's direct appeal to characters in the drama, or *apostrophe*, see Ephraem Graecus's use of *apostrophe* in appealing to God's pitiless prophet:

O, zealous Elijah! ... How did the infants sin? The livestock and beasts and birds, how did they sin? For you handed all of these over to death. If these were guiltless, have mercy and give rain upon the earth!

Quoted in T.F. Crowell, 'The biblical homilies of Ephraem Graecus' (PhD diss., Catholic University of America, 2016), 201–7, at 204.

87 Allen-Hornblower, *Agent to Spectator*, 25–29. On *enargeia* in rhetorical education and on the device's legacy, see H.F. Plett, *Enargeia in Classical Antiquity and the Early Modern Age: The Aesthetics of Evidence* (Leiden, 2012), 7–21. On *enargeia* in forensic oratory, see O'Connell, *Rhetoric of Seeing*, 124–28; P.A. O'Connell, 'Enargeia, persuasion, and the vividness effect in Athenian forensic oratory', *Advances in the History of Rhetoric*, 20 (2017), 225–51. On 'pictorial vividness', see L. Huitink, 'Enargeia, enactivism and the ancient readerly imagination', in M. Anderson, D. Cairns and M. Prevak (ed.), *Distributed Cognition in Classical Antiquity* (Edinburgh, 2019), 169–89; J. Grethlein and L. Huitink, 'Homer's vividness: an enactive approach,' *JHS*, 137 (2017), 67–91. On *enargeia*'s relation to *energeia*, see M. Westin, 'Aristotle's rhetorical *energeia*: an extended note', *Advances in the History of Rhetoric*, 20 (2017), 252–61. On *enargeia* as a mode of immersivity and construal, see R.J. Allan, 'Construal and immersion: a cognitive linguistic approach to Homeric immersivity', in P. Meineck, W.M. Short and J. Devereaux (ed.), *The Routledge Handbook of Classics and Cognitive Theory* (Abingdon, 2019), 59–78. Two incisive treatments of how preachers put these immersive techniques to effect use are M. Ludlow, *Art, Craft, and Theology in Fourth-Century Christian Authors* (Oxford, 2020); B. Leyerle, *The Narrative Shape of Emotion in the Preaching of John Chrysostom* (Oakland, CA, 2020).

88 Romanos, *Hymns*, 7.18, ed. Grosdidier de Matons, vol. 1, 326, tr. Peden, 151.

89 Romanos, *Hymns*, 7.1, ed. Grosdidier de Matons, vol. 1, 308, tr. Peden, 146.

90 Romanos, *Hymns*, 7.4, ed. Grosdidier de Matons, vol. 1, 312, tr. Peden, 147.

91 Romanos, *Hymns*, 7.20, ed. Grosdidier de Matons, vol. 1, 328, tr. Peden, 152.

widow's voice can both 'shame' and 'shake' him out of his pitilessness.⁹² God's voice also appears, particularly in his exchanges with Elijah and the dialogues between the prophet and the widow – it is worth noting how many other voices seep into the tale: the people wail, infants cry, beasts bellow, even Elijah's hollow belly pleads, and the earth 'exulted and began to glorify the Lord'.⁹³ The outcry is so anguished that even God complains to Elijah, 'I cannot bear the universal wailing ... of the men whom I created/ The cry of infants and their tears/And the unintelligible bellowing of beasts – how am I to bear it?'⁹⁴ God's frustration reveals the full extent of Elijah's vindictive refusal to pity.

A cosmic chorus of voices and witnesses chiding the pitiless prophet can also be found in a *memra* (or verse homily) about Elijah and the widow at Sarepta, attributed to Ephrem. When Elijah commands heaven, heaven clamours to God. When trees hear Elijah's harsh words they 'ben[d] their heads in obeisance' to him.⁹⁵ Yet God instructs the ravens to withhold food from the unfeeling prophet, prompting the parched and starving Elijah to supplicate the ravens, who remained characteristically silent. Frustrated by their silence, Elijah then chided the hard earth, which 'groaned out like a bull' before rebuking the prophet for withholding water from his own mother.⁹⁶ Animating the trees and earth with vocal protests further intensifies the opposition to Elijah's pitilessness.⁹⁷ Even if God is bound to honour his prophet's words, God's creation is not bound to that oath and is at liberty to speak up. Such a stereophonic vocal outcry stands in stark contrast to the silence of the ravens (and of God). By endowing nature with voices, Ephrem mounts a non-human protest against Elijah's pitilessness.

In addition to the proliferation of human, animal and cosmic 'voices' which the hymnographer conjures, the refrain itself provides for the congregation a way to join in the drama. As James Peden notes, the refrain, 'keeps before us the central point or doctrine which the poet is investigating and making explicit'.⁹⁸ Yet Romanos's refrains were more than didactic or mnemonic devices. When sung by the audience, the audience becomes the mouthpiece for vari-

92 Romanos, *Hymns*, 7.22, ed. Grosdidier de Matons, vol. 1, 330, tr. Peden, 153. Cf. 7.15, ed. Grosdidier de Matons, vol. 1, 322, tr. Peden, 151: 'At the widow's voice he was shaken and began to sympathise'.

93 Romanos, *Hymns*, 7.8, 7.11, 7.29, ed. Grosdidier de Matons, vol. 1, 316–20, 336, tr. Peden, 148–49, 155.

94 Romanos, *Hymns*, 7.11, ed. Grosdidier de Matons, vol. 1, 320, tr. Peden, 149.

95 S.P. Brock, 'A Syriac verse homily on Elijah and the widow of Sarepta', *Le Muséon* 102 (1989), 93–113, at 107, line 58.

96 Brock, 'Syriac verse homily', 108, lines 73–74.

97 In the words of political theorist Jane Bennett, 'the world comes alive as a collection of singularities', a form of enchantment which entails, in her words, 'a condition of exhilaration or acute sensory activity. To be simultaneously transfixed in wonder and transported by sense, to be both caught up and carried away' (*The Enchantment of Modern Life: Attachments, Crossings, and Ethics* [Princeton, 2001], 5).

98 Peden, 'Romanos's *kontakion* On Elijah', 143–46, esp. 145.

ous biblical characters. To sing along with the refrain renders the audience into suppliants with the preacher (the ‘we’ of the proomion), to speak with divine self-understanding, to share in the mocking intimacy between a prophet and his God. The refrain insists on an all-pitying God when circumstances suggest otherwise. It allows the audience to speak the very irony that compassion has the last word, even as Elijah spouts revenge fantasies. The ‘compassionless’ ravens are ‘child-haters’ with which God attempts to sway the ‘man-hater’ Elijah.⁹⁹ The language of hatred bubbles in this strophe, yet the refrain of divine compassion keeps it from boiling over. And when the widow, undone by rage and maternal grief, seizes Elijah and drags him to court, she cries, ‘Give me my child whom you killed; I have no use for your flour, Do not nourish me, thinking that you have become *philanthropos*’.¹⁰⁰ In a clever and ironic twist on the refrain, the widow chides Elijah’s misguided righteousness. Her prophetic speech exposes the so-called prophet’s pretence and self-illusion.¹⁰¹ More than being a reminder, then, the refrain assures divine protection as it can also serve as prophetic put-down. For once the widow speaks the refrain, the punishment begins to lift.

As this paper has argued, preachers drew from the wider culture’s rhetorical tropes for stirring pity in audiences. Like the Cappadocians before him, Romanos crafts invented speech and vivid description to create a sensory proximity between the pitied and the pitier. The sufferings of others must be heard, seen and morally acknowledged in spoken and sung sermons to awaken pity. In amplifying suffering, description (*ekphrasis*) justifies pity. Likewise, speech-in-character (*ethopoeia*) gives voice to undeserved suffering, a condition for pity. Fourth-century preachers such as Basil of Caesarea and Gregory of Nazianzos use these rhetorical tools to awaken their congregations’ sense of pity and thereby prompt pity for the destitute.

Like the Cappadocians, Romanos also draws on invented speech. Yet, he extends the Cappadocian interior monologues into dialogues, in which the pitiless and the ever-pitying engage in lively moral debate about whether those who clearly deserve punishment ever merit pity. The oaths and divine ruses all expose efforts to banish pity. Yet the refrain, performed with the audience, insists that – even when couched in irony, and even with some wishful thinking on God’s part – pity, in the end, prevails.¹⁰² In *On Elijah*, pity and pitilessness invite a host of cognitive judgements: Is pity deserved here? Has justice been served?

99 Romanos, *Hymns*, 7.1 (self-understanding), 7.2 (mocking intimacy), 7.9 (ravens).

100 Romanos, *Hymns*, 7.20, ed. Grosdidier de Matons, vol. 1, 328, tr. Peden, 152.

101 My reading of this episode is shaped by M.J. Smith, ‘Race, gender, and the politics of “sass”’: reading Mark 7:24–30 through a womanist lens of intersectionality and inter(con)textuality’ in G.L. Byron and V. Lovelace (ed.), *Womanist Interpretations of the Bible: Expanding the Discourse* (Atlanta, 2016), 95–112.

102 Here, I am thinking of the strophes in which the refrain is spoken by God *imagining* Elijah’s relenting, ‘that the righteous man hearing her gentile status might cry: “Give the rain, *ho monos philanthropos*”’ (7.13, ed. Grosdidier de Matons, vol. 1, 320, tr. Peden, 150); or God’s next ruse, ‘So that, observing the widow’s tear and other distress/he (Elijah)

Who suffers? By putting the appeal to pity on the lips of God, the all-pitying one, Romanos heightens the solidarity between the poor and God. To ignore the pleas of the poor, one effectively ignores God. When Elijah resists those pleas in the name of God disastrous consequences ensue. Yet Romanos recasts the pitying God, the one who is ‘suffering the pangs of childbirth’ and longs to ‘give food to all the hungry’,¹⁰³ to bear the suffering of those he pities. That solidarity between God and the poor may explain God’s passivity throughout most of the drama. Yet, as the widow’s eventual rage drags the prophet to court, her anger unleashes his overdue pity.

To some extent, then, Romanos employs the same rhetorical devices Cappadocians and other fourth-century preachers used to elicit pity. Whereas John Chrysostom reminds audiences that they shall pay dearly for turning a deaf ear to the supplicant,¹⁰⁴ Romanos endows a biblical hero with that very deafness and indifference. Hymnography, with its ability to conjure the voices of many characters and put them in dialogue with one another, exposes the human victims of delayed pity, of misguided pitilessness, and of the potential for prophetic witness and even communion with God through pity. If pity involves some degree of sorrow,¹⁰⁵ Romanos gives voice to divine sorrow as God witnesses human suffering and feels beholden to one human agent capable of putting an end to that suffering. With multiple voices uttering the refrain *seriatim*, the depths of that sorrow might also contain the assurance of pity. Dialogue opened the chasms of that sorrow and created a space for pity to emerge.

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might cry: “Give the rain, *ho monos philanthropos*” (7.18, ed. Grosdidier de Matons, I, 326, tr. Peden, 152, slightly modified).

103 Romanos, *Hymns*, 7.24, ed. Grosdidier de Matons, vol. 1, 332, tr. Peden, 153.

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6 Epithet and Emotion

Reflections on the Quality of *Eleos* in the Mother of God Eleousa

Annemarie Weyl Carr

The preceding chapters have mobilised potent resources in managing Byzantium's rhetorics of emotion, whether verbal or visual. This chapter addresses situations in which a verbal indication of emotional content is joined with a visual one, but in a way that has challenged our understanding of word and image alike. It looks at icons labelled 'Μήτηρ Θεοῦ Ἐλεοῦσα (Mother of God Eleousa)'. In marshalling into order Byzantium's myriad images of the Mother of God, early scholars of Byzantine icons concluded that the Greek epithet Ἐλεοῦσα (Eleousa) must have been the equivalent of the Russian УМИЛЕНИЕ (Umelinié) or 'sweet', 'loving'.¹ And many images bearing this qualifier do, indeed, depict a markedly tender Virgin Mother, as exemplified by a thirteenth-century icon on Cyprus identified in its rectangular cartouche as Eleousa (fig. 6.1).² But many icons bearing the same epithet do not, as exemplified by another Cypriot panel of much the same date that displays the less intimate, upright posture identified with the Hodegetria, the potent palladion of Constantinople (fig. 6.2).³ This variability notwithstanding, the identification of the epithet Eleousa with tender sweetness retained a tenacious hold on art historical imagination. Still today, Byzantinists class icons of the Virgin Mary broadly as being either powerful, as epitomised by the pose of the Hodegetria, or belonging to the Eleousa type, tenderly engaged with her Child. Italian art historians identify as 'Eleousa' any panel that draws on a Byzantine icon type to display Mary's poignant compassion for her infant and his fate.

1 V. Lasareff, 'Studies in the iconography of the Virgin', *ArtB*, 20 (1938), 26–65, at 36–42; I. Grabar, 'Sur les origines et l'évolution du type iconographique de la Vierge Éleousa', in *Mélanges Charles Diehl: Études sur l'histoire et sur l'art de Byzance*, vol. 2: *Art* (Paris, 1930), 29–42, with earlier bibliography.

2 S. Sophocleous, *Icones de Chypre: Diocèse de Limassol 12^e–16^e siècle* (Nicosia, 2006), 181 and pl. 56.

3 A. Papageorgiou, *Ιερά Μητρόπολις Πάφου. Ιστορία και Τέχνη. 1950 χρόνια από την ίδρυση της* (Nicosia, 1996), pl. 95. The icon's inscription has been overpainted and it is hard to know if it repeats one original to the icon, but it was clearly considered appropriate to the image.



Figure 6.1 Mother of God Eleousa, new church of the Panagia Chryselousa, Fasoula, Cyprus.

Photo credit: Sophocles Sophocleous

Mirjana Tatić-Đurić long ago made it clear that there is no one type, or even a range of types, to which the epithet Eleousa belonged in Byzantium, though many affective images of the Virgin and Child existed.⁴ Eleousa, in Hans Hallensleben's pungent summary, is a term, not a type.⁵ Yet the term is rooted in *ἔλεος* (*eleos*), the name of an emotion with a powerful history

4 M.Tatić-Đurić, 'Eleousa: à la recherche du type iconographique', *JÖB*, 25 (1976), 259–67.

5 H. Hallensleben, 'Maria, Marienbild, II: Das Mb. der byz.-ostkirchl. Kunst nach dem Bilderstreit', in *LChri*, 3 (1971), 162–78, at 170.



Figure 6.2 Mother of God Eleousa, Geroskipou, Cyprus, Ecclesiastical Museum of Paphos.

Photo credit: author

in both classical and Christian Greek usage.⁶ Thus it seems to require an emotive content, and efforts to give it one have centred recurrently on its presumed bond to images visibly saturated with emotive tenderness and even pain. Tatić-Đurić herself, even after demonstrating the wide diversity

⁶ Along with the chapters by Georgia Frank and Susan Wessel in this volume, see D. Konstan, *The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks: Studies in Aristotle and Classical Literature* (Toronto, 2006), 201–17; M.C. Nussbaum, *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions* (Cambridge, 2001), 301–65.

of images bearing the epithet Eleousa, turns to Demetrios Pallas's selective emphasis on the profile orant and its kinship to Mary's posture at the Crucifixion.⁷ She concludes that 'the drama of the incarnate Logos and the suffering of his Mother has found a single word, Eleousa', thus assuming for Byzantium the affective piety of Mary's co-redemptive participation in Christ's suffering, seen in the Italian Eleousas.⁸ André Grabar distances the Byzantine from the Italian imagery, but retains the centrality of emotive tenderness, saying that 'the Eleousa refers not to the tenderness of the mother for her child, but the tenderness she seeks to evoke in her child to show clemency toward humans'.⁹ Even Hans Belting, though asserting that '[t]he term *Eleousa*, or "compassionate one," refers to a general theological role and not to a specific type of icon', proceeds to affirm that 'the theme of the Mother of Tenderness was invented by two famous icons', namely, the famously affective Virgin of Vladimir and the *Kykkotissa*.¹⁰ Thus, while historians acknowledge the diversity of the image types to which the epithet Eleousa is applied, the content they give to the term still assumes a visual type that is emotively expressive. In fact, though *eleos* can readily be related to the person of Mary, venerated for her boundless compassion as the prime intercessor on behalf of humankind, its relation to the images of Mary that bear the label of Eleousa is far more elusive, given their variability. Thus there has been little recent effort to explore either the history of its use on images or its function when placed on one.¹¹ The present chapter proposes one avenue by which to approach the epithet's emotive content as a component of the images – variable as they are – on which it appears.

Andrew of Crete already refers to the Virgin as Ἐλέους χορηγὸς καὶ πηγὴ συμπαιδείας.¹² But the term Eleousa emerges only in the later eleventh century. It is one of a number of devotional epithets for the Mother of God that appears at this time, especially on private and institutional seals. Four late eleventh-/early twelfth-century seals bear it, accompanying three different images of Mary: two of the Hodegetria type, one profile orant, and one frontal orant.¹³ The appellation seems to have been adopted especially in monastic settings, though the most famous church

7 D.I. Pallas, *Die Passion und Bestattung Christi in Byzanz: Der Ritus – das Bild*, *Miscellanea Byzantina Monacensia*, 2 (Munich, 1965), 120–27.

8 Tatić-Đurić, 'Eleousa', 267.

9 A. Grabar, 'L'Hodegetria et l'Eleousa', *ZbLkUmět*, 10 (1974), 1–14, at 10.

10 H. Belting, *Likeness and Presence: A History of the Image before the Era of Art*, tr. E. Jephcott (Chicago, 1994), 281.

11 Though see S. Kalopissi-Verti, 'Representations of the Virgin in Lusignan Cyprus', in M. Vassilaki (ed.), *Representations of the Mother of God: Perceptions of the Theotokos in Byzantium* (Aldershot, 2005), 305–19, at 305–7; N.P. Ševčenko, 'Virgin Eleousa', *ODB*, 3 (1991), 2171; C. Walter, 'Further notes on the Deesis', *REB*, 28 (1970), 161–87, at 166–68.

12 Tatić-Đurić, 'Eleousa', 265, n. 33.

13 V. Laurent, *Le corpus des sceaux de l'empire byzantine*, vol. 5.2: *L'Église de Constantinople* (Paris, 1965), 75, no. 1148; 76, nos 1149, 1150; 77, no. 1151.

of the name, that adjoining John II Komnenos's Pantokrator monastery, was secular.¹⁴ Along with the monastery of the Eleousa founded at Veljusa in 1081 by Bishop Manuel,¹⁵ Janin cites two further monasteries of the Eleousa in early twelfth-century Constantinopolitan records,¹⁶ and at least one of the four seals and possibly two others refer to a monastery.¹⁷ The earliest monumental image known to have borne the name Eleousa adorned the monastic church of the Koimesis in Nicaea, which was destroyed in 1922.¹⁸ This was a full-length mosaic image of the Virgin in the posture of the Hodegetria on the east face of the north bema pier (fig. 6.3).¹⁹ Attributed by Cyril Mango to the years between 1065 and 1067,²⁰ it plausibly antedates the seals, making it the earliest known use of the word Eleousa as a Marian epithet. It balanced a full-length image of Christ on the south bema pier that was also identified with an epithet, in this case Antiphonetes. The name Antiphonetes was current in court circles at this time in the wake of the empress Zoe's eponymous icon, and its use here may indicate a similarly courtly origin for Eleousa.²¹

Two aspects of the Nicaean mosaic cast particularly interesting light on the history of the Eleousa's imagery: the parity of Mary and Christ, and the message of their coupled epithets. The epithets are impressive in their joint generosity, for both imply responsive accessibility. Standing at the threshold of the bema, they are not minatory or even admonishing, but proclaim their receptivity to human appeal. For a time, figures labelled Eleousa continued to appear coupled with Christ. Such coupling recurs in John II's pairing of the Eleousa church with his Pantokrator monastery, and the next surviving instances of Eleousa images retain both the pairing with Christ and

14 *Pantokrator: Typikon of Emperor John II Komnenos for the Monastery of Christ Pantokrator in Constantinople*, ed. P. Gautier, 'Le typikon du Christ Sauveur Pantocrator', *REB*, 32 (1974), 1–145, tr. R. Jordan, in *BMFD*, vol. 2, 725–81, at 735–56; N.P. Ševčenko, 'Icons in the Liturgy', *DOP*, 45 (1991), 45–57.

15 *Eleousa Typikon: Rule of Manuel, Bishop of Stroumitza, for the Monastery of the Mother of God Eleousa*, ed. L. Petit, 'Le Monastère de Notre-Dame de Pitié en Macédoine', *IRAIK*, 6 (1900), 1–153, tr. A. Bandy, in *BMFD*, I, 167–91.

16 R. Janin, *La géographie ecclésiastique de l'empire byzantine, première partie: La siège de Constantinople et le patriarcat oecuménique, 3: Les églises et les monastères* (Paris, 1969), 176–77.

17 Laurent, *Le corpus des sceaux*, 75–77. No. 1151, of the early twelfth century, is the Σφραγίς τῶν μοναχῶν τῆς Ἐλεούσης; no. 1148, of the eleventh or twelfth century, is the seal of the sanctuary of the Eleousa, possibly monastic; and no. 1150, again of the early twelfth century, is Ἡ Σφραγίς τῆς Θεοτόκου τῆς Ἐλεούσης, presumably indicating an institution of that name.

18 C.A. Mango, 'The date of the narthex mosaics of the Church of the Dormition at Nicaea', *DOP*, 13 (1959), 245–52, at 252.

19 T. Schmit, *Die Koimesis-Kirche von Nikaia* (Berlin, 1927), fig. XXV; Tatić-Đurić, 'Eleousa', fig. 2.

20 Mango, 'The date of the narthex mosaics', 251–52.

21 As suggested in *ibid.*, 252. On the epithet Antiphonetes, see N.P. Ševčenko, 'Christ Antiphonetes', in *ODB*, 1 (1991), 439–40.



Figure 6.3 Mother of God Eleousa, church of the Dormition, Nicaea (Iznik).
Photo credit: T. Schmit, *Die Koimesis-Kirche von Nikaia* (Berlin, 1927)

the receptive generosity of their names. The earliest of them, probably the earliest surviving panel-painted icon with the Eleousa epithet,²² is one of a

22 The earliest surviving, but of course not the first known. The fifteenth-century inventory of the monastery of the Eleousa at Stroumitza, founded in 1081, speaks of an icon of the Mother of God ‘that stands near the icon of the Mother of God the Merciful set out for veneration’, plausibly the original name icon of the institution, see *Eleousa Inventory: Inventory of the Monastery of the Mother of God Eleousa in Stroumitza*, ed. Petit, ‘Le Monastère de Notre-Dame de Pitié’, 114–25, tr. N.P. Ševčenko, in *BMFD*, vol. 4, 1667–78,




Figure 6.4 Mother of God Eleousa, monastery of St Neophytos, Paphos, Cyprus.
Photo credit: monastery of St Neophytos

pair of icons installed at the bema opening of his Enkleistra by the Cypriot holy man, Neophytos the Recluse (figs 6.4 and 6.5).²³

at 1671. The typikon of the Pantokrator Monastery in Constantinople of 1136 describes the use of the name icon of the Eleousa church in Friday night ceremonies, see n. 14 above.

²³ See most recently J. Durand and D. Giovannoni (ed.), *Chypre entre Byzance et l'Occident, IV^e–XVI^e siècle*, exhibition catalogue, Paris, Musée du Louvre, 28 October 2012–28 January 2013 (Paris, 2012), 133–34 (entry by C. Chotzakoglou with earlier bibliography); and especially A. Papageorghiou, *Icons of Cyprus* (Nicosia, 1992), 19, figs 8 (Christ) and 9 (Mother of God Eleousa).



Figure 6.5 Christ Philanthropos, monastery of St Neophytos, Paphos, Cyprus.
Photo credit: monastery of St Neophytos

They were probably made near the date of 1183 given in the wall paintings of his hermitage, as they are often attributed to the same hand.²⁴ Though portable panels, these assumed precisely the place that the images in Nicaea had, on either side of the bema entrance.²⁵ They pair the Virgin Eleousa with Christ Philanthropos, again a significantly receptive characterisation.

24 Papageorgiou, *Icons of Cyprus*, 19.

25 A.W. Epstein, 'The middle Byzantine sanctuary barrier: templon or iconostasis?', *Journal of the British Archaeological Association*, 134 (1981), 1–28, at 19–21.

Neophytos used *eleos* only very rarely for Mary in his writings²⁶ and did not use φιλόανθρωπος (*philanthropos*) frequently or distinctively enough to suggest a specifically Neophytan message in the two names,²⁷ but as in Nicaea, the two images offer a picture of mutual sacred accessibility. The Virgin's iconography differs from that in Nicaea, and she now turns to Christ with hands raised in invocation. The same pose had appeared already on one of the early twelfth-century seals; the Hodegetria had occupied two others, so it seems clear that the epithet was understood to embrace both dimensions of Mary's pity: the powerful and the supplicatory. A decade after Neophytos's panels, in 1192, what may yet again have been the same painter frescoed the naos of the Panagia tou Arakos at Lagoudera.²⁸ Here the bema piers present Christ and the Virgin with the epithets seen in Nicaea: Eleousa and Antiphonetes (figs 6.6 and 6.7). As in the Enkleistra, the Eleousa turns to Christ. But now she holds in her extended hands an open scroll with a well-known dialogue between mother and Son.²⁹ In it, Mary effectively compels him to promise forgiveness to humankind.³⁰ For all the implication of shared accessibility conveyed by the old epithets, an altered power relationship has emerged, in which Mary overtly governs her Son's mercy. Hers is the pity that compels transformative effect; Christ only grudgingly complies.

The scroll-bearing Eleousa recurred at the Panagia tou Moutoulla of 1280 on Cyprus, facing an unnamed Christ,³¹ and then again in 1332/3 in the narthex of the Panagia Phorbiotissa, Asinou, facing a named Christ who once again, despite his grudging role in the dialogue, bears a benign

26 I've found it just once: Neophytos the Recluse, 'Short Oration on the Entrance of the Virgin Mary', ed. M. Jugie, *Homélies mariales byzantines: textes grecs*, PO, 16.3 (Paris, 1922), 533–38, at 534, line 6.

27 *Philanthrope* is used for both Christ and Mary in the kanon on the *Theosemeion*, the celebration of Neophytos's survival on 27 January 1176 of a falling rock, composed by his brother John Chrysostomites: ed. G. Christodoulou, *Le Livre des catéchèses de Saint Néophyte le Reclus: Texte et commentaire historique*, Μελέται και ὑπομνήματα, 7 (Nicosia, 2009), 96.

28 Most recently, A. Papageorgiou, C. Bakirtzis and C. Hadjichristodoulou (ed.), *The Church of Panagia tou Arakos* (Nicosia, 2018), 69, pls 70–74; A. Nicolaïdès, 'L'église de la Panagia Arakiotissa à Lagoudéra, Chypre: étude iconographique des fresques de 1192', *DOP*, 50 (1996), 1–137, at 105–9, figs 9, 77, 78.

29 On this dialogue and its history, see N.P. Ševčenko, 'The metrical inscriptions in the murals of the Panagia Phorbiotissa', in A.W. Carr and A. Nicolaïdès (ed.), *Asinou across Time: The Architecture and Murals of the Panagia Phorbiotissa, Cyprus*, DOS, 43 (Washington, DC, 2012), 69–90, at 85–88. She translates it as follows (p. 87): 'Receive the entreaty of the one who bore you, O Logos. *What is it that you seek, mother? The salvation of mortals. They have angered me. Have compassion, my son. But they do not repent. And save [them out of your] charity. They shall be redeemed. I thank you, O Logos.*'

30 As Kalopissi-Verti, 'Representation of the Virgin', 306, emphasises, Mary's plea is not for the patron of the painting, or for certain people, but for all people: τῶν βροτῶν.

31 S.K. Perdikes, *Ο Ναός της Παναγίας στον Μουτουλλά*, Οδηγοί βυζαντινῶν Μνημείων της Κύπρου (Nicosia, 2009), 20–21.



Figure 6.6 Mother of God Eleousa, church of the Panagia tou Arakou, Lagoudera, Cyprus.

Photo credit: author

epithet: the mirror-image title of Eleemon.³² A decade later in the naos of the same church of Asinou, however, the situation has changed, and though the scroll-bearing mother recurs, the epithet Eleousa is gone.³³ Over the ensuing century, Christ and his scroll-bearing mother would continue to

32 S. Kalopissi-Verti, 'The murals of the narthex: the paintings of the late thirteenth and fourteenth centuries', in *Asinou across Time*, ed. Carr and Nicolaïdès, 115–208, at 154–58, fig. 5.30.

33 A.W. Carr, 'The murals of the bema and naos: the paintings of the late thirteenth and fourteenth centuries', in *Asinou across Time*, ed. Carr and Nicolaïdès, 211–310, at 236–40, fig. 6.16.




Figure 6.7 Christ Antiphonetes, church of the Panagia tou Arakou, Lagoudera, Cyprus.

Photo credit: author

adorn the bema piers or door jambs of a number of churches, but the epithet Eleousa was not used. Mary assumed a range of epithets – Paraklesis, Kecharitomene, Gorgoepikoos, Episkepsis – while those of Christ slowly became more imposing, culminating at Lesnovo with ‘Phoberos Krites’.³⁴ Eleousa, by contrast, settled more often on panel paintings than on mural paintings, a process clear in Neophytos’s Cyprus, where several icons with that name, of varied iconographic type, can be attributed to the early

³⁴ See Walter, ‘Further notes on the Deesis’, 168, n. 26; S. Der Nersessian, ‘Two images of the Virgin in the Dumbarton Oaks collection’, *DOP*, 14 (1960), 69–86, at 81–85.

thirteenth century, as seen already in figs 6.1 and 6.2.³⁵ Over time, then, the epithet took root, but its images lost the coupling with Christ. As they separated, it was Mary who assumed the quality of *eleos*. An attribute of her person, it forged no apparent bond of emotive content with any one of her many iconographic types.

Striking in this history in view of liturgical usage is the parity of Christ and Mary in the early images bearing the word Eleousa. This is not readily paralleled in liturgical texts, where the term *eleos* is not customarily applied to the Mother of God. Throughout the liturgy of John Chrysostom, the Oktoechos, and the Triodion, οἰκτηρμός (*oiktirmos*), συμπάθεια (*sympatheia*), εὐσπλαγχνία (*eusplanchnia*) are regularly used for Mary, but *eleos* is reserved for Christ. It is to him that the plea 'ἐλέησον (*eleeson*)' is sung. No word based on *eleos* is included under Epsilon in John Geometres' alphabetical listing of terms for Mary;³⁶ in assembling Neophytos the Recluse's vocabulary letter by letter, John Tsiknopoullos listed only one word based on *eleos*.³⁷ In both formal worship and theology, a hierarchy of terms emerges, in which *eleos* characterises God himself. Thus to see Mary aligned with Christ and wearing his attribute is striking. The ensuing history of the epithet progressively reinforces this appropriation, as the Virgin first takes verbal dominance over the will of her Son, and then moves into independence of him, occupying the term *eleos* in her own right. This shift cannot have been unrelated to devotional practice, in which Mary was ever more steadily singled out for petitionary invocation. Her capacity to effect *eleos* was consistently qualified in theological writing, which emphasised that her role was to intercede with Christ for its accomplishment.³⁸ Thus the emergence of an imagery of overtly Marian *eleos* requires a frame of reference different from that of either formal liturgy or theology. When one turns to hymnography, on the other hand, the terminological hierarchy loosens. Words based on *eleos* ripple through the index of Enrica Follieri's *Initia hymnorum ecclesiae Graecae*.³⁹ Fifty-nine instances of its use appear, applied to a limited cast of players: it is used in one case each for the Trinity, the angels and David, in thirty for Christ, and in twenty-six – or near parity – for Mary. Of these

35 See also the beautiful, mid-thirteenth-century icon with Mary kissing her child's hand from the Chrysaliniotissa church in Nicosia, now in the Byzantine Museum there: Papa-georghiou, *Icons of Cyprus*, pl. 26.

36 John Geometres, 'Five hymns on the most holy Theotokos', PG 160:866D. *Epsilon* includes: Ἐνθεον, εὐόδινα, εὐερσιχαρῆ, ἔθνοπύστιν, but not ἔλεοῦσα.

37 P.J. Tsiknopoullos, 'Τοῦ Ἁγίου Νεοφύτου Ἐγκομιαστικά: Α. Εἰς τὴν Παναγίαν Θεομήτορα', *Ἀπόστολος Βαρνάβας*, 21 (1960), 215–22, at 217.

38 See H. Graef, *Mary: A History of Doctrine and Devotion* (London, 1985), especially 197 on John Geometres, 323 on John Mauropous, and 327–28 on Neophytos Enkleistos; L. Gambero, *Fede e devozione Mariana nell'Impero bizantino: Dal periodo post-patristico alla caduta dell'Imperio (1453)* (Milan, 2012), passim.

39 E. Follieri, *Initia hymnorum ecclesiae Graecae*, vol. 1: A–Z, Studi e testi, 211 (Vatican City, 1960), 416–17.

twenty-six, all but three are culled from compilations of kanons to the Virgin. This suggests that the context in which to explore the emotive content of the term Eleousa, and with it the likely relation of that content to the images bearing the term, would be the kanons addressed to Mary.

Kanons are hymns of praise and petition.⁴⁰ They are preserved in escalating numbers from the seventh century onward, invoking the full range of heavenly beings – the Trinity, Christ, his mother, the saints, holy men and women. Composition of melodies for them ceased by the eleventh century, but new poems continued, arranged to existing melodies. Kanons are composed of nine segments or odes, echoing the nine canticles of Scripture and initially reflecting in each ode the content of its corresponding canticle. Already the kanons of John of Damascus and Kosmas reflect the habit, soon adopted in Constantinople, of omitting the second ode except during Lent;⁴¹ kanons to the Virgin omit it consistently. Each ode is composed to a different melody, thus assuming its own metre, pace and number of lines per stanza, and lending variety to the canon as a whole. The odes contain a variable number of stanzas, of which one – most often the last – has a distinctive content, reflecting the custom of composing it as a theotokion to the Virgin. In Marian kanons it often turns to petition if the others focus on praise, or to praise if the others stress petition. Their formulaic organisation gives the kanons an apparent uniformity which is reinforced in those to Mary by the endless, dutiful recycling of the well-known formulas of both praise and petition to her. Nonetheless, the kanons are lyrical rather than formal, written in the first person singular and voicing personal concerns. Accordingly, they are more varied than meets the eye, and though the unreliability of the attributions in the largely late and post-Byzantine manuscripts makes any such assessment problematic, they do seem to shift from poet to poet, and over time across the centuries.

Already by the eighth century, the custom had emerged to devote one verse in each ode to the Mother of God, and kanons devoted to Mary soon outnumbered all others: John Mauropous (d. ca. 1079), a contemporary of the empress Zoe,⁴² was a particularly ardent poet of the Virgin: of the

40 C. Troelsgård, 'Kanon performance in the eleventh century: evidence from the Evergetis typikon reconsidered', in N. Gerasimove-Persidskaia and I. Lozovaia (ed.), *Vizantija i Vostočnaja Evropa: Liturgiĉeskie I muzykal'nye svjazi: K 80-letiju doktora Viloša Velimiroviča*, (Moscow, 2003), 44–51, gives a vivid reconstruction of the way in which kanons were chanted; see also J. Grosdidier de Matons, 'Liturgie et hymnographie: kontakion et canon', *DOP*, 34–35 (1980–81), 31–43; E. Wellesz, *A History of Byzantine Music and Hymnography* (Oxford, 1949), 168–203.

41 See S.R. Frøyshov, 'Byzantine Rite', in *Canterbury Dictionary of Hymnology*, <https://hymnology.hymnsam.co.uk/>. I am indebted to Dr Frøyshov for sending me a copy of this entry, and for invaluable help with the canon tradition.

42 On John Mauropous, see Gambero, *Fede e devozione*, 202–13; E. Follieri, 'Giovanni Mauropode, metropolita di Eucaita: otto canoni paracletici a N. S. Gesù Cristo', *Archivio italiano per la storia della pietà*, 5 (Rome, 1967), 1–200; J. Hussey, 'The writings of John

151 kanons accepted as his by Joan Hussey, honouring a total of seventeen subjects, sixty-seven or nearly half were dedicated to the Theotokos; the nearest runners-up were Christ with twenty-eight and the Prodomos with twelve.⁴³ Several of John's kanons found a place in the liturgy.⁴⁴ But by and large such hymns were, in Enrica Follieri's words, "parakletike" hymns, that is, supplicatory, not composed for a fixed place in the liturgy, but to enrich the office in particular situations, especially vigils, in monastic or private devotion'.⁴⁵ The kanons to the Mother of God found a regular place in such devotions, eventually prompting a distinctive type of manuscript, the Theotokarion.⁴⁶ Not standardised, but idiosyncratic to the institutions for which they were created, the Theotokaria gathered Marian kanons into weekly cycles for regular use, usually at compline or vespers. Often hand-crafted, they attest the distinctive place that the hymns to Mary assumed in devotional worship.

As yet, the Marian kanons have not been systematically examined. Nancy Patterson Ševčenko, in an invaluable study of icons in the liturgy, has shown that a *parakletike pannychis* with a kanon to the Virgin was celebrated weekly in the eleventh century at the Evergetis monastery in Constantinople, that manuscripts of the twelfth century call for a *parakletikos kanon* to Mary at apodeipnon on Friday, that in at least one such case – Messina MS Gr. 115 of 1131 – this was specified as sung to an icon, and that in the Pantokrator monastery's famous Friday night ritual it was sung to the title icon of the Eleousa church, itself named Eleousa.⁴⁷ I can cite no other known instance in which an icon labelled Eleousa was used as the focus of a parakletic hymn, and do not suggest that all icons with that label were created for such use. Nonetheless, Eleousa has a clear supplicatory inflection; parakletic hymns were sung to icons; and images bearing the epithet could well have evoked the hymns calling upon Mary's compassion, which do so in a number of cases with the word *eleos*. Thus this chapter proposes to use Marian kanons as a way to explicate the compassion assigned to her in the epithet and its likely relation to the icons bearing it. If the kanons are rather oblique to modern literary taste, they are, in M. Rocchi's words, *cimelium summae Graecorum in Deiparam pietatis*.⁴⁸ In the absence of published English translations, I

Maupous: a bibliographical note', *BZ*, 44 (1951), 278–82; eadem, 'The canons of John Maupous', *JRS*, 37 (1947), 70–73.

43 Hussey, 'The canons of John Maupous', 71.

44 Follieri, 'Giovanni Maupode', 21.

45 *Ibid.*, 22.

46 S. Winkley, 'A Bodleian Theotokarion', *REB*, 31 (1973), 267–73; E. Follieri, *Un Theotokarion Marciano del sec. XIV (cod. Marciano cl. I, 6)*, *Altri testi della pietà bizantina*, 1 (Rome, 1961); S. Eustratiades, *Θεοτοκάριον* (Chennevières-sur-Marne, 1931); P.A. Rocchi, 'In Paracleticam Deiparae Sanctissimae S. Joanni Damasceno vulgo tributam animadversiones', *Bessarione*, 7 (1902–3), 217–34.

47 Ševčenko, 'Icons in the Liturgy', 45–57.

48 Rocchi, 'In Paracleticam Deiparae', 217.

append translations of three examples, the first attributed to John Mauropous,⁴⁹ the second to the monk John Therakas (fl. ca. 1200),⁵⁰ and the third to the emperor Theodore II Laskaris (1221–58; reg. 1254–58).⁵¹

Of the three authors represented here, John Mauropous most fully integrates the two genres of praise and petition that characterise the Marian kanon, so that each verse expresses both. Thus he infuses even the verses of acclamation with a personal tone. He is also the most apt to apply the word *eleos* to Mary. He does so, in two stanzas from a kanon here, and more fully in others:

Ἐλεῆμον,
ἐλεήμονος Λόγου λοχεύτρια,
τὴν ψυχὴν μου,
ἐν ἐλέει σου θεῖω ἐλέησον
καὶ τῆς κατεχούσης με
καὶ τυραννούσης ἀμαρτίας
καὶ συνηθείας ἀπάλλαξον.⁵²

Merciful one,
Bearer of the merciful Word,
Have mercy on my soul
In your divine mercy
And release me from
Being bound and
Tyrannised and possessed by sin.

And again:

Ἐλέους ὑπάρχουσα πηγὴ
Καὶ πέλαγος χρηστότητος
Καὶ συμπαθείας ἄβυσσος ἄπειρος

Τὰς ἀναβλύσεις τῶν ἐγκλημάτων μου
ἐν ἐλέει ξήρανον,
ἐλεῆμον Δέσποινα,
καὶ ἐλέους σου δεῖξόν με μέτοχον.⁵³

Being the wellspring of mercy,
The ocean of kindness
And a boundless abyss of
sympathy,
Dry up the flood
Of my misdeeds in your mercy,
Merciful Lady, and show me
To be the partaker in your mercy.

He writes to Mary with lively and devout enthusiasm, needing to remind himself at the end of the second verse of our kanon (1:15–16) that she is second to God. Of the three poets, John is also the one most oriented to contrition, defining his need for Mary's mercy outspokenly in terms of sin. He

49 Follieri, *Un Theotocarion*, 66–77: Τῆ παρασκευῆ κανὼν παρακλητικὸς εἰς τὴν ὑπεραγίαν Θεοτόκον, οὗ ἡ ἀκροστιχὶς κατὰ στοιχείως ἀντιστρόφως ω, ψ, χ, φ ... with Italian translation.

50 Eustratiades, *Θεοτοκάριον*, 68–71, no. 21: Ποίημα τοῦ Ἰωάννου Μοναχοῦ τοῦ Θηράκα. On the monk John Therakas, see Gambero, *Fede e devozione*, 261–69, with some excerpts from his kanons in Italian translation.

51 Eustratiades, *Θεοτοκάριον*, 39–42, no. 11: Ποίημα τοῦ εὐσεβεστάτου Βασιλέως Θεοδώρου τοῦ Λασκάρη. On this kanon, with partial Italian translation, see Gambero, *Fede e devozione*, 272–81.

52 Eustratiades, *Θεοτοκάριον*, 4, no. 1, Ode 5, stanza 1: ποίημα τοῦ Ἰωάννου Εὐχαΐτου τοῦ Μαυρόποδος οὗ ἡ ἀκροστιχὶς Ἀπάρχομαί σοι τῶν ἐρῶν λόγων κόρη ὁ τλήμων Ἰωάννης.

53 *Ibid.*, 8, no. 2, Ode 3, stanza 3: ποίημα τοῦ Ἰωάννου Εὐχαΐτου τοῦ Μαυρόποδος οὗ ἡ ἀκροστιχὶς Ἰπρωτὴν δέησιν προσφέρω σοι, Παρθένε, πένης Ἰωάννου.

speaks of ‘my soul consumed in the heat of sin’ (1:9–10); of the ‘ocean of my sins’ (4:19–20); of the ‘flames of sin’ (5:24); of the ‘fires of sin’ and the ‘heavy yoke of my sins’ (6:18–21), and of ‘my soul overshadowed with pleasures, with many sins’ (7:15–16). His explicit invocation of sin is a feature he shares more with his predecessors than with later kanonists.⁵⁴

Already in John Mauropous’s poems, however, sin itself is tempered by ‘tribulations’ (5:2, 6:5), ‘sorrows’ (1:1), ‘difficulties and dangers’ (6:4), ‘storms’ (6:16) and victimisation by the forces of evil (1:22, 5:12) – in short, by the trials that beset life in general. A century and a quarter later, John Therakas – or the poem attributed to him – retains only occasional traces of contrition: the things that cause him anguish are not so much transgressions (*παραπτώματα*, 3:25), but tribulations (*πειρατήρια*, 3:17), tears and affliction (*θλίψις καὶ δάκρυα*, 1:21), temptations (*πειρασμοί*, 3:17), missteps (*σφάλματα*, *Kathisma*, line 136). These rise at times to a level of existential distress: pain of the soul (*πόνος τῆς ψυχῆς*, 1:19), shipwreck (*ναυάγιον*, 5:23), despair (*ἀπόγνωσις*, 5:25), catastrophes (*συμφοραί*, 8:19), terrors of life (*ταραχαί τοῦ βίου*, 8:21). Rather than confidently confessional like Mauropous, he feels himself propelled by forces beyond his will, ‘like sheep led to the slaughter’ (6:15), and it is less sin than the turbulence of existence that impels his petitions to the Mother of God. In contrast to Mauropous, he segregates his pleas in a single stanza of each ode, devoting the rest of the poem to the *topoi* of Marian adulation. Both features – the long sequences of gymnastically iterated Marian metaphors of praise and adulation, and the replacement of Mauropous’s fluent, confessional litany of sins by a single concentrated stanza per ode of tribulations – are amplified in the Great Kanon attributed to Theodore II Laskaris. This is one of the three kanons that is still in use in the modern Euchologion, in the Great Parakletic Kanon, sung on occasions of special need.

Applying the poems to the theme of the images identified as Eleousa yields at least three observations. The first concerns the poems’ treatment of the Mother of God herself. Mary is the subject of most of the poems’ language, and she emerges as glorious in a panoply of ways. She is radiant, powerful, wise, compassionate, omni-competent and the chosen of God. The torrent of pleas to her leaves no doubt that her compassionate response is expected. We hear nothing, however, of the way in which her compassion affects her own feelings. If it is painful for her to be drawn into the petitioners’ woes, if the poets’ distress evokes the sufferings of her Son, if her heart is wrenched by its confrontation with human need, if it gives her joy to cast her radiance

54 Thus one can compare it with other kanons in Follieri, *Un Theotocarion*, and with the kanon attributed to the patriarch Photios in Eustratiades, *Θεοτοκάριον*, 314–17, no. 98. One can also note the way Kazhdan pointed out the poet Clement’s reluctance to be confessional as exceptional for his late eighth- to early ninth-century date; see A. Kazhdan, in collaboration with L.E. Sherry and C. Angelidi, *A History of Byzantine Literature*, 2 vols (Athens, 1999–2006), vol. 1, 269.

onto souls in shadow, if she exults in her power over tribulation, we do not see it in the words. There are no evocations of her motherly concern; no expressions of care for her Son, in his infancy, his maturity, his passion, or his death; no intimations that these colour her relationship to the person who speaks in the hymns. While one can imagine the hymns evoking a maternal figure bending tenderly to her child, be he Christ or the poet, one can equally well presume a Mary erect and splendid, radiating strength and confident authority. She illuminates, fills with grace, chases out sloth, crushes evils, heals wounds, pilots through storms, fortifies, protects and succours, one action following another with a kaleidoscopic multiplicity that overwhelms sequential intentionality. The kanons' language can apply to virtually any image of Mary. No iconic type emerges from the kanons, because the Virgin herself is given no affective elaboration in them. Lacking emotional specificity, the kanons' Mother of God arouses no specific iconographic expectation.

The absence of affect in the hymns' figure of the Mother of God forces one to look elsewhere for their emotive content. This lies not with Mary, but with the poems' 'I': their authors, and equally their performers, who sing them in their evening devotions.⁵⁵ This turns attention to our second observation, which concerns the *eleos* of the poems. This is defined not by the one who gives, but by the need of those who receive it. The central need of the poems' voices is Mary's action. They ask not just that she have pity on them but that her pity take concrete effect in her efficacious intervention in their lives. In its activism, the *eleos* of the poems reflects the impact of Christian usage on the inherited antique concept.⁵⁶ The *eleos* of classical Greek, valued as a definitive manifestation of a person's humanity, was seen as capable of engendering moral action but was essentially reactive.⁵⁷ It is characteristically Englished as 'pity'. In Scripture, by contrast, *eleos* is a property above all of God and manifested in the beneficence that accompanies his justice.⁵⁸ Thus it assumes a proactive character, shaping his justice. This is usually Englished as 'mercy', as in Mary's own Magnificat (Lk 1: 46–55), extolling God's accomplishment of *eleos* for her and her people. Jesus, in turn, intensified its active character by placing *eleos* at the centre of his mission, quoting Hosea 6:6 that he sought not sacrifice but *eleos* (Mt 9:13; 12:7). Sacrifice entails a commitment of goods; so, too, Christian *eleos* brings forth goods,

55 On subjective expression in Byzantine literature, see S. Papaioannou, 'Byzantium and the modernist subject: the case of autobiographical literature', in R. Betancourt and M. Taroutina (ed.), *Byzantium/Modernism: The Byzantine as Method in Modernity* (Leiden, 2015), 195–211; idem, *Michael Psellos: Rhetoric and Authorship in Byzantium* (Cambridge, 2013), 237–49 and *passim*.

56 See most concisely G.W.H. Lampe (ed.), *A Patristic Greek Lexicon* (Oxford, 1961), 447–48, s.v. ἐλεημοσύνη, ἔλεος.

57 Konstan, *Emotions of the Ancient Greeks*, 213, though see Nussbaum, *Upheavals of Thought*, 304, commenting on *Philoktetes*.

58 W. Schwer, 'Barmherzigkeit', *RAC*, 1 (1950), 1200–1207, at 1201–2.

addressing distress by redressing it. Throughout the New Testament, *eleos* is ‘done’, not felt. Christ’s end-time judgement (Mt 25: 29–46) hangs upon one’s having done the *eleos* of feeding the poor, comforting the sick and raising the downtrodden. More than pity or mercy, *eleos* approaches ‘charity’ in something close to the modern sense.⁵⁹ So emphatic was the stress on doing that Gregory of Nyssa felt compelled to stipulate with firmness that *eleos* included not only doing but also the free and feeling response of those who wished to do but could not.⁶⁰ The willing sharing of distress that he defends, now readily translated as ‘compassion’, nonetheless does ‘bring forth the good from our nature as if from some inner chamber’,⁶¹ thus embracing a dimension of participative doing, and he asks in turning to its analysis how it is practised.⁶²

Over the Byzantine centuries, the word continued to be measured in terms of action. It was not frequent in secular contexts: thus it and its derivatives appear no more than seventeen times in Niketas Choniates’ history.⁶³ Of these, twelve refer to the actions of God, the generosity of emperors, or convergences in divine and imperial behaviour; only five refer to ordinary

59 *Ibid.*, 1205–7.

60 Gregory of Nyssa, ‘On the Beatitudes’, Oration 5, PG 44:1252D–54A, tr. H.C. Graef, *St. Gregory of Nyssa, The Lord’s Prayer; The Beatitudes*, ACW, 18 (New York, 1954), 133.

61 Gregory of Nyssa, ‘On the Beatitudes’, PG 44:1253D–56A:

Ἔστιν μὲν οὖν τι καὶ δογμάτων ὑψηλότερον ἐν τῷ λόγῳ μαθεῖν: ὅτι πάντων ἀγαθῶν τὰς ἀφορμὰς ὁ κατ’ εἰκόνα ἑαυτοῦ ποιήσας τὸν ἄνθρωπον, τῇ φύσει τοῦ πλάσματος ἐναπέθετο, ὡς μηδὲν ἡμῖν [1256 A] τῶν καλῶν ἐξῶθεν ἐπεισκρίνεσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν εἶναι ὅπερ βουλόμεθα, οἷον ἐκ ταμείου τινὸς προχειριζομένου τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐκ τῆς φύσεως: ἀπὸ μέρους γὰρ περὶ τοῦ παντὸς διδασκόμεθα, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλως τινὰ τῶν κατ’ ἐπιθυμίαν τυχεῖν, μὴ αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ τὸ ἀγαθὸν χαριζόμενον.

From this passage a higher doctrine may be learned. It is this. He who made man in His own image endowed the nature of His handiwork with the principles of all goodness. Hence nothing good enters into us from outside, but it lies with us to have what we will, and to bring forth the good from our nature as if from some inner chamber; tr. Graef, 135.

62 Gregory of Nyssa, ‘On the Beatitudes’, PG 44:1256A:

διό φησί που πρὸς τοὺς ἀκούοντας ὁ Κύριος, ὅτι Ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐντὶς ὑμῶν ἐστίν: καὶ ὅτι Πᾶς ὁ αἰτῶν λαμβάνει, καὶ ὁ ζητῶν εὕρισκει, καὶ τῷ κροδοντι ἀνοιγήσεται: ὡς καὶ τὸ λαβεῖν τὸ ποθοῦμενον, καὶ τὸ εὕρειν τὸ ζητούμενον, καὶ τὸ ἐντὸς τῶν ἐπιθυμουμένων γενέσθαι, ἐφ’ ἡμῖν εἶναι ὅταν βουλόμεθα, καὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας ἐξηρητῆσθαι γνώσης.

For from the parts, we are taught about the whole, that there is no other way of obtaining one’s desire except by procuring the good for oneself. Therefore the Lord says to His listeners: *The kingdom of God is within you; and Everyone that asketh receiveth; and he that seeketh findeth; and to him that knocketh, it shall be opened.* So it depends on us and is in the power of our free will to receive what we desire, to find what we seek, and to enter where we wish to be; tr. Graef, 132.

63 On the basis of a word search in the *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae*.

people, and they, too, refer to deeds. Two decry the violent acts of those without *eleos*, and three cite acts positively motivated by it.⁶⁴ Recurrently, *eleos* is done or shown rather than felt, and to have *eleos* implies having the power to act on it, as shown in the two-to-one concentration of its use in reference to either God or the emperor. This emphasis recurs in the word's vastly more numerous uses in theological and liturgical contexts. Here, it applies to God or to behaviours by which humans can be in imitation of God. It gathers emotive synonyms: *oiktermos*, *sympatheia*, φιλανθρωπία (*philanthropia*), and *eusplanchnia* in particular. More strongly here than in secular contexts, however, *eleos* itself is not just affection, but the affect by which divine benefaction occurs. Traditionally, Mary is a means to it: her movement affects Christ. Increasingly in the kanons, however, she is asked to assume *eleos* herself, by acting upon the needs laid out by the poet who petitions her. It is the needs of the poets that define her *eleos*.

To be on the receiving end of *eleos* had never been enviable – in classical definitions, its pain was intensified by the fear that one might one day find oneself in need of it. In Christian terms to be in need of *eleos* was yet more problematic, for the need was compromised by sin.⁶⁵ Classically, *eleos* was reserved for those suffering unjustly. Sin made all humans complicit in their own suffering. To be in need of *eleos* thus became self-reflexive, a form of self-incrimination that affected not just one's well-being but one's dignity as a person. Far more than for those in a classical context, Christians must ask how they are entitled to seek *eleos*, for their degradation is morally of their own making. Of all the Fathers, Gregory of Nyssa seems most keenly to have addressed this condition.⁶⁶ He did so in taking up Christ's statement in the Beatitudes that μακάριοι οἱ ἐλεήμονες, ὅτι αὐτοὶ ἐλεηθήσονται (blessed are the merciful: for they shall obtain mercy; Mt 5:7).⁶⁷ The passage prompted him to ask not only what *eleos* is, but what it means that one is blessed who receives back what he gave.⁶⁸ That *eleos* is an affection of the heart is to him clear: he defines it as 'the loving disposition toward those who suffer

64 Niketas Choniates, *History*, 2.3, ed. J.A. van Dieten, *Nicetae Choniatae Historia*, 2 vols, CFHB, 11 (Berlin, 1975), vol. 1, 69: Manuel I inciting his troops saying that when we remember all the terrible acts of these people, pity will move us: now stand bravely and fight stoutly. *History*, 9, ed. van Dieten, vol. 1, 352: the disposal of Andronikos I's body when 'certain people who displayed some measure of compassion removed it'. *History*, 9, ed. van Dieten, vol. 1, 333: Andronikos's own disfiguring of the empress Xene's portraits because he was suspicious of the pity elicited by her radiant and very beautiful portrayals.

65 D. Krueger, *Liturgical Subjects: Christian Ritual, Biblical Narrative, and the Formation of the Self in Byzantium* (Philadelphia, 2014), 218–20 and passim.

66 T. Böhm, 'Gregor von Nyssa, *De beatitudinibus*, Oratio V: "Selig sind die Barmherzigen, dass sie werden Barmherzigkeit erlangen" (Mt 5,7)', in H.R. Drobner and A. Viciano (ed.), *Gregory of Nyssa, Homilies on the Beatitudes: An English Version with Commentary and Supporting Studies*, VChrSuppl, 52 (Leiden, 2000), 165–83.

67 Gregory of Nyssa, 'On the Beatitudes', Oration 5, PG 44:1248–64, tr. Graef, 130–42.

68 Gregory of Nyssa, 'On the Beatitudes', PG 44:1252A, tr. Graef, 132: Τί τοίνυν ἐστὶν ὁ ἐλεός, καὶ περὶ τί ἐνεργούμενος; Καὶ πῶς μαρᾶριος ὁ ἀντιλαμβάνων, ὃ δίδωσιν;

distress', or more carefully, 'an intensely loving disposition combined with the affect of sorrow'.⁶⁹ Yet the issue it poses for him lies not in feeling it but in its proper practice. We give it readily to those who have been cast from well-being into unaccountable misfortune, and the endemic inequalities of life demand that we extend it also to the disadvantaged, 'so that the creature in need should be made equal to the one who has a larger share'.⁷⁰ But there is another dimension for Gregory, too. This concerns the self. Given the sad diminishment of our human state, cast from paradise and tyrannised by evil, he asks, 'should the soul not rather be disposed to have pity on itself if it thinks of what it once possessed, and from what state it has fallen?' The fact that we do not take pity on ourselves is due to our very numbness to our condition in the face of this calamity.

The fact that we do not take pity on ourselves is due to our insensibility in the face of these evils. It may be compared to the experience of the insane, whom the violence of the disease prevents from being sensible to what they suffer. If therefore a man knew himself, both what he had once been and what he now is – for Solomon says somewhere that the wise men know themselves – he would never cease to have pity; and this habit of soul would surely be followed by Divine pity. Therefore He says, *Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy*. They themselves, that is, not others.⁷¹

Gregory's text creates a distinctive space in Christian piety for those who perceive their own need for beneficent pity. It is a space occupied in the first person, in which one can ask for charity without compromising one's dignity before God. The kanons move into this space, concentrating their language of emotive nuance around the acute feeling of immediate, first-person need, and asking that Mary respond not to Christ, but to the 'I' who expresses it.

The capacity of Byzantium's kanons to shape a first-person self has been explored by Derek Krueger in his compelling studies of penitential kanons. These, he proposes, were engineered to generate a 'God's-eye view of the

69 Gregory of Nyssa, 'On the Beatitudes', PG 44:1253C, tr. Graef, 133: Ἐλεός ἐστιν ἐπὶ τῶν δυσφορούντων ἐπὶ τισὶν ἀνιαροῖς ἀγαπητικὴ συνδιάθεσις ... ἐπίτασιν εὐρήσει τῆς ἀγαπητικῆς διαθέσεως, τῇ κατὰ τὴν λύπην πάθει συμμεμιγμένην.

70 Gregory of Nyssa, 'On the Beatitudes', PG 44:1152B, tr. Graef, 132: Ὡς ἂν οὖν εἰς ἴσον ἔλθοι τῷ πλεονεκτοῦντι τὸ ὑστερούμενον, καὶ ἀναπληρωθεῖ τὸ λειπόμενον τῷ περισσεύοντι, νομοθετεῖ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐπὶ τῶν καταδεεστέρων τὸ ἔλεον.

71 Gregory of Nyssa, 'On the Beatitudes', PG 44:1260B tr. Graef, 139: Ἀλλ' αἴτιον τὸ μὴ ἔλεειν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐν ἀναισθησίᾳ τῶν κακῶν εἶναι οἷόν τι πάσχουσιν οἱ ἐκ μανίας παράφοροι, ὧν ἢ ὑπερβολὴ τοῦ κακοῦ, καὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν ὧν πάσχουσι προσαφῆρηται. Εἰ τοίνυν τις ἑαυτὸν ἐπιγνοίῃ, οἷός τς πρότερον ἦν, καὶ οἷός ἐπὶ τὸ παρόντος ἐστίν· φησι δὲ που καὶ ὁ Σολομῶν, ὅτι *Οἱ ἑαυτῶν ἐπιγνώμονες σοφοί*: οὐδέποτε ἔλεων ὁ τοιοῦτος παύσεται, τῇ δὲ τοιαύτῃ τῆς ψυχῆς διαθέσει καὶ ὁ Θεὸς ἔλεος κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἀκολουθήσει. Διὸ φησιν: *Μακάριοι οἱ ἐλεήμονες*, ὅτι *αὐτοὶ ἐλεηθήσονται*. Αὐτοὶ οὐχ ἕτεροι· ἐν τούτῳ σαφηνίζει τὸ ὄνομα.

self' through a formalised performance of self-accusation.⁷² The Marian kanons are petitionary, not penitential. But they, too, offer a formalised performance of self-exposure. In his study of the liturgical self, Krueger had written:

In the decoration of middle Byzantine churches, Mary regularly stands at the left of the bema.... Across the space of the golden doors she intercedes with Christ on behalf of humanity.... Further studies into Byzantine subjectivities may explore the role of Mary's intercession in appealing to Christ's mercy for conceptions of the self.⁷³

The Marian kanons have been enlisted here to address a particular variant of this question, in which Mary herself is invested with *eleos*, by both the icons' epithet and the voice of the hymns. As in Derek Krueger's kanons of penitence, the 'I' here is exclusively and perceptibly male, mobilising metaphors of armed combat, the piloting of vessels and rhetorical learning that evoke men's professions, taking responsibility for acts in the world, and assuming a filial stance looking up to Mary as the peerless mother of a peerless male child. Like any such child, the poets are sublimely innocent of any concern for the toll that their petition might take on Mary herself. The deeds for which the poets take responsibility are interlaced with sin and passionate transgression, cited generically and with rue. But as noted, sin is not their consistent preoccupation. The poets' need is fuelled by the turbulent tribulations and the trials of life. Even Mauropous, though confessing that he has a 'soul consumed in the heat of sin', bemoans not his guilt, but his painful vulnerability to distress in life. Anxious and threatened, he feels himself 'in danger and tribulations' and 'in the darkness of despair' (5:8, 6:13). Sunk by a terrible storm in the ocean of life, he craves less remission than respite, asking Mary to pacify the billows of his storm-tossed soul and to guide it through the treacheries of life to a safe harbour (8:1–5). Anxious petition exceeds penance or compunction. The difficulty of making diachronic assessments of the poems' content has already been signalled. Nonetheless, expressions of sin and contrition become yet more oblique in the verses attributed to later poets. John Therakas introduces himself with a cry of compelling pain: 'See the pain of my soul, See the suffering ... the tears' (1:19–21). He acknowledges his *kakia* or 'wickedness' (1:21), but only once, in 8:25 where he admits to transgressions, does he come close to stating that this condition might – like Mauropous's – be due to sin. He suffers from turbulence: the heaving and buffeting of tribulations and the tumult of passions. Foundering, wretched, in the shipwreck of tribulations (3:15–21, 4:3–15, 5:22–25), he feels himself drawn into the depths of despair (5:24).

⁷² Krueger, *Liturgical Subjects*, 216.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 220.

His anguish reaches existential intensity in the litany of ‘woeful situations, catastrophes of sufferings, pressures and envies and terrors of life’ (8:19–21) near the end of Ode 8. It is not sin as such, but the turbulent vulnerability of life that impels his poetic expression. Theodore Laskaris – or the poet of the kanon known under his name – is similarly disinclined to assign his troubles to sin specifically, but feels powerfully the ‘phalanxes of perceived ills’ (3:32–33), the ‘idols of soul-consuming sufferings’ (8:30–31) that assault his life. He places before Mary ‘mind and soul and body all ailing’ (7:37–39) and prays for ‘the deep peace of *apatheia*’ (5:31–34) and a ‘humble life’ (1:26). In sum, the poets seek relief not so much from the guilt of sin, but from the exhausting vulnerability of a life poorly protected from sin.

The emphasis on vulnerability more than guilt has a corollary in the role of Christ in the Marian kanons. John Mauropous needed early in his first ode to remind himself that Mary was his dearest source of hope – after God. She is, as he says repeatedly, his recourse ‘on earth’: he is her servant on earth (3:22); he has no other help on earth (5:1); she is the rain-bringing cloud on earth (5:17); she bore Christ on earth (6:15, 6:22–23, 7:3); she is the fountain who appeared on earth (8:19–20); we have her help, cover, rampart and pride on earth. It is the distresses of life on earth that drive him to seek her help, and he requests that help in full confidence that she can provide what is needed. He does not ask her to petition Christ, and only in the final verse of the kanon does he turn to Christ himself, to solicit help in matters of societal rather than personal concern. John Therakas goes even farther than Mauropous, for he invokes Christ not in his closing stanza but in the penultimate one. He pleads with Christ for protection against eternal condemnation there but reserves his last words for Mary. Here, his concern is about the present, imploring her help not against the eschatological dragon of hell, but against the mental dragons that prey upon life on earth. The kanon of Theodore Laskaris, finally, closes without a plea to Christ, but by lodging a plea to Mary herself, confident that her help will set him on the path to Christ. The need that defines Mary’s *eleos* assumes her own capacity to address it.

The Marian kanons, then, do not – like Krueger’s penitential hymns – offer a ‘God’s-eye view of the self’; their petition is directed to his mother. They offer a ‘Mary’s-eye view of the self’. Thus they expose their own, distinctive tracts of the poets’ self, and with them, the needs for particular domains of compassionate benefaction. Gregory of Nyssa’s admonition to Christian self-pity had already relieved those professing a need for *eleos* of an obligation to shame. To a gradually increasing extent over the middle Byzantine centuries from John Mauropous to Theodore Laskaris, in turn, directing petition to Mary seems to have moderated the obligation to expressions of self-castigating guilt as well, for the kanonists do not dwell upon the stains of sins. They expose instead the anxiety and pain of their buffeted and vulnerable life on earth. What they need is a Mary able to exercise her capability on earth, to perceive and assuage the suffering inflicted by the fragility of humans poorly armoured against the assaults of passion, misfortune,

iniquity and sin. She is invoked for relief from the world's anguish: to heal wounds, crush assailants, still storms and quell despair. Above all, as the 'rain-bringing cloud on earth', 'the fountain who appeared on earth', she has the power to open the floodgates to the 'fount of heartfelt tears' of petition, and so to smooth the way to relief, consolation and still harbour untroubled by storms. It is not just – or even so much – her invocations to Christ's *eleos* as it is the benefaction of her own *eleos* that is at issue. Her own *eleos* responds not to guilt but to need; it functions through earnest petition; and it mediates with Christ by easing the onward path toward him.

Is it possible, then, in the third place, to elicit from the kanons' distinctive *eleos* an emotive bond that might link the name Eleousa with the images on which it appears, despite the iconographic variety that the kanons themselves seem to endorse? As pointed out earlier, the emotion most often linked by scholars with the epithet is that of poignant compassion, interpreted above all in terms of Mary's participation in Christ's saving mercy through the emotional intensity with which she shares in the suffering of his Passion. In Italian art, the term is used for images of Mary's tender sadness as she nuzzles her infant's proleptically bare limbs, images which appropriate icon types of haunting maternal sadness that had originated in Byzantium. In Byzantium itself, the epithet of Eleousa had not been reserved to those types, but its passionate content has been nonetheless asserted in art historical studies on the basis of selective examples: the monumental images of the Eleousa on Cyprus, whose profile orant posture evokes the similar pose of Mary facing Christ in the Crucifixion, or the passionate intensity of great types like the Vladimir and Kykkos icons. As Mirjana Tatić-Đurić had said in summary, 'the drama of the incarnate Logos and the suffering of his Mother has found a single word, Eleousa'. The brooding sadness especially of the Eleousa in Neophytos's icon seems so persuasively to affirm her conclusion, despite her own demonstration that the epithet is not limited to such types, that it seems important to turn some attention to the relation of Mary's suffering compassion to the term Eleousa.

In the Italian context, Tatić-Đurić's reading finds a firm basis in doctrine, for the Roman Church's identification of Mary as co-redemptrix with her Son required that she be seen to participate fully with him in the sacrifice of the Passion through which humankind's redemption was accomplished.⁷⁴ She accomplished this participation through the intensity of her compassionate engagement in his suffering. Images displaying her suffering thus assume a bond not only to the event of the Passion itself but to the pain of redemption from sin. The theme of Mary's intense participative suffering that was mobilised in this doctrine had developed over the period of iconoclasm

74 J. Galot, 'La plus ancienne affirmation de la corédemption mariale: le témoignage de Jean le Géomètre', *Recherches de science religieuse*, 45 (1957), 187–208; V. Lossky, *In the Image and Likeness of God*, ed. J.H. Erickson and T.E. Bird (Crestwood, NY, 1974), 98–110.

as a component in the Passion story.⁷⁵ At the end of iconoclasm it was incorporated into the Holy Friday liturgy through the famous sermon of George of Nikomedeia.⁷⁶ Some decades later, John Geometres' early tenth-century *Vita* of Mary and his sermon on her Dormition forged, for the first time in Byzantine theological discourse, a bond between the suffering assigned to Mary during and after the Passion, and her participative role in the redemptive work of Christ.⁷⁷ Thus the Roman doctrine did characterise Byzantium as well. Two factors, however, suggest that it never fully pre-empted the view of Mary's role in salvation in Byzantine devotion.⁷⁸ First, John Geometres himself makes no connection between the passionate suffering of Mary and her accessibility as a source of comfort to her devotees,⁷⁹ just as poets like John Mauropous make no reference to her compassionate participation in the suffering of her Son as an earnest and guarantee of her succour to those who call upon her compassion in their devotions. The two concepts remain unconjoined. Second, as both Steven Shoemaker and Luigi Gambero have argued, the co-redemptive Mary remained a portion only of the core of her devotional significance as it developed over the middle Byzantine centuries.⁸⁰ As theologians like Theophylact of Ohrid and John Mauropous himself elaborated the devotional significance of the Mother of God, they emphasised her importance not in the Passion and its act of redemption

75 It has been argued that it had originated in pre-iconoclastic Byzantium, in the *Vita* of Mary attributed to Maximos the Confessor, tr. S.J. Shoemaker, *Maximus the Confessor, The Life of the Virgin* (New Haven, 2012), 25–35. I believe, however, that the *Vita* belongs to the early eleventh century, as argued by C. Simelidis, 'Two Lives of the Virgin: John Geometres, Euthymios the Athonite, and Maximos the Confessor', *DOP*, 74 (2020), 125–59.

76 George of Nikomedeia, 'Homily on the burial of Jesus Christ', PG 100:1457–89. The homily has been extensively invoked in art historical literature: see for example M. Vassilaki and N. Tsironis, 'Representations of the Virgin and their association with the Passion of Christ', in M. Vassilaki (ed.), *Mother of God: Representations of Virgin in Byzantine Art*, exhibition catalogue, Benaki Museum, Athens, 20 October 2000–20 January 2001 (Milan, 2000), 453–63, at 457–61; I. Kalavrezou, 'Images of the Mother: when the Virgin Mary became "Meter Theou"', *DOP*, 44 (1990), 165–72; H. Maguire, *Art and Eloquence in Byzantium* (Princeton, NJ, 1981), 86, 89, 97–99, 102, 108.

77 Galot, 'La plus ancienne affirmation', *passim*.

78 As argued vividly by Lossky, *In the Image and Likeness*, 98–110.

79 One must rely on Galot's discussion of John Geometres' unedited *Life* of the Virgin; on John's presentation of Mary's role as redemptrix in his sermon on her Dormition, see A. Wenger, *L'Assomption de la T.S. Vierge dans la tradition byzantine du VI^e au IX^e siècle*, AOC, 5 (Paris, 1955), 405–9, sections 58–60, where one can see that there is no invocation to her to apply this to devotional petitions.

80 Shoemaker, *Maximus the Confessor*, 25–35; Gambero, *Fede e devozione*, 202–25. Rocchi, who read the kanons with exceptional perceptivity, argues in 'In Paracleticam Deiparae', 219–22, that the vast range of capabilities accorded Mary shows precisely her role as co-redemptrix. The point at issue lies less in her capabilities than in the way they are centred, on sin, or upon her enabling centrality as a means of connection between humankind and God.

alone but also in the Incarnation and the vaster economy of salvation. Here Mary's role in redemption is no more than a portion of her importance as the means by which God and man joined, the mediating link that made the drama of salvation possible. To Mauropous, Mary is the 'only one who bore God on earth', who 'brought to the world the compassionate Word, [and makes] me worthy of the compassion of him who has liberated mankind from corruption'.⁸¹ To Theodore Laskaris she is the 'heavenly gateway of Christ' (9:23), the one 'who leads the bright sun Christ into the world' (8:1–2). And to John Therakas she is the 'the most luminous of all creation in whom the creator was veiled' (3:22–24), the 'sensible Paradise, the tree in the middle bearing Christ' (9:1–2). She has no need of suffering to facilitate her centrality to Christ and the drama of human salvation; she has it through her maternity. In the kanons she is humankind's salvation in the world. She does not replicate Christ's mercy but exercises her own in response to the needs that are expressed to her.

Suffering is a major component of the kanons' emotional cargo. It is not Mary's, though. The suffering of the kanons is 'my' suffering – the heavy weight of worldly anguish brought by the 'I' who writes and recites them. An expression of responsive tenderness or gravity might well be preferred for the icons to which such heavy weight is brought. But it is important to be aware whose the suffering is. Mary is not doing it here; nor is she in any visible way reliving her engagement in the suffering of her Son. We are far too prone to apply the Passion Week conventions to all contexts of Marian devotion. They are not evoked in the kanons, and in the icons, too, the epithet Eleousa seems most centrally and fundamentally to evoke the potent mercy of Mary's response to need. Petition is protean: there is no one icon type to which it attaches. Nonetheless, there is a variety of icon that does seem specially adapted to the epithet of Eleousa, and that seems often to have adopted it. This is the miracleworker. Like the Virgin of Vladimir, the Pelagonitissa and perhaps most insistently the Kykkotissa (fig. 6.8), miracle-working icons of the Mother of God have tended to appropriate the name Eleousa.⁸²

This propensity has traditionally been linked to their passionate iconographic types: see the statement of Hans Belting quoted earlier in this essay. But there are Hodegetria-types with the same epithet. Thus it might more readily be linked to the kind of work that is assigned to them. They, like the Mary of the kanons, are the helpers of those in the world. They do not confer salvation in eternity, but they save on earth. They elicit petition, and

81 Gambero, *Fede e devozione*, 211.

82 One can watch the very process of the Kykkotissa's adoption of the epithet in the evolving form of its legend: see C.N. Constantinides, *Η Διήγησις τῆς θαυματουργῆς εἰκόνας τῆς Θεοτόκου Ἐλεούσας τοῦ Κύκκου κατὰ τὸν ἐλληνικὸν κώδικα 2313 τοῦ Βατικανοῦ* (Nicosia, 2002), with the four manuscript versions of the *diegesis* and Ephraim the Athenian's *Perigraphe* of 1751.



Figure 6.8 Mother of God Eleousa of Kykkos, church of the Panagia, Sia, Cyprus.
Photo credit: author

respond with beneficence to it, relieving by their miracles the myriad afflictions, both physical and mental, that harrow worldly life and impede individuals' progress toward the love of God. In their beneficence in the world, they mirror the *eleos* that the poets assign to Mary in the kanons.

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Appendix

John Mauropous, Parakletic kanon to the all-holy Theotokos with the acrostic: ω, ψ, χ, φ ...

Ed. E. Follieri, *Un Theotocarion Marciano del sec. XIV (cod. Marciano cl. I, 6)*, Altri testi della pietà bizantina, 1 (Rome, 1961), 66–74 (folios 15v–17v).

Ἰὸδὴ α'

Ὡς φῶς τεκοῦσα τοῖς πέρασιν,
ψυχὴν μου τὴν ἐν σκότει ὑπάρχουσαν
τῷ σῷ φωτισμῷ καταύγασον,
πάναγνε θεομητορ·
μόνη γὰρ σὺ
φῶς τῆ οἰκουμένη
ἐξάνετειλας Χριστὸν
τὸν πανοικτίρμονα.

Ψυχὴν τακεῖσαν τῷ καύσωνι
ἐμὴν τῆς ἀμαρτίας, πανάμωμε,
ὄμβρω τοῦ ἐλέους δώρησαι
καὶ τῆς ἐπουρανοῦ
θείας τρυφῆς
ἐμπλησόν με, κόρη,
ὅτι σὲ μετὰ Θεὸν
ἐλπίδα κέκτημαι.

Χαρᾶς τὰ πάντα ἐπλήρωσας
τεκοῦσα τὴν χαρὰν τὴν αἰώνιον·
χαρᾶς τὴν ψυχὴν μου ἐμπλησον,
καὶ τὴν ἐπενεχθεῖσαν
θλίψιν ἐμοὶ
ἐκ τοῦ ἄλλοτρίου
ἀποδιώξον, ἀγνή,
ἵνα δοξάζω σε.

Ode 1

1 As you bore light to mortal beings,
2 bring dawn to my mind in shadow
3 by your brilliance,
4 all-pure God-mother,
5 for you alone,
6 light of the world,
7 made Christ come forth,
8 the all-merciful.

9 To my soul consumed in the heat
10 of sin, Immaculate,
11 give the shade of mercy
12 and fill me, Maiden,
13 with the divine sweetness
14 of heaven,
15 for from you – after God –
16 I receive hope.

17 You filled all things with grace,
18 bearing the grace everlasting;
19 fill my soul with grace
20 and expel
21 the sorrows
22 the evil one
23 causes me, pure one,
24 so that I may glorify you.

Ὕδῃ γ'

Φώτισον, Παρθένε,
 τῆς ψυχῆς μου τὸν ζόφον καὶ διώξον
 τὴν ραθυμίαν ἣν ὁ ὄφις
 ἐπισήξεν ἐν ἐμοί,
 Χριστὸν,
 ἢ Θεὸν ἢ κυήσασα
 καὶ ἀνυψώσασα κέρας ἡμῶν,
 μόνη παναμώμητε.

Ὑπὸ τὴν θερμὴν σου
 προστασίαν κατέφυγα, Δέσποινα·
 μὴ ἀποστρέψῃς με, Παρθένε,
 ταπεινὸν, ἡσχυμμένον,
 Χριστὸν
 ἢ Θεὸν κυήσασα
 καὶ ἀνυψώσασα κέρας ἡμῶν,
 μόνη παναμώμητε.

Τεῖχος καὶ κρηπίδα
 σέ, Παρθένε, καὶ σκέπη καὶ καύχημα
 καὶ προστασίαν καὶ μεσίτιν
 καὶ βοήθειαν ἔχω,
 ἀγνή,
 ἐπὶ γῆς, ὁ δοῦλός σου·
 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐχθρῶν ἀπειλήν
 ὄντως, οὐ πεφόβημαι.

Ὕδῃ δ'

Σὺ μου τὰς πληγὰς τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς
 ἰάτρευσον, πανύμνητε,
 ἢ ἐπὶ γῆς τεκοῦσα ψυχῶν ἰατρὸν,
 καὶ τούτου ἐκ δεξιῶν
 ἰκέτευε στήναί με
 ἵνα ἐν ἐμοί μὴ καυχῆσθῃται
 ὁ ἄρχων ὁ δυσμενής·
 σὲ γὰρ μόνην ἔχω βοήθειαν.

Ράντισόν με, Δέσποινα ἀγνή,
 τὸν ὄμβρον τῆς ἰάσεως
 καὶ τοῦ ἔλεους σου τὴν ἄβυσσον·
 ἐδίψησα ὡσπερ τὴ
 ἐξ ἡλίου καύσωνος,
 καὶ διηλεκῶς ἐδέχομαί σου·
 τὸ ἔλεος ἐν ἐμοί
 δεῖξον καὶ τὴν χάριν τῆς γνώσεως.

Πέλαγος κυήσασα ἐν γῆ,
 ἀγνή, τῆς ἀγαθότητος,
 τῆς ἁμαρτίας μου τὸ πέλαγος
 σὺ ξήρανον, ἀγαθή,
 καὶ πρὸς τὸν λιμένα σου
 ἴθυνον ἐμέ τὸν ἐν πελάγει
 τοῦ βίου διηλεκῶς
 ὄντως χαλεπῶς κινδυνεύοντα.

Ode 3

1 Illuminate, Virgin,
 2 the darkness of my soul and
 3 chase out the torpor
 4 which the serpent
 5 imposed on me,
 6 you who bore Christ the God
 7 and raised our aspiration,
 8 only immaculate one.

9 To your warm protection
 10 I fled, Lady;
 11 do not, Virgin, turn me away,
 12 humble and silenced.
 13 Christ,
 14 the God, you bore,
 15 and raised our aspiration,
 16 only immaculate one.

17 As a wall and foundation,
 18 Virgin, and a cover and boast,
 19 and a protector and intercessor
 20 and aid, I have you,
 21 pure one;
 22 being your servant on earth,
 23 through every assault of evils
 24 I will not be afraid.

Ode 4

1 You heal the wounds of my soul,
 2 all-hymned,
 3 who bore on earth the physician of souls,
 4 ask that I stand
 5 at his right,
 6 so that the savage ruler
 7 can claim no boast over me,
 8 for I have only your aid.

9 Moisten me, pure Lady,
 10 with the cloud of your cure
 11 and the abyss of your mercy;
 12 I've thirsted like earth
 13 burned by the sun
 14 and await you constantly:
 15 show mercy for me
 16 and the grace of wisdom.

17 An ocean of goodness, pure one,
 18 you bore on earth;
 19 the ocean of my sins,
 20 good one, you dried up,
 21 and guide me constantly
 22 to your harbour
 23 in the ocean of life,
 24 for I am gravely endangered.

Ωδή ε'

Οὐκ ἔχω, Παρθένε, ἐν γῆ βοηθὸν
εἰ μὴ σὲ ἐν κινδύνοις καὶ θλίψεσιν·

αὐτὴ μοι νῦν βοήθησον
καὶ μὴ μου παρίδῃς
ὄχετοὺς τῶν δακρύων,
ἢ φῶς τεκοῦσα μόνῃ
τοῖς ἐν σκότει, πάναγνε
καθεζομένοις ἀπογνώσεως.

Ξένον γενόμενόν με, Παρθένε ἀγνή,
τῆς τρυφῆς τοῦ ἀφράστως τεχθέντος
ἐκ σοῦ

εὐρῶν δὲ ὁ παγκάκιστος
ἐπλήγωσεν ἔχθρὸς
τὴν ταπεινὴν ψυχὴν μου·
ἀλλ' ἰατρὸν τεκοῦσα
αὐτὴ μοι θεράπευσον
τὴν πληγωθεῖσαν ψυχὴν, πάναγνε.

Νεφέλη ἐφάνης ἐν γῆ ἀληθῶς,
παναγία Παρθένε θεόνυμφε,
ἢ ὄμβρον τὸν οὐράνιον
τεκοῦσα τοῖς ἐν γῆ·
ὄθεν σε δυσωποῦμεν,
ψυχὰς τὰς ἐκτακέϊσας
ἡμῶν ἐκ τοῦ καύσωνος
τῆς ἀμαρτίας καταδρόσισον.

Ωδή στ'

Μόνην σε ἐν γῆ
κεκτήμεθα, πάναγνε,
ἐλπίδα καὶ τεῖχος καὶ ὄχυρωμα
ἐν περιστάσεσιν
καὶ κινδύνοις καὶ θλίψεσι, πάναγνε·
αὐτὴ ἡμᾶς διάσωσον, ὡς μόνῃ Θεὸν
ὄντως
ἐπὶ γῆς κηῖσασα,
καὶ τῆς τούτου τρυφῆς καταξίωσον.

Λαίλαψ χαλεπὴ
κατέλαβεν, ἄχραντε,
πελάγη τοῦ βίου καὶ βυθίζει με
εἰς ἀπόγνωσιν
ἀπωλείας· ἀλλ' ἔκεινον χεῖράς σου
καὶ τοῦτου με διάσωσον, ἄχραντε· μόνῃ
ἐπὶ τῆς γάρ ἔτεκες
τὸν λιμένα, ἀγνή, τὸν ἀχείμαστον

Ode 5

1 I have no help on earth, Virgin,
2 if I don't have you in danger and
tribulations;
3 help me now
4 and do not overlook
5 the floods of my tears,
6 all-pure one, sole bearer
7 of light to those who sit
8 in the darkness of despair.

9 Finding me estranged, pure Virgin,
10 from the sweetness
11 ineffably borne from you,
12 the all-evil one
13 wounded horribly
14 my miserable soul.
15 But having borne the physician,
16 you heal my wounded soul, all-pure one.

17 Truly you appear as a cloud on earth,
18 all-holy Virgin, God-bride,
19 bearing the heavenly rain
20 to those on earth,
21 wherefore we implore you,
22 drench our souls
23 which are parched
24 by the flames of sin.

Ode 6

1 From you alone on earth
2 do we receive, all-pure one,
3 hope and fortification and a wall
4 in difficulties and dangers
5 and tribulations,
6 all-pure one; save us, as the only one
7 who bore God on earth,
8 and made us worthy of his benefice.

9 A terrible storm
10 occurred, pure one,
11 in the ocean of life,
12 and sank me in utter
13 despair. But you extended your hands
14 and saved me, pure one; only you,
15 pure one, bore on earth
16 the harbour untroubled by storms.

Κλοιὸν ἀπ' ἐμοῦ
 τὸν βαρὺ σὺ κούφισον,
 Παρθένε ἀγνή, τῆς ἀμαρτίας μου,
 καὶ κατὰψυξον
 τὴν τακεῖσαν καρδίαν τῷ καύσωνι,
 ἀγνή, τῆς ἀμαρτίας μου, ἡ μόνη ἐπὶ γῆς
 ὄμβρον
 τὸν Χριστὸν κηῖσασα
 τὸν ὄμβρήσαντα πάντα τὰ πέρατα.

17 You lifted from me
 18 the heavy yoke
 19 of my sins, pure Virgin,
 20 and you cooled
 21 my heart consumed with the fire
 22 of my sins, pure one, the only one on
 earth
 23 to bear Christ, the rain
 24 that waters all mortal beings.

Ὕδῃ ζ'

Ἴδέ μου, παναγία,
 τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν χαλεπὴν ἀσθένειαν,
 καὶ ὡς κηῖσασα ἐν γῆ
 ἰατρὸν αὐτῇ ἰάτρευσον
 καὶ ἀνάστησόν με ψάλλειν καὶ βοᾶν
 πρὸς αὐτόν·
 Ὁ τῶν πατέρων Θεός, εὐλογητὸς εἶ.

Ode 7

1 See, all-holy,
 2 the severe illness of my soul,
 3 and as the one who bore on earth
 4 the physician, heal it
 5 and raise me singing and crying to him:
 6 God of the fathers, be praised.

Θρεμμάτων τοῦ ποιμένου
 τοῦ ἀσπόρως σαρκωθέντος, παναγνε,
 ἐκ τῆς γαστροῦ σου ποιήσον ἐμέ,
 τὸν πλανώμενον ὡς πρόβατον,
 ἵνα κράζω σοι, Παρθένε· Χαῖρε,
 καύχημα
 τὸ τῶν πιστῶν, καὶ ὁδὸς πεπλανημένων.

7 Nurslings of the shepherd
 8 who took flesh without seed, pure one,
 9 from your womb, shape me,
 10 who stray like a sheep,
 11 so that I cry to you, Virgin, hail, pride
 12 of the faithful and path for those who
 have strayed.

Ἡ μόνη ἐν γαστρὶ σου
 δεξαμένη τὸ φῶς τὸ ἀπρόσιτον,
 τὴν σκοτισθεϊσάν μου ψυχὴν
 ἡδονῶν, ἀμαρτημάτων πολλῶν,
 σὺ καταύγασον φωτὶ σου, ἵνα κράζω σοι·
 Ὁ τῶν πατέρων Θεός, εὐλογητὸς εἶ.

13 The only one who received the
 14 unapproachable light in your womb,
 15 illuminate with your light my soul
 overshadowed
 16 with pleasures, with many sins,
 17 so that I cry to you:
 18 God of the fathers, be praised.

Ὕδῃ η'

Ζάλη με κατέλαβεν ἐν τῷ πελάγει
 καὶ δεινῶς κινδυνεύω, Παρθένε·
 ἀλλὰ σὺ προφθάσασα
 χεῖρα δός μοι ὡς ἀγαθή,
 καὶ διάσωσον λιμένα σου τὸν εὐδιον,
 ἵνα ὡς οἱ παῖδες < - - > μέλψω ᾠδὴν·
 Εὐλογοῦίτω ἡ κτίσις πᾶσα τὸν Κύριον
 Καὶ ὑπερυψούτω πάντε αἰώνας.

Ode 8

1 A storm overtook me in the ocean
 2 and I was in terrible danger, Virgin,
 3 but you forestalled it;
 4 give me your hand as good,
 5 and save me in your calm harbour,
 6 so that like the youths, I will sing the ode:
 7 may all creation praise the Lord
 8 and glorify him in all eternity.

Ἔτεκες θεοκυῆτορ παναγία,
 τὸν οὐράνιον ἄρτον, τὸν τρέφοντα
 γένος τὸ ἀνθρώπινον·
 τοῦτον ὄντως διαπαντὸς ||
 μὴ ἐλλίπης τοῦ πρεσβεύειν τοῦ
 ἐμπλήσαι με

9 You, all-holy God-bearer, bore
 10 the heavenly bread that nourishes
 11 the human race:
 12 this being forever ||
 13 never neglect the intercession that fills me

αὐτοῦ τῆς τρυφῆς, ἵνα σοι ψάλλω ᾠδήν· 14 with this sweetness, so that I chant to
 you the ode:
 Εὐλογεῖτω ἡ κτίσις πᾶσα τὸν Κύριον 15 may all creation praise the Lord
 καὶ ὑπερυψούτω εἰς πάντας τοὺς 16 and glorify him in all eternity.
 αἰῶνας.

Δακρῶν μοι δὸς πηγὴν, Θεοτόκε,
 τοῦ ἐκπλῦναί μου τὰς ἀμαρτίας·
 σὺ γὰρ μόνη ὄντως
 πηγὴ ἐφάνης ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς
 ἀναβλύζουσα τὰ σωτήριανάματά·
 ἵνα γεγηθῶς ἀναβοῶ σοι ᾠδήν·
 Εὐλογεῖτω ἡ κτίσις πᾶσα τὸν Κύριον
 καὶ ὑπερυψούτω εἰς πάντας τοὺς
 αἰῶνας.

ᾠδὴ θ'

Γαλήνισον,
 πάναγνε κόρε, τὸν ἄγριον
 τῆς ψυχῆς μου κλύδωνα·
 μόνη γὰρ ἐπὶ γῆς σὺ ἐδείχθης
 λιμὴν τῶν ἐν βίου
 δεινοῖς
 διαπλεόντων, καὶ φώτισον, ἀγνή,
 τῆς καρδίας μου τὰ ὄμματα ὡς τέξασα
 φῶς.

Βοήθειαν
 σκέπην καὶ τεῖχος καὶ καύχημα
 ἐπὶ γῆς κεκτήμεθα·
 πύργον καὶ ἀσφαλιῆ σωτηρίαν
 σὲ ἔχομεν, κόρη,
 καὶ γὰρ
 διὰ τοῦτο οὐ πτοοῦμεθα ἐχθρῶν
 ἀπειλὴν οἱ εὐσεβῶς σε μεγαλύνοντες.

Ἀπόστρεψον
 πᾶσαν ὀργὴν κινουμένην, Χριστέ,
 καθ' ἡμῶν, καὶ δώρησαι
 νίκας τῷ βασιλεῖ κατὰ βαρβάρων
 καὶ αἰχμαλώτους ῥύσαι
 πικρᾶς
 τῆς δουλείας ταῖς πρεσβείαις, Σωτήρ,
 τῆς ἀρρητῶς σε τεκοῦσης, πολυέλεε.

17 Give me a fountain of tears
 18 to cleanse my sins,
 19 for you alone are
 20 the fountain who appeared on earth,
 21 gushing the saving flow,
 22 so that rejoicing I cry to you the ode:
 23 may all creation praise the Lord
 24 and glorify him in all eternity.

Ode 9

1 Pacify,
 2 all-pure Maiden, the wild
 3 billows of my soul;
 4 for you alone on earth reveal
 5 the harbour of those who navigate
 6 the treacheries
 7 of life, and brighten, pure one,
 8 the eyes of my heart, as you bore the light.

9 Help,
 10 cover, rampart, and pride
 11 we receive on earth:
 12 wall and secure salvation
 13 we have in you, Maiden,
 14 and indeed,
 15 because of this we do not fear the threat
 16 of terrible things; we blessed glorify you.

17 Turn back
 18 all anger aroused
 19 against us, Christ, and give
 20 victory to the emperor against
 21 barbarians
 22 and liberate captives
 23 from the bitterness
 24 of slavery, Saviour, by the intercessions
 of the one who bore you ineffably, O
 all-merciful.

**John Therakas the Monk, Poem with the acrostic ‘Ἰωάννης Θ’
in the last Theotokion**

Ποίημα τοῦ Ἰωάννου Μοναχοῦ τοῦ Θηράκα, οὐ ἢ ἀκροστιχίς ἐν τοῖς ὑστέροις Θεοτοκίοις «Ἰωάννης Θ», ed. S. Eustratiades, *Θεοτοκάριον*, no. 21 (Chennevières-sur-Marne: L’Hermitage, 1931), 68–71.

Ὠδὴ α’

Χαίροις ὁ πανάγιος ναὸς
τοῦ βασιλέως τῶν ἄνω δυνάμεων
χαῖρε θεῖε στέρανε·
χαῖρε ζωῆς θησαυρὲ ἀνεξάντλητε·
χαῖρε Θεοτόκε
παρθένε μήτηρ ἀνύμφευτε.

Χαῖρε πλατυτέρα οὐρανῶν·
χαῖρε πιστοῦς ἀγιάζουσα, Δέσποινα,
χαῖρε βάθος ἄμετρον
ὡς ἀληθῶς καὶ ὕψος ἀκατάγνωστον·
χαῖρε Θεοτόκε
παρθένε μήτηρ ἀνύμφευτε.

Πλοῦτον ὃν μοι δέδωκας, σωτήρ,
Κατεδαπάνησα ὡσπερ ὁ ἄσωτος
Καὶ ἐνθέου βρώσεως
Λιμώττω στεροῦμενος θείας τροφῆς·
ἀλλὰ ὡς ἐκεῖνον
πρὸ τέλους δέξαι καὶ σῶσόν με.

Ἴδε μου τὸν πόνον τῆς ψυχῆς
ἴδε τὴν θλίβιν, Παρθένε, τὰ δάκρυα
ἴδε μου τὴν κάκωσιν
καὶ μὴ παρίδης· ἀλλ’ ἐκ πάντων λύτρωσαι
τῶν πειρατηρίων,
παρθένε κόρη, τὸν δοῦλόν σου.

Ὠδὴ γ’

Τὸ χαῖρέ σοι πάλαι Γαβριήλ,
Παρθένε, προσεκόμισε·
χαῖρε παστὰς Κυρίου ἀμόλυντε·
τῆς παρθενίας χαῖρε τὸ καύχημα
τὸ σεπτὸν κειμήλιον·
χαῖρε ἄδου νέκρωσις
καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἐτοίμη βοήθεια.

Θεοῦ χαῖρε ἔμψυχε σκηνὴ
καὶ πύλη ἀδιόδευτε
δι’ ἧς φθορὰ ἐξωστράκισται
ἀγγέλων χαῖρε τὸ ἀγαλλίαμα
καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἔρεισμα
καὶ κοινὸν προσφύγιον·
χαῖρε σκέπη τοῦ κόσμου καὶ στήριγμα.

Ode 1

- 1 We hail you, all-holy shrine
- 2 of the king of the powers above,
- 3 hail, holy crown:
- 4 hail, inexhaustible treasure of life,
- 5 hail, Theotokos,
- 6 Virgin mother unwed.
- 7 Hail, wider than the heavens,
- 8 hail, sanctifier of the faithful,
- 9 hail, immeasurable depth
- 10 and truly unknowable height:
- 11 hail, Theotokos,
- 12 Virgin mother unwed.
- 13 Saviour, the wealth that you gave me
- 14 I squandered like a profligate,
- 15 and deprived of the divine taste
- 16 I hunger for holy food,
- 17 but as with that other profligate
- 18 before the end, so also save me.
- 19 See the pain of my soul,
- 20 see the suffering, Virgin,
- 21 the tears, see my wickedness,
- 22 and do not overlook me,
- 23 but redeem your servant from all
- 24 tribulations, Virgin Maiden.

Ode 3

- 1 Gabriel offered the ‘Hail’
- 2 to you long ago, Virgin;
- 3 hail, unstained substance of the Lord,
- 4 hail, the pride of virginity,
- 5 pure treasure,
- 6 hail, death of Hades,
- 7 and ready help of humankind.
- 8 Hail, living tent of God,
- 9 and gate not traversed,
- 10 through which death is shut out.
- 11 Hail, jubilation of angels
- 12 and support of humankind
- 13 and shared refuge,
- 14 hail, veil and support of the world.

Παθῶν μου τὸν τάραχον, ἀγνή,
τῇ θείᾳ μεσιτείᾳ σου
καὶ πειρασμῶν τὸν ἄγριον κλύδωνα
τὸν κυβερνήτην Θεὸν ἢ τέξασα
δέομαι κατεύασον,
παναγία Δέσποινα,
καὶ πρὸς ὄρμον με θεῖον ὁδήγησον.

Ὡς εὔρε τῆς κτίσεως, ἀγνή,
ἀπάσης λαμπροτέραν σε
ὁ ποιητῆς ἐν σοὶ κατεσκήνωσεν
καὶ ρύπωθεισαν τοῖς παραπτώμασιν
ὄλην κατελάμπρυνε
καὶ πρὸς φῶς ἀνήγαγεν
ὁ πατρι καὶ τῷ Πνεύματι σύνθρονος.

Ὡδή δ'

Σκηνὴν σε θεοκόμητον πάντες οἱ
δοῦλοί σου
γνόντες σοὶ κράζομεν, ἀγνή,
οἱ διὰ σοῦ τῶν δυσχερῶν
ρυσθέντες, πανάμωμε,
χαῖρε ζωῆς τῆς αἰδίου ἀπόλαυσις
καὶ πεπτωκότων χαρὰ καὶ ἀνόρθωσις.

Τὸ θεῖον τοῦ Δεσπότης ὑμνήσωμεν
λέγοντες
κατοικητήριον πιστοῖ
δάμαλις χαῖρε ἢ χρυσῆ
τὸν μόσχον ἢ τέξασα
τὸν σιτευτόν, εὐλογημένη πανάμωμε,
εἰς σωτηρίαν ἡμῶν καὶ ἀνάπλασιν.

Κόπασον τὸν σάλον τῶν ἀμέτρων μου
θλίψεων,
θεοκυῆτορ Μαριάμ,
καὶ πρὸς λιμένα χαρμονῆς
ὁδήγησον, ἄχραντε,
ἢ τὴν χαρὰν παντὶ τῷ κόσμῳ πηγάσασα,
καὶ τὴν ζῶην τοῖς νεκροῖς ἀνατείλασα.

Ἄπλαστον τῆς καρδίας μου ἐπίδε,
πανάγνε,
καὶ στεναγμὸν ἐμῆς ψυχῆς

μὴ ἀποπέμψης, ἀγαθῆ,
ἀλλ' οἴκτειρον σῶσόν με
καὶ ἐκ πασῶν κολάσεων ἐλευθέρωσον
τῶν μενουσῶν με, Παρθένε, τὸν
δειλαιον.

15 Lull the tumult of my passions
16 by your holy mediation,
17 and the fierce storm of tribulations,
18 I pray you, pure one,
19 who bore our pilot, God,
20 all-holy Lady,
21 and guide me to holy anchorage.

22 As he found you,
23 most luminous of all creation,
24 the creator was veiled in you,
25 and, rescuing from tribulations,
26 he irradiates all
27 and leads us to light,
28 he who shares the throne of Father and
Holy Ghost.

Ode 4

1 Knowing you the God-made tent,
2 we all, your servants, cry to you, pure one;
3 those rescued through you
4 from miseries, immaculate one,
5 hail, you as the exaltation of joyous life
6 and grace that raises the fallen.

7 We the faithful hymn

8 the holy residence of the Lord, saying:
9 hail, golden heifer,
10 bearer of the fatted calf,
11 be glorified, all-pure one,
12 in our unending salvation.

13 Still the heaving of my countless
afflictions,
14 God-mother Mary,
15 and lead me to the harbour of quiet,
16 all-pure one,
17 who flows forth grace to the world
18 and raised the dead to life.

19 Behold the sincerity of my heart, all-holy,

20 and do not cast away the groans of my
soul, good one,

21 but have mercy, save me,
22 and free me from all
23 the punishments awaiting me,
24 who am wretched, Virgin.

Ὡδή ε'

Χαῖρε πύλη
 ἦν διώδευσε μόνος ὁ Κύριος·
 χαῖρε σκέπη
 τῶν πιστῶς δεομένων σου, πανάγνε,
 χαῖρε σωεὸς πάντιμον
 μύρον τοῦ θείου, Θεοτόκε,
 χαῖρε Παρθένε πανάμωμε.

Χαῖρε κλίνη
 Δυνατοὶ ἦν κυκλοῦσιν ἐξήκοντα
 Σολομών τε
 ὁ σοφώτατος ἦν προεώρακε·
 χαῖρε μῆλον εὐοσμον
 τὸ τοὺς πιστοὺς εὐωδιάζον·
 χαῖρε θεόνυμφε Δέσποινα.

Φῶς τὸ θεῖον
 ἡ τεκοῦσα τὸ φωτίζον ἅπαντα
 φῶς μοι λάμψον
 τῷ ἐν σκότει καθευδόντι, ἄχραντε,
 καὶ χειμαζομένῳ μοι
 ταῖς περιστάσεσι τοῦ βίου
 καὶ συντριβέντι καινούργησον.

Ναυαγίῳ
 πειρασμῶν ἐποντίστην ὁ ἄθλιος
 καὶ βυθός με
 ἀπογνώσεως ἔλκει τὸν ἄθλιον
 κυβερνήτης φάνηθι,
 θεοκυῆτορ παναγία,
 καὶ πρὸς γαλήνην με ἴθινον.

Ὡδή στ'

Ἦ στάμνος ἡ χρυσοῦ ἡ ἔνδον φέρουσα
 τὸ μάννα χαῖρε ἄμωμε
 καύχημα ὁσίων καὶ στερρὸν
 κράτος τῶν μαρτύρων καὶ στεφάνωμα
 τῶν εὐσεβῶν
 ἀνάκτων, κόρη θεομακάριστε.

Ἄγια τῶν ἁγίων χαῖρε Δέσποινα·
 Χαῖρε ἀμνὸς ἡ τέξασα
 ἀφελόμενον ἀμνὸν τὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ
 πάντων τῶν βροτῶν τὰ ἁμαρτήματα
 δι' οἰκτιρμῶν
 ἀνεξιχνίαστον πέλαγος.

Ἐκύκλωσεν ἡμᾶς πταισμάτων ἄβυσσος
 οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ ρυόμενος
 ἐλογίσθημεν ὡς πρόβατα σφαγῆς
 σῶσον τὸν λαόν σου, Θεονύμφευτε·
 σὺ γὰρ ἰσχυρὸς
 τῶν πεπτωκότων καὶ ἐπανόρθωσις.

Ode 5

1 Hail, gateway
 2 entered only by the Lord,
 3 hail, veil
 4 of the faithful venerating you, Virgin,
 5 hail, all-precious vessel
 6 of holy myron, Theotokos,
 7 hail, Virgin immaculate.

8 Hail, bed
 9 surrounded by sixty strong men
 10 which Solomon,
 11 wisest of all, foresaw.
 12 Hail, fragrant apple,
 13 sweet-smelling to the faithful,
 14 hail, Lady, divine bride.

15 Holy light,
 16 bearer of the illuminator of all,
 17 turn on light for me,
 18 who slumbers in darkness,
 19 and for me, frozen by the
 20 conditions of my life
 21 and shattered, renew me, Lady.

22 I have been foundering, wretched,
 23 in the shipwreck of tribulations,
 24 and the depth of despair
 25 draws me on, the wretched.
 26 Steers man, appear,
 27 God-bearer Panagia,
 28 and guide me into the calm.

Ode 6

1 Golden vessel bearing manna
 2 within, hail, Immaculate,
 3 pride of hermits and firm
 4 power of martyrs and crown
 5 of pious rulers,
 6 God-blessed Maiden.

7 Hail, Lady, Holy of Holies,
 8 hail, ewe-lamb bearing
 9 the lamb of God who clears
 10 the sins of humans
 11 through the unchartable
 12 sea of his mercies.

13 The abyss of tribulations surrounds us,
 14 there is no relief.
 15 We are led like sheep to the slaughter.
 16 Save your people, God-hymned,
 17 for you are strong
 18 and raise up the fallen.

Νεφέλη φωτεινὴ τὸν ὄμβρον φέρουσα,
 Παρθένε, τὸν οὐράνιον
 Τὸν τοὺς πάλοι κρατούμενους τῷ
 φλογμῷ
 τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν θείως δροσίσαντα
 κάμει τανῦν
 φλογιζόμενον δρόσισον δέομαι.

ΚΑΘΙΣΜΑ

Φωτὶ σου, ἀγαθὴ,
 τὴν ἐν σκότει ψυχὴν μου
 καταύγασον, ἀγνή,
 καὶ τὴν πάρωσιν λῦσον
 καὶ διδάξον πράττειν με
 τοῦ υἱοῦ σου τὸ θέλημα
 ὅπως ἄφεςιν
 τῶν ἀμετρήτων σφαλμάτων
 εὖρω, πανάγνε,
 καὶ τοῦ πυρὸς ἀσβέστον
 εὐχαῖς σου ρυσθήσομαι.

ᾠδὴ ζ'

Χαῖρε φωτὸς
 αἰδίου ὄχημα
 χαῖρε παράδεισε τρυφῆς
 χαῖρε καύχημα τῶν πιστῶν
 χαῖρε ἀειπάρθενε
 χαῖρε ἀένναος πηγῆ
 δι' ἧς ἡμῖν ἐξανέτειλεν
 ὁ αἰνετὸς τῶν πατέρων
 Θεὸς καὶ ὑπερένδοξος.

Χαῖρε Θεοῦ
 θεῖον ἐνδιαίτημα
 καὶ πλανωμένων ὁδηγέ
 χαῖρε λύσις ἢ τῆς ἀρᾶς,
 ἄχραντε πανάμωμε
 χαίροις ὑπερθαύμαστε
 δι' ἧς ἡμῖν ἀνεβλάστησεν
 ὁ αἰνετὸς τῶν πατέρων
 Θεὸς καὶ ὑπερένδοξος.

Ὑπὸ ληστῶν
 ψυχοφθόρων, ἄχραντε,
 ἐτραυματίσθην κραταιῶς
 καὶ τοῖς βέλεσι τοῖς αὐτῶν
 πέπλησμαι ὁ δυστηγος
 ἴασαι καὶ σώσον με
 τῷ σῶν υἱῷ ἀνακράζοντα
 ὁ αἰνετὸς τῶν πατέρων
 Θεὸς καὶ ὑπερένδοξος.

19 Radiant cloud bearing the heavenly shade,
 20 Virgin, heaven divinely slaking
 21 those long dominated
 22 by the flames of sin,
 23 I, too, now,
 24 enflamed, crave moisture.

Kathisma

1 By your light, good one,
 2 you brightened my soul
 3 in darkness, pure one,
 4 and loosened my hardness of heart,
 5 and taught me to do
 6 the will of your Son
 7 as he demands.
 8 From countless transgressions,
 9 all-pure one,
 10 and the unquenchable fire,
 11 I find myself released by your prayers.

Ode 7

1 Hail, bearer
 2 of everlasting light,
 3 hail, sweet paradise,
 4 hail, pride of the faithful,
 5 hail, ever-Virgin,
 6 hail, ever-flowing spring,
 7 through which flowed to us
 8 the God praised of the fathers
 9 and all-glorious.

10 Hail, godly
 11 dwelling-place of God,
 12 and guide of the misguided,
 13 hail, dissolver of the curse,
 14 peerless Immaculate,
 15 we hail you all-wondrous one
 16 through whom sprang
 17 the God hymned of the fathers
 18 and all-glorious.

19 By soul-destroying
 20 thieves, pure one,
 21 I have been terribly hurt,
 22 and, miserable as I am,
 23 wounded by their bolts.
 24 Heal and save me,
 25 crying to your Son,
 26 the God hymned of the fathers
 27 and all-glorious.

Ἡ τὴν πηγὴν
τῆς ζωῆς κηύσασα
ζώωσον κείμενον νεκρὸν
καὶ ἀνάστησόν με, βροτῶν
μόνη ἐπανόρθωσις
ὦ Θεοχαρίτωτε,
τῷ τοκετῷ σου κραυγάζοντα
ὁ αἰνετὸς τῶν πατέρων
Θεὸς καὶ ὑπερένδοξος.

Ὡδὴ η'

Πενομένων χαῖρε θησαυρέ
καὶ πλοῦτε πρωχευόμετων,
πανύμνητε Θεομητορ,
καὶ πεινόντων ἢ τροφὴ
ἡμῶν τε ἀνάκλησις
τῶν βοώντων πάντα τὰ ἔργα Κυρίου
τὸν Κύριον ὑμνεῖτε
καὶ ὑπερυψοῦτε
εἰς πάντας τοὺς αἰῶνας.

Καταχρέως σὺν τῷ Γαβριὴλ
τὸ χαῖρέ σοι βοῶμεν
οἱ δούλοι σου, Θεοτόκε,
χαῖρε στήριγμα πιστῶν
καὶ τεῖχος ἀπόρθητον
τοῖς βοῶσι πάντα τὰ ἔργα Κυρίου

τὸν Κύριον ὑμνεῖτε
καὶ ὑπερυψοῦτε
εἰς πάντας τοὺς αἰῶνας.

Περιστάσεις θλίψεις συμφοραὶ
δεινῶν τε ἐπιτάσεις
καὶ φθόνοι καὶ ταραχαὶ τοῦ βίου
νῦν χειμάζουσιν, ἀγνή,
σφοδρῶς με τὸν δειλαιὸν
ὦν με σῦσαι πίστει βοῶνται
τῷ τόκῳ σου, Παρθένε,
σὲ ὑπερυψοῦμεν
εἰς πάντας τοὺς αἰῶνας.

Σὲ λιμένα ἔχομεν πιστοὶ
καὶ πύλην σωτηρίας
καὶ θύραν τῆς μετανοίας
καὶ στερέωμα, ἀγνή,
καὶ πύργον ἀσύλευτον
οἱ βοῶντες πάντα τὰ ἔργα Κυρίου
τὸν Κύριον ὑμνεῖτε
καὶ ὑπερυψοῦτε
εἰς πάντας τοὺς αἰῶνας.

28 The one bearing
29 the source of life,
30 animate me, lying dead,
31 and raise me,
32 O God-graced and
33 only raiser of humans,
34 crying to the one you bore,
35 the one hymned of the fathers,
36 God and all-glorious.

Ode 8

1 Hail, treasure of the needy
2 and wealth of the impoverished,
3 all-hymned mother of God,
4 and food of those who hunger,
5 and summoner of those crying
6 all the Lord's deeds to humans.
7 Sing hymns to the Lord
8 and exalt him
9 unto the ages of ages.

10 Committed by Gabriel
11 we cry 'Hail' to you,
12 we your servants, Theotokos,
13 hail, support of the faithful
14 and impregnable wall
15 for those crying all the Lord's deeds to
humans.

16 Sing hymns to the Lord
17 and exalt him
18 unto the ages of ages.

19 Woeful situations, catastrophes
20 of sufferings, pressures,
21 and envies and terrors of life
22 now congeal me, pure one,
23 quickly, be my rescue, me the wretched,
24 crying in faith,
25 to your Child, Virgin,
26 we exalt you
27 unto the ages of ages.

28 We faithful have you
29 as a threshold and gate of salvation,
30 and door of repentance
31 and support, pure one,
32 and unbreachable fortress,
33 we who always cry all the Lord's deeds,
34 hymning the Lord,
35 and exalting him
36 unto the ages of ages.

Ὡδή θ'

Χαίροις λογικὴ παράδεισε
 ξύλον ζωῆς ἐν μέσῳ Χριστὸν
 βλαστήσασα
 τοῦ προτέρου ξύλου
 καθελόντα τὸ ἔμπικρον
 καὶ τοὺς πάλαι τῇ βρώσει τεθνήξαντα,
 γλυκάναντα καὶ θείας
 ζωῆς μετόχους ἀναδείξαντα.

Χαῖρε Θεοτόκε Δέσποινα·
 χαῖρε χαρά τοῦ κόσμου καὶ ἀγαλλίαμα.

χαῖρε ἡ ἐλπίς
 καὶ σωτηρία τῆς κτίσεως·
 χαῖρε στέφος μαρτύρων ἀμάραντον,
 χαῖρε ἀγγέλων δόξα
 καὶ τῶν βροτῶν ἀγαλλίασμα.

Βῆμα τὸ φρικτὸν σον δέδοικα
 καὶ δειλιῶ τὸ πῦρ ἐκεῖνο τὸ ἀτελεύτητον
 καὶ τὰς ἀμετρήτους
 δὲ κολάσεις ὁ ἄθλιος
 ὦν με ρῦσαι, φιλόφθωπε, Κύριε,

λιταῖς τῆς σέ τεκουσης
 ὡς ἀαθὸς καὶ παντοδύναμος.

Θλάσον τῶν δρακόντων, Δέσποινα,
 τῶν νοητῶν τὰς κάρας ὡς παντοδύναμος
 τῶν ἀνηλεῶς
 πολιορκούντων τὴν ποίμνην σου
 καὶ ἰσχὺν τὴν αὐτῶν ἐξαφάνισμον
 ἰσχὺν δὲ τοὺς σοὺς δούδους
 τὴν σὴν περιζώσον, παναμύμητε.

Ode 9

- 1 We hail you sensible paradise,
- 2 tree of life in the middle bearing Christ,
- 3 displacing the bitterness
- 4 of the earlier wood,
- 5 and those of old who perished by a taste,
- 6 revealing sweetness and
- 7 partners of a holy life.
- 8 Hail, Lady Theotokos,
- 9 hail, grace of the world and transporting
- joy,
- 10 hail, hope
- 11 and salvation of creation,
- 12 hail, unfading wreath of martyrs,
- 13 hail, grace of angels
- 14 and transporting joy of humans.
- 15 I fear your terrifying throne
- 16 and that terrible everlasting fire
- 17 and the measureless punishments,
- 18 wretched as I am,
- 19 from which preserve me, Lord and
- Philanthropos,
- 20 by the prayers of the one who bore you
- 21 as one both good and all-powerful.
- 22 Lady, as one all-powerful,
- 23 crush the heads of the mental dragons,
- 24 the merciless,
- 25 that prey upon your flock,
- 26 and empower their disappearance,
- 27 empowering your servants
- 28 who flock around you, all-immaculate
- one.

Poem by the most venerated Emperor Theodore Laskaris

Ποίημα τοῦ εὐσεβεστάτου Βασιλέως Θεοδώρου τοῦ Λασκάρη, ed. S. Eustratiades, *Θεοτοκάριον*, no. 11 (Chennevières-sur-Marne, 1931), 39–42.

Ὠδὴ α'

Χαίροις ἰλαστήριον ψυχῶν,
Παρθενομήτορ, χαρὰν ἢ κυήσασα·
χαῖρε ἢ βασιλίсса·
χαῖρε ναὶ Χριστοῦ· χαῖρε ἢ πάνσεμνος·
χαῖρε προστασία
ψυχῶν ὁμοῦ καὶ κραταίωμα.

Χαῖρε εὐζωίας ἀπαρχή·
χαῖρε ἀρᾶς ἢ ἀναίρεσις, Δέσποινα·
χαῖρε θεονύμφευτε·
χαῖρε Χριστοῦ νεφέλη ὑπέρφωτος·
χαῖρε θεία ράβδος
παθῶν πελάγη ἢ ῥήσσουσα.

Χαῖρε γαλουχὸς ἢ τῆς ζωῆς·
χαῖρε τοῦ Λόγου ἢ μήτηρ θεόνυμφε·
χαῖρε στάσις γνώσεως·
χαῖρε ἀγγέλων δοξασμὸς καὶ καύχημα·
χαῖρε Θεομήτορ·
χαῖρε λυχνία ἀυγάζουσα.

Χαῖρε ἢ χωρήσασα Θεόν·
χαῖρε τῆς πρὶν παραπτώσεως ὕψωμα.
χαῖρε ἢ ἀνίκητος·
χαῖρε προστάτις κόσμου· χαῖρε
ἀχραντε·
χαῖρε βασιλείας
Χριστοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἢ οικείωσις.

Δώρησαι δακρῦν μοι πηγὰς
καρδιακὴν, Θεοτόκε, ταπεινώσιν
βίον ἀνεπίληπτον
καὶ πολιτείαν καθαρὰν, πανάμωμε,
ἵνα σου δοξάζω
τὸν πλοῦτον τῆς ἀγαθότητος.

Ὠδὴ γ'

Χαῖρε ὄλβος ἄσυλος πιστῶν·
Χριστοῦ χαῖρε διάδημα·
χαῖρε ἀστήρ Κυρίου λαμπρότατε
πηλίκον ὕψος χάριν μοι ὄρεξον
τοῦ βοᾶν σοι, Δέσποινα,

χαῖρε μόνη ἄνασσα
ἢ παστὰς Ἰησοῦ τοῦ παντάνακτος.

Ode 1

1 Hail, illuminator of souls,
2 Virgin mother, the bearer of grace,
3 hail, queen,
4 hail, shrine of Christ, hail, all-pure,
5 hail, protection
6 of all souls and my strength.

7 Hail, starting point of good life,
8 hail, lifter of the curse, Lady,
9 hail, God-wed,
10 hail, brilliant cloud of Christ,
11 hail, sacred rod
12 stilling seas of sufferings.

13 Hail, who gives milk of life,
14 hail, mother of the Word, God-bride,
15 hail, fixed point of knowledge,
16 hail, pride and glory of the angels,
17 hail, God-mother,
18 hail, radiant light.

19 Hail, revealer of God,
20 hail, the height before the fall,
21 hail, unconquered,
22 hail, protector of the world, hail,
undefiled,
23 hail, royal dwelling
24 of Christ the God.

25 Give me a fount of heartfelt
26 tears, Theotokos, a humble life
27 beyond reproach
28 and a pure citizenship, Immaculate,
29 so that I glorify you as the
30 wealth of goodness.

Ode 3

1 Hail, unalloyed joy of the faithful,
2 hail, diadem of Christ,
3 hail, gleaming star of the Lord.
4 What magnitude of grace
5 will you extend me, crying out to
you, Lady?
6 hail, only queen,
7 substance of the all-ruler Christ.

Χαῖρε νύμφη πάναγνε Θεοῦ· χαῖρε θεοχαρίτωτε δι' ἧς βροτοὶ ἐθεώθημεν· χαῖρε ἡ βάτος ἡ ἀκατάφλεκτος· χαῖρε τὸ γαλήνιον· χαῖρε ἡ ἀφάντωσις τῆς ἀράς· χαῖρε μόνῃ πανύμνητε.	8 9 10 11 12 13 14	Hail, all-pure bride of God, hail, God-graced, through whom we humans rise to God, hail, bush unburned, hail, peacefulness, hail, dispeller of the curse, hail, only all-hymned one.
Χαῖρε ὁ λιμὴν ὁ σωστικὸς· λειμὼν χαῖρε ὁ εὖοσμος· χαῖρε λαμπτήρ ψυχῶν, πανάχραντε· χαῖρε ἀπάντων τὸν κρῖστην ἡ τέξασα· χαῖρε ἦν ἀνύμνησε προφητῶν ὁ σύλλογος· Γαβριὴλ δὲ τὸ χαῖρε προσήγαγε.	15 16 17 18 19 20 21	Hail, saving harbor, hail, sweet-smelling meadow, hail, light of souls, all-pure, hail, bearer of the maker of creation, hail, whom the group of the prophets hymn: Gabriel initiated the hail.
Χαῖρε ἡ βασιλίσις βροτῶν, ἀγγέλων, χαῖρε Δέσποινα· χαῖρε ἀρχῶν αὐτῶν ὑπερέχουσα· ταμεῖον χαῖρε Χριστοῦ πανάμωμον·	22 23 24 25	Hail, queen of humankind, of angels, hail, the Lady, hail, rising over their rulers, hail, immaculate treasure-house of Christ,
χαῖρε πύλη ἄβατε· χαῖρε πόκε ἐμψυχε· χαῖρε μόνῃ ἐλπίς τῶν ψυχῶν ἡμῶν.	26 27 28	hail, forbidden gate, hail, enspirited fleece, hail, only hope of our souls.
Ἰσχύς μου καὶ πύργος ἀσφαλῆς γενοῦ, Θεοχαρίτωτε, καὶ θυρεὸς καὶ ἄπλον ἀήττητον τῶν νοουμένων ἐχθρῶν τὰς φάλαγγας ἀπ' ἐμοῦ διώκουσα τοῦ ἐν πίστει καὶ πόθῳ Παρθένε, σὲ μεγαλύνοντος.	29 30 31 32 33 34 35	My strength, and protective fortress of our race, God-graced, and shield and invincible weapon, expel the phalanxes of perceived ills from me who in faith and toil glorifies you, Virgin.
ᾠδὴ δ' Χαῖρε μητροπάρθενε ἀγνή· χαῖρε πύρινε στύλε φωτὸς ὑλιακῆ· χαῖρε σεμνὴ περιστερὰ· χαῖρε τιμαλφέστατον τοῦ βασιλέως παλάτιον· χαῖτε τῶν βροτῶν τὴν πτώσιν μειώσασα.		Ode 4 Hail, pure Virgin mother, hail, fiery column of brilliant light, hail, pure dove, hail, most honorable palace of the king, hail, diminisher of humans' fall.
Χαῖρε ὀλόφωτος νεφέλη· χαῖρε πανάχραντε ναὲ Θεοῦ· χαῖρε σεμνὴ· χαῖρε νυμφὼν ὁ εὐπρεπέης· χαῖρε σέλας ἄδυτον τοῦ νοητοῦ φωσφορόν· χαῖρε ἀείρωτε	7 8 9 10 11	Hail, all-luminous cloud, hail, immaculate shrine of God. Hail, pure one, hail, most comely of brides, hail, bright temple of the intellectual light-bearer, hail, ever-gleaming
κόσμου λαμπτήρ· χαῖρε πάναγνε Δέσποινα.	12	lamp of the cosmos, hail, holy Lady.
Χαῖρε βασιλίσις σκέπη βροτῶν ἀκατάληπτε	13	Hail, queen, incomprehensible veil of humans,

κόσμου μεσίτρια τερπνή·	14	warm intercessor of the world, hail, ever-glowing star,
χαῖρε ἀλάβαστρον	15	hail, awesome alabastron
φρικτὸν τοῦ μύρον τῆς χάριτος	16	of the myron of grace,
τοῦ νοητοῦ φυτοῦ τοῦ βλαστήσαντος	17	of the intellectual plant bearing fruit
ἐκ Θεοῦ καὶ πατρός· χαῖρε πάναγνε	18	from God and Father: hail, spotless
Δέσποινα.		lady.
Χαῖρε ἡ πολόπτυχος Χριστοῦ βιβλίον,	19	Hail, many-paged book of Christ,
ἄνασσα		royal
τῶν διεστώτων συνδρομή·	20	gathering of the dispersed,
χαῖρε τὸ ρεῖθρον τῆς ζωῆς·	21	hail, watercourse of life,
χαῖρε τὸ ξύλον τῆς τρυφῆς·	22	hail, tree of sweetness,
χαῖρε ἡλιόμορφε	23	hail, sun-form,
τριαδικῆς μορφῆς ἀγνὸν οἰκητήριον	24	pure mercy of triadic form, hail, table,
τράπεζα χαῖρε καὶ στάμνε καὶ γέφυρα.	25	vase and bridge.
Δαιμόνων ἀπάτη χαλεπῶς ἐξελομένον	26	Dreadfully drawn away by the deceit of demons
Τῶν ἐντολῶν με τοῦ Θεοῦ	27	from the demands of God,
Μὴ ὑπερίδης, ἀγαπή,	28	do not overlook me, good one.
ἀλλ' οἰκτεῖρον δέομαι	29	But I plead mercy
καὶ τῆς αὐτῶν ἀπάτης δεῖξον ἀνώτερον	30	and show [me] superior to their deception,
προσπεφευγῶτα αἰεὶ τῷ ἐλέει σου.	31	driven out forever by your mercy.
Ὡδὴ ε'		Ode 5
Χαῖρε λίθε	1	Hail, stone
τὸν ἀκρόγωνον λίθον ἡ τέξασα·	2	who bore the cornerstone,
χαῖρε πύργε	3	hail, tower
τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἀπαντῶσα τὸ φρύαγμα·	4	answering the arrogance of the evil,
χαῖρε φῶς αἰδίων	5	hail, everlasting light
τῆς ὑπεράρχου θεαρχίας	6	admitted by the thearchy
εἰσδεξαμένη, πανάμομε.	7	without beginning, all-Immaculate.
Χαῖρε στάσις	8	Hail, standard of those
κινουμένων ἐξ ὕλης, πανάμομε,	9	rising out of matter, Immaculate,
χαῖρε φαῦσις	10	hail, brightness
φωτισμὸν τοῖς ἐν ζόφῳ παρέχουσα·	11	offering light to those in darkness,
χαῖρε ὄντως Δέσποινα·	12	hail, you who are Lady,
χαῖρε λυχνία· χαῖρε ξίφος	13	hail, lamp, hail, sword
τάς ἀσθeneϊας ἡ τέμνουσα.	14	that severs illnesses.
Χαῖρε τόμε	15	Hail, volume
ὁ Θεοῦ τὴν σοφίαν δεξάμενος	16	in which God displays his wisdom,
χαῖρε πλάξ	17	hail, slab
γεγραφυῖα τὸν Λόγον τῷ Πνεύματι·	18	inscribed with the Word by the Spirit,
χαῖρε θεοπάροχον	19	hail, God-worthy
δῶρον βροτῶν εἰς σωτηρίαν	20	gift of humans for salvation,
εὐλογημένη μόνῃ πανύμνητε.	21	praised only spotless one.

Χαῖρε ἄνθος	22	Hail, flower,
ἀγνισθὲν ταῖς ἀρδείαις τοῦ Πνεύματος	23	purified by the streams of the Spirit.
χαῖρε ἄστρον	24	Hail, star
τηλαυγέστερον πάσης καθάρσεως	25	most brilliant of all purity.
χαῖρε ἀδιάδοχε	26	Hail, one without successor,
κρατὴρ πιστῶν ἀειζωίας	27	ever-living crater of the faithful,
Μαρία μήτηρ Χριστοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ.	28	Mary, mother of Christ the God.
Τὸν κλύδωνα	29	Still the billows
Τὸν πολλῶν μου πταισμάτων	30	of my many offences,
κατεύνασον		
καὶ τὸν σάλον	31	and soothe the heaving
τῶν παθῶν μου, ἀγνή, καταπράυνον	32	of my passions, pure one,
καὶ πρὸς ἀπαθείας με	33	and toward the deep peace
βαθείαν ἴθυον γαλήνην	34	of <i>apatheia</i> lead me,
τὸν σὲ γηρησίως δοξάζοντα.	35	who truly glorifies you.
Ωδὴ στ'		
Χαῖρε λύχνη φαεινέ·	1	Hail, radiant lamp,
χαῖρε φῶς ἀειλαμπές·	2	hail, light ever luminous,
χαῖρε πλοῦτε νοητέ·	3	hail, intellectual richness,
χαῖρε μήτηρ τοῦ Χριστοῦ	4	hail, mother of Christ,
πανάμωμε·	5	Immaculate,
χαῖρε ἡ μόνη Θεὸν κυήσασα.	6	hail, the only bearer of God.
Χαῖρε βάσις ἀσφαλής·	7	Hail, secure base,
χαῖρε στάσις ἀστραπής·	8	hail, gleaming standard,
χαῖρε νύμφη τοῦ Πατρός·	9	hail, bride of the Father,
χαῖρε μήτηρ τοῦ Χριστοῦ	10	hail, mother of Christ
πανύμνητε,	11	exalted,
τοῦ κόσμου σκέπη χαῖρε ἡ πάντων	12	veil of the cosmos, hail, hope of all.
ἐλπίς.		
Χαῖρε λύσις τῆς ἀρᾶς·	13	Hail, dissolution of the curse,
χαῖρε φύλαξ εὐσεβῶν,	14	hail, guardian of the pious,
χαῖρε σπάθη κατ' ἐχθρῶν·	15	hail, sword against the hateful,
χαῖρε τεῖχος ἀσκητῶν,	16	hail, wall wondrously wrought,
πανύμνητε,	17	exalted,
Θεοῦ τοῦ Λόγου μῆτηρ ἀνύμφευτε.	18	mother unwed of God the Word.
Χαῖρε κλίμαξ νοητῆ	19	Hail, intellectual ladder
ἀπὸ γῆς πρὸς οὐρανόν·	20	from the earth to heaven,
χαῖρε πύλη τοῦ φωτός	21	hail, gateway of light,
χαῖρε καύχημα πιστῶν	22	hail, pride of believers
ἀκήρατε	23	undefiled,
πάντων κτισμάτων ὡς ὑπερέχουσα.	24	standing out from all creation.
Ἐπὶ σὲ διὰ παντὸς	25	To you through all
καταφεύγω, ἀγαθὴ,	26	I flee, good one,
σὲ γὰρ μόνην ἀσφαλῆ	27	for you are the only safety
καὶ βεβαίαν ἐν δεινοῖς,	28	and clearly in tribulations,
πανύμνητε,	29	exalted,
ὁ σὸς οἰκέτης ἄγκυραν κέκτημαι.	30	I your servant gain anchor.

Ὠδὴ ζ'

Χαῖρε ψυχῶν
 ὄρμος ὁ γαλήνιος
 χαῖρε παστῆς χρυσοειδῆς·
 χαῖρε κλίνη βασιλική,
 θρόνε ἀστραπόμορφε·
 χαῖρε μητροπάρθενε
 δι' ἧς ἡμῖν ἐξανέτειλεν
 ὁ φωτισμὸς τοῖς ἐν σκότει
 Χριστὸς ὁ ὑπερένδοξος.

Χαῖρε σαφῆς
 νοσημάτων ἰασίς
 τῶν προστρεχόντων ἐπὶ σοί·
 χαῖρε σκέπη πολυτελής
 χαῖρε εὐσυμπάθητε·
 χαῖρε ροῦς ἀένναος
 τὸν ἰλασμὸν πελαγίζουσα
 καὶ νοσημάτων κρουνοῦς
 ἀποξηραίνουσα.

Χαῖρε ζωῆς
 ἀπαρχῆ καὶ γέφυρα
 διαβιβάζουσα λαοὺς
 ἀπὸ γῆς πρὸς τὸν οὐρανόν·
 χαῖρε οἰκτήριον,
 ἄχραντε ἀκήρατε
 Θεοῦ τοῦ Λόγου ὡς ἠυδόκησε·
 χαῖρε πιστοῖς φωσφοροῦσα
 λυχνία τὰ χαρίσματα.

Χαῖρε πηγῆ
 ἀειζῶου νάματος·
 χαῖρε παράδεισε τρυφῆς·
 χαῖρε τείχος τὸ τῶν πιστῶν·
 χαῖρε ἀειπάρθενε·
 χαῖρε μόνη Δέσποινα
 δι' ἧς ἡμῖν ἐξανέτειλεν
 ὁ αἰνετὸς τῶν πατέρων
 Θεὸς καὶ ὑπερένδοξος.

Νοῦν καὶ ψυχὴν
 καὶ σαρκὸς ἀσθένειαν
 σοὶ ἀνατίθημι βοῶν·
 Θεοτόκε ἡ κραταία
 σκέπη καὶ βοήθεια
 ἐκ τῆς ἀγνοίας με λύτρωσαι
 καὶ ραθυμίας καὶ λήθης,
 παντευλόγητε.

Ode 7

1 Hail, tranquil
 2 bond of souls,
 3 hail, substance like gold,
 4 hail, royal bed,
 5 beauty-blazing throne,
 6 hail, Virgin-mother
 7 through whom brightness
 8 flows out to those in darkness:
 9 Christ the all-glorious.

10 Hail, clear
 11 cure of intellects
 12 who hasten to you,
 13 hail, precious veil,
 14 hail, empathiser,
 15 hail, ever-flowing stream,
 16 making an ocean of light
 17 and drying up the well-head
 18 of afflictions.

19 Hail, beginning
 20 of life and bridge
 21 leading peoples across
 22 from earth to heaven.
 23 Hail, merciful
 24 Immaculate, unmingled as
 25 giver of God the Word,
 26 hail, phosphorescence to the faithful,
 27 grace-laden lamps.

28 Hail, spring
 29 flowing ever live,
 30 hail, sweet paradise,
 31 hail, wall of the faithful,
 32 hail, ever-Virgin,
 33 hail, only Lady
 34 through whom the praise
 35 of the fathers extends to us,
 36 God and all-glorious.

37 I place before you
 38 mind and soul and body,
 39 all ailing, crying:
 40 Theotokos, powerful
 41 cover and help,
 42 cleanse me of ignorance
 43 and thoughtlessness and sorrow,
 44 all-praised one.

ᾠδὴ η'

Χαῖρε αὐγος ἥλιον Χριστὸν
 εἰσάξασα τῷ κόσμῳ
 τὸ κάλλος τῆς βασιλείας τοῦ Χριστοῦ·
 χαῖρε ἀγνῆς χαρᾶς,
 ἀγνή, ἡμῖν πρόξενος·
 εὐλογοῦμεν πάντα τὰ ἔργα
 τὸν ἄναρχον υἱὸν σου
 καὶ σὲ κατὰ χρέος
 γεραίρομεν ἀπαύστως.

Χαῖρε στάμνε πάγχρυσε Θεόν,
 ὡς μάννα δεξαμένη
 ὡς ρεῖθρον ἀειζωίας
 τοῖς λαοῖς χαῖρε σεμνή·
 ὦ χαῖρε ἀκήρατε
 Θεομητορ· χαῖρε ὀρθαδόξων
 λιμὴν καὶ προστασία·
 χαῖρε τῆς ζωῆς μου
 ἐλπίς ἀρραγεστάτη.

Χαῖρε ράβδος ἡ νικοποῖδος
 πάντων τῶν ἀντιπάθων
 συνθλώσα τῇ σῇ πρεσβείᾳ
 τὰς ἐπάρσεις κραταιῶς·
 ὦ χαῖρε Θεόνυμφε παναγία· χαῖρε
 μοναζόντων
 κραταίωμα καὶ φύλαξ·
 χαῖρε τῆς ψυχῆς μου
 καταφυγὴ καὶ σκέπη.

Κοίμισόν μου δὴ τὰς ἐμπαθεῖς
 ὀρέξεις, παθῶν τε
 τῶν ψυχοφθόρων
 τὰ ἰνδάματα, ἀγνή,
 εἰς τέλος ἐξάλεινον,
 Θεομητορ, ἵνα σε δοξάζω
 ἀεὶ καὶ εὐλογῶ σε
 τὴν μόνην αἰτίαν
 τῆς πάντων σωτηρίας.

ᾠδὴ θ'

Χαῖρε Θεοτόκε Δέσποινα
 χαῖρε τὸ ὕψος τῆς σοφίας ἡ τέξασα·
 σοφίαν καὶ Λόγον
 τοῦ πατρὸς ἐνυπόστατον·
 χαῖρε πέλαος γνώσεων ἄπειρον
 χαρᾶς ἀδδιαδόχου
 καταξιοῦσα τοὺς τιμοῦντάς σε.

Ode 8

1 Hail, who leads the bright
 2 sun Christ into the world,
 3 the beauty of the kingdom of Christ,
 4 hail, pure one, ambassador
 5 of pure grace to us:
 6 we praise all the works,
 7 your Son without beginning,
 8 and of necessity unceasingly
 9 we honour you.

10 Hail, all-golden vessel
 11 filled with God as manna,
 12 as an ever-living steam
 13 to the peoples, hail, pure one:
 14 O hail, undefiled
 15 mother of God: hail, harbour
 16 and protection of the Orthodox;
 17 hail, unbreachable hope
 18 of my life.

19 Hail, rod bringing victory
 20 over all adversaries,
 21 crushing their conceits powerfully
 22 by your intercession;
 23 O hail, all-holy bride of God, hail,
 24 strength and guardian of
 25 those living in solitude;
 26 hail, refuge and cover
 27 of my soul.

28 Still my impassioned appetites,
 29 pure one,
 30 and wipe out the idols
 31 of soul-consuming sufferings
 32 completely, God-mother,
 33 so that I can glorify you
 34 forever and praise you,
 35 the only cause
 36 of the salvation of all.

Ode 9

1 Hail, God-bearing Lady,
 2 hail, bearer of the highest wisdom:
 3 the wisdom and Word
 4 of the Father in hypostatic form;
 5 hail, boundless sea of knowledge,
 6 deeming those honouring you
 7 worthy of incomparable grace.

Χαῖρε χελιδὸν ἡ εὖσημος	8	Hail, swallow of good omen,
περιστερὰ τὴν γαλήνην εἰσάξασα·	9	dove bringing in calm,
χαῖρε ἄσπιλε·	10	hail, Immaculate,
χαῖρε τὸ ἄνθος τῆς φύσεως·	11	hail, flower of nature,
ἀλατόμητον ὄρος, παντάνασσα,	12	fertile mountain, queen;
ὦ χαῖρε Θεοτόκε	13	O hail, Theotokos,
ἐλπὶς ἀνθρώπων ἀκαταίσχυντε.	14	unashamed hope of humankind.
Χαῖρε τῆς ζωῆν ἡ τέξασα·	15	Hail, bearer of life,
Χαῖρε λαβὶς ἡ τὸν θεῖον ἀνθρακα	16	hail, tongs bearing the divine coal,
φέρουσα·		
χαῖρε πορφυρίς	17	hail, most awesome
βασιλικὴ φοβερῶτατε·	18	imperial purple robe,
χαῖρε νόμων Χριστοῦ φυλακτήριον.	19	hail, guardian of the laws of Christ.
ἡ πάλαι τὰς προρρήσεις	20	Hail, you who are the fulfilment
τῶν προφητῶν χαῖρε περάνασα.	21	of what the prophets foretold of old.
Χαῖρε ὁ ναὸς ὁ ἐμπυρῆτος·	22	Hail, enspirited temple,
χαῖρε Χριστοῦ ἡ πύλη ἡ ἐπουράνιος·	23	hail, heavenly gateway of Christ,
ὄρος τοῦ Θεοῦ	24	mountain of God
χαῖρε σεμνὴ τὸ κατάσκιον·	25	overshadowed, pure one, hail;
χαῖρε βάσις καὶ στάσις καὶ κίνησις	26	hail, base and standard and motive
		force
μαρτύρων καὶ ὁσίων	27	of martyrs and holy men
καὶ ἀποστόλων τὸ ἐδραῖωμα.	28	and foundation of the apostles.
Ἄρον τὸ βαρὺ φορτίον μου	29	Lift the heavy burden of my misdeeds,
τῶν ἐγκλημάτων, Παναγία πανύμνητε	30	all-hymned Lady,
καὶ τὸν ἔλαφρὸν	31	and deem me worthy
ζυγὸν καταξίωσον	32	to bear the light yoke
τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ Θεοῦ σου βαστάζειν με	33	of your Son and God,
καὶ τρίβον διοδεύειν	34	and to walk the path that leads
τὴν πρὸς τὴν ἄνω λῆξιν φέρουσαν.	35	upward to the end.

7 *Storge*

Rethinking Gendered Emotion apropos of the Virgin Mary

Niki J. Tsironis

Is *storge* an emotion that may be termed as mainly ‘female’, and what do we mean by female emotions? This chapter looks into the association of emotions with gender from the point of view of recent research in neuroscience but also through the lament of the Virgin. Modern research in neuroscience shows that male and female brains differ not only morphologically but also in the way they function. Does this difference account for the association of specific emotions with men or women, respectively? How is this related to the tenderness that is associated with the figure of the Virgin and with the feeling that is referred to as *storge* in Byzantine sources? The Christian understanding of love, and especially of the love of the Virgin for her Son and God, permeates all literary and visual sources. Marian lament encapsulates approaches to grief and *storge*, as well as to ritual expressions of ancient Greek and Roman tradition which continues in the Byzantine era: the lament of the Virgin encompasses elements of ritual lament adapted to the Christian perception of the world. In Byzantine sources, ritual expressions of emotion, and especially of grief, are voiced by women. Yet what is conventionally understood as female emotion was recorded and performed exclusively by men. This is true both in ancient Greece and in Byzantium, suggesting that this crossing of boundaries shows that female emotion – whether grief or *storge* – is not all that ‘female’, and that in fact it expresses a feeling of the community which ancient societies ascribed to women.

According to C.S. Lewis, *storge*, affection, is one of the four kinds of love, along with friendship, *eros* and charity/*caritas*, among which *storge* holds a place of honour.¹ It is, according to Lewis, a broadly conceived brotherly love that includes both need-love, deriving from biological needs and gift-love, associated with theological notions loosely based on the St John’s Gospel view of God as love. Lewis considered *storge* the mainstay of solid and lasting human happiness; at the same time, he warned about its fragile nature in so far as it is linked to the natural cycle of life. His definition

1 C.S. Lewis, *The Four Loves* (New York, 1960), 31–56.



Figure 7.1 Virgin Mary with a halo, fresco from a tomb in Tyre/Sour, ca 440 CE, National Museum of Beirut, Lebanon.

Photo credit: Wikimedia Commons

demonstrates the dual aspect of caring affection, with its strong biological basis but also its spiritual undertones, that permeate ancient and Byzantine literary sources. All human emotions serve a purpose.

Storge certainly contributes to the survival of the species with the care for offspring and at the same time forms part of the cohesive social codes of ancient and modern societies. As such, it involves both positive and negative aspects for the giver and the receiver alike. Hence, *storge* seems to be a precious but also challenging emotion that needs to be handled appropriately so as to allow the person to attain their full stature. This is especially the case in the archetypal image of the bonding of Virgin and Child that we are going to explore with reference to its Byzantine literary and artistic depictions (fig. 7.1).

After a preliminary glance at the etymology of the word *storge*, its history and context, as well as the way it has been translated into English, I will turn to science and relate it to the strong imagery with which *storge* is associated in Byzantine sources. In particular, to delineate *storge* in the world of emotion, I look into neurobiological and psychological

research of affective states, collectively known as ‘affective science’:² if *storge* is an emotion distinct from other types of love and affective care, it may well be gendered. In this respect, it is interesting to examine whether the visual and textual records give different, culturally determined answers. In this quest, the Virgin plays a pivotal role, as the emblematic figure of motherhood, summarising past and current concepts related to affective care set against the cosmological context of Christian beliefs. Of special interest for the current study is the type of the Virgin of Tenderness whose very name – Glykophilousa – focuses on the most tangible expression of affective care, the tender embrace. Special attention will be paid to the seminal work of Romanos the Melodist and George of Nikomedeia, as their work coincides with major turning points in the development of Marian devotion.

The etymology of the word *storge* (from the verb *στέργω*) points to the primal function of nurturing, taking care of, and protecting, with specific reference to the animal practice of raising offspring, where the female plays the central role. Initially associated with the care provided by parents to children, the word retained the sense of that context in subsequent usage.³ *Στέργω* initially meant ‘to take care of’, ‘to surround with love’ and, regardless of whether it emanates from the mother or the father, it transmits a vivid imagery of parental protection. The English lexical categories render affection, alternatively recorded as fondness or dearness, as the most appropriate translation for *storge*, though these terms have more intellectual connotations and do not carry the specific strength of the Greek word. *Storge* does not represent a separate emotion, clearly distinguished from either *philia* or *agape*. The limits of the terms employed to describe the various kinds of love, among which *storge* maintains a significant place, are fluid and often overlapping, thus allowing space for parallel schemes and interplays between givers and receivers. A theoretical approach is provided by ancient and modern philosophy. Plato and Aristotle offer significant and articulate delineations of emotions. The Byzantines perhaps have little to offer in the theoretical discussion of emotions but a lot in their integration in texts and images. Emotions have preoccupied the most important figures of philosophy in modern times, including Spinoza, Descartes, Hobbes, Hume and Locke.⁴

2 This field, formed around a core of neurological, psychological and physiological research, has benefited from input from many social, biological and behavioural sciences, including linguistics and anthropology. For a definition, see R.J. Davidson, K.R. Scherer and H.H. Goldsmith (ed.), *Handbook of Affective Sciences* (Oxford, 2003), XIII–XVII.

3 *TLG*, s.v. *στοργή*, where *στοργή* is defined as ‘love, affection ... esp. of parents and children’.

4 A. Scarantino and R. de Sousa, ‘Emotion’, in E. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Stanford, 2018), sections 3 (‘The early feeling tradition: emotions as feelings’) and 10.2 (‘Instrumental and substantive strategic rationality’), <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2021/entries/emotion>, accessed July 2020.

They all viewed emotion as a unified whole out of which bodily reactions emanated, and it was not until William James, in what came to be known as the James-Lang theory, that an analysis of the experience of emotion into its constitutive parts was attempted.⁵ Since the late nineteenth century, when emotion began to be studied as a distinct topic, philosophers and affective scientists have not reached agreement over its exact nature and classification. Recent decades have witnessed an expansion in the field of affective neuroscience that came into being with the aim of investigating the neural basis of emotion and its embodiment in the brain.⁶

Love in general, and *storge* in particular, is relational, that is, it entails two parts: the giver, provider of love and care, and at the other end the necessitous receiver. Psychologists stress that an affectionate relationship should allow space for mutual input. In other words, *storge* is reciprocal and presupposes the interaction between giver and receiver. Reciprocity is emphasised in the ancient Greek treatment of love and friendship (both expressed by the term *philia* in Aristotle), but also remains a standard topos in Christian writers of the late antique and early Byzantine period.⁷ Elizabeth Belfiore, in her study on the violation of *philia* in Greek tragedies, stresses the view of Aristotle that tragedy is concerned with terrible deeds among *philo*i and defines *pathos*, one of the three parts of the tragic plot, as a destructive and painful event. She further explores the ways in which love and friendship overlap in classical literature and suggests that ‘the noun *philos* surely has the same range as *philia*, and both refer primarily, if not exclusively, to relationships among close blood kin’.⁸ In his discussion of Belfiore, David Konstan observes that during late antiquity and among Christian writers love/*caritas* militated against friendship since love for the creature – as opposed to love for the creator – was thought of as a form of idolatry. He adds that ‘metaphors for Christian ties tended to be derived from the sphere of kinship’ and especially male kinship, such as paternity or brotherhood rather than friendship.⁹ Classical references abound both in pagan and Christian writers, and it is often difficult to determine whether words and respective meanings have a strict correspondence, or whether their semantics have shifted owing to changes in religious orientation and beliefs. Interestingly enough, however, Aristotle refers to *philia* by pointing to a mother’s love for her child, thus linking *philia* with *storge* and setting it against its biological root:

5 W. James, ‘What is an emotion?’, *Mind*, 9 (1884), 188–205; see also below n. 20.

6 T. Dalgleish, ‘The emotional brain’, *Perspectives*, 5 (2004), 582–89.

7 D. Konstan, ‘Problems in the history of Christian friendship’, *JECrSt*, 4.1 (1996), 87–113; idem, ‘Aristotle on love and friendship’, *ΣΧΟΛΗ*, 2.2 (2008), 207–12.

8 E.S. Belfiore, *Murder among Friends: Violation of Philia in Greek Tragedy* (New York, 2000), 20; Konstan, ‘Aristotle on love’, 208.

9 Konstan, ‘Problems in the history of Christian friendship’, 87–88.

φύσει τ' ἐνυπάρχειν ἔοικε πρὸς τὸ γεγεννημένον τῷ γεννήσαντι καὶ πρὸς τὸ γεννησάν τῷ γεννηθέντι, οὐ μόνον ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ὄρνισι καὶ τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν ζῴων.

And there seems to be a natural friendship of a parent for a child, and of a child for a parent, and this occurs not only among human beings, but among birds and most animals.¹⁰

Aristotle further refers to the opinions of other philosophers and thinkers about friendship and love (*Nic. Eth.*, 8.6–7). References to nature and the way in which creatures interact form a repetitive pattern also in his *On the Soul* (A2. 404b 8) where he reverberates Empedokles (*Fragments*, 1342.004) as well as in his *History of Animals*. Ethological is also the context of *storge* in Aesop's Fables. Blurred boundaries between love and friendship, parallel to the moral qualities insinuated, and the repetitive references to kinship in ancient literature, suggest that iconic exemplars for caring affection were primarily sought and found in the animal world, thereby linking *storge* to biological concerns long before evolution research emerged. Equally prominent is the association of caring affection with parental and kinship contexts, as seen above in Aristotle, but also in Plato, Theophrastos and Philemon.¹¹ Nature instructs humans in the caring affection exemplified in the education of children, especially when associated with males.¹²

In a Christian context, the word *storge* occurs with reference to the parental relationship but acquires a different nuance as it reflects the piety of the authors. John Chrysostom's usage of *storge* offers relevant examples of the variable senses with which the term is invested and used in the fourth century. In his homilies on the prodigal son¹³ and those on the epistles to Titus and to Philemon,¹⁴ John considers *storge* as a salient trait of parental love, describing it as a feeling 'befitting the ones who have given birth'. In his homily 'Against the theatre', he refers to the knowledge of *storge* even by those who have not become fathers and were not taught the caring affection

10 *Nicomachean Ethics*, 8.1, ed. I. Bywater, *Aristotelis Ethica Nicomachea*, OCT (Oxford, 1894), 156; ed.tr. R. Crisp, *Nicomachean Ethics* (Cambridge, 2004), 143.

11 Aristotle, *Categories*, 4, treatise 27, fragm. 182, line 19, ed. V. Rose, *Aristotelis qui ferebantur librorum fragmenta* (Leipzig, 1886); Plato, *Laws*, 754b, ed. J. Burnet, *Platonis Opera*, vol. 5 (Oxford, 1907); Theophrastos, *On Piety*, fragm. 19, line 7, ed. W. Pötscher, *Theophrastos, Περὶ εὐσεβείας*, *Philosophia Antiqua*, 11 (Leiden, 1964); Philemon, fragm. 200, line 1, ed. T. Kock, *Comicorum Atticorum fragmenta*, vol. 2 (Leipzig, 1884).

12 See Gregory of Nyssa, 'Homily on the divinity of the Son and of the Holy Spirit', PG 46:568C: τί πεπόνθατε ἀκούοντες τοῦ διηγήματος, ὅσοι πατέρες ἐστέ, καὶ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς παῖδας στοργὴν παρὰ τῆς φύσεως ἐδιδάχθητε;

13 John Chrysostom, *Homilies on Repentance*, Homily 1, PG 49:284.

14 John Chrysostom, *Homilies on the Epistle to Titus*, Homily 4, PG 62:688: περὶ τέκνα στοργὴν ἐπεδείξατο; idem, *Homilies on the Epistle to Philemon*, Homily 2, PG 62:711: τοῦ τέκνου τὴν στοργὴν ἔδειξε.

by nature.¹⁵ Showing his *storge* for humans, Christ is presented by Chrysostom in an exchange with the Father asking him to keep humans safe, since he is about to be summoned by the Father and will no longer be on earth.¹⁶ In a homily on Genesis, Chrysostom employs *storge* in the sense of fraternal love, while in a homily on the Psalms, he uses it in the simple sense of care inflamed by desire.¹⁷ The address ‘brothers’ is often encountered in Christian texts from the Pauline epistles onwards, attesting the conversion of ancient *philia* into a quasi-kin relationship, where friends are united as brothers and sisters under the common paternity of God the Father. Elsewhere, the composite φιλοστοργέω, *philostorgeo*, combining the notions of *philia* and *storge*, first used by Plato (*Laws*, 9.27b) and meaning loving tenderly, is included in the main virtues of one’s life along with caring for the necessitous, giving one’s own bread to the hungry, not setting store by money, controlling anger and rejecting vanity.¹⁸ Chrysostom’s commentary on the Pauline Epistle to the Corinthians elucidates the way in which *storge* is perceived by the author and his contemporaries. Glossing the famous passage on love (*caritas*) from 1 Corinthians 13, Chrysostom replaces *caritas* (ἀγάπη in Greek) with ‘the source of *storge*’, thus identifying God as the source of love and equating him with love and *storge*.

ὄθεν ἡ πηγὴ τῆς στοργῆς. [οὐ χαίρει ἐπὶ τῇ ἀδικίᾳ. Τουτέστιν, οὐκ ἐφήδεται τοῖς κακῶς πάσχουσιν. ... Συγχαίρει δὲ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ. Συνήδεται, φησί, τοῖς εὐδοκίμοῦσιν· ὃ λέγει Παῦλος· λογίζεσθαι μετὰ χαϊρόντων, καὶ κλαίειν μετὰ κλαίωντων... εἶδες πῶς κατὰ μικρὸν ἄγγελον ποιεῖ τὸν αὐτῆς τρόφιμον ἢ ἀγάπη;

The source of *storge* does not rejoice in iniquity, that is, it does not take pleasure in the suffering of others ... but rejoices in truth. It rejoices with those who are happy, as Paul says; it rejoices with those who rejoice and weeps with the weeping.... Did you see how, little by little, love makes the one who dwells in love [lit. ‘lives by it’] an angel?¹⁹

From the above we may deduce that *storge* in the Chrysostomic corpus appears closely associated with love/*caritas* and *philia*, and that semantic

15 Idem, ‘Against the theatre’, PG 56:546: οἱ μὴ γεγονότες πατέρες, οἱ τέκνων στοργὴν μὴ δεδιδαγμένοι παρὰ τῆς φύσεως.

16 Idem, *Homilies on John*, Homily 81, PG 59:439: τῷ Πατρὶ διαλέγεται, τὴν εἰς αὐτοὺς στοργὴν ἐπάθεικνύμενος· ὡσανεὶ ἔλεγεν· Ἐπειδὴ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν με συγκαλεῖς, κατὰσθησον αὐτοὺς ἐν ἀσφαλείᾳ.

17 John Chrysostom, *Homilies on Genesis*, Homily 44, PG 54:474: τὴν ἀδελφικὴν στοργὴν ἐν διανοίᾳ λαμβάνει; idem, ‘Exposition on Psalm 115 (PIE)’, PG 55:326: ἀλλὰ τὴν κατὰ πολλὴν διάθεσιν καὶ στοργὴν, διαθερμαίνόμενος τῷ πόθῳ.

18 Idem, *Homilies on Matthew*, Homily 46, PG 58:480: βίον δὲ λέγω νῦν, ... ἀλλ’ ἐὰν χρημάτων ὑπερίδης ὡς ὑπεριδεῖν χρῆ, ἐὰν φιλοστοργήσης, ἐὰν δῶς πεινῶντι τὸν ἄρτον σου, ἐὰν θυμοῦ κρατήσης, ἂν κενοδοξίαν ἐκβάλῃς.

19 Idem, *Homilies on First Corinthians*, Homily 33, PG 61:281.

limits are fluid, although the biological factor is invariably present in both pagan and Christian authors.

The relationship between emotions and the rational part of the self is about as compelling as that of the mind to the body. The study of the field has had input from philosophy and psychology and has been enriched by contributions from cognitive psychology and neurobiology. Scholarly debate revolves around the relationship of feelings with sensation, which, as William James has argued, *is* the emotion,²⁰ but also around the association of feeling with consciousness, thoughts, beliefs, judgements, etc. For the analysis of emotion, it may prove useful to revert to one (or more) of the above-mentioned categories, keeping in mind, however, that each emotion employs a different form of cognition.²¹ Antonio Damasio in his seminal studies has drawn attention to the role of the body in kinaesthetic judgement, emphasising that somatic appraisals play significant roles in cognition and action.²² Psychologists and philosophers alike have attempted a categorisation of emotions. A detailed analysis would be out of place here, but some key remarks are necessary, as the study of emotions represents the backdrop against which gender considerations will be dealt with in the context of the paradigm of *storge*.

In the largely unmapped world of human feelings and emotions, *storge* has remained unchallenged as material for the discussion of evolution in modern psychological discourse, according to which the survival of the species – subserved by *storge* – is one of the main postulates of natural selection.²³ Less clear is the extent to which social training and moral development shape our emotions, or whether the practice of maternal nursing associates *storge* singularly with the female human. Various research methodologies

20 James, 'What is an emotion?', 189–90; J. Corrigan and J. Carrette, 'William James', in J. Corrigan (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Emotion* (Oxford, 2007), 419–37; J. Carrette, *William James's Hidden Religious Imagination: A Universe of Relations* (London, 2013), 182–87.

21 R.C. Solomon, 'Thoughts and feelings: what is a "cognitive theory" of the emotions, and does it neglect affectivity?', in A. Hatzimoysis (ed.), *Philosophy and the Emotions* (Cambridge, 2003), 1–18.

22 A.R. Damasio, *Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain* (New York, 1994); idem, *The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness* (New York, 1999).

23 A. Ploeger, H.L.J. van der Maas and M.E.J. Raijmakers, 'Is evolutionary psychology a metatheory for psychology? A discussion of four major issues in psychology from an evolutionary developmental perspective', *Psychological Inquiry*, 19.1 (2008), 1–18. For an overview of evolutionary psychology and recent debates over cultural and genetic evolution, see M. Mameli, 'Evolution and psychology in philosophical perspective', in R.I.M. Dunbar and L. Barrett (ed.), *Oxford Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology* (Oxford, 2007), 21–34.

have been applied to the question of gender difference, contributing exciting results.²⁴

An essential distinction needs to be drawn between sex and gender, the first referring to genetic characteristics and the latter representing a social construction that affects not only self-perception and behaviour, but also the way a person experiences his or her emotions.²⁵ The study of the subtle world of the human brain has brought up innumerable parameters of interaction and interdependence among the various centres that regulate human perception, feelings and emotions.

Research since the 1950s has shown that there is sexual differentiation in the development and organisation of the brain, and that men and women tend to focus on different aspects of the surrounding reality, which they apprehend, analyse and store in their brains in distinct ways.²⁶ In particular, men and women vary in their use of the hippocampus, and consequently, stimuli are presented differently in the hemispheres of the brain, affecting respective responses to emotions.²⁷ Scientists argue that beyond societal rules, the female brain is more open to the world of emotion but also to language and art, although others show that blanket stereotypes about women's greater emotionality are not accurate.²⁸ Differences in the function of the male and the female brain are associated with primitive needs and the survival of the species, as well as with childbearing, labour and rearing. The biological aspect of childbearing involves a self-giving process (where the embryo is fed by the very blood of the mother, whose intestines are pushed aside for the womb to grow and allow space for the foetus) and provokes significant psychological consequences, altering irreversibly the person of the mother. It is telling that maternal pain, in the homily on Good Friday by George of Nikomedeia in the ninth century, is described as scorching of

24 W. Wood and A.H. Eagly, 'Two traditions of research on gender identity', *Sex Roles*, 73, 11–12 (2015), 461–73; L. Brannon, *Gender: Psychological Perspectives* (New York, 2017), 22–45.

25 R. Adolphs and D. Anderson, *The Neuroscience of Emotion: A New Synthesis* (Princeton, 2018), 281–307.

26 See, for example, A.M. Svedholm-Häkkinen, S.J. Ojala and M. Lindeman, 'Male brain type women and female brain type men: gender atypical cognitive profiles and their correlates', *Personality and Individual Differences*, 122 (2018), 7–12; M. Ingallhalikar et al., 'Sex differences in the structural connectome of the human brain', *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America*, 111 (2014), 823–28.

27 J.E. Le Doux, 'Rethinking the emotional brain', *Neuron*, 73.4 (2012), 653–76.

28 See, among others, L. Brizendine, *The Female Brain* (New York, 2006) and A. Fidalgo, H. Tenenbaum and A. Aznar, 'Are there gender differences in emotion comprehension? Analysis of the test of emotion comprehension', *Journal of Child and Family Studies*, 27.4 (2018), 1065–74. For the opposite view, see, among others, E. Quest, A. Higgins, C. Allison and M.C. Morton, 'Gender differences in self-conscious emotional experience: a meta-analysis', *Psychological Bulletin*, 138.5 (2012), 947–81.

the inner parts.²⁹ Affective sciences remind us that emotion is determined by genetic characteristics as well as by individual biological, neurological and psychological factors, including the social background of the person.³⁰

Damasio's interoceptive theory holds that conscious experience of feelings is intertwined with the basic sense of the self, forming more or less two sides of the same coin, upon which identity it attempts to establish the seminal importance of emotions in the biological and social life of the person.³¹ Current theories of emotions tend to offer supplementary perspectives and perhaps could be unified. Among the spectrum of alternative theories, it is worth noting that both the constructed emotion theory³² and Panksepp's emotion systems theory recognise 'basic emotions'. Among his seven basic emotional systems, Panksepp reserves a place for *care*, which is nothing but the caring affection, namely *storge*.³³ *Storge* emerges as the distinct feeling that supersedes the limits of the self and, drawing on empathy, urges the person to take care of another being in need. The standard example of caring affection among philosophers, neuroscientists and psychologists is maternal love. In maternal *storge*, the biological need for the survival of the species – seen from an evolutionary perspective – is reinforced by societal concerns that dictate its behavioural and functional expression.

Wood and Eagly note that gender is among the core concepts that constitute human identity and situate persons within social structures, although biological, cognitive and social factors produce individual differences in gender identity.³⁴ Self-categorisation and stereotyping, however, are further determined by other factors, such as ethnicity, social status, education and religion. The 'nature-nurture' debate refers to the dilemma over which factors (biological or environmental/societal) most strongly affect a person's behaviour. The debate has been influenced by ideological currents, such as the feminist movement, which on the one hand fuelled discussions over gender in the circles of psychologists and neurobiologists, but on the other hand

29 George of Nikomedeia, 'Homily on Good Friday', 8, PG 100:1461: τοῖς διαφλεγομένοις αὐτῆς σπλάγχνοις.

30 T. Chaplin, 'Gender and emotion expression: a developmental contextual perspective', *Emotion Review*, 7.1 (2015), 14–21.

31 Damasio, *The Feeling of What Happens*; see also the review by J. Panksepp and A.H. Modell, *Neuropsychoanalysis: An Interdisciplinary Journal for Psychoanalysis and the Neurosciences*, 16 (2014), 81–91.

32 L.F. Barrett, 'The theory of constructed emotion: an active inference account of interoception and categorization', *Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience*, 12.1 (2017), 1–23.

33 J. Panksepp, B. Knutson and D.L. Pruitt, 'Toward a neuroscience of emotion', in M.F. Mascolo and S. Griffin (ed.), *What Develops in Emotional Development? Emotions, Personality, and Psychotherapy* (Boston, 1998).

34 Wood and Eagly, 'Two traditions', 390; A.H. Eagly and W. Wood, 'The nature-nurture debates: 25 years of challenges in understanding the psychology of gender', *Perspectives on Psychological Science*, 8 (2013), 340–57.

resulted in biased studies favouring the supported cause.³⁵ In any case, as A. Constantinople puts it, ‘masculinity and femininity are among the muddiest concepts in the psychologist’s vocabulary’.³⁶

Scholarly treatment of emotion in late antiquity and Byzantium has been growing, and the subject has benefited from the attention of David Konstan over a period of forty years, which has concentrated on the emotions relevant to the classics: beauty, friendship, anger, pity, forgiveness, clemency and so on.³⁷ Konstan has drawn material and methodological tools from psychology and neuroscience to compare our own emotions to those of the ancients. The enduring nature of emotions often takes him back to the theories and methods of Darwin and his followers, as well as to modern theories of adaptiveness and evolutionary psychology.³⁸

In recent years, scholars from various backgrounds, such as cultural studies, philosophy, history, literature and art history, have focused on the study of emotions in order to gain deeper insight into hitherto hidden aspects of past cultures. Angelos Chaniotis, through his research project ‘The social and cultural construction of emotions: the Greek paradigm’ and subsequent publications, illustrates the use and expression of emotion in the public sphere, as recorded in text and image with respect to the Hellenistic era and late antiquity.³⁹ Concerning Byzantium, a body of work employing theoretical cultural tools brought to the fore vibrant undercurrents of this reticent civilisation. In this discussion, I confine myself to noting some representative recent publications that mark a point of departure for an investigation of emotion in conjunction with gender. Also, I intentionally leave aside the

35 M.B. Lykes and A.J. Stewart, ‘Evaluating the feminist challenge to research in personality and social psychology: 1963–1983’, *Psychology of Women Quarterly*, 10 (1986), 393–412. For a systematic overview, see R.K. Unger, *Resisting Gender: Twenty-Five Years of Feminist Psychology* (London, 1998). See also A. Gheaus, ‘Feminism and gender’, in A. Fiala (ed.), *The Bloomsbury Companion to Political Philosophy* (London, 2015), 167–82, esp. 168–70, where the author analyses the ethics of care and ‘maternal thinking’.

36 A. Constantinople, ‘Masculinity-femininity: an exception to a famous dictum?’ *Psychological Bulletin*, 80 (1973), 389–407.

37 D. Konstan, *Sexual Symmetry: Love in the Ancient Novel and Related Genres* (Princeton, 1994), esp. 178–85 with reference to ἔρως (*eros*); idem, *Friendship in the Classical World* (Cambridge, 1997); idem, *Pity Transformed* (London, 2001); idem, ‘Shame in ancient Greece’, *Social Research: An International Quarterly*, 70.4 (2003), 1031–60; idem, ‘Clemency as a virtue’, *CQ*, 100.4 (2005), 337–46; idem, *Before Forgiveness: The Origins of a Moral Idea* (Cambridge, 2010).

38 D. Konstan, *The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks: Studies in Aristotle and Greek Literature* (Toronto, 2006).

39 A. Chaniotis, *Ritual Dynamics in the Ancient Mediterranean: Agency, Emotion, Gender, Representation* (Stuttgart, 2011); idem (ed.), *Unveiling Emotions: Sources and Methods for the Study of Emotions in the Greek World* (Stuttgart, 2012); idem (ed.), *Unveiling Emotions II: Emotions in Greece and Rome; Texts, Images, Material Culture* (Stuttgart, 2013). See also D. Cairns and D. Nelis (ed.), *Emotions in the Classical World: Methods, Approaches, and Directions* (Stuttgart, 2017).

numerous studies on women in Byzantium that touch upon gender issues, as it would divert us from the scope of the present study. Liz James was among the first to challenge conventional concepts about gender roles in Byzantium and tackle issues related to the concept of the self and emotion;⁴⁰ Martin Hinterberger has drawn attention to various aspects of emotions,⁴¹ while the volume recently edited by Susan Harvey and Margaret Mullett marks a major turning point in the appreciation of the Byzantine sensory universe.⁴² Mati Meyer has been attentive to the proper theoretical framework for the study of emotion, which is also the case for the volume she co-edited with Stavroula Constantinou on emotion and gender.⁴³ That collection also presents case studies that mark a step forward in the field. Finally, the volume at hand represents a valuable addition to the study of emotions in Byzantium.

‘The limits of my language mean the limits of my world’.⁴⁴ Wittgenstein has ingeniously shown that subjective experience – such as that involved in memory – draws on linguistic models and criteria for its cognition. In the absence of social, objective, anchoring, descriptions come adrift and lose their content. Language cannot possibly describe something other than what the person experiences in terms of safely grounded public language.⁴⁵ An array of usages of the word *storge* demonstrates the manner in which it was perceived by ancient and Byzantine authors and audiences.

In Byzantium, *storge* is authored and depicted invariably by males in a conceptual framework that draws mainly on the Bible rather than the

- 40 L. James (ed.), *Women, Men, and Eunuchs: Gender in Byzantium* (London, 1997); eadem (ed.), *Desire and Denial in Byzantium: Papers from the 31st Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies*, SPBS, 6 (Aldershot, 1997); eadem, *Empresses and Power in Early Byzantium* (London, 2001). See also L.-M. Peltomaa, ‘Gender and Byzantine Studies from the viewpoint of methodology’, *AnzWien*, 140.1 (2005), 23–44; C. Galatariotou, ‘Holy women and witches: aspects of Byzantine concepts of gender’, *BMGS*, 9 (1984–85), 55–94; and the important exhibition catalogue by I. Kalavrezou (ed.), *Byzantine Women and their World* (Cambridge, MA, 2003).
- 41 M. Hinterberger, ‘Emotions in Byzantium’, in L. James (ed.), *A Companion to Byzantium* (Chichester, 2010), 123–35; idem, *Phthonos: Mißgunst, Neid und Eifersucht in der byzantinischen Literatur*, Serta Graeca, 20 (Wiesbaden, 2013).
- 42 S.A. Harvey and M. Mullett (ed.), *Knowing Bodies, Passionate Souls: Sense Perceptions in Byzantium*, DOBSC (Washington, DC, 2017).
- 43 M. Meyer, ‘Constructing emotions and weaving meaning in Byzantine art’, in R. Milano and W. Barcham (ed.), *Happiness or its Absence in Art* (Cambridge, 2013); S. Constantinou and M. Meyer (ed.), *Emotions and Gender in Byzantine Culture: New Approaches to Byzantine History and Culture* (Cham, 2019); and therein M. Meyer, ‘Towards an approach to gendered emotions in Byzantine culture: an introduction’, 3–32.
- 44 L. Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, tr. D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness (London, 1961), 5.6. For an analysis of this quote and Wittgenstein’s reasoning, see M. Morris, *Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Wittgenstein and the Tractatus* (London, 2008), 263–308, esp. 275–77.
- 45 See the relevant discussion in D. Stern, ‘Private language’, in O. Kuusela and M. McGinn (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Wittgenstein* (Oxford, 2011), 333–50. See also D. Nanopoulos and G. Babinotis, *Από την κοσμογονία στη γλωσσογονία* (Athens, 2010), 84–85.

classical past. Notwithstanding the fluidity of its use, *storge* in Byzantium is employed as an emotion between friends, as we saw in the case of Chrysostom. Parallel to that, it is employed with reference to God and God's relationship to humankind. The view of the classics that friendship, and consequently *storge* can only develop among equals or two of the same kind is abandoned by Christian authors, who speak about our relationship to God in terms evoking the emotional undertones of friendship and caring affection. The biblical roots are to be sought in the story of Moses, but also in the challenge with which Abraham, the friend of God (Isa 41:8), is presented when asked to sacrifice his only son as a proof of his absolute love for God (Gen 22:1–19). The command of Deuteronomy 6:5, 'You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your strength', reverberates in Matthew 22:38–40. In Matthew, the love of God becomes 'the great and first commandment'.

Reciprocity is noted in biblical narratives stressing not only the affection streaming from parents to children but also the honour that children should show to their parents and the comfort they should provide for them, especially when they reach old age.⁴⁶ Affectionate care and a sense of honour permeate the narrative of Genesis 9:20–24, describing the way in which Noah's sons cover the naked body of their drunk father after the flood. Honour of parents has its place among the ten commandments, and the precept receives kindred treatment in the New Testament.⁴⁷ Kinship acquires a new meaning in the context of the Incarnation, one encompassing the members of the community beyond biological bonds. The gospels signal this shift in the episodes where Christ speaks openly about his mission and that of his disciples.⁴⁸ In other passages, Christ draws a line between himself and his biological family, emphasising the spiritual ties bonding him in a caring, and sacrificial, relationship with the living body of the *ecclesia*.⁴⁹ The miracle at Cana has been much discussed with reference to the attitude of Christ towards his mother, and theologians have invariably expressed the view that Christ makes a clear statement about his mission in dismissing his mother's exhortation to help out with the lack of wine. The scene is intricate: *καὶ λέγει αὐτῇ ὁ Ἰησοῦς· Τί ἐμοὶ καὶ σοί, γύναι; οὐπω ἤκει ἡ ὥρα μου. λέγει ἡ μήτηρ αὐτοῦ τοῖς διακόνοις Ὅτι ἂν λέγῃ ὑμῖν ποιήσατε* (And Jesus said to her, 'Woman, what concern is that to you and to me? My hour has not yet come'. Jn 2:4–5). Christ's distancing address to the Virgin as *γύναι* (woman) relegates the affectionate mother-child relationship to suggest the scope of his mission, but the request is granted, and Mary hardly appears doubting,

46 See, for example, Deut 5:16; Ex 20:12; Mt 15:4.

47 Mt 15:4; 19:19; Mk 7:10; 10:19; Lk 18:20; Eph 6:2.

48 Mt 10:34–36.

49 For example, the twelve-year-old Jesus teaching at the temple (Lk 2:41–52). See also Mt 12:50: 'For whoever does the will of my Father in heaven is my brother and sister and mother'.

whereby their relationship is affirmed. However, it is being transformed, and it no longer is the conventional tender mother-child relationship. As Romanos the Melodist depicts the scene, Christ appears at the wedding in order to sanctify the ritual. His reply to his mother is set against a backdrop of nonverbal communication between Mary and Christ:

Οἶδα πρὶν μάθης, παρθένε σεμνή, ὡς οἶνος ἔλειψε τούτοις νυνί, ἀπεκρίνατο.
Οἶδά σου τῆς καρδίας πάσας τὰς ἐνθυμήσεις ... καὶ γὰρ ἐν ἑαυτῇ ἐλογίσω
τοιαῦτα· ἡ χρεια νῦν καλεῖ τὸν υἱόν μου πρὸς θαῦμα.

I knew before you learned, modest virgin, that they have run out of wine.... He replied, 'I knew all your heart's worries ... and what you thought to yourself, that the need now calls my son to a miracle'.⁵⁰

The New Testament does not have much to offer in the study of caring affection, especially between the Virgin and Christ. Mary's worry, concern and eventual agony as the crucifixion approaches are only implied. The scene at the crucifixion, where Christ entrusts his mother to the beloved disciple (Jn 19:26–27), conforms to the norms of ancient societies steeped in the morality of the Bible. The scene as described in the Gospels, endlessly reproduced in art, combines the manifestation of *storge* towards the mother and of friendship towards the disciple. Christ, who has repeatedly rejected the family niche, pays his duty to his mother by entrusting her to John, who takes his place as a son. In other words, he affirms the deep loving friendship that connects him with John and at the same time pays tribute to his mother.

Male affection reflects the social background of biblical narratives in which the paternal figure occupies a special place as the safeguard for the survival and the honour of the family and the race. Tenderness is often encountered as a related emotion in the context of parent-child kinship. In the parable of the prodigal son, *storge* streams from the father, the leader of the household, who welcomes the 'lost sheep' of the family (Lk 15:20). This parable has been employed as an archetypal reference to the love of God towards his creatures. Biblical references offer insights into the affectionate relationship between man and God that evokes the strong bond between provider and recipient.

In Byzantine tradition, the Mother of God is invested with the double role of representing the female gender that is largely absent from the front scene of the ecclesiastical and the public sphere, and of interceding on behalf of mankind. Unsurprisingly, the rare references to Mary in the gospels do not include any direct expression of maternal or filial affection, other than at the

50 Romanos the Melodist, Hymn 7 ('On the marriage at Cana'), 12.1–5, ed. P. Maas and C.A. Trypanis, *Sancti Romani Melodi Cantica: Cantica genuina* (Oxford, 1963), 53; see also the more recent edition by J. Grosdidier de Matons, *Romanos le Melode, Hymnes*, vol. 2, SC, 110 (Paris, 1965), 312.



Figure 7.2 Virgin Mary with the infant Jesus, sixth-century icon in Khanenko Museum, Kiev, Ukraine.

Photo credit: Wikimedia Commons

crucifixion scene. Nonetheless, in the literature and art of eastern Christianity, the Virgin and Child constitute a key image (fig. 7.2).

This imagery underwent several phases before acquiring its two main forms, the Virgin Hodegetria and the Virgin of Tenderness. To these two types the image of the Virgin as Intercessor may be added, portrayed in the Orans and the Deesis depictions. Types are not standard, even less so, the epithets applied to their variants.⁵¹ The exemplars of this typology follow

51 B. Neil, 'Mary as intercessor in Byzantine theology', in C. Maunder (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Mary* (Oxford, 2019), 140–52; A. Lidov, 'The priesthood of the Virgin Mary

one another chronologically in terms of emergence but exist simultaneously and appear accompanied by a number of site- or cult-specific epithets.

Early Byzantine artistic representations promote a hieratic profile of the Virgin. The examples of this type are numerous and spread over a wide geographic area, ranging from Sinai, with the famous encaustic icon of the Enthroned Virgin and Child (around 600), to Rome, with S. Maria Antiqua, S. Maria Maggiore and S. Maria in Trastevere to mention the best-known examples, to the apse mosaics of the Virgin in churches of Cyprus. In terms of chronology, plausible dates from the sixth century onwards have been proposed. Although the *Maria Regina* represents a type specific to western Christendom and is closely associated with papal influence, it belongs to the same category of material, as far as the expression of affection is concerned. Specific examples have been presented and scrutinised in art-historical studies.⁵² Of particular interest for our purposes are the facial characteristics and the hieratic posture of the early representations of Mary in east and west, which differ significantly from the typical features of the Virgin as she came to be known and recognised in post-iconoclastic art. In all early known examples dating prior to the iconoclastic era, Mary has no direct eye contact with the infant Christ who appears sitting on her lap but devoid of outward signs of affection.

Early Nativity scenes depicting Christ swaddled, a prefiguration of his crucifixion and entombment, emphasise the typology rather than the human aspect of Christ's birth from Mary.⁵³ The iconography of the Nativity

as an image-paradigm of Christian visual culture', *Ikon*, 10 (2017), 9–26, esp. 11–13. Valuable are the articles published in the volume edited by L.-M. Peltomaa, A. Külzer and P. Allen (ed.), *Presbeia Theotokou: The Intercessory Role of Mary across Times and Places in Byzantium, 4th–9th Centuries* (Vienna, 2015). M.J. Milliner, 'The Virgin of the Passion: development, dissemination, and afterlife of a Byzantine icon type' (PhD diss., Princeton University, 2011), associates the Virgin of the Passion with Mary's intercession and priesthood. See also A.W. Carr's essay in the present volume.

52 For the hieratic posture of the Virgin in early representations, see A. Kateusz, *Mary and the Early Christian Women: Hidden Leadership* (London, 2019), 10–12 and *passim*. For *Maria Regina*, see J. Osborne, 'The cult of *Maria Regina* in early medieval Rome', *Acta ad archaeologiam et artium historiam pertinentia*, 21.7 (2008), 95–106; and the pertinent studies of M. Lidova, 'The earliest representations of *Maria Regina* in Rome and Byzantine imperial iconography', in M. Rakojska (ed.), *The Days of St. Emperor Constantine and Helena*, Niš and Byzantium: The Collection of Scientific Works, 8 (Niš, 2010), 231–43; eadem, 'Empress, Virgin, Ecclesia: the icon of Santa Maria in Trastevere in the early Byzantine context', *Ikon*, 9 (2016), 109–28; eadem, 'Maria Regina on the "Palimpsest Wall" in S. Maria Antiqua in Rome: historical context and imperial connotations of the early Byzantine image', *Iconographica*, 16 (2017), 9–25, with earlier bibliography and discussion of the multifaceted issues involved. For the Virgin in Cyprus, apart from the monographs discussing specific sites, see B. Shilling, 'Apse mosaics of the Virgin Mary in early Byzantine Cyprus' (PhD diss., Johns Hopkins University, 2013).

53 M. Cunningham, 'Byzantine reception', in P.M. Blowers and P.W. Martens (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Early Christian Biblical Interpretation* (Oxford, 2019), 666–85, esp. 671–72. For the earliest example of the Nativity, the third-century sarcophagus lid

testifies to the most tragic aspects of human love, of parental affection and of motherly angst faced with inconceivable loss. In the case of the Mother of God, this is magnified through the prophecy of the sword that would pierce Mary's heart (Lk 2:35). The salvific death of Christ is suggested by the expression of the eyes of the Virgin, whose cult becomes ever more closely linked to the Crucifixion, the Lamentation and Christ's Resurrection.⁵⁴ The treatment of the subject in art points to the importance of the divine conception, and therefore to the Christological background against which these representations were created.

In Byzantine literature and art, Mary is the central figure for the expression of affection, especially as related to rituals of rearing and burial inherited from the centuries-long tradition of the eastern Mediterranean. However, text and image do not quite correspond, especially in the early Byzantine period.⁵⁵ *Storge*, absent from early Christian iconography, abounds in texts and especially in poetry. Romanos the Melodist is singled out here as the most influential hymnographer whose work vibrates with emotional imagery, primarily of the affectionate Virgin. His Syriac background with its rich literary tradition, and especially the *madrasha*, accounts at least partially for the distinct emotional tone that characterises his poetry, which became a model for Byzantine hymnography.⁵⁶ Style and content in the poetry of Romanos engaged in biblical exegesis, revisiting familiar stories and dramatising the persons involved, especially Mary, in a relational and participatory manner,⁵⁷ revealing the effect the *kontakia* had on various audiences inside and outside the sacred space of the church.

The first hymn on the Nativity – still in use in the Orthodox rite – is perhaps the most famous *kontakion* of Romanos. According to the tradition,

(from St Ambrose basilica in Milan), see Kateusz, *Mary and Early Christian Women*, 5–8 and fig. 1.

54 M. Vassilaki and N. Tsironis, 'Representations of the Virgin and their association with the Passion of Christ', in M. Vassilaki (ed.), *Mother of God: Representations of the Virgin in Byzantine Art* (Athens, 2000), 453–63.

55 See, for example, the evidence regarding Marian devotion in the *Apophthegmata Patrum* presented by M. Constatas, 'I wish I could always weep like that: Abba Poemen and Mary at the cross; on the origins of Byzantine devotion to the Mother of God', in N. Tsironis (ed.), *Lament as Performance in Byzantium* (London, forthcoming). Sensory piety occupies a significant part in G. Frank, *The Memory of the Eyes: Pilgrims to Living Saints in Christian Late Antiquity* (Berkeley, 2000).

56 W.L. Petersen, 'The dependence of Romanos the Melodist upon the Syriac Ephrem: its importance for the origin of the *kontakion*', *VChr*, 39.2 (1985): 171–87; idem, *The Diatessaron and Ephrem Syrus as Sources of Romanos the Melodist*, CSCO, 475, Subsidia, 74 (Leuven, 1985); M. Cunningham, 'The reception of Romanos in middle Byzantine homiletics and hymnography', *DOP*, 62 (2008), 251–60. The year 2017 saw two important publications on Romanos: S. Gador-Whyte, *Theology and Poetry in Early Byzantium: The Kontakia of Romanos the Melodist* (Cambridge, 2017); and T. Arentzen, *The Virgin in Song: Mary and the Poetry of Romanos the Melodist* (Philadelphia, 2017).

57 Arentzen, *Virgin in Song*, 164–73 and *passim*.

it was with this hymn that the poet started his career in the church of the Virgin in Blachernae sometime in the sixth century, after having received a vision in which Mary gives him a scroll to eat. In this hymn, Romanos stresses kinship, and furthermore the antinomy of the omnipotent God being born of the humble Virgin: with his own consent, the father becomes the son of the mother (ὁ πατήρ τῆς μητρὸς γνῶμη υἱὸς ἐγένετο).⁵⁸ Affection is expressed by the metaphor with which the infant Christ asks his mother to accept the magi in the cave as if in her arms (ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς ἀγκάλαις σου), recalling the imagery of the Virgin Platytera (‘wider than the heavens’). In Romanos, Mary’s affectionate intercession acquires a cosmological dimension. Bringing the Saviour into the world, Mary becomes the mediator on behalf of humankind and the created order:

βλέπουσα ἡ ἀμόμητος
 μάγους δῶρα χερσὶ φέροντας καὶ προσπίπτοντας,
 ἀστέρα δηλοῦντα, ποιμένας ὑμνοῦντας,
 τὸν πάντων τούτων κτίστην καὶ κύριον ἰκέτευε λέγουσα·
 Τριάδα δώρων, τέκνον, δεξάμενος,
 τρεῖς αἰτήσεις δὸς τῇ γεννησάσῃ σε·
 ὑπὲρ ἀέρων παρακαλῶ σε
 καὶ ὑπὲρ τῶν καρπῶν τῆς γῆς καὶ τῶν οἰκούντων ἐν αὐτῇ.

The immaculate seeing/ the magi bringing presents in their hands and prostrating,/ the star pointing at [the cave] and the shepherds glorifying [the Saviour],/ she begged the Creator and Lord of all these, saying,/ ‘Accept, my child, the triad of presents,/ granting three favours to the one who gave birth to you:/ I plead with you on behalf of the air,/ for the fruit of the earth and for the inhabitants of the earth’.⁵⁹

In the following stanza, Mary asserts that she is not only the mother of the Saviour; he has also raised her to be the ‘steady roof’ and the ‘wall’ for the whole of mankind, the one who guides the forefathers who were once expelled from paradise back to its bliss. The content of her supplication is clearly liturgical as it echoes the very words of the Divine Liturgy of John Chrysostom that show Mary as a kind of universal priestess.

Ὑπὲρ εὐκρασίας ἀέρων, εὐφορίας τῶν καρπῶν τῆς γῆς, καὶ καιρῶν εἰρηνικῶν, τοῦ Κυρίου δεηθῶμεν.

For seasonable weather, abundance of the fruits of the earth, and peaceful times, let us pray to the Lord.

58 See S. Brock, ‘From Ephrem to Romanos’, *Studia Patristica*, 20 (1989), 139–51.

59 Romanos the Melodist, Hymn 1 (‘On the Nativity’), 22.7–8, ed. Maas and Trypanis, 8; ed. Grosdidiers de Matons, *Hymnes*, vol. 2, SC, 100, pp. 72–74.

In the second hymn on the Nativity, Romanos depicts Mary as addressing mankind, the earth and the sky to share in her joy of bearing the creator in her embrace. Grief is to be set aside; salvation is here; it has come through the heavenly gate that is the Mother of God herself. The hymn typifies the affectionate care of Mary in the image of the creator held in her bosom (2.2.8–9), as well as in the various scenes where she is presented as embracing and nursing the infant Christ (e.g., 1.2.6; 1.4.8; 1.6.8). Romanos's poetry elsewhere portrays Mary both as the humble virgin and the mighty queen, as the tender mother and the lowly maiden, who puts herself at the service of God. Significantly, it is in the Hymn 'On Mary at the foot of the cross' that Romanos sets off the intimacy of Mary's relation to Christ, in order to intensify emotion surrounding the crucifixion.⁶⁰

It has been argued that throughout the Christian era, Mary has been used by the church for the propagation and justification of a role model that associates the female sex with attitudes of submission and obedience.⁶¹ Regarding the Virgin as intercessor, the conceptual, chronological and geographical boundaries are ill-defined, although it is generally accepted that new impetus was given in the iconography of the post-iconoclastic era to the concept of Mary as mediator. In the context of Christian literature, however, already from the time of Romanos, Mary pleads not for the female sex alone but for the entirety of mankind. Already at the Annunciation, the Virgin represents the entire human person, the *καθ'όλου πρόσωπο* as Christos Yannaras put it,⁶² and her consent, which opened the way to the Incarnation and to the fulfilment of the divine economy cannot be reduced to a graceful, passive, feminine response to God's will.⁶³ As the Fathers have demonstrated in homilies, hymns and treatises, and modern theologians have further argued, at the Annunciation Mary is circumspect: she doubts, thinks, judges and consents to the calling of God on behalf of all humanity. In the exegetical tradition, her person becomes emblematic of the distress of the fallen human, with all the pain for their condition, the doubt regarding the transcendence of natural law the longing and the desire to be found reunited with God. When she says yes to the angel, it is a moment of catholic and all-inclusive acceptance.

Alexander Schmemmann sets the Mother of God against the backdrop of modern society, and speaking about the Annunciation he says:

I do not pretend to understand what the angel is, nor, using the limited language of rationalism, can I explain the event that happened almost

60 Romanos, Hymn 19 ('On Mary at the cross'), ed. Maas and Trypanis, 142–49.

61 Kateusz, *Mary and the Early Christian Women*, passim.

62 C. Yannaras, *The Ontological Content of the Theological Notion of Personhood* (Athens, 1970); R.W. Williams, 'The theology of personhood: a study of the thought of Christos Yannaras', *Sobornost*, 6 (1972), 415–30.

63 A. Louth, *Mary and the Mystery of the Incarnation: An Essay on the Mother of God in the Theology of Karl Barth* (Oxford, 1977), 14, 16–18; idem, 'John of Damascus on the Mother of God as a link between humanity and God', in L. Brubaker and M. Cunningham (ed.), *The Cult of the Mother of God in Byzantium: Texts and Images*, BBOS, 11 (Farnham, 2011), 153–61, esp. 159.

two thousand years ago in a tiny Galilean town. But it strikes me that mankind has never forgotten this story, that these few verses [of the dialogue between the angel and the Virgin] have repeatedly been incorporated into countless paintings, poems and prayers, and that they have inspired and continue to inspire.⁶⁴

In Schmemmann's statement, we see how emotion makes a biblical story appealing and relevant to various audiences across the centuries.

Neurobiology and psychology have illustrated the ways in which facial expressions, but also postures, throw light on the vast world of human emotion (fig. 7.3).⁶⁵



Figure 7.3 Enthroned Virgin and Child, sixth-century mosaic on the north wall of the church of Sant' Apollinare Nuovo, Ravenna.

Photo credit: Wikimedia Commons

64 A. Schmemmann, *The Virgin Mary, The Celebration of Faith: Sermons*, 3, ed. tr. J.A. Jillions (Crestwood, NY, 2001), 29–30.

65 P. Ekman, E.T. Rolls et al., 'Facial expressions of emotion: an old controversy and new findings', *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society*, series B, 335 (1992), 63–69.

The transition from the hieratic Virgin to the Virgin of Tenderness, similarly, sheds light on the way in which the face of the Virgin reflects the apprehension of the divine as a fusion of noetic categories determined by the doctrine of the church and the liturgical experience. In this respect, the remarkable study of Ioli Kalavrezou on the shift from the Virgin Mary to the *Meter Theou* connected theological and representational developments to psychological reality.⁶⁶ The emergence of this new type in the years following the controversy over the legitimacy of matter to represent the divine links the Virgin to the major arguments upon which the veneration of icons was based.⁶⁷ The very appellation ‘Glykophilousa’ echoes in the most vibrant manner the caring affection of the Virgin for the infant Christ, the ‘little child, before the ages’ of the first hymn of Romanos ‘On the Nativity’. The epithet itself refers us back to Aristotle and his use of the verb φιλέω/φιλήω (*phileo/philo*), which signifies love and comprises a variety of nuances, including the affectionate relationship between mother and child. The sweetly embracing Virgin recalls the imagery conceived with such flair and ingenuity by Romanos, a mixture of pulsating presence and a modest pathway leading to Christ. Her characteristics differ significantly from the representations of pre-iconoclastic art (fig. 7.4).

The royal posture of the hieratic Virgin gave way to a body curling to embrace the infant Christ: the head appears to be bending towards his side in a three-quarters perspective, while Christ’s bodily attitude expresses a tender emotion towards the mother who has nurtured him, thus affirming the reciprocity of *storge*. Often his hand encircles her neck, and his cheek is pressed against hers in a gesture of mutual affection. Literature precedes art, offering the model that iconographers would follow and inscribe on their representations.⁶⁸ At the same time that the type of the Virgin of Tenderness appears, iconographic types related to the Passion emerge.⁶⁹ Most importantly, though, the association of the Virgin with the Passion is imprinted on Mary’s facial characteristics. The sorrowful eyes of the Virgin transmit the message of the prospective sacrifice of the ‘little child, before the ages’. And at the same time, the Virgin stands and recapitulates the awareness of any human mother, and of humans in general, regarding the mortality of the species. Her facial expression transmits the reverence towards the infant Christ; the wonder, but also the grief, at his designated death on the cross is expressed in the suspended lips and the sadness of her eyes, arched by the lowered eyebrows.

66 I. Kalavrezou, ‘Images of the Mother: when the Virgin Mary became *Meter Theou*’, *DOP*, 44 (1990), 165–72; eadem, ‘Exchanging embrace: the body of salvation’, in M. Vassilaki (ed.), *Images of the Mother of God: Perceptions of the Theotokos in Byzantium* (Aldershot, 2005), 103–15, esp. 105–7.

67 N. Tsironis, ‘The Mother of God in the iconoclastic controversy’, in M. Vassilaki (ed.), *Mother of God: Representations of the Virgin in Byzantine Art* (Athens, 2003), 21–47.

68 H. Maguire, *Art and Eloquence in Byzantium* (Princeton, 1982); N. Tsironis, ‘From poetry to liturgy: the cult of the Virgin in the middle Byzantine era’, in *Images of the Mother of God*, ed. Vassilaki, 91–102.

69 Vassilaki and Tsironis, ‘Representations of the Virgin’, 453–63.



Figure 7.4 Virgin of Tenderness, seventh-century ivory, Walters Art Museum.
Photo credit: Wikimedia Commons

Romanos's ingenuity and vividness in the description of emotion can be compared to the liveliness with which the ninth-century homilist George of Nikomedeia portrays the Virgin in his homiletic corpus, most of which is dedicated to Mary. In this corpus, outstanding for its expressive intensity and dramatic verve, his homily on Good Friday conveys Mary's sorrow.⁷⁰ Desolate, when all friends and relations have deserted Christ, Mary alone stood steadfast by his side; and 'great as the kindling of her inner parts' might have been, her bravery and doughtiness were just as great. Seeing her alone persevering, the other two women waxed manlier and more

⁷⁰ George of Nikomedeia repeatedly uses the word *philia* and relates it to *storge* in order to emphasise God's love for mankind and to exhort the sacrifice of the Lord. See George of Nikomedeia, 'On Good Friday', PG 100:1457.

compassionate.⁷¹ Vocabulary here shows Mary's *storge* growing into virtues associated with manly attitudes. Employing images from apocryphal texts, and relying heavily on the sermons of Jacob of Serugh and the *kontakia* of Romanos the Melodist, George composed a sermon that we could consider to be the first known full-fledged lament of the Virgin and the source of the highly emotional encomia of Good Friday, the liturgical hymns sung during Vespers and in recent centuries during the procession of the *Epitaphios*.⁷² The Virgin, full of agony, following each step of Christ from the court of Annas and Caiaphas right through to Calvary where she witnesses the body of Christ being nailed on the cross and the last hours of her Son and God until he gives up the spirit. The form, content and tone employed in the narrative are richly expressive of emotion,⁷³ an emotion that one may wish to characterise as feminine, as it is based on the long tradition of ritual lament that emerged and flourished in the eastern Mediterranean.⁷⁴ However, how 'feminine' is this emotion? George's lament, written (or at least conceived) in the context of church ritual, was not simply delivered in the church of Hagia Sophia in Constantinople, but was literally performed, if we are to judge from its dramatic qualities.⁷⁵ All rhetorical devices employed by the

71 Ibid., 1461C.

72 N. Tsironis, 'The lament of the Virgin from Romanos the Melode to George of Nikomedia: aspects of Marian devotion' (PhD diss., King's College London, 1998). For the Life of the Virgin as model of George of Nikomedeia, see M.-J. van Esbroeck, *Maxime le Confesseur, Vie de la Vierge*, CSCO, 478–79, Scriptorum Iberici, 21–22 (Leuven 1986); S.J. Shoemaker, *Maximus the Confessor, The Life of the Virgin* (New Haven, 2012). The latter's arguments regarding the authorship and dating of the text were persuasively refuted by P. Booth, 'On the *Life of the Virgin* Attributed to Maximus the Confessor', *JTS*, 66 (2015), 149–203. See also Shoemaker's response 'The (Pseudo-)Maximus *Life of the Virgin* and the Byzantine Marian tradition', *JTS*, 67 (2016), 115–42 and the erudite discussion by M. Cunningham, 'The Life of the Virgin Mary according to middle Byzantine preachers and hagiographers: changing contexts and perspectives', *Apocrypha*, 27 (2016), 137–59; and M. Constatas, 'The story of an edition: Antoine Wenger and John Geometres' *Life of the Virgin Mary*', in T. Arentzen and M.B. Cunningham (ed.), *The Reception of the Virgin in Byzantium: Marian Narratives in Texts and Images* (Cambridge 2019), 3–22; C. Simelidis, 'Two Lives of the Virgin: John Geometres, Eftymios the Athonite, and Maximus the Confessor', *DOP*, 74 (2020), 125–59.

73 L. James, 'Art and lies: text, image and imagination in the medieval world', in A. Eastmond and L. James (ed.), *Icon and Word: The Power of Images in Byzantium* (Aldershot, 2003), 59–72.

74 Ritual elements, although initially banned by the Church in Byzantium, were gradually accepted and incorporated in the standard practices: see M. Alexiou, *The Ritual Lament in Greek Tradition*, 2nd edn (Lanham, MD, 2002), 32–34.

75 Generally, for the oral delivery of sermons in the church, see M. Cunningham, 'Messages: the reading of sermons in Byzantine churches and monasteries', in A. Lymberopoulou (ed.), *Images of the Byzantine World: Visions, Messages and Meanings: Studies Presented to Leslie Brubaker* (Farnham, 2011), 83–98. On dramatic and performative aspects of church rituals, see O. Cargill, *Drama and Liturgy* (New York, 1930); J. Childers, *Performing the Word: Preaching as Theatre* (Nashville, 1998); I. Vivilakis, *Το κήρυγμα ως Performance. Εκκλησιαστική ρητορική και θεατρική τέχνη μετά το Βυζάντιο* (Athens, 2013).

homilist – as well as the emotionally loaded content – point clearly to a performance that would be consistent with the objectives of the homily.⁷⁶

Can we thus speak of *storge* as a gendered emotion? In both Byzantine literature and art, we encounter a paradoxical fusion of gender as the tender, caring affection of the Virgin, sketched by authors and artists who were invariably male: in all likelihood, men were the authors of apocryphal texts; men were the poets of the Syriac Orient where the first poetic and emotionally charged portrayals of the Virgin emerged; men were the hymnographers of the middle Byzantine period who composed the Stavrotheotokia – an ekphrasis of maternal affection; and a man was also George of Nikomedeia, who produced the first Marian lament right at the end of the iconoclastic controversy (fig. 7.5).⁷⁷

Affection and sorrow seem interwoven, concomitant in human nature, inherent in literature and art, in all rituals accompanying passage from nothing to life and from life to death. The assistant, male or female, follows and supports rituals with *storge*, an emotion that is perhaps female in its biological origin but universal in its ontological character. In this sense, the caring affection that the Virgin shows does not belong to the stock of ‘female emotions’; on the contrary, we may suggest that elevated beyond the limits of her nature she takes the place of the male provider of *storge*: the Merciful Lord, the Eleemon finds his counterpart in the Eleousa, the Virgin of Mercy and Tenderness. Neuroscience and psychology, although still unable to produce a detailed mapping of the brain, demonstrate the instrumental role of emotion not only for the survival of mankind but also for complex processes such as conception, memory and perception. If we apply emotion theories and attained results in the study of *storge* we may conclude that it represents a versatile tool and medium employed by the Byzantines for the exegesis and promulgation of subtle but critical aspects of Orthodox doctrine. *Storge*

76 N. Tsironis, ‘Emotion and the senses in middle Byzantine homiletics’, in L. Brubaker and M. Cunningham (ed.), *The Mother of God in Byzantium: Relics, Icons and Texts* (Farnham, 2011), 179–98; eadem, ‘Desire, longing and fear in the narrative of middle Byzantine homiletics’, *Studia Patristica*, 44 (2010), 515–20. For further considerations on the connection between rhetoric and its emotional impact, see D. Konstan, ‘Rhetoric and emotion’, in I. Worthington (ed.), *A Companion to Greek Rhetoric* (Oxford, 2007), 411–25. For studies on the rhetorical training of the Byzantines in relation to the performative character of Byzantine literature, see, for example, I. Toth, ‘Rhetorical *theatron* in late Byzantium’, in M. Grünbart (ed.), *Theatron: Rhetorische Kultur in Spätantike und Mittelalter* (Vienna, 2007), 429–48; E. Bourbouhakis, ‘Rhetoric and performance’, in P. Stephenson (ed.), *The Byzantine World* (London, 2010), 175–87. See also R. Webb, *Ekphrasis, Imagination and Persuasion in Ancient Rhetorical Theory and Practice* (Farnham, 2009).

77 M. Conostas, ‘Poetry and painting in the middle Byzantine period: a bilateral icon from Kastoria and the Stavrotheotokia of Joseph the Hymnographer’, in S. Gerstel (ed.), *Viewing Greece: Cultural and Political Agency in the Medieval and Early Modern Mediterranean* (Turnhout, 2016), 12–32.



Figure 7.5 Virgin of Vladimir, icon, ca 1100, in Tretyakov Gallery, Moscow.
Photo credit: Wikimedia Commons

epitomises an emotion shared between men and women who have at least once in their lives received the *storge* of a nurturer, and probably have also given it, in one way or another. Caring affection thus appears as the common experiential base artfully used by authors and artists for the expression of the most appealing emotion of all. This is the emotion of *storge* that links humans with the person who proved instrumental for the utter transformation of human life through the Incarnation: the Mother of God, the one who stands at the root of life and the gateway to death.

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8 An Early Christian Understanding of Pride

Robin Darling Young

Historians usually date the modern investigation into the emotions from the publication of Darwin's *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals* (1872); but over the past 145 years of their study, it has taken them until the 1990s to begin the study of feelings in the specific time-periods they study. One of the first to examine the difficulties of writing a history of an emotion and its construal in antiquity had to note how little research had investigated the emotions since Lucien Febvre's unanswered 1941 call to *Annales* school historians to investigate *sensibilité* in the pre-modern world. But even that historian, writing in the late 1990s, did not venture far into late antiquity.¹ Since the turn of the millennium, however, studies of the emotions in the post-classical world have multiplied. With this multiplication have come debates – still not settled – about how much can be known about the emotions of a very different culture, given the social construction of emotions and the tricky vocabulary for them.²

As an object of study and description, a particularly difficult emotion – if it is an emotion – is pride. As familiar as it is to students of early Christianity or late ancient philosophy, its status as a feeling is as uncertain as its negative valence seems sure. It is undeniable, for instance, that early in Christian thinking in the Latin west, pride had already been identified as the primal sin. Although the word has come to have a positive valence in contemporary English – thus, 'black pride', or 'gay pride', signifying especially from 1968 forward a positive self-image or self-regard, collectively or personally, in the wake of historical discrimination or mistreatment – the word 'pride'

1 See the discussion in the printed version of the Gifford Lectures for 1997: R. Sorabji, *Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation* (Oxford, 1990); see also L. Febvre, 'La sensibilité et l'histoire: comment reconstituer la vie affective d'autrefois?', *Annales d'histoire sociale*, 3 (1941), 5–20.

2 An excellent overview of the first part of the ensuing discussion can be found in B.H. Rosenwein, 'Worrying about emotions in history', *AmHR*, 107.3 (2002), 821–45. See also the account of scholarly approaches to the topic in W.V. Harris, *Restraining Rage: The Ideology of Anger Control in Classical Antiquity* (Cambridge, MA, 2001), 18–22; and D. Konstan, 'The emotions of the ancient Greeks: a cross-cultural perspective', *Psychologia*, 48 (2005), 225–40.

has been used much more frequently with negative connotations, as when a person harbours arrogant self-regard and conceit. It is often thought of as a state or a status assertion with which is associated a feeling, or what would be called in modern English an emotion.³

But usually, pride, or its Greek or Latin putative equivalent, is a problematic state for early Christians. Augustine identified pride – or what translators often render as pride, *superbia*, as the cause of Adam and Eve’s downfall in paradise. ‘Pride’, Augustine wrote in *On the City of God*, ‘hates a fellowship of equality under God, and seeks to impose its own dominion on fellow humans, in place of God’s rule’.⁴ Already in the *Confessions*, he had written that pride had made his younger self disdain the simple language of the Latin Bible: ‘The Bible was composed in such a way that as beginners mature, its meaning grows with them. I disdained to be a little beginner. I was puffed up with pride and incorrectly considered myself a mature adult’.⁵

It is important to note, however, that the term pride does not appear at all in the first chapters of Genesis describing Adam and Eve’s lawbreaking and consequent punishment; rather, the assembly of a narrative connecting the sin of Adam and Eve with the vice (or feeling) of pride was a long interpretive process. In the biblical text, the couple is not pictured as previously sinless; rather, they formed wrong opinions and became disobedient, for which crime they were expelled from their original home, ‘the garden’. Only following the interpretation of Paul was the idea of a fall introduced into the interpretation of Genesis, but as Paul drew on ideas in Hellenistic Judaism to explain the ‘fall’ he described in Romans 5:12–19 and 1 Corinthians 15:20–22, he did not ascribe pride to either. Understanding the snake in paradise, however, as Satan, as later interpreters did, helped to associate the ‘fall’ with pride, since Satan is represented as both arrogant and fallen – in 1 Timothy 3:6, a neophyte is forbidden office in the church ‘lest he be puffed up (τυφωθείς) and fall under the judgement of the devil’ (Latin, *ne in superbiam elatus in iudicium incidat diaboli*).⁶

Nonetheless, without asserting that Augustine was an outlier, it still is important to state that not all interpreters identified pride as the reason for the fall of Satan or of the first humans. For the great third-century thinker Origen, the originally-created minds ‘fell’ not from pride, and not in the

3 For a discussion of the emerging ambivalence of the word in English, see J. Taylor, ‘Hume on the dignity of pride’, *Journal of Scottish Philosophy*, 10.1 (2012), 29–49.

4 Augustine of Hippo, *On the City of God*, 19.12, ed. B. Dombart, *Sancti Aurelii Augustini episcopi De civitate Dei libri XXII*, 2 vols, Teubner (Leipzig, 1877–78), vol. 2, 375, tr. H. Bettenson, *Concerning the City of God against the Pagans*, Pelican Classics (New York, 1972), 868–69.

5 Augustine of Hippo, *Confessions*, 3.5.9, ed. C. J.-B. Hammond, *Augustine, Confessions*, LCL 26 (Cambridge, MA, 2014), 104, tr. H. Chadwick, *Saint Augustine, Confessions* (Oxford, 1991), 40.

6 English translations of biblical quotations come from the New Revised Standard Version (Oxford, 2010).

garden, but because they became weary of the contemplation of God for which they had been created.⁷ Origen viewed this fall, rather, as a distancing resulting from satiation or weariness with the presence of God.⁸ Equipped with freedom, they moved from God, cooled, became souls and mercifully were clothed in bodies, with the attendant difficulties that arise in embodied souls, but also with the possibility of learning and being restored.⁹

That a conception of ‘pride’ is missing from Origen’s account of the first movement of minds away from God, is significant for a discussion of the words we translate as pride in early Christianity. The difference between Origen and Augustine indicates not only a different interpretation of Genesis, but a differing understanding of the state for which ‘pride’ is the usual translation.

But there is an even greater problem in identifying the word ‘pride’ and its meaning for early Christians. In any discussion of the emotions in the late ancient and Byzantine periods, two difficulties attend to an exploration of the matter of pride. First, and most significantly, pride seems not to be treated as an emotion or feeling per se, as if it were a disturbance something like anger or sorrow, even though some commentators in that long period include it as a *pathos* in their list of vices.

Second, except in a few cases, pride as an English term seems to translate a range of Greek words that signify both an attitude or stance, and a position – but *not* an emotion or sensation (which latter at least has a Greek equivalent, αἴσθησις, *aisthesis*). These two difficulties will be dealt with quickly, in order to explore what these words seem to have become, as Greek culture and language absorbed the biblical and theological analysis of an attitude (or an action) repellent to the God of Israel, who became the God of late ancient and Byzantine Christianity. The connotation of the word for pride in those more ancient sources persists alongside the newer, more positive valence. When the Septuagint construal of pride entered the cultural mainstream in the third and fourth centuries, through early Christianity and its appended New Testament, pride gained an eschatological dimension that persists in the present alongside the modifications of the 1960s.

Consider, for example, a recent portrayal of the problem of pride. In one episode of the series *Fargo*, Noah Hawley’s allegorical tale overseen by the Coen brothers, a prophet in a business jacket sits at a bar in a bowling alley. This man, smiling gently, greets a young woman – Nikki – who has narrowly escaped assassination by the hired thugs of Varga, an arrogant merger-and-acquisitions agent for a distant Russian capitalist. The bar, the

7 Origen, *On First Principles*, 1.5.2, ed.tr. J. Behr, *Origen, On First Principles*, OECT (Oxford, 2017), 90–91.

8 *Ibid.*, 2.8.3, ed.tr. Behr, 228.

9 Origen, *On First Principles*, 2.9.2–8, ed.tr. Behr, 238–50. On the restoration of minds in the thought of Origen, see J.W. Trigg, *Origen* (New York, 1998), 30.

viewers learn, is in reality the divine judgement hall. The unnamed man is the fictional Paul Marrane, the Wandering Jew.¹⁰

Leaning on the bar, he tells Nikki, 'We all end up here eventually, to be weighed and judged, as it now is for you and your friend.... This is the universe at its most ironic'. The young woman, herself a petty criminal, must complete her redemption in a battle against Varga, she is told. And then the man – taking away his bait, the kitten-reincarnation of her murdered boyfriend – says the following:

Deliver a message, when the time comes, to the wicked:
'Though thou exalt thyself like the eagle;
Though thou make thy nest among the stars;
Thence I will bring thee down, saith the Lord'.

Nikki gets into a car now parked outside the bowling alley, drives off with her companion Mr Wrench, and does deliver the message. A scene of bloody judgement follows – as a fulfilment of the prophecy quoted in the bar – Obadiah 1:4. The scene works because the viewers know that the suave drinker is in actuality a divine messenger, Obadiah in the guise of Marrane, predicting apocalyptically a battle anticipating the final judgement itself. The episode makes sense to its contemporary viewers because it presents the punishment of the arrogant swiftly and decisively – and because contemporary viewers still understand that malignant pride is repugnant to the God of the Jewish and Christian scriptures, and arrogance repugnant in a social world which, although thoroughly changed with regard to the understanding of the self and the emotions, still recognises the pattern of divine judgement conveyed by a culture that also still understands the Second Inaugural of Abraham Lincoln and its assertion of divine judgement against 'that man by whom the offense cometh'.¹¹

Marrane's scriptural source, Obadiah, was one of the minor prophets, and like all the prophets of the Jewish scriptures, the book that bears his name contains ritual rebukes.¹² Prophets rebuked either the people that accepted the terms of a covenant with God and have neglected or deliberately broken it – Israel – or its enemies, one of the 'peoples', the pagan nations. In this case, 'Edom', it is predicted, will be reduced to 'least among the nations' for rising up and doing battle against 'Jacob' – Edom being Esau symbolically and 'Jacob' being those faithful to the covenant, the true heirs of the covenant. Why will Edom/Esau fall? The earlier verses give the reason:

We have heard a report from the Lord, and a messenger has been sent among the nations; you shall be utterly despised. Your proud heart has

10 *Fargo*, season 3, episode 8, 'Who rules the land of denial?' <https://www.refinery29.com/2017/06/158023/fargo-recap-season-3-episode-8>, accessed 25 February 2018.

11 R.N. Bellah, 'Civil religion in America', *Daedalus*, 96.1 (1967), 1–21.

12 J. Blenkinsopp, *A History of Prophecy in Israel* (Louisville, KY, 1997), 114.

deceived you (LXX ὑπερηφανία τῆς καρδίας σου: the pride/arrogance of your heart), you that live in the clefts of the rock, whose dwelling is in the heights.

(Ob 1:2–3)

Such examples of prophetic threats and indictments are abundant in the books of prophecy; they persist into the Hellenistic period, in apocalyptic compositions, where they are often more visual than verbal; and they are common in the books of earliest Christianity, as what might be called emphatic moral discourse – whether in the canonical New Testament or in extracanonical works.¹³

The central issue around which these threats circle is the audacity of a single human, or a people, in pretending to oppose – or to be equal to – the God of Israel. But do these texts hint of an emotion as is commonly understood in the present? And what do they mean by pride? Later in this essay, I shall consider the philosophical presuppositions behind the Christian interpretation of earlier Jewish writings dealing with pride, and the philosophical cure they use to heal the condition. Yet this development tends to complicate both those sources because early Christian authors treat pride as a disease, not as an emotion.

But is pride an emotion in the original writing that ‘Fargo’ quotes and narrates? In Obadiah, the word translated as Greek ὑπερηφανία, ‘pride’, is Hebrew זָדוֹן, *zadon*. This construction suggests that, at least for this text, the ‘pride’ of Edom comes from something related to anger, certainly an emotion. Further, it is a matter of the heart: when in the last verse of Obadiah 1:3, Edom ‘say[s] in your heart, “Who will bring me down to the ground”’, the heart could be understood as the place of an emotion that yields a thought. In Obadiah, there is a self-deception implied of Edom – he (or it, as a ‘nation’) may think that he can set himself up high, ‘like the eagle’, and go unpunished. Since God is pictured as an eagle in numerous scriptures (e.g., Deut 32:11; cf. Ps 50:15; Isa 55:6–7), Obadiah’s eagle could also be understood as an arrogant imitation of the divine.¹⁴

Numerous other passages in the Old Testament condemn pride.¹⁵ Thus other texts name the pride of the eyes (Ps 101:5; Isa 5:15) or of the heart (Ezek 28:2, 5, 17) or of the spirit (Prov 16:18; Eccl 7:8) or of speech (1 Sam 2:3; Jer

13 R. Horsley, *Scribes, Prophecy, and the Politics of Second-Temple Judaea* (Louisville, KY, 2007); and D. Aune, *Prophecy in Early Christianity and the Ancient Mediterranean World* (Grand Rapids, MI, 1983).

14 E. Ben-Zvi, *A Historical-Critical Study of the Book of Obadiah* (Berlin, 1996), 114, 165.

15 See, for example, B.C. Gregory, ‘Pride and sin in Sirach 10:13 (15): a study in the interdependence of text and tradition’, *HTR*, 108.2 (2015), 213–34. Gregory discusses the relationship of Sirach’s description of pride to a developing Jewish and Christian tradition of listing vices and virtues. He notes in particular the role of the thought of Evagrius of Pontus and John Cassian in creating these lists, but points to Augustine’s dependence on Ben Sira, followed by Gregory the Great (pp. 230–31).

48:29), all with words usually translated as pride, conceit, arrogance and haughtiness – but signifying an attitude, and not a feeling.

Thus in a human being, consistently in the Old Testament, pride is a characteristic or a stance leading to an action; and it may result from anger, but it is not itself an emotion; rather, it is closer to being a potentially fatal misperception. Yet the words used to translate pride are sometimes positive. When this is so, pride is not a characteristic of a human being; rather, it is applied to the land of Israel (Ps 47:4; Ezek 24:21), or used as a descriptive attribute of God (Ex 15:7; Job 37:4; Isa 2:10).

The Septuagint translated most of these instances with the word for pride, *hyperephania* long in use in earlier Greek philosophy and literature to signify insolence, presumptuousness, arrogance or mockery (Ps 119:21, 51; Prov 3:34). Perhaps, consonant with the sexually tinged violence associated with the word ὑβρις (*hybris*), Israel is frequently called *hybristes* in the prophets (for instance, Jer 13:9; Ezek 7:10, 20; 16:56; Hos 5:5; 7:10; Am 6:8; 8:7; Zeph 2:10). The proof of its negative connotation is its association with the downfall of persons like Uzziah (2 Chron 26:26) or Nebuchadnezzar (Dan 5:20), destruction generally (Ps 16:18), and blindness (Ps 10:4), disgrace (Ps 11:12), quarrelling (Ps 13:10) and deception (Jer 49:16), and results in humiliation (Prov 29:23; Isa 2:11, 17; 23:9; Dan 4:37).¹⁶

When in the first and second centuries the Greek authors of the writings later included in the New Testament used it, the word *hybris* had shifted meanings, referring to disaster, hardship or personal violence (Acts 27:10; 27:21; 2 Cor 12:10; 1 Tim 1:3), though Paul uses *hybristes* to describe a person who behaves arrogantly toward the weak. Ὑπερήφανος, *hyperephanos*, however, appears in two gospels (Mk 7:22; Lk 1:51) and in several epistles (Rom 1:30; 2 Tim 3:2; Jas 4:6; 1 Pet 5:5). Arrogance is in a list of vices in Mark 7:22, and there are also examples of such lists in the letters of Paul (1 Thess 5:12–22; Gal 5:19–23; and elsewhere). As in Proverbs 3:34, the proud are opposed by God; and James 4:6 and 1 Peter 5:5 quote this proverb, contrasting ‘proud’ with ‘humble’, a quality honoured by God. Possibly one of the most influential of the New Testament passages is in Luke 1:51, where the Magnificat mentions the proud as the ones whom God will cast down.

But these citations do not indicate that there was a consistent point of view in the Hebrew Bible from which the early Christian authors of the books of the New Testament drew – rather, the prophetic books of the Old Testament and its Christian successor are the result of a development over time that the final collection of the Old Testament represents. In that period, in Jewish thought, there was an increasing concentration upon God as lawgiver and judge. Perhaps because of the rise of the synagogues in the Jewish diaspora, laws governing the relationship between God and Israel or

16 See S. Dawes, ‘Walking humbly: Micah 6:8 revisited’, *Scottish Journal of Theology*, 41.3 (1988), 331–40.

individual members of the covenant proliferate, and as they multiply they emphasise the distance and disproportionality between God and Israel. This is an emphasis that will continue in the New Testament and in the Mishnah and Talmud.¹⁷

Pride in Greek Culture and Philosophy

To divide the Hebrew Bible and its surrounding culture from ancient Greek culture is both a methodological problem and a persistent error of intellectual history, and by the era of Hellenistic Judaism, including earliest Christianity, the interrelationship of Greek and Jewish literature was thorough, if not uncontroversial in some quarters.¹⁸ Interpreters of the Jewish scriptures began, however, to draw upon Greek philosophy and grammatical analysis to derive a coherent and consistent interpretation of those scriptures: the most well-known example is Philo of Alexandria, using Middle Platonic concepts and terms to explain Judaism and interpret its traditions in the Greek cultural context. Using the procedures of Alexandrian grammarians to discover a unified teaching in the Septuagint, Philo unwittingly laid the foundation for later Alexandrian Christians' appropriation of a philosophical interpretation of prophetically indicted human states – whether a behaviour, a feeling or a stance.¹⁹

For example, in *On the Cherubim*, Philo views the passions as diseases; progress in changing for the better 'as to the characteristics ... of souls' engenders a passionless state.²⁰ A subsequent passage will illustrate Philo's interpretive strategy:

ὅταν δὲ ἦδη ὁ μὲν Ἀβραὰμ ἀντὶ φυσιολόγου γένηται σοφὸς καὶ φιλόθεος μετονομασθεὶς Ἀβραάμ, ὃς ἐρμηνεύεται πατὴρ ἐκλεκτὸς ἠχοῦς – ἠχεῖ μὲν γὰρ ὁ γεγωνὸς λόγος, πατὴρ δὲ τοῦτου ὀνοῦς ἐπειλημμένος τοῦ σπουδαίου—, Σάρα δὲ ἀντὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς μου γένηται Σάρρα, ἧς ἐστὶν ἡ κληῖσις ἄρχουσα, ὅπερ ἦν ἴσον τῷ ἀντὶ εἰδικῆς καὶ φθαρτῆς ἀρετῆς γενικὴν καὶ ἄφθαρτον γενέσθαι τῷ ἀντὶ εἰδικῆς καὶ φθαρτῆς ἀρετῆς γενικὴν καὶ ἄφθαρτον γενέσθαι, ἐπιλάμνη δὲ καὶ τὸ εὐδαιμονίας γένος, ὁ Ἰσαάκ, ἐκλιπόντων τὰ γυναικεῖα καὶ ἀποθανόντων τὰ πάθη χαρᾶς καὶ εὐφροσύνης, καὶ παιδιᾶς, οὐ τὰς παίδων, ἀλλὰ τὰς θείας οὐκ ἄνευ σπουδῆς μεταδιώκων, ἐκβληθήσεται

17 J. Kugel, *The Great Shift: Encountering God in Biblical Times* (Boston, 2017), 184–85.

18 E.S. Gruen, *The Construct of Identity in Hellenistic Judaism: Essays on Early Jewish Literature and History* (Berlin, 2016); see also G. Boccaccini, *Middle Judaism: Jewish Thought, 300 B.C.E. to 200 C.E.* (Minneapolis, 1991).

19 See, for example, C. Lévy, 'Philo's ethics', in A. Kamesar (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Philo* (Cambridge, 2009), 146–73.

20 Philo, *On the Cherubim*, 2.4, ed.tr. F.H. Colson and G.H. Whitaker, *Philo, with an English Translation*, vol. 2, LCL, 227 (London, 1929), 10.

μὲν τὰ ἐπόνυμα τῆς Ἄγαρ προπαιδεύματα, ἐκβληθήσεται δὲ καὶ ὁ σοφιστῆς αὐτῶν υἱὸς ἐπικλησιν Ἰσμαήλ.

But when Abram, instead of an inquirer into natural philosophy, became a wise man and a lover of God having his name changed to Abraham, which being interpreted means ‘the great father of sounds’; for language, when uttered, sounds, and the father of languages is the mind, which has attained to what is virtuous. And when Sarai instead of being ‘my authority’, had her name also changed to Sarah, the meaning of which is princess, and this change is equivalent to becoming generic and imperishable virtue, instead of virtue special and perishable: then will arise the genus of happiness, that is to say, Isaac, and he, when all the feminine affections have ceased, and when the passion of joy and cheerfulness are dead, will eagerly pursue not childish amusements but divine objects; then too those elementary branches of instruction that bear the name of Agar, will be cast out, and their sophistical child will also be cast out, who is named Ishmael.²¹

Later in the treatise – a discussion of the angelic state – Philo makes a division between the ‘outward senses’ and the ‘inward senses’, describing a difference between two sets of human senses (*aistheseis*) in which one is distinctly inferior. One of these sets of *aistheseis* equips the human being for life in the present, visible world, where the senses are critical to proper functioning. They are, however, distinctly inferior to the intellectual world – and need to be surpassed as the soul progresses:

ἐκκεκριμένου γάρ ἐστιν ὡσπερ ἐξ ἀγῶνος ἱεροῦ καὶ ἀποδοδοκιμασμένου παιδὸς ὄντως νηπίου κοιμηθῆ λογισμοῦ σεμνολογεῖν ἐπὶ τῷ τὸν νοῦν ἡγαπηκέναι καὶ τὸν νοῦν νομίζειν ἑαυτοῦ κύριον εἶναι καὶ εὐεργέτην καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ τὴν αἴσθησιν σφόδρα στέργειν καὶ κτῆμα ἴδιον αὐτὴν καὶ ἀγαθῶν τὸ μέγιστον ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ τὰ τούτων ἀμφοῖν παιδιά, τοῦ μὲν τὸ νοεῖν, τὸ λογίζεσθαι, τὸ διανοεῖσθαι, τὸ βουλευέσθαι, τὸ στοχάζεσθαι, τῆς δὲ τὸ ὁρᾶν, τὸ ἀκούειν, τὸ γεύεσθαι, τὸ ὀσφραίνεσθαι, τὸ ἄπτεσθαι, κοινῶς τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι.

It is a sign of a mind which is as it were rejected from the sacred contest and wholly discarded, and of reasoning faculties wholly childish and deficient, to make a boast of the mind being contented, and of thinking one’s mind one’s own lord and benefactor, and to boast of being very sufficiently pleased with the outward senses, and of thinking one’s own property and the greatest of all good things, and their offspring with them: the offspring of the mind being to comprehend, to reason, to discriminate, to will, to conjecture; and the offspring of the

21 *On the Cherubim*, 2 (7–8), ed. Colson and Whitaker, 12, tr. C.D. Yonge, *The Works of Philo Judaeus*, vol. 1 (London, 1854), 176–77.

outward sense being to see, to hear, to taste, to smell, to touch, in short, *to feel*.²²

Philo calls these senses ‘harsh mistresses’ – habitually signifying their lower value with a feminine word. The object of moral progress and the knowledge of the true meaning of the scriptures is, rather, to pass beyond *aisthesis* and to undergo a transformation, possessing ‘new senses’ (i.e., intellectual senses) and moving toward a resemblance to the divine that, for Philo, was the characteristic of Moses and his *philia* toward God:

ἐρεῖς πάντα τοῦ θεοῦ κτήματα, οὐχὶ σαντοῦ, τὰς διανοήσεις, τὰς ἐπιστήμας, τὰς τέχνας, τὰ θεωρήματα, τοὺς ἐν μέρει λογισμούς, τὰς αἰσθήσεις, τὰς διὰ τούτων καὶ ἄνευ αὐτῶν ψυχῆς ἐνεργείας· ἐὰν δὲ μέχρι παντὸς ἀπαιδαγωγῆτον καὶ ἀδίδακτον ἐάσης σεαυτὸν, δουλεύσεις τὸν αἰῶνα χαλεπαῖς δεσποίναις, οἰήσεσιν, ἐπιθυμίαις, ἡδοναῖς, ἀδικίαις, ἀφροσύναις, ψευδέσι δόξαις.

[Y]ou would then affirm that everything was the property of God not of yourself, all conceptions, all knowledge, all art, all speculation, all particular reasonings, all the outward senses, and all the energies of the soul... and if you leave yourself throughout the whole of your life without any instructor and without any teaching, you will be a slave forever to harsh mistresses, such as vain opinions, appetites, pleasures, acts of injustice, follies, and erroneous conceptions.²³

Here and in other treatises of Philo, the *paidagogos* of the soul trains it to abandon its ‘mistresses’, the *pathe*, themselves arising from ‘outward senses’. He insists that ‘freedom of soul’, rather, is not to hold these ‘mistresses’, but instead to be free from passion (*pathos*) in which ‘the invisible soul’ is ‘the terrestrial habitation of the invisible God’.²⁴

Philo’s understanding of moral pedagogy, then, has integrated a developing philosophical understanding of the *pathe* with scriptural texts that he was able, in the course of a prodigious exegetical programme, to deploy as exemplars. Philo would, with the addition of key philosophical doctrines, be the source for Christian philosophical interpretation of scriptures dealing with pride, which, in turn, became the basis for a much longer tradition of treating *pathe* as either diseases or vices, and for cures applying practices understood either as *therapeia* or the building up of the virtues.²⁵ For early Christian successors in Philo’s interpretive project, however, interpreting

22 Philo, *On the Cherubim*, 22 (73), ed. Colson and Whitaker, 52, tr. Yonge, 193, emphasis added.

23 Philo, *On the Cherubim*, 22 (71), ed. Colson and Whitaker, 50–52, tr. Yonge 193.

24 Philo, *On the Cherubim*, 22 (71) and 30 (101) ed. Colson and Whitaker, 52, 68, tr. Yonge, 193, 200.

25 M. Alexandre, ‘Le lexique des vertus: vertus philosophiques et vertus religieuses chez Philon’, in C. Lévy (ed.), *Philon et le langage de la philosophie* (Turnhout, 1998), 17–46.

the human being in a philosophical manner still had to give equal weight to biblical language, no matter how unified those later interpreters thought that language was. As a prominent scholar describes Philo's view,

If man sets aside any thoughts of pride and self-esteem, and recognizes his nothingness (ουδένεια, *oudeneia*) before God, he will be rewarded with the gift of grace leading to blessedness in the intimate relation with the divine presence (to the extent possible), as in the case of God's friend Moses.²⁶

Yet even if the scriptural authors never saw pride as an acceptable human state, nonetheless in the Greek philosophy with which early Christian authors were imbued, the distinction between rightful pride and arrogance that flouts the divine law is a significant one in the literature upon which both early Christian and late ancient culture drew. And in each case, rightful pride could be both a private attitude and a public display, as could problematic arrogance. By the time that early Christian authors began to reflect at length on pride, they were able to draw upon the earlier descriptions of the soul and its emotions. They used, singly or in combination, specific texts by Plato, Aristotle and Stoic authors – often filtered through the interpretations of later commentators.

From Plato – particularly *Republic*, 4, 439b–441a – the Christian authors Clement, Origen and a succession of fourth-century authors derived the description of the soul as tripartite, including the reasoning, desiring and angry or spirited part: λογιστικόν, ἐπιθυμητικόν, θυμητικόν (*logistikón, epithumetikon* and *thumetikon*). In *Timaeus*, 69c–d, Plato describes the origin of the human as the 'immortal principle' – the soul – around which a mortal body was fashioned. For Plato, the *pathe* should be subjected to diminution, and their eventual elimination was both practicable and possible, precisely because they had been added to the self as it was made. In the *Timaeus*, Plato illustrated this by a story:

οἱ δὲ μιμούμενοι, παραλαβόντες ἀρχὴν ψυχῆς ἀθάνατον, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο θνητὸν σῶμα αὐτῇ περιετόρνενυσαν ὄχημά τε πᾶν τὸ σῶμα ἔδοσαν ἄλλο τε εἶδος ἐν αὐτῷ ψυχῆς προσφοκιδόμουν τὸ θνητόν, δεινὰ καὶ ἀναγκαῖα ἐν ἑαυτῷ παθήματα ἔχον, πρῶτον μὲν ἡδονήν, μέγιστον κακοῦ δέλεαρ, ἔπειτα λύπας, ἀγαθῶν φυγὰς, ἔτι δ' αὖ θάρρος καὶ φόβον, ἄφρονε συμβούλω, θυμὸν δὲ δυσπαραμύθητον, ἐλπίδα δ' εὐπαραγωγὸν· αἰσθήσει δὲ ἀλόγῳ καὶ ἐπιχειρητῇ παντὸς ἔρωτι συγκερασάμενοι ταῦτα, ἀναγκαίως τὸ θνητὸν γένος συνέθεσαν.

They made the whole body a vehicle and constructed within the body another kind of soul which was mortal and contained within it terrible

26 D.T. Runia, *Philo in Early Christian Literature: A Survey* (Assen, 1993), 40.

and necessary passions (*pathe*) – first of all pleasure, the greatest incitement to evil; then pain, which deters from the good; then confidence and fear, two foolish counsellors; anger, hard to assuage, and hope, easily led astray. These they mingled with irrational sense perception, and with all-venturing love. In this way, as was necessary, they framed the mortal soul.²⁷

Where Plato viewed the *pathe* as harmful, and diseases of the soul, however, Aristotle took a notably different view, and one later rejected by some Christian authors but accepted by others. Aristotle's discussion of the *pathe* treated them as regulable, not as a defect. Thus he wrote in *On the Soul*:

ἔτι δὲ ὅταν μὲν δοξάζωμεν δεινόν τι ἢ φοβερὸν, εὐθὺς συμπάσχομεν, ὁμοίως δὲ κἂν θαρραλέον· κατὰ δὲ τὴν φαντασίαν ὡσαύτως ἔχομεν ὥσπερ ἂν οἱ θεώμενοι ἐν γραφῇ τὰ δεινὰ ἢ θαρραλέα.

When we form an opinion that something is threatening or frightening, we are immediately affected by it, and the same is true of our opinion of something that inspires courage; but in imagination we are like spectators looking at something dreadful or encouraging in a picture.²⁸

This description – which is rooted in Aristotle's teaching of *μετριοπαθεία* (*metriopatheia*) – regards the *pathe* not as defects, but as aspects of the human soul that are potentially useful, and are constitutively descriptive. *Pathe* were not necessarily problematic unless they were present in the wrong proportion.

Aristotle's most extensive discussions of the *pathe* are in two separate treatises: the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Rhetoric*. In each of these discussions, Aristotle describes them as able to be experienced either too much or too little, 'but', he wrote in *Nicomachean Ethics*, 2.6,

to feel these feelings at the right time, on the right occasion, towards the right people, for the right purpose and in the right manner, is to feel the best amount of them, which is the mean amount – and the best amount is of course the mark of virtue.²⁹

27 Plato, *Timaeus*, 69c–d, ed. J. Burnet, *Platonis opera*, vol. 4 (Oxford, 1902), tr. E. Hamilton and H. Cairns, *The Collected Dialogues of Plato, including the Letters* (Princeton, 1971), 1193.

28 Aristotle, *On the Soul*, 3.3 (427b.21–24), ed. tr. W.S. Hett, *Aristotle, On the Soul. Parva Naturalia. On Breath*, LCL 288 (Cambridge, MA, 2014), 156–57.

29 Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 2.6 (1106b18–23), ed. tr. H. Rackham, *Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics*, LCL (London, 1926), 92–93: τὸ δ' ὅτε δεῖ καὶ ἐφ' οἷς καὶ πρὸς οὓς καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ ὡς δεῖ, μέσον τε καὶ ἄριστον, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς.

But Aristotle's work, and in particular his view of what scholars have termed 'pride', was of limited use for most early Christian writers. The pathos usually translated 'pride' in English renderings of this treatise of Aristotle actually is in Greek μεγαλοψυχία (*megalopsychia*), a term meaning literally 'great-souledness', and it, too, occupies the middle position between two extremes:

Though therefore in regard to the greatness of his claim the great-souled man is an extreme, by reason of its rightness he stands at the mean point, for he claims what he deserves; while the vain and the small-souled err by excess and defect respectively.³⁰

Although Aristotle's view of certain aspects of both soul and ethics would be absorbed in later Christian writers such as Clement of Alexandria, Evagrius of Pontos and Gregory of Nyssa, none adopted his view of *megalopsychia*. One reason why this might have been the case is that Aristotle, like most ancient Greek authors, did not speak favourably of humility. Early Christian authors had already identified and interpreted humility and gentleness (ταπεινωσις, and πραότης, *tapeinosis* and *praotes*) as desirable characteristics for the students of Jesus, if not technically virtues in the philosophical sense (cf. Mt 5:3–11).

Christian authors also adopted, in varying degrees, Stoic theories of the *pathe* and the θεραπεία (*therapeia*) developed by the Stoic tradition to heal them.³¹ Without requiring the Stoics to take the dim view of the *pathos* of *hyperephania*, nonetheless from Clement of Alexandria onward, the Stoic *therapeia* of the *pathe* proved a useful description for the eradication of a *pathos* that was troubling, and repeatedly condemned, in the scriptural passages with which they were familiar. For the Stoics, *therapeia* consisted of regulating the opinions by which the *pathe* were prompted, and by training their adepts to adjust the outlook with which, in the absence of knowledge of the divine reason guiding the world, they viewed the world as hostile. The mistaken apprehensions driving human behaviour, they reasoned, can be removed by extensive training: by learning to take a different view of events; by the constant, vigilant attention to the self and to the cultivation of *eupatheiai*, or 'helpful disturbances', aimed against the problematic *pathe*.

30 Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 4.3.9 (1123b 24–27), ed. tr. Rackham, 214–15.

31 Recent helpful discussions of passions or emotions in late antiquity are S. Knuutilla, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy* (Oxford, 2004), 111–76; P. Hadot, *The Inner Citadel: The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius*, tr. M. Chase (Cambridge, MA, 1998); M.C. Nussbaum, *The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics* (Princeton, 1994); and J.T. Fitzgerald (ed.), *Passions and Moral Progress in Graeco-Roman Thought* (New York, 2008). See also Sorabji, *Emotion and Peace of Mind*.

Finally, because Stoic philosophy valued above all, as a condition of the soul, *apatheia*, ‘un-disease’, or ‘health’, this philosophy could appeal to a Christian tradition whose New Testament contained multiple examples of healing or restored health.

Pride: An Early Christian Discussion

By the late second century, early Christian authors had begun explicitly to engage philosophical texts as they described the process of becoming a Christian, or gave instructions in living the Christian life. It is important to remember that these authors had been educated in the same schools, with the same educational tradition, as contemporary philosophers; and they read the same texts. Therefore, they adapted the moral philosophy circulating in their own culture to describe the stages of achieving the conduct and understanding necessary for didactic exposition to Christian catechumens and advanced students alike, and they often interpreted scriptural commandments (just as they allegorised difficult texts) with the assistance of a philosophy that could put in motion a therapy of the soul and mind that made it possible to obey those same commandments.

There is another aspect of their teaching, however, that is not often invoked in discussions of their *therapeia* or moral philosophy – and that is the way in which Christian martyr acts circulated as examples of the mimesis, the imitation, of Christ’s suffering. The portrayal of physical suffering – beginning already with the portrayal of the mother of the Maccabees in both 2 Maccabees and 4 Maccabees as a mother firm in purpose and unaffected by the passions as her sons were slaughtered – may well have influenced the martyr acts’ description of the firm and unswayed purpose of martyrs such as Polycarp or Perpetua. And not only did Christian authors celebrate their subjects’ calm in the face of public torment; at least some were aware of the developing description of Christ as calm during the crucifixion. Although Athanasios would not begin to develop the idea of divine impassibility – a natural, not an acquired, *apatheia* – until the beginning of the fourth century, this parallel stream of narrative or theological discourse opposing pride and the other *pathe* – and substituting *tapeinosis*, humility, for them – would raise a significant controversy in the fifth century.

Aware of both the developing Christian tradition concerning the *pathe* and the Greek philosophical and literary traditions, the first Christian author to discuss the *pathe* in the context of the specific education of a Christian is Clement of Alexandria. Clement’s aim was to train those who were capable of becoming *gnostikoi* – sages and teachers in the Christian assemblies of Alexandria and the east. Like Eusebios and other fourth-century Christian authors after him, but unlike the subtler Origen, Clement openly recommended the conjunction or blending of scriptural passages and philosophical treatises as guides both for the ethical and contemplative life of

the Christian; and he combined them in the apparently continuous training programme his graduated works seem to outline.³²

For Clement, the training of the Christian sage required, after she or he finished turning away from both heresy and Hellenic worship in all its forms, the appropriation of moral training in order to restore the mind and make it capable of contemplation. But it also required the reduction of the *pathe* to as small a space as possible.

θάρσους τε καὶ ἐπιθυμίας τίς ἔτι τοῦτω χρεία, τὴν ἐκ τῆς ἀγάπης οἰκείωσιν πρὸς τὸν ἀπαθῆ θεὸν ἀπειληφότι καὶ διὰ τῆς ἀγάπης ἑαυτὸν εἰς τοὺς φίλους ἐγγεγραφότι; ἐξαιρετέον ἄρα τὸν γνωστικὸν ἡμῖν καὶ τέλειον ἀπὸ παντὸς ψυχικοῦ πάθους· ἡ μὲν γὰρ γνῶσις συνάσκησιν, ἡ συνάσκησις δὲ ἔξιν ἢ διάθεσιν, ἡ κατάστασις δὲ ἡ τοιάδε ἀπάθειαν ἐργάζεται, οὐ μετριοπάθειαν.

What need is there now of courage or of desire for this man who has attained affinity with the impassible (*apathes*) God, which arises from love and who has been enrolled among friends by love? For us, the perfect gnostic must be removed from any *pathos* of the soul. For *gnosis* achieves exercises, exercise then brings about habit, or the state of becoming accustomed, and this calming ends in *apatheia*, not in *metriopatheia*.³³

Clement, then, views *apatheia* as the state of health, realised most fully in God, that eliminates all the troubling *pathe*, because they are not natural to the mind. But this *apatheia* is not in view only of the accomplished sage he calls the true *gnostikos*. His *Protreptikos*, or *Exhortation to the Greeks*, requires the withdrawal from the *pathe* as first object of training. ‘If excesses in the indulgence of the passions (*pathe*)’, he writes, ‘though pernicious and dangerous, yet are accompanied with pleasure, why should we not in the conduct of life abandon that evil, godless, and *pathe*-inducing usage?’³⁴ Clement here advocates a *politeia* that is, at first, a withdrawal from occasions – public and private – for the occurrence of the *pathe*, which he understands as maladies arising from social circumstances that were well established in the urban life of Alexandria, where he wrote, ‘Even if our

32 A recent comprehensive study is that of P. Ashwin-Siejkowski, *Clement of Alexandria: A Project of Christian Perfection* (London, 2008); still useful is A. Méhat, *Étude sur les ‘Stromates’ de Clément d’Alexandrie* (Paris, 1966). See also J. Kovacs, ‘Saint Paul as apostle of *apatheia*: *Stromateis* VII, chapter 14’, in M. Havrda, V. Husek and J. Platova (ed.), *The Seventh Book of the Stromateis: Proceedings of the Colloquium on Clement of Alexandria* (Leuven, 2013), 199–216.

33 *Stromateis*, 6.9.73–74, ed. L. Früchtel, O. Stählin and U. Treu, *Clemens Alexandrinus*, vol. 2: *Stromata, Buch I–VI*, GCS, 15 (Berlin, 1985), 468, tr. W. Wilson, ‘The writings of Clement of Alexandria’, in A. Roberts et al. (ed.), *The Ante-Nicene Fathers*, 2, (New York, 1905), 497 (modified).

34 Clement, *Exhortation to the Greeks*, 10.89.2, ed. tr. C. Mondésert, *Clément d’Alexandrie, Le protreptique*, 2nd edn by A. Plassart, SC, 2bis (Paris, 1949), 157.

fathers are hurt, let us take ourselves to the truth, and seek Him who is truly our father, and reject custom as a harmful drug'.³⁵

Thus Clement is requiring his students to abandon both urban and family customs – reflecting, perhaps, an ascetic association of students who, like other philosophical students, understood themselves as undertaking a discipline or therapy that would remake their conduct and relations. Clement encourages them to think of their accustomed circumstances as a kind of prison.

Οὐχὶ δὲ καταφεύξεσθε, ἐκ τῶν ἐνταῦθα δεσμοτηρίων ἐκφεύγοντες, ἐπὶ τὸν ἔλεον τὸν ἐξ οὐρανῶν; Ὁ γὰρ θεὸς ἐκ πολλῆς τῆς φιλάνθρωπίας ἀντέχεται τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ὡσπερ ἐκ καλιᾶς ἐκπίπτοντος νεοττοῦ ἢ μήτηρ ὄρνις ἐφίπταται· εἰ δέ που καὶ θηρίον ἐρπηστικὸν περιχάνοι τῷ νεοττῷ, μήτηρ δ' ἀμφιποτᾶται ὀδυρομένη φίλα τέκνα· ὁ δὲ θεὸς πατὴρ καὶ ζητεῖ τὸ πλάσμα καὶ ἰᾶται τὸ παράπτωμα καὶ διώκει τὸ θηρίον καὶ τὸν νεοττὸν αὐθις ἀναλαμβάνει ἐπὶ τὴν καλιὰν ἀναπτῆναι παρορμῶν.

And will you not escape from these dungeons, and flee to the mercy that comes down from heaven? For God, of his great love to man (*philanthropia*), comes to the help of man, as the mother-bird flies to one of her young which has fallen out of the nest, and if a serpent open its mouth to swallow the little bird, 'the mother flutters round uttering cries of grief over her dear progeny' (*Iliad*, 2.315) and God the Father seeks his creature, and heals his transgression, and pursues the serpent, and recovers the young one, and incites it to fly up to the nest.³⁶

In the next stage of training, Clement's students are to be more strongly regulated and to begin to remove from themselves the habits that made their *pathe* seem acceptable. *Hyperephania* is subject to the teacher's reproach, which acts like medicine upon bunions or scabs:

Φαρμακεία δὲ ἔοικεν ὁ ὄνειδισμὸς τὰ τετυλωμένα ἀναλύων τῶν παθῶν καὶ τὰ ῥυπαρὰ τοῦ βίου, τὰς λαγνείας, ἀνακαθαίρων, πρὸς δὲ καὶ τὰς ὑπερσαρκώσεις τοῦ τύφου ἐξομαλίζων, εἰς τὸν ὑγιῆ καὶ ἀληθινὸν ἀνασκευάζων τὸν ἄνθρωπον.

Reproach is like the application of medicines, dissolving the callosities of the passions, and purging the impurities of the lewdness of the life; and in addition, reducing the excrescences of pride, restoring the patient to the healthy and true state of humanity.³⁷

35 *Exhortation to the Greeks*, 10.89.2, ed. Mondésert, 157–58: Ἐῖτα ἐπὶ τῶν πάντων αἱ παρεκβάσεις καίτοι ἐπιζήμιοι καὶ ἐπισηφαλεῖς οὐσαι, ὁμως γλυκεῖαί πως προσπίπτουσιν, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ βίου οὐχὶ τὸ ἔθος καταλιπόντες τὸ πονηρὸν καὶ ἐμπαθὲς καὶ ἄθεον, κἄν οἱ πατέρες χαλεπαίνωσιν, ἐπὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐκκλινούμεν καὶ τὸν ὄντως ὄντα πατέρα ἐπιζητήσομεν, οἷον δηλητήριον φάρμακον τὴν συνήθειαν ἀπώσάμενοι. Tr. Wilson, 197 (modified).

36 *Exhortation to the Greeks*, 10.91.3, ed. Mondésert, 159, tr. Wilson, 197.

37 *Pedagogue*, 1.8.65.1, ed. tr. H.-I. Marrou, M. Harl, C. Mondésert and C. Matray, *Clément d'Alexandrie, Le pédagogue*, 3 vols, SC 70, 108, 158 (Paris, 1960–70), here SC, 70, p. 226, tr. Wilson, 225.

Associating the *pathe* with evil, he compares moral healing with an amulet: just as necromancers' amulets and charms are taken by their clients to 'ward off evil', the instructor's students should 'allow the heavenly Word, the Saviour, to be bound on to you as an amulet, and by trusting in God's own charm, be delivered from *pathe* which are the diseases of the mind, and rescued from sin'.³⁸ Finally, for Clement, if *pathos* is a sickness it is also an evil – 'an excessive appetite exceeding the measures of reason, or appetite unbridled and disobedient to the word. Passions, then, are a perturbation of the soul contrary to nature, in disobedience to reason'.³⁹ Only *apatheia* is the proper state of the mind; as Clement states in the final chapters of the *Stromateis*, 'This is the really good man, who is without passions, having, through the habit or disposition of the soul endued with virtue, transcended the whole life of passion'.⁴⁰

Diseases of the Mind

At this point it is worth asking again why malaises as Clement describes them – *pathe* – are described so frequently as 'emotions'. Scholars' uncertainty about the meaning of these words, as I have noted already in this article, has only expanded as the wider discussion has gone on. Are these movements diseases, as the word suggests, or are they emotions? In a discussion of Maximos the Confessor's view of the emotions, one scholar quotes from that writer's *Liber Asceticus* to show the seventh-century author upbraiding his monastic audience. Emotions are easily translatable in his account of Maximos's thought, for 'nearly all the vices listed (*philedonia*, *philoulia*, *thumos*) hatred of brethren (*misadelphia*), gluttony (*gastrimargia*), envy (*phthonos*), and pride (*alazoneia*, *hyperephania*, *typhos*) are *misdirected emotions* (emphasis mine) which get in the way of the pursuit of virtue'.

Οὐ πάντες ἐσμὲν γαστρίμαργοι; Οὐ πάντες φιλήδονοι; Οὐ πάντες ὑλομανεῖς
καὶ φιλόῦλοι; Οὐ πάντες θυμώδεις; Οὐ πάντες μηνιασταί; Οὐ πάντες
μνησικάκοι; Οὐ πάντες προδόται πάσης ἀρετῆς; Οὐ πάντες λοῖδοροί;

38 *Exhortation to the Greeks*, 11.115.2, ed. Mondésert, 183–84: Εἶθ' οἱ μὲν τοῖς γόησι πιστευκότες τὰ περιπτα καὶ τὰς ἐπαιδὰς ὡς σωτηρίου δῆθεν ἀποδέχονται, ὑμεῖς δὲ οὐ βούλεσθε τὸν οὐράνιον αὐτὸν περιάψασθαι, τὸν σωτήρα λόγον, καὶ τῇ ἐπιφθῆ τοῦ θεοῦ πιστεῦσαντες ἀπαλλαγῆναι μὲν παθῶν, ἃ δὴ ψυχῆς νόσοι, ἀποσπασθῆναι δὲ ἀμαρτίας. Tr. Wilson, 204.

39 *Stromateis*, 2.13.59, ed. Früchtel, Stählin and Treu, 134: πάθος δὲ πλεονάζουσα ὁρμὴ ἢ ὑπερτείνουσα τὰ κατὰ τὸν λόγον μέτρα, ἢ ὁρμὴ ἐκφερομένη καὶ ἀπειθῆς λόγῳ· παρὰ φύσιν οὖν κινήσις ψυχῆς κατὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸν λόγον ἀπειθειαν τὰ πάθη. Tr. Wilson, 356.

40 *Stromateis*, 7.11.65, ed. L. Früchtel, O. Stählin and U. Treu, *Clemens Alexandrinus, Stromata Buch VII und VIII*, vol. 3, GCS, 17 (Berlin, 1970), 46–47: οὗτος ὁ τῷ ὄντι ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ ὁ ἐξῶ τῶν παθῶν, κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν ἢ διὰ θεσιν τῆς ἐναρέτου ψυχῆς ὑπερβάς ὅλον τὸν ἐμπαθῆ βίον. Tr. Wilson, 541.

Οὐ πάντες ὑπερήφανοι; Οὐ πάντες κενόδοξοι; Οὐ πάντες ὑποκριταί; Οὐ πάντες δόλιοι; Οὐ πάντες φθονεροί; Οὐ πάντες ἀνυπότακτοι; Οὐ πάντες ἀκηδισταί; Οὐ πάντες περιάκτοι; Οὐ πάντες ῥάθυμοι; Οὐ πάντες ἀμελείς τῶν τοῦ Σωτῆρος ἐντολῶν; Οὐ πάντες πάσης κακίας ἀνάμεστοι; Οὐχὶ γεγόναμεν ἀντὶ ναοῦ Θεοῦ ναὸς εἰδώλων; Οὐχὶ ἀντὶ Πνεύματος ἁγίου, πνευμάτων πονηρῶν ἐσμεν καταγωγή; Οὐχὶ πεπλασμένως τὸν Θεὸν Πατέρα ἐπικαλούμεθα; Οὐχὶ ἀντὶ υἱῶν Θεοῦ, υἱοὶ γεέννης γεγόναμεν; Οὐχὶ χεῖρονες τῶν Ἰουδαίων, οἱ νῦν τὸ μέγα Χριστοῦ ὄνομα περιφερόμενοι, γεγόναμεν; Καὶ μηδεὶς ἀνανακτεῖτω τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀκούων.

Woe to us, for we have come upon the extreme of evil.... Are we not gluttonous? Are we not all lovers of pleasure? Are we not all mad for, and lovers of material things? Are we not all savages? Are not all nurturers of wrath? Are we not all bearers of malice? Are not all traitors to every virtue? Are we not all revilers? Are we not all fond of scoffing? Are we not all hasty and rash? Do we not all hate our brothers? Are we not all proud? Are we not all hypocrites? Are we not all deceitful? Are we not all jealous? Are not all unruly? Are not all listless? Are not all fickle? Are we not all slothful? Are we not all neglectful of the Saviour's commandments? Are we not all full of evil? Instead of God's temple have we not become the temple of idols? Instead of dwellings of the Holy Spirit are we not dwellings of evil spirits? Is not our calling upon God the Father make believe? Instead of sons of God are we not become sons of Hell? We, who now bear the great name of Christ, are we not become worse than the Jews? And let no one be vexed at hearing the truth.⁴¹

The author of this study has chosen a text that is an extreme examination of men who aspired to calm and contemplation – he goes on to state that ‘sacral fear having been aroused, the master moves on to cultivate the emotion of compunction’. Compunction, too, in his view, is an emotion: a

quintessentially Christian emotion with biblical roots, compunction became the focus of profound theorisation in monastic literature. As well as involving remorse and regret, it was, at the same time, a call to perfection. It wove together remorse and regret with a call to perfection originating in God.⁴²

To back up his assertion that this ‘parainetic dialogue’ is meant to arouse emotions that lead to their opposite – love and compassion – in a programme devoted to the ‘use of the emotions as catalysts for the soul to repent’, the author

41 Maximos Confessor, *On the Ascetic Life*, ed. P. van Deun and S. Gysens, *Maximi confessoris Liber asceticus*, CCSG, 40 (Turnhout, 2000), 596–615, tr. P. Sherwood, *The Ascetic Life: The Four Centuries on Charity* (Westminster, MD, 1955), 122.

42 I. Papadogiannakis, ‘Dialogical pedagogy and the structuring of emotions in the *Liber Asceticus*’, in A. Cameron and N. Gaul (ed.), *Dialogues and Debates from Late Antiquity to Late Byzantium* (London, 2017), 94–104.

has cited particular states of the soul, some of which are *pathe*, and others of which are attitudes or actions. There is no space here to analyse each one of these, but this piece of rhetoric on the part of Maximos might better be thought of as protreptic rhetoric, not an analysis of emotions; many of the words he uses are actions rather than feelings, and he is not engaging in philosophical therapeia, but in something more like an ascetic version of prophetic indictment.

Maximos's reproaches, according to Papadogiannakis, are held to arise out of the philosophically inflected monastic tradition arising from the writings of Evagrius of Pontos, and this connection is enabled on the basis of earlier scholarly treatments of Evagrius's programme of training the beginning monk, a programme best known in the *Praktikos*. This genealogy, which actually reaches back from Evagrius to the Alexandrians Clement and Origen, seems to place Maximos in a line of monastic teachers themselves inspired by the two earlier philosophical teachers.

Evagrius requires a closer look since he genuinely is the first author to import the Alexandrian Christian philosophical method into a discussion of the formally ascetic life. He seems to think that the *pathe* are prompted by demonic *logismoi*, but he does not outright describe all the eight *pathe* as emotions; rather, some may be emotions (depending, again, on the meaning of *pathe*) and others are errors or vices. Where Maximos founded his own view of ascetic progress on Evagrius's,⁴³ the latter's pedagogy had earlier origins.⁴⁴ Columba Stewart has most recently investigated Evagrius's treatment of the passions; he writes that beginning in the work of Evagrius and continuing in later authors there is 'a particular Christian version of the general late antique concern with emotions and their management, placed within an explicitly theological and social framework'. Central to this developing Christian programme, Stewart correctly writes, is that early Christian demonology, now organised into one part of the monastic theory of the passions, had developed in the writings of earlier Christianity and entered the philosophy of Origen and his successors. Evagrius's predecessors 'themselves developed themes found in Deuterocanonical, Intertestamental, and Jewish sectarian texts grappling with the perennial questions of theodicy, viz., the origin and enduring presence of evil in a world created by a beneficent God'.⁴⁵

Evagrius, Stewart writes, placed

standard monastic diagnostic and therapeutic techniques ... within a model of the Christian life that offered a theological trajectory of personal development that moved from a starting-point of fear and anxiety

43 See C. Stewart, 'Evagrius Ponticus and the "eight generic *logismoi*"', in R. Newhauser (ed.), *In the Garden of Evil: The Vices and Culture in the Middle Ages* (Toronto, 2005), 3–34.

44 See also C. Stewart, 'Evagrius Ponticus and the eastern monastic tradition on the intellect and the passions', *Modern Theology*, 27.2 (2011), 263–75.

45 Stewart, 'Eight generic *logismoi*', 25.

about one's own salvation, to a goal of love and knowledge directed outwards toward God and the whole of Creation.⁴⁶

As earlier scholars observed, he 'used Platonic tripartite anthropology derived from a late antique version [of this philosophy] with wide circulation in manuals designed for teaching and self-help'. Thus in the monastic Christian version of the analysis of the *pathe*, the soul was divided into two irrational parts, desire and repulsion/resistance, and a rational part. By passions, Evagrius means 'desire and repulsion when they are engaged destructively, and [he]also employs [them] as a synonym for *logismoi* when a thought has become engaged with desire or repulsion'.⁴⁷

It is well known that Evagrius used as an explanatory device a schema of eight ranked 'thoughts', *logismoi*, which he pictured as entering into the monk by means of demonic interference based on hostile observation – spying – through which demons collected useful knowledge of the monk's weaknesses. Evagrius's list of eight thoughts seems to encompass the *pathe* – 'the first three *logismoi* can be mapped to the desiring part of the soul, the next three to the repelling part of the soul, and the final two to the rational or intellectual part'.⁴⁸

Evagrius, then, connected the first of the *pathe* to lust, and the next to anger or sadness. It is notable that Stewart's article, illuminating for tracing Evagrius's ideas to those of Origen and of contemporary or earlier Neoplatonism, quickly abandons the idea that the 'thoughts' are emotions. Whether or not Evagrius thought the lower and non-intellectual *pathe*, lust and gluttony, and anger and fear, to be emotions, can be put aside for now. But the difficulty with thinking of pride as an 'emotion' for Evagrius (or for Maximus) is that it arises from the intellectual part of the soul – the part that judges and evaluates – not the part that has *aisthesis* and thus feels, even though *pathos* is commonly translated as passion, which, like pride, has an emotional tinge in English, but not in Greek, and therefore probably is not an emotion per se in late antiquity.

In fact, Evagrius developed a theory of philosophically-grounded monastic pedagogy that not only depended upon a longer, biblical, Hellenistic Jewish and Alexandrian tradition to treat the *pathe*, but did not

46 Stewart, 'Eight generic *logismoi*', 25; cf. Antoine Guillaumont's comment on the *Gnostikos*:

Properly, this accomplishment belongs to the trained monk, the *gnostikos*, who has quelled his *pathe* and is able to instruct others: "It is necessary that the *gnostikos* be neither somber nor downcast; for this would be to be ignorant of the *logoi* of [created] beings and [characteristic] of someone who does not wish 'that all humans be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth (1 Tim 2:4)'".

Gnostikos, 22, ed. A. Guillaumont and C. Guillaumont, *Evagre le Pontique, Le gnostique, ou, À celui qui est devenue digne de la science*, SC, 356 (Paris, 1989), 122–23.

47 Stewart, 'Evagrius Ponticus and the eastern monastic tradition', 268.

48 Ibid.

inherit it, as if this were a self-enclosed tradition extending by means of a self-enclosed theological *diadoche* across several centuries. Evagrius's programme, rather, originated as a response to institutional and cultural changes within Christianity as it spread and began to replace and absorb the previous culture and thought of the pre-Christian empire. Like Clement's pedagogy – crafted for learned adepts of a smaller Christian group in cosmopolitan Alexandria of the second century – Evagrius's pedagogy of the *pathe* responded to the hazards of a new situation – not only a spectrum of rapidly developing ascetic forms of life, with their study of and struggle with the *pathe*, but a multiplying urban clergy and a novel flow of money and power toward and within churches, as cities and shrines now became sites for the display of monuments or ceremonials honouring donors and officials, and church officials increasingly participated in local and regional rule.⁴⁹

Perhaps this new arrangement – and the *pathe* that now more strongly appeared in his students – encouraged Evagrius to describe the two intellectual or noetic *pathe* in the following way:

Ὁ τῆς κενοδοξίας λογισμὸς λεπτότατός τις ἐστὶ καὶ παρυφίσταται τοῖς κατορθοῦσι ῥαδίως δημοσιεύειν αὐτῶν τοὺς ἀγῶνας βουλόμενος καὶ τὰς παρὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων δόξας θηρώμενος, δαίμονάς τε κράζοντας ἀναπλάττων καὶ θεραπευόμενα γύναια καὶ ὄχλον τινὰ τῶν ἱματιῶν ἐφαπτόμενον· μαντεύεται δὲ αὐτῷ καὶ ἱερωσύνην λοιπὸν καὶ τοὺς ζητοῦντας αὐτὸν ταῖς θύραις ἐφίστησι· καὶ ὡς εἰ μὴ βούλοιο δέσμιος ἀπαχθήσεται. Καὶ οὕτως αὐτὸν μετέωρον ταῖς κεναῖς ἐλπίσι ποιήσας ἀφίπταται καταλιπὼν ἢ τῷ τῆς ὑπερηφανίας δαίμονι πειράζειν αὐτὸν ἢ τῷ τῆς λύπης, ὅστις ἐπάγει καὶ λογισμοὺς αὐτῷ ταῖς ἐλπίσιν ἐναντιουμένους· ἔστι δὲ ὅτε καὶ τῷ τῆς αὐτῷ ταῖς ἐλπίσιν ἐναντιουμένους· ἔστι δὲ ὅτε καὶ τῷ τῆς πορνείας δαίμονι παραδίδωσι τὸν πρὸ ὀλίγου δέσμιον καὶ ἅγιον ἱερέα.

The thought of vainglory is a most subtle one, and readily insinuates itself within the virtuous person with the intention of publishing his struggles and hunting after the esteem that comes from people (1 Thess 2:6). It invents demons crying out, women being healed and a crowd touching his garments (Mt 9:20–21; Mk 5:27); it even predicts to him that he will eventually attain the priesthood [i.e., the episcopacy]; it has people come to seek him at his door, and if he should be unwilling he will be taken away in bonds. When this thought has thus raised him aloft on empty hopes, it flies off abandoning him to be tempted either by the demon of pride or by that of sadness, who brings upon him further

49 For a general description of the situation, and abundant bibliography referring to previous studies, see C. Rapp, *Holy Bishops in Late Antiquity: The Nature of Christian Leadership in an Age of Transition* (Berkeley, 2005).

thoughts opposed to his hopes. Sometimes it delivers him over to the demon of fornication, he who a little earlier was a holy priest [=bishop] carried off in bonds.⁵⁰

As Evagrius has organised his list of *logismoi*, vainglory (κενοδοξία, *kenodoxia*) seems to be an aspect of pride, which is why it is the penultimate step before moral disaster. That *pathos*, also prompted by a demon, brings the soul to the very worst sort of fall, into an insanity that imitates Satan's. Of it Evagrius says,

It induces the soul to refuse to acknowledge that God is its helper, and to think that it is itself the cause of its good actions, and to take a haughty view of its brothers as being unintelligent because they do not all hold the same opinion of it. Anger and sadness follow closely upon this as well as the ultimate evil – derangement of mind, madness, and the vision of a multitude of demons in the air.⁵¹

Longer treatments of pride occur in two treatises to Eulogios: *To Eulogios: On the Confession of Thoughts and Counsel in their Regard* and *On Virtues and Vices*.⁵² These two works, introducing a sophisticated man to the perils of the ascetic life, contain, respectively, a longer description of pride and a list of the features of pride and its antidote, humility. In the first, Evagrius warns Eulogios against the occurrence of pride as he practices asceticism. The former lists a series of descriptions of how pride may occur, when someone engages in bodily ascetic works with greater harshness for praise, or becomes conceited for glory. This missed motivation sets off a further assault of the demon who encourages the soul to put on 'even greater airs'; the demons prompt the soul to try to exceed the achievements of other monks. Even 'causing the monk to gain the throne of the teaching logos' (καὶ γὰρ ἐνθρονίζουσιν αὐτὸν καὶ εἰς τὸν

50 Evagrius, *Praktikos*, 13, ed. Guillaumont and Guillaumont, 528–31.

51 Evagrius, *Praktikos*, 14, ed. Guillaumont and Guillaumont, 532–35: Ὁ τῆς ὑπερηφανίας δαίμων χαλεπωτάτης πτώσεως τῆ ψυχῆ πρόξενος γίνεται· ἀναπείθει γὰρ αὐτὴν Θεὸν μὲν μὴ ὁμολογεῖν βοηθόν, ἑαυτὴν δὲ τῶν κατορθουμένων αἰτίαν εἶναι νομίζειν καὶ φυσιοῦσθαι κατὰ τῶν ἀδελφῶν ὡς ἀνοήτων, διότι μὴ τοῦτο περὶ αὐτῆς πάντες ἐπίστανται. Παρακολουθεῖ δὲ ταύτη ὀργὴ καὶ λύπη, καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον κακόν, ἔκστασις φρενῶν καὶ μανία καὶ δαιμόνων ἐν τῷ ἄερι πλῆθος ὀρώμενο. The following two English translations of the original Greek version of the *Praktikos* are most commonly used: J.E. Bamberger, *Evagrius Ponticus, The Praktikos: Chapters on Prayer* (Collegeville, MN, 1972); and R. Sinkewicz, *Evagrius of Pontus: The Greek Ascetic Corpus* (Oxford, 2003), 91–114. Forthcoming is a translation of the entire *Gnostic Trilogy* from the Syriac and remaining Greek texts, ed. R. Darling Young et al. (Oxford University Press).

52 See Sinkewicz, *Evagrius*, 12–65, for a translation of both treatises, with text on pp. 310–33; and now the critical edition by C.-A. Fogielman, 'Les deux traités à Euloge d'Evagre le Pontique' (PhD diss., École pratique des hautes études, 2015).

διδασκαλικὸν ἐξουσιθεῖσθαι λόγον), they urge him to compete with his monastic rivals and encourage him to consider himself as the victor over the demon of fornication, thanks to his manifest austerity. They also remind him that he is now in the rank of the highest ascetics, encourage him to brag and to discount divine assistance. Again, the result of pride is the fall into madness or hallucinations, ‘through visions seen in a change of light’. It is at this point that Satan takes over, apparently, from the regular demons associated with pride, and lets the monk know that he will grant further gifts, ‘proclaims that he will elevate you as a saint; or he promises to make saints some of those who, having received the faith, sinned against the truth and went crazy’.⁵³

For Evagrius – and later, for Maximos the Confessor – pride has become a genuine and escalating sickness, even a fatal one. Evagrius elaborates a two-stage *pathos* of pride. In this *pathos*, *kenodoxia* is the first stage, beguiling the monk with dreams of wealth, social prominence and fame that will come to him along with the episcopal ordination of which he dreams. This corrupts his mind with fantasies of social position. And having so imagined himself, the *pathos* of pride – *hyperephania* – ensues as a form of madness in which airborne demons will become his companions. The victim of vain-glory and pride, then, recapitulates the fall of Satan; but he does it with the full complement of Stoic and Platonic diagnoses transposed into a Christian ascetic format.

Another treatise, one addressed to ascetics who were still engaged in training for life in their communities (or so Evagrius thought), diagnoses both the personal malady engendered by pride, and the existential dangers that come from the monk’s unseen opponents. In this treatise, titled in the Latin translation and its manuscript tradition *Sententiae ad monachos* (but in the Greek tradition, preserved under the name of Nilos, Πρὸς τοὺς ἐν κοινοβίοις ἢ συνοδίαις μοναχοὺς, to signify its more elementary character), Evagrius writes:

61. Περίελε σεαυτοῦ ὑπερηφανίαν καὶ κενοδοξίαν μακρὰν ποίησον ἀπό σου. ὁ γὰρ ἀποτυχῶν δόξης λυπηθήσεται, ὁ δὲ ἐπιτυχῶν ὑπερήφανος ἔσται.

62. Μὴ δῶς ὑπερηφανία σὴν καρδίαν καὶ μὴ εἴπης πρὸ προσώπου τοῦ θεοῦ· δυνατός εἰμι, ἵνα μὴ κύριος ἐγκαταλίπη σὴν ψυχὴν, καὶ πονηροὶ δαίμονες ταπεινώσουσιν αὐτήν. τότε γὰρ σε δι’ ἀέρος πτοήσουσιν οἱ ἐχθροί, τότε γὰρ σε δι’ ἀέρος πτοήσουσιν οἱ ἐχθροί, νύκτες δὲ φοβεραὶ διαδέξονται σε.

53 Evagrius, *To Eulogios*, 33, ed. Fogielman, 194: Αὐτὸς γὰρ ὁ Σατανᾶς μετασχηματίζεται εἰς ἄγγελον φωτὸς πρὸς ἀπάτην ἡμετέραν, ἴσως χαρίσματα δώσειν ἐνδεικνύμενος, ὡς ἵνα πεσὼν προσκυνήσης, ἢ ἀναλαμβάνειν ὡς ἄλλον Ἥλιον εὐαγγελιζόμενος, ἢ ἀγιάζειν ὑπισχνούμενος, ὃν τινες τὴν πίστιν δεξάμενοι περὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἠστόχησαν, καὶ φρενοβλαβεῖς ἐγενήθησαν. Tr. Sinkewicz, 59 (modified).

61. Eliminate pride from yourself and set vainglory far from you, for one who fails to attain esteem will experience sadness and one who attains it will be prideful.

62. Give not your heart to pride and say not before the face of God, 'I am able', lest the Lord abandon your soul and the wicked demons humiliate it; for then the enemies will terrify you through the air and frightful nights will come to you one after the other.⁵⁴

Finally, Evagrius also provided, in response to a request by an abbot of a cenobitic monastery in Egypt, a long list of scriptural excerpts meant to repel the assaults of the demons who stirred up in monastic souls the thoughts of various vices. The *Antirrhethikos*, lost in Greek, contains sixty of these remedies against various situations and suggestions the monks might encounter in their daily lives. Although Evagrius did compose collections of scholia, or short notes, as explanations of biblical texts, the *Antirrhethikos* seems to enlarge Evagrius's interest in pride and other vices: in addition to diagnostic sketches, here he offers powerful remedies extracted from the holy book and offered to the abbot, Loukios, perhaps for memorisation by the monks under his leadership.⁵⁵

Conclusion

This essay began with an attempt to distinguish the modern English term 'emotion' and the English word 'pride' from their apparent cognate terms in antiquity. After a review of the scriptural, exegetical and philosophical permutations of the *pathos* of pride in one significant strand of late ancient and early Christian tradition, it seems clearer that pride is not – at least for this ancient group – a feeling of confidence either rightly earned or wrongly appropriated. Rather, for the Alexandrian tradition – a Christian philosophy with many later adepts – it is a cognitive problem, a disease of the highest part of the mind, which leads to the dissolution of the part of the human being – the mind – which that tradition viewed as its most important aspect.

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9 The Ascetic Construction of Emotions

Lupe and *Akedia* in the Works of Evagrius of Pontos

Andrew Crislip

A concern with the propriety and display of sadness has a long history in Christianity. To be sure, Greco-Roman philosophers and moralists debated the display and experience of sadness and other painful emotions.¹ Yet to feel and express sadness and grief was especially vexing for Christians. One might think of the Christology of the canonical Gospels, whose Messiah declares ‘happy’ (μακάριοι) those who weep or mourn (οἱ πεινῶντες, οἱ κλαίοντες, Lk 6:21). Jesus himself suffers from sadness and emotional anguish (περίλυπος, Mk 14:34; λυπεῖσθαι καὶ ἀδημονεῖν, Mt 26:37).² And he famously weeps, if not for himself then at least for others.³ Yet sadness occupies an ambiguous role in early Christian thought, even in the gospels, as a feeling to be managed as part of the distinctive practice of being Christian.

1 Debates over the propriety of distress, sadness and other painful emotions are explored in several essays collected in T. Fögen (ed.), *Tears in the Graeco-Roman World* (Berlin, 2009), and for the post-classical period see M. Alexiou and D. Cairns (ed.), *Greek Laughter and Tears: Antiquity and After*, Edinburgh Leventis Studies, 8 (Edinburgh, 2017). Aristotelian and Stoic approaches to grief and its propriety may be further explored in D. Konstan, *The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks: Studies in Aristotle and Classical Literature* (Toronto, 2006), 244–58, and in Seneca’s letters of consolation, recently translated and contextualised in E. Fantham, H.M. Hine, J. Ker and G.D. Williams (tr.), *Lucius Annaeus Seneca, Hardship and Happiness* (Chicago, 2014). The problematic feeling of *lupe* in mid-imperial Rome is treated extensively by Galen. See C.K. Rothschild and T.W. Thompson, ‘Galen: “On the avoidance of grief”’, *Early Christianity*, 2 (2011), 110–29; C.K. Rothschild and T.W. Thompson (ed.), *Galen’s De indolentia*, STAC, 88 (Tübingen, 2014); P.N. Singer (ed.), *Galen, Psychological Writings* (Cambridge, 2013); and S.P. Mattern, ‘Galen’s anxious patients: *lypē* as anxiety disorder’, in G. Petridou and C. Thumiger (ed.), *Homo Patiens: Approaches to the Patient in the Ancient World*, Studies in Ancient Medicine, 45 (Leiden, 2016), 203–23. Approaching the debate from the opposite direction is D. McMahon, *Happiness: A History* (New York, 2006), 19–75.

2 And his final words in Mark (15:34) and Matthew (27:46) quote the biblical psalm of lament (Ps 22:1). Biblical quotations follow the New Revised Standard Version.

3 Even in those portraits of Jesus that downplay his sadness and grief for himself, he still openly weeps for others, such as Jerusalem as a whole (Lk 19:41) or Lazarus (Jn 11:35). Biblical studies are only beginning to grapple with the gospels’ depiction of Jesus’s emotions. A comprehensive but methodologically limited study is S. Voorwinde, *Jesus’ Emotions in the Gospels* (London, 2011).

In the Gospel of John, although he himself weeps, Jesus characterises his mission as the elimination of sadness. ‘Do not let your hearts be troubled’ (μὴ παρασέσθω), he says twice in his farewell discourse (14:1, 27). And later, ‘I have said these things to you so that my joy (χαρά, *chara*) may be in you, and that your joy may be complete’ (15:11). He predicts an imminent time in which all sadness will be replaced by unceasing joy: ‘So you are sad now (λύπην ἔχετε); but I will see you again, and your hearts will rejoice, and no one will take your joy from you.... Ask and you will receive, so that your joy may be complete’ (16:22, 24). The Apocalypse of John looks forward to a new Jerusalem in which God ‘will wipe every tear from [his people’s] eyes. Death will be no more; mourning (πένθος, *penthos*) and crying and pain will be no more’ (Rev 21:4). Such contrasting models or proscriptions of sadness offer a choice for the follower of the risen messiah, an opportunity or command to manage their emotions: should one imitate Christ and his anguished and tearful sufferings, or should one embody that ‘joy made complete’ (Jn 16:24, 15:11, 17:13) that Jesus proclaims to his followers in the fourth Gospel, to anticipate the eschatological joy of the new Jerusalem here and now?

Early Christians responded in different ways to the paradoxical emotional standards transmitted in early memories of Jesus. Paul, who of course did not have access to the written Gospels or the Apocalypse, recognised the paradox in sadness for the follower of Christ. In his second letter to the Corinthians, he speaks obscurely of the duality of sadness. Sadness (λύπη, *lupe*) is of two types, a worldly sadness that leads to death; and a godly sadness that leads to repentance (μετάνοια, *metanoia*), and thus to salvation (2 Corinthians 7:8–11). How does one tell the two types of sadness apart, though? Christians in the second century tended to resolve the duality of sadness in one direction: to encourage the life of the Christian to be one of constant joy. We can see this in a number of significant texts reflecting a range of theological persuasions.⁴ Hermas, a moralist and visionary in the city of Rome in the mid-second century, describes sadness as the worst of all vices.⁵ Appearing in a vision, his eponymous Shepherd chastises Hermas: ‘You are senseless.... Do you not understand that sadness (*lupe*) is the worst spirit of all and most to be dreaded by the slaves of God? That it corrupts a person more than any other spirit?’⁶ The proto-orthodox Hermas knows Paul’s teaching on *lupe*, and acknowledges the dual power of sadness to destroy and to save, but nonetheless emphasises the repression of sadness as a Christian ideal: ‘Be clothed, therefore’, the Shepherd says, ‘with the cheerfulness that always

4 For example, in the Christian philosophers Justin Martyr and Athenagoras, who both draw on philosophy in arguing for emotional self-control, discussed in S. Knuutila, *Emotions and Ancient and Medieval Philosophy* (Oxford, 2004), 111–13.

5 *Shepherd of Hermas*, Commandments, 40.10.1, ed. tr. B. Ehrman, *The Apostolic Fathers*, vol. 2, LCL, 25 (Cambridge, MA, 2003), 278.

6 *Shepherd of Hermas*, Comm., 40.10.1, tr. Ehrman, 279.

conveys grace before God and that is acceptable to him, and delight in it. For every man who is cheerful does good things and thinks good things and despises sadness'.⁷ Hermas specifically notes how grief weighs down one's prayers and petitions, so they do not ascend to God. This contrasts starkly with later Christian encouragement of tears as conducive – even necessary – for petitioning God. 'Cleanse yourself', the Shepherd says, 'of this evil sadness, and you will live to God'.⁸ A distrust of the passion of sadness is not unique to Hermas. Jerome describes an earlier gospel popular among Jewish Christians as deeming it 'among the worst offences' to cause any sadness (*contristauerit*) to another of the brethren.⁹ Classic Gnostic scriptures, such as the *Apocryphon of John* and the *Gospel of Judas*, distinctively portray Jesus as a laughing saviour.¹⁰ Although it is not always clear what the joke is, the point at least is clear: Jesus and his followers stand aloof, passers-by, from the sadness and illusory traumas of the material world. A very different kind of gnostic, Clement of Alexandria, contrasts Christianity with the rites of old, which '[brought] stories of sorrow (*πένθος*, *penthos*) into worship'. The Word of the Lord, he says, sings a 'new song, the song of Moses, "Soother of grief and wrath, that bids all ills be forgotten". There is a sweet and genuine remedy against grief blended with this song'.¹¹ Contemporaneous traditions narrate the wonders of martyrs, who imitate Jesus's sufferings in ways that evoke as much the Christ of the Gnostics as of the four Gospels. No tears in the garden or cries of despair from the cross for them: they go to their elaborate executions as cheerful victims, embodying a Roman virility and joy as they are humiliated, pierced, burned and dismembered.¹²

7 *Shepherd of Hermas*, Comm., 42.10.3, tr. Ehrman, 283 altered.

8 *Shepherd of Hermas*, Comm., 42.10.3, tr. Ehrman, 283, altered.

9 Gospel according to the Hebrews 7 (= Jerome, *Commentary on Ezekiel*, 18.7), ed. tr. B. Ehrman and Z. Pleše, *The Apocryphal Gospels: Texts and Translations* (New York, 2011), 221.

10 E.g., *Apocryphon of John* (NHC II,1 22:18), ed. M. Waldstein and F. Wisse, *The Apocryphon of John: Synopsis of Nag Hammadi Codices II,1; III,1; and IV,1 with BG 8502,2* (Leiden, 1995), 127; *Gospel of Judas* 34:3, 36:23, 44:19, 55:12, ed. R. Kasser and G. Wurst, *The Gospel of Judas: Together with the Letter of Peter to Philip, James, and a Book of Allogenes from Codex Tchacos; Critical Edition* (Washington, DC, 2007), 187, 191, 207, 229; with discussion in G.W. Most, 'The Judas of the Gospels and the *Gospel of Judas*', in M. Scopello (ed.), *The Gospel of Judas in Context: Proceedings of the First International Conference on the Gospel of Judas, Paris, Sorbonne, October 27th–28th, 2006*, Nag Hammadi and Manichaean Studies, 62 (Leiden, 2008), 69–80; and F.B. Rubio, 'Laughing at Judas: conflicting interpretations of a new Gnostic Gospel', in *Gospel of Judas in Context*, ed. Scopello, 153–80.

11 Clement of Alexandria, *Exhortation to the Greeks*, 1, ed. tr. G.W. Butterworth, LCL, 92 (Cambridge, MA, 1919), 6–7, following the emendation of O. Stählin (*πένθους* for *πειθοῦς*).

12 A typical and influential image of a joyful martyrdom is that of Polycarp, see *Martyrdom of Polycarp*, 12, ed. tr. H. Musurillo, *The Acts of the Christian Martyrs* (Oxford, 1972), 10–11.

The early Christian response to the paradox of sadness – that the Christian life should be one of unadulterated joy – seems at odds with the positive attitudes toward pious crying in the early and middle Byzantine periods. Henry Maguire has noted that it is the emotion of ‘sorrow... which Byzantine artists portrayed most frequently and with the greatest intensity’.¹³ The encouragement of pious weeping as an ascetic practice has a long history from John Klimakos and the Byzantine collections of *The Sayings of the Desert Fathers* on.¹⁴ The Latin middle ages too show the encouragement of sadness and tears as venerated forms of spiritual practice, so much so that the Romanian philosopher E.M. Cioran describes the middle ages as ‘saturated with tears’.¹⁵ How do we get from a Christianity in which sorrow is at best paradoxical, and at worst a sin, to a Christian piety that embraces the performance of sadness, grief and tears?

In her study of the gift of tears in medieval piety and iconography, Diane Apostolos-Cappadona points to the fourth century as ‘pivotal’ in the history of tears. It is, she suggests more expansively, ‘perhaps the most crucial century in church history’.¹⁶ I hypothesise that the Christian writers of the early Byzantine period proved pivotal not just in refiguring the meaning of tears, but in shaping all manner of norms for managing emotions. From the accession of Constantine through the next two centuries of Christianisation, the empire – east, west and beyond – witnessed significant changes in emotional norms, the way passions are managed, defined, encouraged and suppressed.¹⁷ Such changes in emotional norms and

13 H. Maguire, ‘The depiction of sorrow in middle Byzantine art’, *DOP*, 31 (1977), 123–74, at 125.

14 See H. Hunt, *Joy-Bearing Grief: Tears of Contrition in the Writings of the Early Syrian and Byzantine Fathers*, TMM, 57 (Leiden, 2004); B. Müller, *Der Weg des Weinens: Die Traditionen des ‘Penthos’ in den Apophthegmata Patrum*, Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte, 77 (Göttingen, 2000); J. Driscoll, ‘Penthos and tears in Evagrius Ponticus’, *Studia Monastica*, 36 (1994), 147–64; I. Hausherr, *Penthos: The Doctrine of Compunction in the Christian East*, tr. A. Hufstader, CSS, 33 (Kalamazoo, MI, 1982).

15 E.M. Cioran, *Tears and Saints*, tr. I. Zarifopol-Johnston (Chicago, 1995), 29–30; cited in K.C. Patton, ‘“Howl, weep and moan, and bring it back to God”: holy tears in eastern Christianity’, in K.C. Patton and J.S. Hawley (ed.), *Holy Tears: Weeping in the Religious Imagination* (Princeton, 2005), 255–73, at 257. For the extensive literature on medieval tears (usually pious), see E. Gertsman (ed.), *Crying in the Middle Ages: Tears of History* (New York, 2012). I note, however, that the meaning of tears – and thus their usefulness as a form of piety – may be very different in the Latin middle ages when compared to the penitential sorrow of Byzantine *penthos*. Compare A. Hollywood’s suggestion that melancholy of medieval pious women is more an act of *imitatio Christi*, assimilating the mourning and suffering of Christ and his mother with the practices of the believer, rather than an act of compunction and repentance for one’s personal sins or the collective sins of humanity, ‘Acute melancholia’, *HTR*, 99 (2006), 381–406.

16 D. Apostolos-Cappadona, ‘“Pray with tears and your request will find a hearing”: on the iconology of the Magdalene’s tears’, in *Holy Tears*, ed. Patton and Hawley, 201–28, at 205.

17 Important orientation for emotions history is in S.J. Matt, ‘Recovering the invisible: methods for the historical study of the emotions’, in S.J. Matt and P.N. Stearns (ed.), *Doing*

practices were fostered – and can potentially be recovered by the historian and philologist – through the writings of moral and ethical theorists, ascetics and bishops, through visual culture, ecclesiastical and political ritual, epigraphy and epistolary practices.¹⁸ Here I focus on the ascetic writings of Evagrius of Pontos, a writer whose work – contested and marginalised as it was – undeniably influenced Byzantine emotional discourse, especially the painful emotional constellation of sadness and its relatives.

In the last decades of his short life, Evagrius composed a wealth of texts reflecting on the nature of the passions and thoughts or ‘thinkings’ (λογισμοί, *logismoi*) that would play such a central role in the formation of the monk.¹⁹ Evagrius’s conception of managing passions, their suppression and their utility, bears the influences of Stoic, Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy, as well as of the teachings of the Christian philosopher Origen.²⁰ Yet his system is very much his own, in a number of ways. Not least, Evagrius provides a richness and detail of systematic reflection on passions that is unparalleled in Christian sources from previous centuries. But also unique among contemporaries and predecessors is the peculiar scheme that lies at the heart of his discussion of passions, the list of eight generic ‘thinkings’, ‘thoughts’, or ‘demons’, into which, Evagrius claims, all thoughts may be classified: gluttony, fornication, avarice, sadness, anger, ἀκηδία (*akedia*), vainglory and pride. The list would have a long history in Christian spirituality from Ireland to China, most familiarly transformed into the seven cardinal (or deadly) sins through the mediation of Gregory the Great, Irish penitential literature and the writings of homilists and schoolmen in the high middle ages.²¹ The two strangest members of the eight evil thoughts – strange at

Emotions History (Urbana, IL, 2014), 41–53; and B.H. Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages* (Ithaca, NY, 2006).

- 18 The list is not exclusive. Recent studies on different types of Byzantine sources for emotional norms and change include D. Krueger, *Liturgical Subjects: Christian Ritual, Biblical Narrative, and the Formation of the Self in Byzantium* (Philadelphia, 2014); and C. Kotsifou, “‘Being unable to come to you and lament and weep with you’: grief and condolence letters on papyrus”, in A. Chaniotis (ed.), *Unveiling Emotions: Sources and Methods for the Study of Emotions in the Greek World*, Heidelberg althistorische Beiträge und epigraphische Studien, 52 (Stuttgart, 2012), 389–411.
- 19 D. Brakke comprehensively places Evagrius within the broader context of late ancient ascetic self-fashioning and demonology in his *Demons and the Making of the Monk: Spiritual Warfare in Early Christianity* (Cambridge, MA, 2006), 48–77. As the word *logismoi* among the Stoics indicates ‘reasonings’, Evagrius’s adoption of this term reflects their ongoing, ruminative quality, which I prefer to render as ‘thinking’ as parallel to Stoic ‘reasoning’.
- 20 Useful perspectives are of R. Sorabji, *Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation* (Oxford, 2000), 357–71; and Knuuttila, *Emotions*, 136–51.
- 21 The literature on the western European history of the seven cardinal sins is large. See, among others, C. Straw, ‘Gregory, Cassian, and the cardinal vices’, in R. Newhauser (ed.), *In the Garden of Evil: The Vices and Culture in the Middle Ages*, Papers in Mediaeval Studies, 18 (Toronto, 2005), 35–58; and S. Wenzel, *The Sin of Sloth: Akeidia in Medieval Thought and Literature* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1960), 3–67. Irish reception of the Evagriian tradition

least to modern sensibilities – are the two I focus on here: sadness (*lupe*) and *akedia*, which I will not translate for now.²²

It is useful to treat these two thoughts together because they have become so closely connected in modernity, and especially among postmodern cultural theorists. In his treatise *Stanzas*, the philosopher Giorgio Agamben, for example, devotes the first chapter to ‘The Noonday Demon’, Evagrius’s nickname for *akedia* based on Psalm 90 (91):6.²³ Yet Agamben treats the two thoughts, *tristitia* (translating *lupe*) and *akedia*, as identical. Others, especially those writing from a cultural studies perspective, show a similar quickness to conflate ancient *lupe* and *akedia*, as well as to conflate them with depression and post-modern renderings of melancholia.²⁴

Here I offer an alternative to the loose assimilation of *lupe* and *akedia* among contemporary theorists by focusing on how these thoughts, passions or demons were constructed in the writings of Evagrius, and thus also in the ascetic communities in which Evagrius’s works were written and transmitted. In his ascetic corpus Evagrius offers a detailed phenomenology of the thinkings of *lupe* and *akedia*, revealing the distinctive construction of the emotions for his ascetic readers.²⁵ *Lupe* and *akedia* are quite distinct from each other, and while there are inevitably parallels to the ways that later authors have understood the passions, Evagrius’s *lupe* and *akedia* are contingent on and grounded in the ascetic culture of early Byzantium, in which Evagrius practised. In the following pages I will describe Evagrius’s understanding of the two thoughts and their ascetic management, and then focus on their mutual relationship, and turn, ever so briefly, to the problem

is detailed in J.T. McNeill and H.M. Gamer, *Medieval Handbooks of Penance: A Translation of the Principal Libri Poenitentiales and Selections from Related Documents* (New York, 1938), in particular the *Penitential of Cummean* and the *Old Irish Penitential*, 98–117, 155–68.

22 K. Corrigan notes the unusual presence of sadness and *akedia* in the list, *Evagrius and Gregory: Mind, Soul and Body in the 4th Century* (Farnham, UK, 2009), 75.

23 G. Agamben, *Stanzas: Word and Phantasm in Western Culture*, tr. R.L. Martinez, *Theory and History of Literature*, 69 (Minneapolis, 1993), 3. On the noonday demon see Evagrius, *Praktikos*, 12, ed. A. Guillaumont and C. Guillaumont, *Évagre le Pontique, Traité pratique, ou, Le moine*, 2 vols, SC, 170–71 (Paris, 1971), 171, 523–26, tr. R.E. Sinkewicz, *Evagrius of Pontus, The Greek Ascetic Corpus*, OPCS (Oxford, 2003), 91–114, here 99.

24 This trend in postmodern approaches to melancholia and mourning is exemplified in D.L. Eng and D. Kazanjian, ‘Introduction: mourning remains’, in D.L. Eng and D. Kazanjian (ed.), *Loss: The Politics of Mourning* (Berkeley, 2003), 1–25, especially 12–13. Agamben’s influence, and through him Walter Benjamin’s work on which he relied, is in evidence in other essays as well.

25 Distinctions noted by D. Burton-Christie, ‘Evagrius on sadness’, *CSQ*, 44 (2009), 395–409; my own perspective on sadness in Evagrius emphasises some different aspects than does Burton-Christie’s more pastoral perspective. Also worth comparing is A. Tilby, *The Seven Deadly Sins: Their Origin in the Spiritual Teachings of Evagrius the Hermit* (London, 2009), 108–14.

of their long and tangled relationship to the construction and regulation of emotions in later periods which Evagrius influenced.

Lupe

Like Hermas two centuries before, Evagrius sees *lupe* as a grave threat to the Christian. Sadness poses a threat to the monk because it impedes contemplation: ‘the monk afflicted by sadness cannot move the mind towards contemplation or offer up pure prayer’.²⁶ His description evokes Hermas, whose Shepherd says that ‘the prayer of the man filled with grief (λυπηροῦ ἀνδρός) never has the power to rise up upon the altar before God’.²⁷ Evagrius, thus, writes in a long Christian tradition of seeing sadness as inimical to prayer and contemplation. This runs counter to a trend in contemporary depression research that argues for the evolutionary adaptiveness of sadness and depression. Sadness and depression are adaptive emotions because they facilitate ‘rumination’, sustained contemplation on life’s obstacles and problems.²⁸ The *Psychology Today* cover story of January 2015 summarises the research:

Sadness makes you more rational, your thinking more concrete... Depression – a state of prolonged sadness and hopelessness ... can be a healthy response to difficult life situations. It may have evolved as a way for people to remove themselves from distracting activities ... and to ruminate on whatever complex problem is besetting them.²⁹

This approach to sadness or depression is popular in contemporary psychology, though it has no shortage of critics, who point out that such an ‘adaptive’ or ‘positive’ interpretation of depression has little clinical basis.³⁰ While Evagrius’s perspective differs from that of modern psychiatric critics, he would not find the ‘analytical (or adaptive) rumination hypothesis’ any more plausible than they do. From Evagrius’s perspective, sadness – usually rendered as ‘depression’ in modern discourse – hinders productive

26 *On the Eight Thoughts*, 5.6, PG 79.1145D–64D, at 1156, tr. Sinkewicz 66–90, at 82. Also *Eight Thoughts*, 5.20, 5.21, PG:79:1156–57, tr. Sinkewicz, 83.

27 *Shepherd of Hermas*, 42.10.3, ed.tr. Ehrman, 283.

28 Discussed by J. Rottenberg, *The Depths: The Evolutionary Origins of the Depression Epidemic* (New York, 2014), 94–98. While this perspective asserts that such persisting ‘thinking has evolutionary logic’, rumination can lead to poorly adaptive behaviours as well, 98–100.

29 M. Hutson, ‘Beyond happiness’, *Psychology Today*, 48.1 (2015), 82.

30 See R.W. Pies’s survey and incisive critique, ‘Is major depression “adaptive”?’, *Psychiatric Times*, 9 February 2011, <http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/major-depressive-disorder/major-depression-adaptive>, accessed 13 February 2021.

thought.³¹ The monk afflicted by *lupe* is chained by its oppressive fetters and prevented from carrying out fundamental goals of the ascetic life, prayer and contemplation of God.

Evagrius traces the origins of sadness to loss, and to the frustration of all manner of desires. The causal relationship between loss and sadness is no surprise: it is foundational to some modern psychological perspectives on sadness and depression.³² More to the point, Evagrius's focus on frustrated desire is typical of fourth-century Christian reflection on *lupe*, much as Warren Smith describes Gregory of Nyssa's view of *lupe* as 'frustrated desire'.³³ At the root of much sadness is the loss of the comforts, routines and companions of one's previous life. Evagrius characterises the monk's profession as exile (ξενιτεία), though to be sure a voluntary one.³⁴ Exile is in fact the foundational 'contest' that the monk enters: to withdraw from the *polis* or village, to cut ties with family and friends, and to give up ambitions for worldly success, all in order to take up a life of solitude, contemplation and deprivation. The burden of sadness is a common theme in the literature of exile, such as the exiled Ovid's laments from Pontos, the *Tristia*. Thus, thoughts of one's family and friends left behind and the absent comforts of home drive the monk to nostalgia and sadness at their loss. Memories play a significant role in sadness, recalling lost loved ones, lost time and lost opportunities, and can come upon the monk from obscure origin. The monk's companions in the monastery who are too 'material-minded' can also drive the monk to sadness at his separation from the world of familiarity and comfort.³⁵

Along with the sense of loss, sadness is also characterised by unremitting and ultimately groundless fear. The close connection between sadness and fear echoes ancient medical reflection on melancholia, a disorder of black

31 Emotion terms are an inevitable problem in such comparison. In recent decades in the Anglo-American context depression has overtaken what used to be called sadness in both professional and colloquial usage. See A.V. Horwitz and J.C. Wakefield, *The Loss of Sadness: How Psychiatry Transformed Normal Sorrow into Depressive Disorder* (New York, 2007).

32 See Burton-Christie, 'Evagrius on sadness', 399–400. Contemporary social psychology of sadness and depression is indebted to the work of J. Bowlby, *Loss: Sadness and Depression* (New York, 1980).

33 J.W. Smith, *Passion and Paradise: Human and Divine Emotion in the Thought of Gregory of Nyssa* (New York, 2004), 97, italics his. For Stoic antecedents see Knuuttila, *Emotions*, 53.

34 *Foundations of the Monastic Life: A Presentation of the Practice of Stillness*, passim, PG 40:1252D–64C, tr. Sinkewicz, *Evagrius*, 1–11; *To Eulogios: On the Confession of Thoughts and Counsel in their Regard*, 2, ed. Sinkewicz, *Evagrius*, 310–33, here 310–11, tr. Sinkewicz, *Evagrius*, 12–59, here 4–5; *On the Vices Opposed to the Virtues*, 4, PG 79:1140–44, at 1144, tr. Sinkewicz, *Evagrius*, 60–65, at 64. Sinkewicz, *Evagrius*, 25, discusses sadness arising from the memories of those left behind in the secular world. Sinkewicz frequently translates *xeniteia* as 'voluntary exile', e.g., *Eulogius*, 2 (*Evagrius*, 29–30).

35 *Foundations*, 5, PG 40:1256, tr. Sinkewicz, 6–7. Other 'dangers' not included in the eight evil thoughts are 'madness over material things, fear, and scandal'.

bile which from the Hippocratics on was characterised by sadness and fear without reason.³⁶ In Evagrius's writings, often the object of fear is not clearly stated, but it is not generally an existential fear; it is a fear of the demons, who afflict the monk with unwanted thoughts and with physical assault.³⁷

Evagrius frequently describes sadness attacking the monk with a physicality that differs considerably from other thoughts. 'Sadness', he writes, 'is a disease of the soul and the flesh'.³⁸ The physicality of sadness is especially clear in Evagrius's handbook called *Antirrhetikos*, which catalogues 498 thoughts among the eight types of thinking, and provides scriptural passages with which the monk may manage emotion by countering demonic suggestions.³⁹ The demon of sadness touches the monk's body, strikes his limbs like a scorpion (4.33); it 'burn[s] the body's sinews' (4.41) and burns his eyes and face (4.53); it 'lands on the shoulders and neck, scratches the ears, and punches the nose' (4.56, also 4.65); it wounds the body and casts it into 'incurable illness' (4.76).⁴⁰ The intense and varied physicality of sadness differs from other demonic thoughts. This is not to say that no other thoughts have physical symptoms. The thought of fornication occasionally attacks the monk with touch or the threat of touch, though the touch is predictably more lascivious than violent.⁴¹ But the thought of sadness is distinguished by its violence and bodily pain.

It is worth noting that *lupe* is itself a word for bodily pain, especially 'that caused by hunger or thirst ... by heat or cold, or by sickness'.⁴² In philosophical and moral literature from at least Plato and Aristotle on, it normally refers to a psychic or emotional pain.⁴³ Stoics influentially included *lupe*

36 J. Radden, *The Nature of Melancholy: From Aristotle to Kristeva* (New York, 2000), esp. 4, 12–14. The testimony of Rufus of Ephesus and the broader medical context of ancient melancholia is covered in Rufus of Ephesus, *On Melancholy*, ed. P. Pormann, *Rufus of Ephesus, On Melancholy*, SAPERE, 12 (Tübingen, 2008); see also in the same volume, S. Swain, 'Social stress and political pressure: *On Melancholy* in context', 113–38, at 135.

37 E.g., *Antirrhetikos*, 4.16, 4.18, 4.19, Syriac text ed. W. Frankenberg, *Evagrius Ponticus*, AbhGött, Philol.-hist. Kl., Neue Folge, 13.2 (Berlin, 1912), 472–545, at 504, tr. D. Brakke, *Evagrius of Pontus, Talking Back: A Monastic Handbook for Combating Demons*, CSS, 229 (Collegeville, MN, 2009), 102–3.

38 *Eulogius*, 7, ed. tr. Sinkewicz, 34, 314.

39 See David Brakke's discussion in *Evagrius of Pontus, Talking Back*, 1–40.

40 Ed. Frankenberg, 506, 508, 510, 512, tr. Brakke, 107, 108, 111, 112, 114, 117.

41 *Antirrhetikos*, 2.11, 2.27, 2.45, 2.63, ed. Frankenberg, 486, 487, 490, 492. *Antirrhetikos*, 2.45 mentions the threat of burning, understandable in the context of fornication. The other thought of fornication that verges on violence ('concerning the demon that suddenly fell upon the body', *Antirrhetikos*, 2.27) interestingly prescribes a psalm of sorrow turned to gladness as the response: 'You have turned my sorrow into dance for me; you have ripped off my sackcloth and have girded me with gladness', tr. Brakke, 75, citing Ps 29:12–13 (30:11).

42 R. Bultmann, 'λύπη, λυπέω', *TDNT*, vol. 4, 313, citing Plato, *Philebus*, 31e–f; *Phaedo*, 85a; and Sophocles, *Ajax*, 338.

43 In his *Rhetoric*, Aristotle does not refer to sadness as an independent emotion, but classifies a range of other emotions as various types of *lupai*, pains felt in the soul, for example

among the four generic passions, and more often denoted bodily pain by 'words based on the root *alg-*' or ὀδύνη (*odune*).⁴⁴ But whether in Aristotle or in the eclectic spiritual guides of late antiquity, psychic and bodily pain were linked, if not necessarily straightforwardly so.⁴⁵ It is thus telling that the ascetic's sadness specifically presents itself in manifold types of bodily pain, in addition to emotional anguish. Medical anthropologists have long argued that depression (normally considered a psychological or emotional ailment in the west) is widely somatised in other cultures.⁴⁶ Even the west's dominant tradition of biomedicine – which has for so long tried to sequester emotions and the mind from the body – has slowly come to recognise this. Leslie Jamison writes of this in an essay recounting her job as a medical actor, playing an ailing patient to train aspiring doctors in the techniques of differential diagnosis. She impersonates someone 'suffer[ing] from something called conversion disorder. She is grieving the death of her brother, and her grief has sublimated into seizures. Her disorder is news to me. I didn't know you could convulse from sadness'.⁴⁷ It would thus be a mistake, and certainly unnecessary, to consider the various painful bodily symptoms of sadness as metaphors on Evagrius's part.

Sadness is particularly difficult for the ascetic to manage because it is chained with the other evil thoughts – all of them.⁴⁸ Sadness, alone among the eight thoughts, according to Evagrius, is not born of desire and does

at seeing an undeserving person suffer (ἔλεος, *eleos*), or an undeserving person profit (νέμεσις, *nemesis*). See discussion in Konstan, *Emotions of the Ancient Greeks*, 245–46; and Knuuttila, *Emotions*, 15–17, 31–36, on *lupe* in Plato and Aristotle.

44 Konstan, *Emotions*, 245–46, 359. On the Stoic classification, see M.R. Graver, *Stoicism and Emotion* (Chicago, 2007), 53–59.

45 W.V. Harris notes the lack of clear boundaries between bodily and emotional pain in his study of ancient anger and its management, *Restraining Rage: The Ideology of Anger Control in Classical Antiquity* (Cambridge, MA, 2001), 340, nuanced by Konstan, *Emotions*, 245–46. Evagrius himself observes the dialectic between the two types of pain in a play on passages from the farewell discourse of the Gospel of John (mentioned above) and the Greek version of the 'curse' of Eve in Genesis 3:16; he contrasts the bodily pain (*odune*) of the woman giving birth and the birth of sadness (*lupe*) – which, Evagrius well knows, is the word used in the Greek Bible to describe birth in Gen 3:16; while the pain of childbirth quickly fades, the concomitant pain of sadness continues to cause 'suffering' and 'toil' (*Eight Thoughts*, 5.4, PG 79:1156, tr. Sinkewicz, 81). For further discussion, see A. Crislip, 'Emotions in Eden and after: ancient Jewish and Christian reflections on Gen 2–4', *Journal of the Bible and its Reception*, 6 (2019), 97–133.

46 The cross-culturally varied somatic symptoms of depression are discussed throughout A. Kleinman's and B. Good's foundational edited collection, *Culture and Depression: Studies in the Anthropology and Cross-Cultural Psychiatry of Affect and Disorder* (Berkeley, 1985). Also see A. Kleinman, *Social Origins of Distress and Disease: Depression, Neurasthenia, and Pain in Modern China* (New Haven, 1996).

47 L. Jamison, *The Empathy Exams* (Minneapolis, 2014), 1.

48 See Evagrius's discussion throughout *Eight Thoughts*, 5, PG 79:1156–57, tr. Sinkewicz, 81–83.

not lead to pleasure.⁴⁹ And unique among the evil ways of thinking, sadness is not other-directed, unlike, say, gluttony, which is focused on desire for material comforts, or vainglory in the praise of others. Sadness, rather, consumes the self: Evagrius declares sadness ‘the maw of a lion [that] readily devours one afflicted by it’, and ‘a worm in the heart, [which] consumes the mother who gives it birth’.⁵⁰ As sadness is born of the frustration of desires and pleasures, it follows from the frustrations caused by the other thoughts. Evagrius suggests that sadness – uniquely – cannot act on its own, but is chained with other passions: sadness has no strength unless the other passions are present, as a fetter is without strength unless there is someone to attach it’.⁵¹ Not surprisingly, given the distinctive physicality of sadness, images of being bound, chained, in darkness, underwater and weighed down are common in Evagrius’s description of sadness.⁵²

How closely the other thoughts are connected to *lupe* varies. Greed and vainglory, for example, can lead to sadness.⁵³ Evagrius also connects the directionless listing of the thought of *akedia* to sadness on a number of occasions – he once calls sadness a ‘kinsman of *akedia*’. But their relationship is not as close as later traditions have presumed, a point to which I will return.⁵⁴ The emotion most closely connected with sadness, however, is anger (*ὀργή*, *orge*).⁵⁵ In Evagrius’s list, the order generally runs, in fact, *lupe* – *orge* – *akedia*.⁵⁶ In his system, sadness and anger are intersecting and tangled. In his treatise for beginners addressed to Eulogios, he writes that ‘sadness gets stirred up as an intermediary between angry persons’.⁵⁷ If anger, as Aristotle defines it, is ‘a desire for a perceived revenge, on account

49 *Eight Thoughts*, 5.12, PG 79:1156, tr. Sinkewicz, 82.

50 *Eight Thoughts*, 5.2, 5.3, PG 79:1156, tr. Sinkewicz, 81; ‘worm in the flesh’, *Vices*, 4, PG 79:1144, tr. Sinkewicz, 63.

51 *Eight Thoughts*, 5.9, PG 79:1156, tr. Sinkewicz, 82.

52 *Eight Thoughts*, 3.7, 5.7, 5.9, 5.10, 5.21, 5.22, PG 79:1152, 1156–57, tr. Sinkewicz, 80, 82–83.

53 *Eight Thoughts*, 3.7, 5.17, PG 79:1152, 1157, tr. Sinkewicz, 79, 85; *To the Monks in Monasteries*, 57, ed. H. Gressmann, *Nonnenspiegel und Mönchsspiegel des Euagrius Pontikos*, TU, 39.4 (1913), 152–65, at 158, tr. Sinkewicz, *Evagrius*, 115–31, here 126. On vainglory and sadness: *Eight Thoughts*, 5.18, PG 79:1157, tr. Sinkewicz, 83; *Monks*, 61, ed. Gressmann, 158, tr. Sinkewicz, 126. Gluttony and sadness: *Eight Thoughts*, 5.12, ed. PG 79:1156–57, tr. Sinkewicz, 82. Without desire, there is no grief, according to Evagrius, *Exhortation to a Virgin*, 34, ed. Gressmann, *Nonnenspiegel*, 146–51, at 148, tr. Sinkewicz, *Evagrius*, 131–35, at 133.

54 *Vices*, 4, PG 79:1143–44, tr. Sinkewicz, 65.

55 Burton-Christie, ‘Evagrius on sadness’, 401. Anger in Evagrius’s ascetic corpus is studied by A. Louth, ‘Evagrius on anger’, *Studia Patristica*, 47 (2010), 179–85; and G. Bunge, *Dragon’s Wine and Angel’s Bread: The Teachings of Evagrius Ponticus on Anger and Meekness*, tr. A.P. Gythiel (Crestwood, NY, 2009).

56 In the treatise *Eight Thoughts*, sadness follows anger, the same order that John Cassian adopts. See K.C. Russell, ‘John Cassian on sadness’, *CSQ*, 38 (2003), 7–18, at 9–10, although it is not necessary to claim that Cassian’s list is more ‘careful’ or ‘more accurately’ arranged, as Russell does.

57 *Eulogius*, 7, ed. tr. Sinkewicz, 34, 314.

of a perceived slight on the part of people who are not fit to slight one or one's own', then among two or more angry people seeking retribution against one another, in most cases at least one party will fail to gain their desired revenge.⁵⁸ In many cases, all parties – for all their anger – will fail to see justice done to their liking. Sadness, thus, is a predictable consequence of anger. Owing to the failure to achieve vengeance between 'opposing forces', Evagrius states that 'from sadness' comes wrath. This 'wrath' (μῆνις, *menis*) differs in valence from the evil thought of anger (*orge*), and is more a vengeful and impotent spite: 'From [sadness and wrath (*lupe* and *menis*)] is born madness and insults'.⁵⁹ I do not think it too much to hear echoes of Achilles' accursed wrath (*menis*) at his loss of Briseis, which brought madness, insults and innumerable pains upon the Greeks.⁶⁰ To free oneself from the pair of sadness and wrath one should practise charity and take joy in one's innocence.

Evagrius is not alone in connecting sadness with anger. Contemporary western psychology of sadness and loss has emphasised the central, even normative, role of anger in sadness, especially in the grieving process.⁶¹ Classic psychoanalysis, rooted in Freud's influential essay 'Mourning and melancholia', has long traced grief's typical turn toward vilification and hatred of the self.⁶² But Evagrius's understanding of the intersecting thoughts of *lupe* and *orge* is not the same as that of twentieth-century psychology, particularly that of Freudian psychoanalysis. Fortunately, we need not rely on modern psychology to make sense of Evagrius's perspectives. In her interdisciplinary review of research on sadness, Carol Barr-Zisowitz notes that a number of cultures connect anger and sadness, or to put it another way, do not distinguish neatly between the two emotions.⁶³ Anger and sadness may be conceived as both responding to loss or frustration of desire; anger actively, sadness passively; the choice of emotional script is less neurological than socially determined. This is the case, Barr-Zisowitz claims, in medieval western emotion. She writes:

In the eleventh and twelfth centuries, in relatively stable situations in Europe, anger was increasingly seen as a necessary privilege of the powerful, while it was deemed inappropriate and ridiculous in the powerless.

58 Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 2.2 (1378a31–33), cited according to Konstan, *Emotions*, 41.

59 *Eulogius*, 7, ed.tr. Sinkewicz, 34, 314. Cf. the discussion of the emotions of Achilles in Konstan, *Emotions*, 48–49.

60 *Iliad*, 1.1–7, for example.

61 Bowlby, *Loss*, 28–31.

62 See S. Freud, 'Mourning and Melancholy', in Radden, *Nature of Melancholy*, 285; Radden notes the 'largely unchallenged' place of Freud's essay in psychoanalysis at 282. We see this reflected in the current cliché that depression is but anger turned inward.

63 C. Barr-Zisowitz, "'Sadness' – is there such a thing?", in M. Lewis and J.M. Haviland-Jones (ed.), *Handbook of Emotions*, 2nd edn (New York, 2000), 607–22, especially 609–16.

Historically in Europe, then, sadness could be either active or passive, depending on one's social class.⁶⁴

She notes that medieval sculptural depictions of the virtue of 'patience', the opposite of anger and a 'medieval cousin of sadness', bear the telltale facial markers of anger as posited by Paul Ekman in his extensive cross-cultural studies of emotional facial expression.⁶⁵ Turning to the perspective of contemporary brain science, Barr-Zisowitz notes that Sylvan Tomkins, a pioneer in the psychology of affect, 'was himself unable to differentiate a qualitative difference between the neuronal firings of sadness and anger, only concluding that anger is a more intense form of sadness'.⁶⁶

It may, thus, be helpful to think of anger as an active counterpart to sadness when reading Evagrius's responses to the thought of sadness in his *Antirrhētikos*. We have already seen that sadness attacks the monk with an intense physicality. This complements Evagrius's choice of martial language when describing the cure for sadness. Evagrius adduces a range of biblical passages that give strength to warriors, now in the monastic context, to instil courage and strength in battle against the demons.⁶⁷ In my reading of the *Antirrhētikos* this is distinctive: martial imagery and calls to bravery and endurance in battle are significantly more prevalent in his discussion of sadness. Observers since the time of archaic Greece have noted that anger has the potential to destroy, and thus needs to be controlled or even eliminated. Yet anger may at the same time be 'obligatory' in the face of injustice and sleights, depending on the social location of the subject.⁶⁸ And some related emotions, like θυμός (*thumos*, courage, anger), have a more positive valence, especially in battle.⁶⁹ Yet Evagrius seems to be developing a tradition of his own in managing emotion, by underscoring the close connection between sadness and anger. To combat sadness one must bring to bear the positive aspects of anger. On the other hand, to combat anger, one must apply the virtuous analogue to sadness, gentleness.

Akedia

While sadness has been an emotion relatively neglected by psychologists and historians alike, as Barr-Zisowitz noted over a decade ago, the situation

64 Barr-Zisowitz, 'Sadness', 615.

65 Barr-Zisowitz discusses the research and some of the methodological problems, 'Sadness', 616. The approaches of Ekman and Tomkins are not without methodological complications, as demonstrated by R. Leys, *The Ascent of Affect: Genealogy and Critique* (Chicago, 2017).

66 Barr-Zisowitz, 'Sadness', 617

67 *Antirrhētikos*, 4.6, 4.7, 4.9, 4.11–14, 4.18, 4.19a, 4.19b, 4.20–21, 4.23–24, 4.34, ed. Frankenberg, 502–7.

68 Konstan, *Emotions*, 75.

69 Harris, *Restraining Rage*, 94–98.

is very different with the emotion of *akedia*.⁷⁰ *Akedia*, in all its ambiguities, has exercised an enduring hold on the imagination of the religious and the scholarly in western history. Jennifer Radden, in the sourcebook *The Nature of Melancholy*, traces reflection on depression from Pseudo-Aristotle to the twentieth century, stopping along the way among ascetics of the fourth and fifth centuries. She excerpts John Cassian's chapter on *akedia*, yet includes no discussion of the ascetic thinking, spirit or passion of sadness.⁷¹ The poet and memoirist Kathleen Norris, a great fan of monks both ancient and modern, entitled her 2007 memoir of depression *Acedia and Me*, in which she conflates the ancient, medieval and modern phenomena of *akedia*, melancholia and depression.⁷² And Andrew Solomon entitled his acclaimed 2000 book on depression after Evagrius's nickname for *akedia*, *The Noonday Demon: An Atlas of Depression*.⁷³

Modern and postmodern intellectuals have embraced the concept of *akedia* in trying to place depression or melancholy in historical context. Yet the *akedia* of modern critical theory is not the same as the ancient thought described by Evagrius and his circle, notwithstanding that such critical discussion is usually rooted in a claimed genealogy, traceable to medieval monks or further to pagan and Christian antiquity. Much of this interest in *akedia*, it seems, may be traced to the influence of Walter Benjamin, who identifies *akedia* at the origin of a sort of melancholic nineteenth-century historiography as

a process of empathy whose origin is the indolence of the heart, *acedia*, which despairs of grasping and holding the genuine historical image as it flares up briefly. Among medieval theologians it was regarded as the root cause of sadness.⁷⁴

Benjamin's aphoristic comments on *akedia* have inspired many others, such as the aforementioned Giorgio Agamben, who starts his short treatise

70 Barr-Zisowitz, 'Sadness', 607. *Akedia* is of continuing interest to historically-minded psychiatrists as well, e.g., R.W. Daly, 'Before depression: the medieval vice of *acedia*', *Psychiatry*, 70 (2007), 30–51.

71 Radden, *Nature of Melancholy*, 69–74.

72 K. Norris, *Acedia and Me: A Marriage, Monks, and A Writer's Life* (New York, 2008). Norris recognises that she is mixing up ideas in ways that would not satisfy an historian or specialist: 'I can hear the scholars howling, with some justification, that I am mixing it all up, failing to make the necessary and proper distinctions. That is their job, not mine' (p. 47).

73 A. Solomon, *The Noonday Demon: An Atlas of Depression* (New York, 2001), who quickly surveys the history of depression on pages 284–334. He is largely dependent on S.W. Jackson, *Melancholia and Depression: From Hippocratic Times to Modern Times* (New Haven, 1986).

74 W. Benjamin, 'Theses on the Philosophy of History', in idem, *Walter Benjamin, Illuminations*, ed. H. Arendt, tr. H. Zohn (New York, 1968), 256.

Stanzas with a chapter on *akedia*, to set the stage for a reading of ‘Freud and Saussure to discover the impossibility of metalanguage and of synthesis that could be reflected in the transparency of signs’.⁷⁵ Feminist theorist Ann Cvetkovich also finds *akedia* a particularly useful tool, in her case for thinking about sexual, gender and ethnic identity, as well as feminist performance art.⁷⁶ There are some good reasons for this assimilation of *akedia* to modern melancholy, malaise and depression, but this interesting story is rooted in the history of emotional discourse and norms from the high middle ages into modernity, not early Byzantium.⁷⁷ So I want to bracket off this important part of the history of sadness and *akedia* and continue to focus rather closely on Evagrius’s ascetic writings.

The most famous feature of early Byzantine *akedia* is the monk’s distraction, boredom and sleepiness. This is especially common at midday, hence Evagrius’s famous nickname for the demon.⁷⁸ Around the sixth hour (noon) the slightest of sounds distracts the anchorite, and he repeatedly looks out the window to see if someone is there. He flips ahead in his book to count the pages and quires left. His mind wanders. He yawns and dozes.⁷⁹ He is driven by the desire to leave his cell, to get a change of scenery, or to seek out the companionship of friends.⁸⁰ This description of the distracted, bored monk is surely the most influential picture of *akedia*. We might look to Jan Van Eyck’s (or his workshop’s) painting *Saint Jerome in His Study* as a case study in western European *akedia* in the Evagrius mode. The scholar and monk rests his head heavily on his palm. A foregrounded hourglass underscores the passage of time, and the astrolabe at the picture’s centre reminds the viewer of the slow course of the heavenly bodies across the sky. Jerome’s

75 Agamben, *Stanzas*, back cover.

76 A. Cvetkovich, *Depression: A Public Feeling* (Durham, NC, 2012), 85–202. I find Cvetkovich’s argument (pp. 85–104) for the potential of history of emotions to critique the dominant biomedical paradigm for depression thoughtful and compelling, and think that such a project could be expanded with the engagement of specialists in early historical periods. For the influence of Benjamin and Agamben on her approach to *akedia* and ‘Left Melancholy’, see 105–11, and compare also the essays in *Loss*, ed. Eng and Kazanjian.

77 See M. Theunissen, *Vorentwürfe von Moderne: Antike Melancholie und die Acedia des Mittelalters* (Berlin, 1996); also R. Klibansky, E. Panofsky and F. Saxl, *Saturn and Melancholy: Studies in the History of Natural Philosophy, Religion and Art* (Nendeln, Liechtenstein, 1964); a recent, brief survey is provided by C. Lawlor, *From Melancholia to Prozac: A History of Depression* (Oxford, 2012), 41–72.

78 As noted above, this demon, for example, provided the title for Andrew Solomon’s influential study of depression, *The Noonday Demon*.

79 *Eight Thoughts*, 8.13–14, PG 79:1160, tr. Sinkewicz, 84; cf. *Praktikos*, 12, ed. Guillaumont and Guillaumont, CS 171, 523–26, tr. Sinkewicz, 99.

80 *Antirrhethikos*, 6.4, 6.9, 6.24, 6.26, 6.33, 6.35, 6.52, 6.53, ed. Frankenberg, 522–31, tr. Brakke, 134–35, 139–41, 145; *Eulogius* 13.12, ed. tr. Sinkewicz, 38–39, 317–18; *Eight Thoughts*, 6.5, 6.8, 6.13, PG 79:1157–60, tr. Sinkewicz, 84; *Thoughts*, 11.30; *Vices*, 6.4, PG 79:1144, tr. Sinkewicz, 64; *Praktikos*, 12, ed. Guillaumont and Guillaumont, 523–26, tr. Sinkewicz, 99.

eyelids are nearly closed; his expression is not of intent reflection, but sleepiness and malaise. His fingers hold places in his book – perhaps he is marking a cross-reference, but it seems more likely that he is counting the pages and quires, as Evagrius had vividly described so long before. Although Evagrius's image of the bored monk lies at the root of the later European tradition about *akedia*, this is not because it is typical of Evagrius's description of *akedia*.⁸¹ Rather, this image of the listless, bookish recluse speaks powerfully to the concerns of the very bookish, and frequently melancholy scholars who have made *akedia* their own since the Renaissance.⁸²

This is where many modern commentators on *akedia* leave off, but Evagrius's description of the thought of *akedia* is far more wide-ranging and points to the difficulties of managing this mode of thinking. An important feature of Evagrius's account of *akedia* is bitterness and resentment against the monastery and against one's fellow monks. The monk begins to hate the monastic life itself. He obsesses about the many burdens and difficulties of the ascetic life, and wonders whether they are truly necessary, and whether he might achieve the same spiritual goals back in the city, with his old friends and family around to comfort him.⁸³ *Akedia* tends to produce not self-hatred, but a sense of superiority over the monk's peers. The slight offences of those around him bother him. The others are not up to his high ascetic standards and are holding him back from achieving his spiritual goals. Or maybe the community as a whole is holding the monk back. It is not providing the emotional or material support that he needs to be successful. And what about when he is old and sick: will he have any support then? Probably not. Maybe he should go to a monastery with higher standards and that provides more support for its members.⁸⁴

Akedia provokes not just tedium and resentment. Some monks driven by *akedia* undertake great feats of charity and asceticism. Some, Evagrius says, decide to visit the sick in the community. This is normally valued as a form of charity – and indeed it is a central component of the community's functioning – but here is just a ruse of the demon. Others look at the models of the ascetic life, the extraordinary self-mortifications of Antony or the asceticism of John the Baptist, and attempt to imitate them, thus hurting themselves physically and spiritually. In the event of the inevitable failure to match the achievements of an Antony or John the Baptist, the monk will be

81 Wenzel's account is representative. It is this image of *akedia* (from *Praktikos*, 12) that he places at the origin of the medieval Christian traditions of the 'sin of sloth' (*Sin of Sloth*, 5).

82 On the melancholy miseries of scholars, see the famous Renaissance scholar and melancholiac R. Burton, *The Anatomy of Melancholy*, ed. H. Jackson (New York, 2001), vol. 1, 300–330, 333–35, as well as melancholy caused by the related conditions of scoffing, calumnies and poverty, so long associated with the academic life, 339–57.

83 See discussion in my fuller account, 'The sin of sloth or the illness of the demons: the demon of acedia in early Christian monasticism', *HTR*, 98 (2005), 143–69, at 151.

84 Crislip, 'Sin of sloth', 151–52.

prone to quit the monastery altogether.⁸⁵ In all of these behaviours, praying half-heartedly and with distraction, resentment against one's monastery, excessive asceticism and wanton charity, the goal of the demon of *akedia* is the same: to get the monk to quit the monastic life.

From this brief overview, I hope it is clear that the widespread and facile equation of *akedia* with melancholia or depression does little justice to the early Byzantine *logismos* of *akedia* as Evagrius defines it. Even renderings like *Überdruss* or the common translations of 'listlessness' or 'despondency' hardly capture the complexity of Evagrian thought.⁸⁶ True, listlessness and despondency capture the most famous description of *akedia* as the noon-day demon, causing boredom, distraction and sleepiness. But other equally prominent features of *akedia* fail to fit well within modern professional or folk categories of depression.⁸⁷ I am sympathetic to scholars like Placide Deseille, who characterises *akedia* as 'a word so pregnant with meaning that it frustrates every attempt to translate it'.⁸⁸

That is not to say that there are no parallels in other times and cultures to the way that *akedia* is constructed by Evagrius and his followers. I have argued elsewhere that whereas ancient *akedia* differs considerably from the late modern concept of depression, some emotions or moods from other times and places are comparable. In particular, drawing on the work of Robert Merton, sociologist Wolf Lepenies has identified a specific mode of melancholy, a feeling, emotion or set of behaviours, rooted in social anomie. This form of anomic melancholy, Lepenies argues, afflicts certain social groups at historically bound times, particularly among classes of people facing the failure of utopian ideals, and when the sanctioned goals of the society are no longer believed achievable by the sanctioned means at hand.⁸⁹ In a previous essay I have compared early Byzantine *akedia* with the sociological category of anomie, which displays a comparable diversity of behaviours

85 Crislip, 'Sin of sloth', 152–55.

86 G. Bunge, *Despondency: The Spiritual Teaching of Evagrius Ponticus on Acedia*, tr. A.P. Gythiel (Yonkers, NY, 2012).

87 Peter Toohey, however, has noted that some aspects of ancient melancholy (which overlap in some ways with *akedia*) and the melancholia as reflected in some modern literature have coalesced in modern diagnostic psychology in the category of Obsessive Compulsive Personality Disorder, 'Rufus of Ephesus and the tradition of the melancholy thinker', in *Rufus of Ephesus, On Melancholy*, ed. Pormann 221–43, at 240–42. He rightly does not suggest an 'affiliation between the DSM-IV-TR and Rufus, but instead', he writes, 'it seems better to suggest that the link between thinking and melancholy is one that is endlessly and independently rediscovered, or reinvented, because it is not so much basic to the human psyche as it is one of those simple stereotypes that easily and fruitfully reassert themselves', 241–42.

88 P. Deseille, 'Acedia according to the monastic tradition', *CSQ*, 37 (2002), 297–301, at 297.

89 See W. Lepenies, *Melancholy and Society*, tr. J. Gaines and D. Jones (Cambridge, MA, 1992), especially 3–22, for orientation within twentieth-century sociology, as well as Burton's seventeenth-century *Anatomy of Melancholy*.

and thoughts.⁹⁰ This is not to say that ancient *akeidia* is the same as later melancholy or anomie, or that they stand in direct relation. Rather, a comparison of the ascetic emotional norms of early Byzantium with other well-documented emotional communities can plausibly show how coherent are the seemingly disparate and even contradictory behaviours that Evagrius attributes to *akeidia*.⁹¹ Such comparison may also enrich our understanding of the long history of melancholy and its genealogy in the European tradition in a way that is not reflected in diachronic studies of the emotion.⁹²

The goal of this paper, however, is not to place early Byzantine *akeidia*, or *lupe* for that matter, in the context of the tangled emotional histories of western Europe, but rather to shed light on the details of the ascetic construction and management of select passions. So I conclude by way of reviewing and expanding on the relationship between these traditionally connected thoughts, *akeidia* and *lupe*. First, while sadness is associated with *akeidia* in Evagrius's ascetic works, this is not unique. It is tempting to cite Evagrius's statement that sadness is the kinsman of *akeidia* as proof that the two thoughts are specially connected.⁹³ They are connected, true, but sadness is chained with all the other thoughts as well. *Akeidia* sometimes also acts like other thoughts as well, such as gluttony.⁹⁴ The relationship between sadness and *akeidia* is, at any rate, very different from later traditions of the sins that have assimilated them. Sadness is instead most closely and consistently connected with anger.

A second thing to note is that most of the truly distinctive features we would consider as typical of 'depression' today belong to *lupe*, not *akeidia*: persistent sadness, low mood, feelings of worthlessness and thoughts of death. Some aspects of *akeidia*, fatigue and loss of interest in activities, share some superficial resemblance with the modern diagnostic category of depression but sound quite different in emphasis if Evagrius's description is read side by side with the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders*. The same is true of Evagrius's thinking about sadness. Fear, for example, so central to early Byzantine *lupe*, is not a significant component of modern depression.⁹⁵ While such comparison is not without interest,

90 In 'Sin of sloth', 158–69, I draw directly on Merton's articles rather than Lepenies's further reflection.

91 Crislip, 'Sin of sloth', 160–67. The concept of 'emotional community' is very effectively used for the study of early medieval emotions in western Europe by Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities*.

92 For example, this approach sets the early history of *akeidia* (Radden, *Nature of Melancholy*, 69–74) in sharper comparison with the melancholia of the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries (*ibid.*, 17–19). This may be pursued further in Crislip, 'Sin of sloth'.

93 *Vices*, 4, PG 79:1143–44, tr. Sinkewicz, 65.

94 For example, *Thoughts*, 35, where *akeidia* acts like gluttony in driving monks to compete with Antony or John the Baptist.

95 As in the criteria for Major Depressive Episode in the American Psychological Association's *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: DSM IV-TR* (Arlington,

the interest lies mainly in just how incompatible the modern diagnostic and ancient approaches to the passions are. At any rate, the classic ancient definition of melancholia (fear and sadness without reason) is characteristic of *lupe*, not *akedia*.

Another point of contrast is that unlike the rest of the thoughts, sadness or *lupe* is both vice and virtue. Evagrius, unlike Christians of the second century, took Paul's admonition to heart: there is a *lupe* that saves and a *lupe* that kills. Evagrius notes that hell will be filled first and foremost with sadness: cries, fear, laments, anguish and groans. But godly sadness meditates tearfully on this unfortunate fate for sinners – both one's own and that of others – and the moral faults that merit these punishments.⁹⁶ This duality of sadness – that one should embrace godly sadness and eschew worldly sadness – would have a long afterlife in medieval traditions. The duality of sadness may be seen in the role of tears in Evagrius's understanding of managing emotions. It is noteworthy that Evagrius does not connect tears with the negative, unwanted emotion of sadness. Tears, though they are true tears of sadness and not tears of joy, are on the whole a good sign for the ascetic. Not least, tears are a potent remedy for *akedia*. Pious tears have a long, rich, and well-documented tradition in later Byzantine religion, developed in ascetic practice and theology as the doctrine of *penthos* or compunction for one's sins.⁹⁷ In the Latin west, traditions of pious crying further proliferated and may have a very different valence, as Amy Hollywood has argued.⁹⁸ Evagrius's description of tears differs from both of these later receptions.⁹⁹ Just as the evil thinking of sadness is rich in painful, violent and martial imagery, the tears of godly sadness are also martial. Tears are 'sharpened swords'.¹⁰⁰ One should 'hold a vigil of tears' prior to

VA, 2000), 356. Any similarities between *akedia* and a Major Depressive Episode are quite superficial, such as fatigue or hypersomnia, which in Evagrius's account is seen only at certain times of the day (midday, when fatigue and sleepiness is expected even among psychologically 'normal' or 'neurotypical' populations) and in certain contexts (prayer). Also the noontime sleepiness of Evagrius hardly seems of the same order as the hypersomnia of Major Depressive Episode.

96 *Eulogius*, 16, ed.tr. Sinkewicz, 43–44, 320–21; for further imagery of Hell as a place of sadness – more so than bodily torment – see 4 Ezra (=2 Esdras 7:75–87).

97 See the recent studies by Müller, *Weg des Weinens*; Hunt, *Joy-Bearing Grief*; and A. Torrance, *Repentance in Late Antiquity: Eastern Asceticism and the Framing of the Christian Life, c. 400–650 CE* (Oxford, 2013).

98 Hollywood, 'Acute melancholia', 400–2, whose observations are admittedly preliminary and suggestive.

99 For a different, and quite traditional, emphasis on tears and πένθος in Evagrius, cf. Driscoll, 'Penthos and tears in Evagrius Ponticus'. Driscoll reads Evagrius's very early witness as largely in agreement with the more elaborated traditions in later centuries; of this I am not yet convinced, but this deserves a more thorough examination than this essay allows.

100 *Eulogius*, 7.7, ed.tr. Sinkewicz, 34, 314.

‘warfare’.¹⁰¹ The model for the weeping monk is not Christ, Paul or Mary, but David, king, warrior, giant-slayer.¹⁰² We see an analogue in Evagrius’s description of gentleness (πράϋνσις, *praunsis*), a cure for anger. The biblical model of gentleness is not the Lamb of God, but the hot-tempered warrior Moses.¹⁰³ As the Evagrian nexus between sadness, anger and wrath calls to mind the emotionality of Homeric heroes, so Evagrius’s evocation of tears as characteristic of the warrior recalls the very typical, yet very un-Stoic and un-Roman, tendency of Homer’s warriors to burst into tears, and not to their shame.¹⁰⁴ From Evagrius’s perspective, tears have such great utility because, first, they make God happy.¹⁰⁵ Second, they help to focus ascetic practice – important to cure the listlessness of *akedia*. From a sociological perspective, Jack Barbalet has argued that weeping can play an important role in self-transformation in that weeping is not just cognitive, recognising and making meaning of a loss, as Jerome Neu has argued, but communicative.¹⁰⁶ In particular, ‘weeping is a form of internal communication in which the self is engaged when registering transformation of changes in the self’.¹⁰⁷ From this sociological perspective one can see how, particularly for an ascetic plagued by *akedia*, who feels ‘stuck’ and incapable of progressing toward the goals of ascetic practice, tears can helpfully signify to the monk that he is indeed in the process of overcoming the demon. Yet tears are not always a sign of ascetic progress, as bodily and emotional changes always have the potential for multiple meanings in Evagrius’s thought. Evagrius warns that many weep but have forgotten why. Weeping without object and without purpose leads to madness, much as Paul’s ill-focused *lupe* leads to death.¹⁰⁸

Finally, while the passion or thought of sadness might be felt by anyone, Evagrius’s description of *akedia* is targeted to the experiences of monks, specifically anchoritic monks or solitaries. The special connection of *akedia* to the life of the hermit has long been noted: Antoine Guillaumont discusses

101 *Eulogius*, 18.19, ed.tr. Sinkewicz, 45, 322.

102 *Ant.* 6.10, ed. Frankenberg, 522, tr. Brakke, 136; *Prak.*, 27, ed. Guillaumont and Guillaumont, 562, tr. Sinkewicz, 102; *Thoughts* 13, ed. P. Géhin, C. Guillaumont and A. Guillaumont, *Évagre le Pontique, Sur les pensées*, SC, 438 (Paris, 1998), 196–98, tr. Sinkewicz, 162.

103 *Thoughts*, 13, ed. Géhin, Guillaumont and Guillaumont, 196–98, tr. Sinkewicz, 162.

104 See discussion in S. Föllinger, ‘Tears and crying in archaic Greek poetry (especially Homer)’, in *Tears in the Graeco-Roman World*, ed. Fögen, 17–36; and H. van Wees, ‘A brief history of tears: gender differentiation in archaic Greece,’ in L. Foxhall and J. Salmon (ed.), *When Men Were Men: Masculinity, Power and Identity in Classical Antiquity* (London, 1998), 10–53.

105 *Prayer*, 5, PG 79:1168, tr. Sinkewicz, 193.

106 J. Neu, *A Tear Is an Intellectual Thing: The Meanings of Emotions* (New York, 2000), 14–40.

107 J. Barbalet, ‘Weeping and transformations of self’, *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*, 35 (2005), 125–41, at 125.

108 *Prayer*, 8, PG 79 :1169, tr. Sinkewicz, 193.

it in his introduction to the critical edition of Evagrius's beginner's manual *Praktikos*.¹⁰⁹ We can see explicit claims of the anchoritic proclivity to *akedia* in John Cassian and others. This has struck some modern commentators as odd, and certainly wrong. Gabriel Bunge, author of a volume on *akedia* in Evagrius, argues against the cultural specificity of *akedia*. In a chapter entitled 'Acedia – a disease typical only of monks?', Bunge opens with a list of the ancient testimonies pointing to the cultural specificity of *akedia*, only to dismiss them out of hand as unthinkable.¹¹⁰ *Akedia* or despondency, he contends, is *a priori* of universal significance: 'the vices which plague humankind are the same from time immemorial and everywhere'.¹¹¹ Yet research in the anthropology and sociology of emotions, as well as the history of emotions, has shown that emotions are culturally bound and constructed, even if they are conditioned by evolutionary biology. Comparing emotions across time and culture is a process of translation, not diagnosis.¹¹² The culturally specific rendering of the passions seen in Evagrius of Pontos is a particularly rich source for exploring the diversity of emotional experience and emotional management over time. In her history of 'lost and found' emotions through European history, Ute Frevert points to the ancient thought or emotion of *akedia*, as my work has characterised it, as a 'lost emotion', 'lost in translation to a new emotional state called *depression*'.¹¹³ Rom Harré and Robert Finlay-Jones have, from the perspective of social constructionism, identified *akedia* ('accidie') as 'an extinct emotion'.¹¹⁴ Our assertion that Evagrius's notion of *akedia* was a sort of culturally bound thought or passion, specifically recognised or felt by solitary monks, is plausible in the perspective of the anthropology and sociology of emotions, and helps to clarify why the construction and experience of *akedia* and the related passion of *lupe* changed over the centuries. As the kinds of psychological introspection promoted by Evagrius and others were transmitted and deployed beyond the anchoritic communities into other social contexts, the behaviours expressed by *lupe*

109 Guillaumont and Guillaumont, *Traité Pratique*, 89.

110 Bunge, *Despondency*, 21–23.

111 Bunge, *Despondency*, 23.

112 See the anthropological perspectives of C. Lutz, *Unnatural Emotions: Everyday Sentiments on a Micronesian Atoll and Their Challenge to Western Theory* (Chicago, 1988), 8, cited by Konstan, *Emotions*, 75; and A. Wierzbicka, *Emotions across Languages and Cultures: Diversity and Universals* (Cambridge, 1999).

113 U. Frevert, *Emotions in History – Lost and Found* (Budapest, 2011), 32–33, 36.

114 R. Harré and R. Finlay-Jones, 'Emotion talk across times', in R. Harré (ed.), *The Social Construction of Emotions* (Oxford, 1986), 220–33, at 221. The essay touches on Evagrius's *akedia*, but focuses on the medieval and Renaissance traditions of melancholy. The 'construction' of emotions is also an important concept in recent neuroscience on emotions, a line of research which has the potential for applying to future work on ancient emotions as well; see the leading research of L.F. Barrett, 'The theory of constructed emotion: an active inference account of interoception and categorization', *Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience*, 12 (2017), 1–23; and idem, 'Constructing emotion', *Psychological Topics*, 20 (2011), 359–80.

and *akedia* came to be reconfigured. Labels shifted, and those living within the traditions could come to feel and identify such thoughts, demons or passions in shifting ways as well.

With Evagrius we see a sort of late ancient phenomenology of select passions, which he normally treats as discrete and generic ‘thinkings’. A great virtue of looking so closely at the works of Evagrius is the detail and sophistication that he brought to his investigation. His approach to the emotions had a lasting influence on Christian attitudes toward emotion, east and west. But it was idiosyncratic, and certainly not normative. How the early Byzantine emotions of *lupe* and *akedia* became lost and found in translation among the various inheritors of early Byzantine spirituality has its own interesting history: forgotten, remembered, managed, intertwined and eventually assimilated into melancholia and depression.

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10 *Katepheia*

From Heroic Failure to Christian Dejection

Aglæ Pizzone

Introduction

Sadness is baffling. It is the most intense emotion, longer-lasting than fear, anger, shame – or even joy for that matter.¹ And yet, being associated with little vocal, non-verbal or verbal behaviour, it is often overshadowed by cognate affective states, such as grief, sorrow, melancholy or depression. Equally, while being a dysphoric emotion, sadness is not always perceived negatively, its value depending on the relevant cultural context.² Andrew Crislip's essay in this volume is a masterly illustration of the polarisation of Christian attitudes toward sadness and their evolution over time. My paper has a different take on the issue. It will show that sadness should not be treated as a unified emotion. Antecedents are crucial in defining the quality of sadness and they affect the way that the emotion is valued and behaviourally experienced.

Sadness will provide a case study functional to a broader aim, namely, to demonstrate that linguistic expressions of 'Byzantine emotions' drawn from our texts can be fully understood only when read as part of a diachronic continuum. Such a continuum, in turn, can be best investigated using the tools of historical semantics, cognitive linguistic and quantitative methods, combined with a more traditional philological and historical approach. Although the sources we rely on are far from the spoken language at any point in time and are often determined by generic constraints, they nonetheless reflect the linguistic practices of their producers. Therefore, when examined from both a *longue durée* and a granular perspective, they can offer valuable information on how expression and perception of emotions changed over time. Looking at the cognitive development of the language not only provides better insights into its workings, but it also leads, as we

1 K.R. Scherer and H.G. Wallbott, 'Evidence for universality and cultural variation of differential emotion response patterning', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 66.2 (1994), 310–28.

2 C. Barr-Zisowitz, "'Sadness' – is there such a thing?", in M. Lewis and J.M. Haviland-Jones (ed.), *Handbook of Emotions*, 2nd edn (New York, 2000), 607–22.

shall see, to question current assumptions regarding affective states, making us more aware of our biases in approaching the sources under investigation.

As a starting point of my argument, I shall use Photios's Homily 11 on Holy Saturday. The homily is emotionally charged. On the day before Easter, Photios stresses time and again the paradox entailed by the death of Jesus, putting an end to incarnation and, at the same time, paving the way to the re-creation of mankind. The paradox is also an emotional one, as the faithful are torn by mixed feelings:

Οὐχ ἀπλῆν οὐδὲ μονότροπον τὴν διάθεσιν ἀπεργάζεται, ἀλλ' ἅμα τε καταπλήττει καὶ ἀνακτωμένη δίδωσι θαρρεῖν καὶ ἀνιᾶ καὶ ἠδύνει τὰ μὲν τῷ πάθει καὶ τῷ θανάτῳ, τὰ δὲ τῶν παθῶν τῷ φθόρῳ καὶ τῇ τοῦ θανάτου νεκρώσει, ἃ διὰ τὴν ἐμὴν ὑπὲρ λόγον καινοποιεῖται ἀνάστασιν.

The feeling it arouses is neither simple nor unmixed, but it both overwhelms us and revives us with courage; it grieves and gladdens, the former by the passion and the death, the latter by the destruction of the passions and the slaying of death – which things are marvellously wrought for our resurrection in a manner surpassing words.³

Although it comes at the end of a long homiletic tradition, Photios's treatment of the subject is distinctive as he focuses with intensity on the mixed feelings of the audience facing the mystery of the burial of Christ. This approach surfaces again when he introduces the story of Joseph of Arimathea successfully pleading in front of Pilate to obtain the right to bury Jesus's body. Using focalisation, Photios describes the scenes from the perspective of Joseph, capturing the complexity of his emotional response, which, ultimately, mirrors the audience's. This is in fact Photios's main innovation in treating his subject. He is interested in the wide array of emotions stirred by the paradox of burying the Son of God. This interest also explains why he chooses to exclude from his narrative the otherwise very popular motif of the Virgin's lament – a detail that Cyril Mango does not fail to notice.⁴ Mary's lament would have tilted the balance toward sorrow, shifting the audience's attention from the wide – and paradoxical – array of affective responses that interested Photios. Such focus on multiple and conflicting mental states makes the oration extremely valuable for understanding better the lexical fields related to the conceptual domain of the emotions. The description of Joseph's reactions before the body of Christ raises interesting questions on the issue of sadness.

Καὶ περιχυθεὶς τῷ κειμένῳ πάσας μὲν ἠφίει φωνάς, πᾶσι δὲ κατεμερίζετο πάθεισιν· ὁμοῦ δ' αὐτὸν εἶχεν ἅπαντα, θάμβος, ἔκπληξις· εὐφοροσύνη, λύπη·

3 Photios, *Homilies*, 11.1, ed. B. Laourdas, *Φωτίου Ομιλίες. Έκδοσις κειμένων, εισαγωγή και σχόλια* (Thessalonike, 1959), 105, tr. C. Mango, *The Homilies of Photius, Patriarch of Constantinople* (Cambridge, MA, 1958), 193.

4 Mango, *Homilies of Photius*, 192.

χαρά, δάκρυα· μῖσος, ἔλεος· φόβος, δειλία, θάρσος· φαιδρότης προσώπου καὶ κατήφεια.

Flinging himself on the recumbent corpse, he uttered all manner of cries, and was divided between every kind of emotion. Everything possessed him at the same time: wonder and dismay, gladness and sorrow, joy and tears, hatred and pity, fear, cowardice and courage; his countenance was both gay and dejected.⁵

In depicting the psychological turmoil undergone by Joseph, Photios pinpoints two typologies of dysphoric emotions, *λύπη* (*lupe*) and *κατήφεια* (*katepheia*). The variation is not dictated – or not only – by aesthetic reasons; the goal is rather to describe two different reactions and attitudes. In what follows, Photios shows that Joseph's *lupe* and *katepheia* are triggered by distinct cognitive operations:

Τίς ἂν ζωγράφος λόγος εἰκονίσει τὴν τότε τούτου διάθεσιν; Ἐχαιρεν ἔχων τὸ ποθούμενον, ἐθρήνει νεκρὸν καθορώμενον· ἠλέει κείμενον ἄταφον· τῶν σταυρωσάντων ἐμισάττετο τὴν ὠμότητα, τοῦ σταυρωθέντος ἐθαύμαζε τὸ μακρόθυμον· ἐδεδίει ψαύων τοῦ σώματος, ἐθάρρει πόθῳ ῥωννύμενος· ἐσκυθρώπαζε τῷ παθήματι, χαροποιὸς ἦν εὐτυχήματι.

What descriptive speech could portray his condition at that time? He rejoiced at having the object of his desire; he wept to see Him dead. He pitied Him as He lay without burial. He hated the cruelty of those who had crucified Him; he wondered at the long-suffering of the One crucified. He was afraid as he touched the body; he felt courageous, strengthened by love. He was sad for the suffering; he rejoiced at his good fortune.⁶

While *lupe* conflates with weeping and can ultimately be construed as sorrow ensuing from bereavement,⁷ *κατηφής* (*katephes*) is glossed with the synonym *σκυθρωπάζειν* (*skuthropazein*, having a sombre look), which equally points to a dejected facial expression. *Katepheia*, moreover, is motivated by an empathic reflection on Christ's suffering. Joseph feels powerless and therefore saddened before Christ's crucifixion and at the same empowered and therefore joyful at the prospect of burying him.

Katepheia – just like *skuthropazein* – is a metonymic emotion-term primarily describing a distinctive behaviour and facial posture consisting in downcast eyes. Photios clearly describes two different experiences. The first one, denoted by *lupe* and characterised by the shedding of tears as well as by a sense of loss, can be conceptualised as grief. Grief, however, is not

5 Photios, *Homilies*, 11.4, ed. Laourdas, 111, tr. Mango, 200, slightly modified.

6 *Ibid.*

7 On sorrow in Byzantium, see the seminal study by H. Maguire, 'The depiction of sorrow in middle Byzantine art', *DOP*, 31 (1977), 123–74.

to be reduced to emotion alone, and certainly not to one emotion, but is ‘a complex and enduring molar experience that generates various molecular components, including a range of specific emotions’, of which sadness is just one component.⁸ This fits well with the generic term *lupe* employed by Photios, who further characterises it through the mention of tears. *Katepheia* refers to a different typology of dysphoric affective states that does not necessarily include tears. In fact, *katepheia* in modern Greek generally expresses sadness. *Katepheia*, moreover, does not have the loss of a beloved one as an immediate antecedent. Rather it pertains to the wide constellation of ‘sadness’, which is a dysphoric affective state that can be elicited by loss in the interpersonal sphere but also by ‘disruption of *personal* goals and beliefs (e.g. good health, economic security, a positive self-concept)’.⁹ In fact, most recent psychological experimental studies have proven that sadness encompasses two different subcategories – sadness induced by ‘loss of someone’ and ‘failure to achieve a goal’ – producing different subjective responses but also different ratings and physiological measures.¹⁰

Building on these findings, in this contribution I investigate the semantic development of *κατηφής/katepheia* from ancient to Byzantine Greek. I contend that *katepheia* was originally *not* connected with the idea of sadness caused by loss, but rather with the notion of sadness ensuing from failure. By looking at the transition from classical to Byzantine Greek, I focus in particular on the occurrences of the word in early Christian texts. My aim is to understand how Christian authors exploited the semantic potential of the term to reinforce their ethical stance and at the same time to create a new emotional regime.

Metonymy, Metaphor and Sadness

In the last twenty years, studying the history of pre-modern emotions from the perspective of conceptual metonymies and metaphors has proven a

8 G.A. Bonanno, L. Goorin and K.G. Coifman, ‘Sadness and grief’, in M. Lewis, J.M. Haviland-Jones and L.F. Barrett (ed.), *Handbook of Emotions* (New York, 2009), 797–810, at 798.

9 V.L. Zammuner, ‘Sadness’, in D. Sander and K. Scherer (ed.), *Oxford Companion to Emotion and the Affective Sciences* (Oxford, 2009), 351–52. For the notion of constellation as related to sadness, see *ibid.* On the socio-cultural components of sadness, see Barr-Zisowitz, ‘Sadness’.

10 M. Shirai and N. Suzuki, ‘Is sadness only one emotion? Psychological and physiological responses to sadness induced by two different situations: “loss of someone” and “failure to achieve a goal”’, *Frontiers in Psychology*, 8 (2017), 288. The study is based on a sample of 74 individuals exposed to an imaginary task, involving three scenarios: loss, failure and neutral. Tears correlate with sadness from loss in the subjective ratings. Blood pressure correlates with intensity in sadness from failure and again with tears in sadness from loss. Electrodermal activity in the post-task drops more rapidly in sadness from failure than sadness from loss.

successful approach.¹¹ Linguistic research on modern languages, moreover, has acknowledged the necessity of taking into account the diachronic dimension, going beyond the pre-cultural, allegedly universal cognitive conceptualisation expressed by metaphors.¹² Even though metaphors seem to testify to the existence of certain ‘image schemas’, such as ‘verticality’, ‘container’ or ‘temperature’, that are cross-cultural and build on shared ways to know and live in the world, recent cognitive-functionalist approaches consider cognition side by side with the communicative function of language, whose goal is to create meaning. Such creation of meaning reflects the experience of historically situated speakers who organise their embodied experience of the world into specific cultural models. Cultural models are, in turn, diachronic and evolve over time, thus bringing about changes in the way emotion-related metaphors, metonymies and words are understood. Evolving cultural values and practices can also cause shifts in prototypical scenarios associated with emotion words. Context therefore becomes crucial again, and so does the necessity to combine literary-historical studies with linguistic research.

Taking my cues from these methodological tenets, I look at the impact of diachronic cultural models on the conceptualisation of *katēpheia*. As mentioned above, *katēpheia* is based on metonymy and refers primarily to a behavioural reaction of casting the eyes down. The interplay of metonymy and metaphor is crucial in the linguistic definition and expression of the emotion, as metonymy often provides the dimensions used for the mapping operations carried out by metaphors.¹³ Metonymy and metaphors are at the opposite ends of the same spectrum, as recently explained by Günther Radden, who introduces the category of metonymy-based metaphor to describe the ‘fuzzy’ area between the two poles:

Metonymy is a mapping within the same conceptual domain. Metaphor is a mapping of one conceptual domain onto another. Metonymy-based metaphor is a mapping involving two conceptual domains which are grounded in, or can be traced back to, one conceptual domain.¹⁴

- 11 See, e.g., D. Cairns, *Aidos: The Psychology and Ethics of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greek Literature* (Oxford, 1993); idem, ‘Mind, body, and metaphor in ancient Greek concepts of emotion’, *L'atelier du Centre des recherches historiques*, 16 (2016), doi.org/10.4000/acrh.7416, accessed 14 May 2021; idem, ‘Mind, metaphor, and emotion in Euripides (*Hippolytus*) and Seneca (*Phaedra*)’, *Maia*, 2 (2017), 247–67; S. Braund and G.W. Most (ed.) *Ancient Anger: Perspectives from Homer to Galen* (New Haven, 2004).
- 12 J.-E. Diaz-Vera (ed.), *Metaphor and Metonymy across Time and Cultures: Perspectives on the Sociohistorical Linguistics of Figurative Language* (Berlin, 2015).
- 13 A. Barcelona, ‘On the plausibility of claiming a metonymic motivation for conceptual metaphor’, in A. Barcelona (ed.), *Metaphor and Metonymy at the Crossroads: A Cognitive Perspective* (Berlin, 2003), 31–58.
- 14 G. Radden, ‘How metonymic are metaphors?’, in *Metaphor and Metonymy at the Crossroads*, ed. Barcelona, 93–108, at 93.

Metonymy, moreover, is one of the typical mechanisms through which cognitive development in languages happens – in the form of *semantic expansion*. Such an expansion, as described by Lüdtke, typically unfolds in three stages: first, creativity, through the introduction of a metaphoric meaning; second, imitation, in which speakers and hearers use the metaphor; and third, polysemy, in which the hierarchical relationship between the basic and the metaphorical meaning is not so clear-cut anymore.¹⁵ As we will see, *katepheia* seems to follow the same patterns in Greek literary texts from the archaic to the Byzantine period.

In a seminal paper on depression in English, Antonio Barcelona shows that the fundamental metonymies structuring the concept of depression are ‘based upon the folk theory of the psychological effects of depression, on the one hand, and those based upon the folk theory of the behavioural effects of depression, on the other hand’.¹⁶ *Visual behaviour*, that is ‘eyes looking down’ and ‘lack of brightness (when looking)’ count among the latter. Barcelona also points out how more general metaphors arise precisely from these metonymies.¹⁷ The major orientational metaphor ‘happy is up, unhappy is down’,¹⁸ as well as the light perception metaphor ‘light is happiness, dark is unhappiness’, derive from the tendency to cast the eyes down, which also entails a ‘lack of brightness effect’.¹⁹ As metonymy and related metaphors have a common experiential domain and are correlated, we can talk in this case, with Radden, of a metonymy-based metaphor.

In this respect, *katepheia* fits the bill, as the effect of sadness – eyes downcast – comes to denote the cause, that is, the emotion itself. In archaic, classical and Hellenistic texts, moreover, the abstract noun, as well as the adjective *κατηφής* (*katephes*)²⁰ and the verb *κατηφέω* (*katepheo*), always refers to the subject experiencing sadness. In imperial and medieval Greek, however, we see a further metonymic shift, whereby the adjective can come

15 H. Lüdtke, ‘Diachronic semantics: toward a unified theory of language change?’, in A. Blank and P. Koch (ed.), *Historical Semantics and Cognition* (Berlin, 1999), 49–60, at 51.

16 A. Barcelona, ‘The concept of depression in American English’, *Cognitive Psychopathology*, 2.3 (1986), 13–32.

17 Barcelona, ‘On the plausibility’, 19.

18 Barcelona, ‘On the plausibility’, 43–44.

19 Cf. also Barcelona, ‘On the plausibility’, 40.

20 In classical Greek, the adjective is still suspended between the literal and the metonymical. The boundary is not always clear. This emerges particularly in ancient drama, see, for instance, Euripides, *Medea*, 1012, ed.tr. D. Kovacs, *Euripides, Cyclops; Alcestis; Medea*, LCL, 12 (Cambridge, MA, 1994), 374; Euripides, *Orestes*, 881, ed.tr. D. Kovacs, *Euripides, Helen; Phoenician Women; Orestes*, LCL, 11 (Cambridge, MA, 2002), 512; Menander, *Dis Exapaton*, 104, ed.tr. W.G. Arnott, *Menander, Aspis; Georgos; Dis Exapaton; Dyskolos; Encheiridion; Epitrepontes*, LCL, 132 (Cambridge, MA, 1979), 162. This point would deserve a thorough study as probably such occurrences have to be read against actual theatrical practices, including the wearing of masks, which translated into very visual terms the characters’ ‘dejection’ and their emotions at large; cf. W.B. Stanford, *Greek Tragedy and the Emotions* (London, 1983).

to denote entities that are the cause of sadness (life in general, a particular object or even another feeling),²¹ even though this usage seems to be less frequent. Over time, moreover, *katēpheia* becomes a source domain for metaphorical expressions that indicate weather conditions, inverting the more usual pattern in which ‘an emotional mood is the weather’.²² Therefore, in Byzantine Greek *katēphes* can denote winter, a cloudy sky or an atmospheric phenomenon.²³

When it comes to the way in which *katēpheia* affects the individual, the dominant conceptual metaphor, especially in Byzantine Greek, is ‘the emotions are fluids in a container’.²⁴ The subject is filled by *katēpheia*, and the relevant verbs are typically γέμω, ἐμπύμπλημι (in the passive voice) or the adjective μεστός.²⁵ This construal overlaps with what has been registered in English for depression (‘she was *filled with sorrow*’²⁶) and relies on the emergent concept of the body as a container.²⁷ Yet it is important to note that this schematic structure emerges only late in Greek texts. The first instances are to be found in Philo of Alexandria,²⁸ and the expression becomes common

- 21 The earliest examples are Herakleitos, *Allegories*, 39.16 (sky), ed. F. Buffière, *Héraclite, Allégories d’Homère*, Collection des Universités de France – Collection grecque, 156 (Paris, 1962), 47; Plutarch, *On the Tranquility of the Soul*, 477e (life), ed. tr. W.C. Helmbold, *Plutarch, Moralia*, vol. 6, LCL, 337 (Cambridge, MA, 1939), 240; Philostratos, *Lives of the Sophists*, 556 (Delphic stone), ed. tr. W.C. Wright, *Philostratus and Eunapius, The Lives of the Sophists*, LCL, 134 (Cambridge, MA, 1921), 160; Origen, *Homilies on Job*, 31.6–7 (life), ed. J.B. Pitra, *Analecta sacra spicilegio Solesmensi parata*, vol. 2 (Paris, 1884), 379.33; Porphyry, *Against the Christians*, fragm. 34.12 (events), ed. A. von Harnack, *Porphyrius, Gegen die Christen: 15 Bücher; Zeugnisse und Referate*, AbhGött, Philol.-hist. Kl., 1 (Berlin, 1916), 61; Tryphiodoros, *Capture of Troy*, 32 (Eos, the mother of Memnon, turns daylight into darkness out of grief), ed. L. Miguélez-Cavero, *Triphiodorus, The Sack of Troy: A General Study and a Commentary* (Berlin, 2013), 96, with commentary on p. 145; Gregory of Nyssa, *Life of Macrina*, 22.11–12 (hope), ed. E. Maraval, *Grégoire de Nysse, Vie de sainte Macrine*, SC, 178 (Paris, 1971), 212; Eusebios, *Life of Constantine*, 2.30.2 (life), ed. F. Winkelmann, *Eusebius, Werke*, vol. 1.1: *Über das Leben des Kaisers Konstantin*, 2nd edn, GCS, 7 (Berlin, 1991), 61.14.
- 22 Z. Kövecses, *Emotion Concepts* (New York, 1990), 228.
- 23 See, for instance, Theodore of Studios, Letter 498.30, ed. G. Fatouros, *Theodori Studitae Epistolae*, 2 vols, CFHB, 31 (Berlin, 1991), vol. 2, 735.
- 24 On the body as a vessel, see C. Maurer, ‘σκεῦος’, *TDNT*, vol. 7, 365, nn. 48–49.
- 25 See, e.g., Gregory of Nyssa, Oration 1, ‘On holy Easter’, ed. G. Heil, A. Van Heck, E. Gebhardt and A. Spira, *Gregorii Nysseni opera*, vol. 9: *Sermones pars I* (Leiden, 1967), 247.22; Gregory of Nazianzos, Oration 18, PG 35:988.12; Theodore of Studios, Letter 520.12, ed. Fatouros, II, 575; Symeon the New Theologian, Hymn 17.140, ed. J. Koder and tr. L. Neyrand, *Syméon le nouveau théologien, Hymnes*, vol. 2, SC, 174 (Paris, 1976), 24; Euthymios Tornikes, Oration 3.22, ed. J. Darrouzès, ‘Les discours d’Euthyme Tornikès (1200–1205)’, *REB*, 26 (1968), 56–72, 76–89, 94–117, here 109.26.
- 26 Barcelona, ‘Concept of depression’, 12.
- 27 Lakoff and Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By*, 50.
- 28 See, for example, *On Abraham*, 151.4, ed. tr. F.H. Colson and G.H. Whitaker, *Philo, with an English Translation*, 10 vols, LCL, 226–27, 247, 261, 275, 289, 320, 341, 363, 379 (Cambridge, MA, 1929–41), here LCL, 289, p. 76; *On Joseph*, 89.3, ed. Colson, *ibid.*, 84.

only from the fourth century CE onwards. In ancient Greek, *kateptheia* is rather something that one has or that dwells among a group of people (see below), while in Hellenistic and imperial Greek we start seeing the metaphor ‘emotions are an opponent’, with *kateptheia* getting hold (ἔχῳ) of the victim.²⁹

In what follows I shall look, as a first step, at *kateptheia* in the Homeric poems, testing the hypothesis that in the poems the term implied a prototypical scenario where dysphoric feelings are elicited by failure rather than loss. ‘Failure’ is a conceptual area that, through Stamatia Dova’s recent monograph has begun to attract the attention of classicists.³⁰ Unlike Dova, however, I will look at archaic and classical texts only as a starting point of a broader diachronic enquiry. Furthermore, I will look in greater detail at the variation between adjacent semantic areas such as sadness, shame and dejection, trying to understand how they are lexicalised.

Heroic Dejection in Homer

We find the substantive *kateptheia* three times in Homer. In one instance, the term is used as antonymous with χάρμα (*charma*, joy) and is associated with the idea of dejection subsequent to failure in abiding by the expected ethical norms. At *Iliad*, 3.51, Hector reproaches Paris for his misconduct, which has brought ruin to the Trojan people, despondency to himself and joy to their enemies:

ἦ τοιόσδε ἐὼν ἐν ποντοπόροισι νέεσσι
 πόντον ἐπιπλώσας, ἐτάρους ἐρήρας ἀγείρας,
 μιχθεὶς ἀλλοδαποῖσι γυναικ’ εὐεϊδέ’ ἀνήγεσ
 ἐξ ἀπίης γαίης νυδὸν ἀνδρῶν αἰχμητῶν
 πατρί τε σῶ μέγα πῆμα πόλιτι τε παντί τε δήμῳ,
 δυσμενέσιν μὲν χάρμα, κατηφείην δὲ σοὶ αὐτῶ;

Was it in such strength as this that you sailed over the deep in your sea-faring ships, having gathered your trusty comrades and, mingling with foreigners, brought back a fair woman from a distant land, a daughter of warriors who wield the spear, but to your father and city and all the people a great misery – to your foes a joy, but to yourself dejection?³¹

At first sight, the concept of *kateptheia* looks close to notions of shame or guilt,³² with the persons failing to conform to the expected standards

29 Kövecses, *Metaphor and Emotion*, 69. For the earliest examples, see Apollonios Rhodios, *Argonautica*, 4.594, ed.tr. W.H. Race, *Apollonius Rhodius, Argonautica*, LCL, 1 (Cambridge, MA, 2009), 376; Flavius Josephus, *Jewish Antiquities*, 2.108, ed. H.S.J. Thackeray, *Josephus, Jewish Antiquities*, vol. 1, LCL, 242 (Cambridge, MA, 1930), 212.

30 S. Dova, *The Poetics of Failure in Ancient Greece* (London, 2020).

31 *Iliad*, 3.46–51, ed.tr. A.T. Murray, rev. W.F. Wyatt, *Homer, Iliad*, 2 vols, LCL, 170–71 (Cambridge, MA, 1924), 130–32, tr. slightly modified.

32 On shame and guilt, see Cairns, *Aidos*, 14–47.

causing *katēpheia* to themselves or bringing *katēpheia* upon someone else. This reading seems to be confirmed by the formulaic association *κατηφείη καὶ ὄνειδος* (dejection and reproach), which appears twice in the *Iliad* in two mirror scenes. In book 16.498–500 Sarpedon, mortally wounded by Patroklos, urges his companions to protect his body after his death so that his remains will be untouched by the Greeks. Otherwise, he will turn into a token of *katēpheia* and reproach to his companions.

σοὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ καὶ ἔπειτα κατηφείη καὶ ὄνειδος
ἔσσομαι ἡματα πάντα διαμπερές, εἴ κέ μ' Ἀχαιοὶ
τεύχεα συλήσωσι νεῶν ἐν ἀγῶνι πεσόντα.

For to you even in time to come shall I be a rebuke and a cause of dejection all your days continually if the Achaeans strip me of my armour, now that I have fallen where the ships are gathered.³³

Later on, in book 17.556–58, with the heroes now battling over Patroklos's body, Athena disguised as Phoenix stirs Menelaos so as to have him recover Patroklos's remains from the battlefield, lest he bring *katēpheia* and reproach upon himself.

σοὶ μὲν δὴ Μενέλαε κατηφείη καὶ ὄνειδος
ἔσσειται εἴ κ' Ἀχιλλῆος ἀγαθοῦ πιστὸν ἐταῖρον
τείχει ὑπο Τρώων ταχέες κύνες ἐλκήσουσιν.

For you, surely, Menelaos, will it be a rebuke and a cause of dejection, if the trusty comrade of lordly Achilles is torn by swift dogs beneath the wall of the Trojans.³⁴

The closeness of *katēpheia* to shame or guilt appears to be strong in these examples. Dova has recently argued that 'the term denotes shame or disgrace and the dejection resulting from it', showing how the private and public spheres conflate.³⁵ And yet I would like to argue that *katēpheia* refers to a specific prototypical scenario, one that, moreover, is not in contradiction with Dova's argument but ensues naturally from it. First of all, *katēpheia* is always retrospective (for more examples, see the passages discussed below).³⁶ Even in books 16 and 17, where Sarpedon and Athena use the threat of *katēpheia* to push the Greeks and the Trojans toward the correct course of

33 *Iliad*, 3.46–51, ed. tr. A.T. Murray, rev. W.F. Wyatt, *Homer, Iliad*, 2 vols, LCL, 170–71 (Cambridge, MA, 1924), 130–32, tr. slightly modified.

34 Ed. Murray, 268–70, tr. Murray, slightly modified.

35 Dova, *Poetics of Failure*, 150.

36 In the poems *aidos* is inhibitory while *aischyne* is both prospective and retrospective, as demonstrated by Cairns, *Aidos*, 48–146, 300–1.

action, they do so by presenting the consequences of the behaviour they discourage. In book 3, *katephea* is clearly the unwanted and unforeseen consequence of Paris's choices. In this respect, *katephea* can be more precisely interpreted as the remorse ensuing from an appraisal that the subject, with hindsight, regards as wrong. Not coincidentally, *katephea* always pertains to the individual making the relevant judgement. Linked to self-appraisal, it is the dejection that is elicited by wrong judgement.

Homeric scholia make clear that ancient scholars interpreted *katephea* as situated between pain/gloominess and shame/blame.³⁷ Although *katephea* and *αἰσχύνη* (*aischyne*) seem in fact to share some features, the two notions do not overlap completely, as we shall see. *Katephea* is rather – and was interpreted as such at least by Byzantine times – a reaction that can be, but is not exclusively, provoked by the feeling of shame and or by the blame by others. Equally, it can be a component of a reaction to feelings of pain. *Katephea* is not solely associated with the idea of moral failure, rather it is connected to the notion of 'failure' in general or to situations ensuing from 'cognitive dissonance'. This silver thread runs through the uses of the family *kateph-* in the Homeric poems and finds support also in the examples provided by Dova pertaining to defeated athletes in Pindar.³⁸ The bordering on shame and guilt is not surprising but has to be read in connection with the issue of agency. Shame and guilt go with appraisals of self-agency, while unmixed sadness correlates with lack of self-agency.³⁹

The most telling example comes from *Iliad*, 22.291–93, where we find the verb *kateptheo*. We are in the final stages of the duel between Hector and Achilles. The Trojan has thrown his spear to no avail and is struck by the realisation that he does not have a spare weapon.

χάσατο δ' Ἐκτωρ/ ὅττι ρά οἱ βέλος ὠκὺ ἐτώσιον ἔκφυγε χειρός,/ στή δὲ
κατηφής, οὐδ' ἄλλ' ἔχε μείλιον ἔγχος.

37 D scholia ad *Iliadem*, 16.498, ed. H. van Thiel, *Scholia in Iliadem, Proecdosis aucta et correctior 2014 secundum codices manu scriptos*, Elektronische Schriftenreihe der Universitäts- und Stadtbibliothek, 7 (Cologne, 2014), 490: Κατηφείη. Αἰσχύνη. Ὀνειδος; D scholia ad *Il.* 17.556, ed. van Thiel, 507: Κατηφείη. Στυγνότης, λύπη. ἀπὸ τοῦ κάτω ἔχειν τὰ φάη. As we have seen, the two passages from *Iliad* 16 and 17 describe two mirror scenes in which *κατηφείη* has the same semantic value. And yet the scholia gloss with two different meanings. This is further evidence that the semantic spectrum of the term was indeed felt as broad. The breadth of the spectrum is confirmed by the *scholia vetera* which, in commenting on *Iliad*, 24.253d (ed. H. Erbse, *Scholia Graeca in Homeri Iliadem [scholia vetera]*, vol. 5 [Berlin, 1977], 566. 69–71), gloss as follows: ἄλλως· κατηφῶν παρὰ τὸ φῶ, οὗ παράγωγον φάω, ὃ κάτω ἔχων τὰ φάη δι' αἰσχύνην ἢ δι' ὀνειδισμόν ἢ <διά> λύπην. ('Also: *katephon* like *pho*, from which *phao* derives, those who keep their eyes downcast due to shame, blame or pain').

38 Dova, *Poetics of Failure*, 149–51.

39 P.C. Ellsworth and C. Smith, 'From appraisal to emotion: differences among unpleasant feelings', *Motivation and Emotion*, 112.3 (1988), 271–302.

And Hector was angered because the swift shaft had flown vainly from his hand, and he stood dejected, nor did he have a second spear of ash.⁴⁰

Katēphēsas translates here the sudden feeling of dejection and the sense of powerlessness ensuing from the realisation that not only had Hector missed his target, but, contrary to his beliefs, he had run out of available weapons. An association between *katēpheo* and *ἀχεύω* (*acheuo*, to grieve) is to be found in *Odyssey*, book 16, when the swineherd brings the news that Telemachos has indeed returned from Pylos to the palace. The suitors' reaction is described as follows: *μνηστῆρες δ' ἀκάχοντο κατήφησάν τ' ἐνὶ θυμῷ* (the suitors grieved and were downcast in their heart; 16.342). Eurymachos's subsequent speech makes clear that the news had both proven their beliefs false and rendered their plans vain.

ὦ φίλοι, ἦ μέγα ἔργον ὑπερφιάλως ἐτελέσθη
 Τηλεμάχῳ ὁδὸς ἦδε· φάμεν δέ οἱ οὐ τελέεσθαι.
 ἀλλ' ἄγε νῆα μέλαιναν ἐρύσσομεν, ἦ τις ἀρίστη,
 ἐς δ' ἐρέτας ἀλιῆας ἀγείρομεν, οἳ κε τάχιστα
 κείνοισ' ἀγγείλωσι θεῶς οἴκόνδε νέεσθαι.

My friends, truly a great deed has been insolently brought to pass by Telemachos, to wit this journey, and we thought that he would never see it accomplished. But come, let us launch a black ship, the best we have, and let us get together seamen as rowers that they may as soon as possible bring word to those others speedily to return home.⁴¹

The couple *katēpheolacheuo* is far from surprising, given that, as already Arthur Adkins stressed, mistake and moral error are situated on the same continuum in the poems.⁴² Interestingly, Byzantine readers could clearly feel the semantic equivalence between *katēpheo* and *acheuo*. In commenting on the suitors' disappointment, Eustathios points out that the two verbs have essentially the same meaning:⁴³

Ὅτι σιγηλῆς λύπης δήλωσις τὸ, οἱ δεῖνα ἀκάχοντο κατήφησαν δ' ἐνὶ θυμῷ. πάσχουσι δὲ τοῦτο οἱ μνηστῆρες μαθόντες ἐπανελεθεῖν ἀβλαβῆ τὸν Τηλέμαχον. Ὅρα δὲ τὸ κατήφησαν ἐκ τοῦ κατηφῶ κατηφήσω τοῦ καὶ ἐν

40 Ed. Murray, 472–74, tr. Murray, slightly modified.

41 *Odyssey*, 16.346–50, ed. Murray, 142, tr. Murray, slightly modified.

42 A.W.H. Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility. A Study in Greek Values* (Oxford, 1960), 30–31; and cf. idem, 'Homeric values and Homeric society', *JHS*, 91 (1971), 1–14. Adkins' view on Homeric values is nonetheless problematic, as stressed by Cairns, *Aidos*, 50–51, 72–74.

43 *Commentaries on the Odyssey, ad 16.342*, ed. J.G. Stallbaum, *Eustathii archiepiscopi Thessalonicensis commentarii ad Homeri Odysseam: Ad fidem exempli romani*, 2 vols (Leipzig, 1825–26), vol. 2, 126.30–33.

ἄλλοις κειμένον, τὸ μέντοι κατηφιᾶν κοινόν. ὅμοιον δὲ καὶ τὸ μειδῶ μειδήσω καὶ μειδιῶ. Δῆλον δὲ ὅτι ταυτὸν τὸ ἀκάχοντο καὶ τὸ κατήφισαν.

The verse οἱ δὲ δεινα ἀκάχοντο κατήφισαν δ' ἐνὶ θυμῷ indicates silent pain. The suitors suffer when they learn that Telemachos has come home unarmed. Notice that *katephesan* comes from *katepho*, *katepheso* and the other parsed forms, even though the form *katephian* is the common one. The same happens with *meido*, *medeso* and *medio*. It is clear that *akachonto* and *katephesan* are the same.

Eustathios's commentary also reveals a further detail. Both *katepheo* and *acheuo* by themselves usually refer to perceivable expressions of disappointment that do not include tears. Indeed, ἐνὶ θυμῷ implies that the suitors showed no sign of their feelings.⁴⁴ Eustathios's exegesis helps us also in another respect. In commenting upon the passage from *Iliad*, 16, Eustathios stresses that whereas *oneidos* refers to the community's judgement, *katepheia* pertains to the subject's inner judgement.

Τοῦ δὲ «κατηφείη καὶ ὄνειδος» τὸ μὲν οἴκοθεν αὐτοῦ δὴ τοῦ Γλαύκου πάθος ἔσται, τὸ δὲ ἐξ ἄλλων.

In the phrase *katepheie kai oneidos*, the former indicates Glaukos's own feelings, the latter others' feelings.⁴⁵

Likewise, Eustathios's contemporary John Tzetzes, resorting to a passage by Aristoxenos known also from other sources,⁴⁶ associates *katepheia* with the awareness of shameful deeds. In commenting on *Iliad*, 1.331, he asserts:

ταρβήσαντε καὶ αἰδομένω· φοβηθέντες καὶ αἰδεσθέντες· διαφέρει αἰδῶς καὶ αἰσχύνη καθὰ πού φησι ὁ μουσικὸς Ἀριστοξένος· αἰδῶς μὲν γάρ ἐστι, κατ' αὐτόν, ἢ ἐπ' ἀγαθῷ εὐλάβεια καὶ ὑποστολή· αἰσχύνη δέ, ἢ ἐξ αἰσχυρῶν πραγμάτων ἀτιμία τε καὶ κατήφεια.

Tarbesante kai aidomeno: Scared and ashamed. *Aidos* and *aischyne* differ, as explained by Aristoxenos the musician: *aidos* is, as he argues,

44 See D. Cairns, 'Ψυχή, θυμός, and metaphor in Homer and Plato', *Études platoniciennes*, 11 (2014), doi.org/10.4000/etudesplatoniciennes.566, accessed 16 May 2021.

45 *Commentaries on the Iliad*, ad 16.498, ed. M. van der Valk, *Commentarii ad Homeri Iliadem pertinentes*, 5 vols (Leiden, 1971–87), vol. 3, 890.19.

46 Aristoxenos, Fragm. 42, ed. F. Wehrli, *Die Schule des Aristoteles: Texte und Kommentare; Aristoxenos* (Basel, 1945), 21. Tzetzes reprises the same passage by Aristoxenos also in *Commentary on Hesiod's Works and Days*, 190, ed. T. Gaisford, *Hesiodi Carmina praecipua lectionis varietate et indicibus locuplentissimis* (Leipzig, 1823), 212. For a survey of the sources and a translation, see S.I. Kaiser (ed.), *Die Fragmente des Aristoxenos aus Tarent* (Hildesheim, 2010), 190–1.

caution and holding back in view of the good; *aischyne*, on the contrary, consists in the dishonour and dejection ensuing from base action.⁴⁷

The passage makes clear that Tzetzes subscribed to Aristoxenos's view that *aischyne* does not completely overlap with *katēpheia*, but rather is a particular kind of it.⁴⁸ He also shares the view that *katēpheia*, like *aischyne* in this case, is purely retrospective.

The dynamic between external and internal moral condemnation can be appreciated also in the passage from the *Odyssey*, where Autolykos's father urges his fellow men to take revenge on Odysseus, lest they be ashamed among the generations to come.

ἀλλ' ἄγετε, πρὶν τοῦτον ἢ ἐς Πύλον ὄκα ἰκέσθαι
ἢ καὶ ἐς Ἥλιδα δῖαν, ὅθι κρατέουσιν Ἐπειοί,
ἴομεν· ἢ καὶ ἔπειτα κατηφῆες ἐσσομέθ' αἰεὶ.
λώβη γὰρ τάδε γ' ἐστὶ καὶ ἐσσομένοισι πυθέσθαι,
εἰ δὴ μὴ παίδων τε κασιγνήτων τε φονῆας
τεισομέθ'· οὐκ ἂν ἐμοὶ γε μετὰ φρεσὶν ἡδὺ γένοιτο
ζῶέμεν, ἀλλὰ τάχιστα θανῶν φθιμένοισι μετεῖην.

Come then, before this fellow speeds off either to Pylos or to splendid Elis, where the Epeians rule, let us go; truly now and afterwards we shall be dejected forever. For this is a disgrace even for men yet to be to hear of, unless we avenge the deaths of our sons and brothers. I, certainly, would find no pleasure in living; instead, let me die at once and be among the dead.⁴⁹

The passage makes clear that 'feeling *katēpheis*' is what awaits the suitors' kinsmen if they do not take action. While these feelings would be accompanied by collective disapproval (λώβη), they ultimately ensue, once again, from a wrong decision and result in a feeling of powerlessness and hatred for life.

To sum up, in its first usages *katēpheia* refers to the retrospective feeling of powerlessness following failed decision-making that might or might not be of moral character. This fact emerges also in the vast majority of the instances⁵⁰ of the abstract concept *katēpheia* in classical and Hellenistic

47 John Tzetzes, *Commentary on the Iliad*, ed. M. Papathomopoulos, *Ἐξηγήσεις Ἰωάννου γραμματικοῦ τοῦ Τζέτζου εἰς τὴν Ὁμήρου Ἰλιάδα* (Athens, 2007), 310.3–7.

48 This seems also confirmed by Plutarch, *On Compliancy*, 528 E–F, ed. tr. P.H. De Lacy and B. Einarson, *Plutarch, Moralia*, vol. 7, LCL, 405 (Cambridge, MA, 1959), 46–48. See S. Swain 'Polemon's Physiognomy', in S. Swain et al. (ed.), *Seeing the Face, Seeing the Soul: Polemon's Physiognomy from Classical Antiquity to Medieval Islam* (Oxford, 2007), 125–202, at 141.

49 *Odyssey*, 24.430–37, ed. Murray, 442–44, tr. Murray.

50 If we exclude Philo (to whom I will return) and Homeric scholia, fifteen instances of the word can be counted in the *TLG*.

times. A clear example is found in Thucydides, where *kateptheia* describes the pitiful Athenian retreat by land led by Nikias and Demosthenes during the campaign in Sicily. The retreat is the result of a chain of disastrous judgement calls, and therefore among the retiring troops κατήφειά τέ τις ἄμα καὶ κατὰμμεμυγίς σφῶν αὐτῶν πολλή ἦν.⁵¹ The phrase κατήφειά τέ τις ἄμα καὶ κατὰμμεμυγίς is so powerful and icastic that it is taken up verbatim by later prose writers or hinted at to describe similar situations through an intertextual reference to Thucydides.⁵² Likewise, powerlessness is the unifying factor signifying the uses of *kateptheia* in Apollonios Rhodios, as recently stressed by James Livingston.⁵³

Significantly, *kateptheia* appears in Rhianos, fragment 1, to qualify the powerless condition of the despondent man, unable to utter any brave word or perform a virtuous deed.⁵⁴ This use of the term by Rhianos testifies again to the likelihood of the original semantic range in Homer as outlined above. Rhianos was himself a well-versed Homeric scholar who had prepared a critical edition of the poems, and fragment 1 is loaded with references to the Homeric text.⁵⁵ The lack of agency also explains both the association of *kateptheia* with the female gender and its connection with reprehensible psychological conditions such as lack of spirit. In Pseudo-Aristotle's *Physiognomics*, 'being *katepthes*' is seen as a hallmark of both the fainthearted and the complaining individual. It is also closely connected to feminine and weak attitudes.⁵⁶

Pseudo-Aristotle represents a milestone in the evolution of the construct. First, the *Physiognomics* specifies that 'being *katepthes*' refers to the *pathos* characterising the complaining subject. *Kateptheia* therefore seems to evolve

51 *History of the Peloponnesian War*, 7.75.5, ed.tr. C.F. Smith, *Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War*, vol. 4, LCL, 108 (Cambridge, MA, 1923), 152.

52 Chariton, *Callirhoe*, 6.8.3, ed.tr. G.P. Goold, *Chariton, Callirhoe*, LCL, 48 (Cambridge, MA, 1995), 314; with R.D. Luginbill, 'Chariton's use of Thucydides' *History* in introducing the Egyptian Revolt (*Chaireas and Callirhoe* 6.8)', *Mnemosyne*, 53 (2000), 1–11, at 6–7; and cf. Dionysios of Halikarnassos, *Roman Antiquities*, 7.19.4, ed.tr. E. Cary, *Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities*, vol. 4, LCL, 319 (Cambridge, MA, 1937), 204.

53 J.G. Livingston, 'Imagery and psychological motivation in Apollonius Rhodius' *Argonautica and early Greek poetry* (PhD diss., University of Edinburgh, 2014), 199–200.

54 Fragm. 1.8, ed. I.U. Powell, *Collectanea Alexandrina: Reliquiae minores poetarum Graecorum aetatis Ptolemaicae* (Oxford, 1925), 9.

55 See L. Leurini, 'Osservazioni, vecchie e nuove, su Rhian. fr. 1 Powell', in M. Cannatà Fera and S. Grandolini (ed.), *Poesia e religione in Grecia: Studi in onore di G. Aurelio Privitera*, 2 vols (Naples, 2000), I, 385–97. On Homer's edition prepared by Rhianos, see L. Leurini, *L'edizione omerica di Riano di Creta* (Rome, 2007); and C. Esposito, 'Riano studioso di Omero', *Eikasmos*, 19 (2008), 560–66.

56 *Physiognomics*, 808a7–12, ed. C. Plantl, *Aristotelis quae feruntur De coloribus, De audibilibus, Physiognomica*, Bibliotheca scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana (Leipzig, 1881), 40 (fainthearted); 8, 812a4–5, ed. Plantl, 49 (complaining characters); tr. S. Vogt, *Aristoteles, Physiognomica*, Aristoteles, Werke in Deutscher Übersetzung, 18.6 (Berlin, 1999), 17–18 (fainthearted); 27 (complaining characters). 808a7–12 ed. Plantl, 40, deserves attention because it shows that by Aristotle's time the metonymical meaning of *kateptheia*/κατήφης could obscure the literal one. In fact, Aristotle says that drooping eyelids or closed eyes are a sign of both a weak/feminine and a fainthearted/*katepthes* state, as if he did not feel anymore that κατήφης encapsulated by itself the notion of 'drooping eye-lids'.

from the status of an emotion to that of a character trait.⁵⁷ In imperial times, *κατήφεια δεινή* (*katepheie deine*) will be understood in medical literature as one of the characteristics of melancholy, opening up a long tradition that will continue well into the modern era.⁵⁸ For the purposes of the present paper, however, I will follow a different track, looking instead at what *katepheia* becomes in Christian texts.

From Philo to the Catenae: Sadness and Christian Conscience

The number of occurrences of *katepheia* recorded in the *TLG* jump up with Philo of Alexandria. Philo uses the term fifteen times.⁵⁹ In his work, we see a clear semantic broadening of the word, which denotes now behavioural responses to pain or psychological reactions to evil,⁶⁰ as well as a general state of dejection.⁶¹ At the same time, however, a potential semantic narrowing can also be detected. In thirteen out of fifteen instances, *katepheia* is accompanied by the term σύννοια (*synnoia*) in the formulaic phrase *katepheia kai synnoia*. As shown by previous scholarship, the term *synnoia* has a very complex semantic range, spanning from concentration (lit. ‘gathered mind’) to anxious rumination, to something very close to remorse and, ultimately, conscience. In a thorough but often overlooked study dating back to 1970, Tonia Cancrini argues that fifth-century tragic authors use σύννοια as synonymous with moral conscience. In addressing the cognate term συνείδησις (*syneidesis*), Cancrini shows that the word becomes standard for ‘conscience’ only in Graeco-Roman times, with this specific meaning emerging precisely in Philo of Alexandria.⁶² Cancrini’s findings have been confirmed by sub-

57 P. Goldie, *The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration* (Oxford 2002), 141, defines traits of character as ‘generally, dispositions to have thoughts and feelings of a certain sort, and thus to act in certain ways’. Emotions are on the contrary episodes limited in time and elicited by a specific antecedent, as all the examples seen so far have also shown.

58 Cf. Aretaeos, *On the Causes and Signs of Daily Diseases*, 1.5.7, ed. K. Hude *Aretaeos*, 2nd edn, *Corpus medicorum Graecorum*, 2 (Berlin, 1958), 5.12; and cf. R. Klibansky, E. Panofsky and F. Saxl, *Saturn and Melancholy: Studies in the History of Natural Philosophy, Religion, and Art* (London, 1964); M. Peri, *Malato d’amore: La medicina dei poeti e la poesia dei medici* (Rubbettino, 1996), 43–45.

59 On Philo’s linguistic and cultural background, see M.R. Niehoff, *Philo of Alexandria: An Intellectual Biography* (New Haven, 2018), who also stresses the fact that Philo, who probably did not know Hebrew (see 251–52), anticipates later linguistic and rhetorical trends proper of the Second Sophistic (see 18–22).

60 *On Abraham*, 151, ed. Colson, LCL, 289, p. 76; *On the Decalogue*, 145, ed. tr. Colson, LCL, 320, p. 78; *On the Special Laws*, 3.193, ed. Colson, *ibid.*, 596.

61 *On Dreams*, 2.24 (168), ed. Colson and Whitaker, LCL, 275, p. 518; *Concerning Noah’s Work as a Planter*, 167, ed. Colson and Whitaker, LCL, 247, p. 298; *On the Special Laws*, 2.214, ed. Colson, LCL, 320, p. 440; *On Rewards and Punishments*, 35, ed. Colson, *ibid.*, 332.

62 A. Cancrini, *Syneidesis: Il tema semantico della ‘con-scientia’ nella Grecia antica* (Rome, 1970), 15. See Philo, *On the Special Laws*, 2.49, ed. Colson, LCL, 320, p. 338; *That the Worse is Wont to Attack the Better*, 50 (146), ed. Colson and Whitaker, LCL, 227, p. 298; *On the*

sequent research focused more specifically on Philo's work. Philip Bosman, in particular, demonstrates that *syneidesis* as conscience is overwhelmingly connoted in a negative way in Philo.⁶³ More specifically it is construed as 'guilty conscience'. I would argue that essentially the same process can be documented for *synnoia*. This brings about interesting implications for the understanding of *katepheia*, given that *synnoia* is used sixteen times in Philo, of which fifteen are in connection with *katepheia*.

Like *katepheia*, *synnoia* can be a metonymic term. As *katepheia* comes to indicate the mental state (dejection) associated with the relevant behavioural response (downcast eyes), σύννοια can indicate a behavioural response to a mental state (anxious thought). The response in this case consists in frowning.⁶⁴ The formulaic coupling of *katepheia* and *synnoia* serves the purpose to convey the feeling of dejection in both its outer and inner expression, as *synnoia* is more related to the cognitive component of the feeling. In the only instance where Philo employs *synnoia* on its own, the word indicates the mental state arising from a deeper awareness of the world and its moral challenges. It is not a negative feeling from an ethical point of view, even if it stems from the awareness that human nature is essentially faulty and hardly ever achieves the required perfection.

προσφνέστατα θεις ὀνόματα. τίς γάρ οὐ τὰς δι' ὀφθαλμῶν, τίς δ' οὐ τὰς δι' ὠτῶν, τίς δ' οὐ τὰς διὰ γεύσεως ὀσφρήσεώς τε καὶ ἀφῆς ἡδονὰς καὶ τέρψεις ἀποδέχεται; τίς δ' οὐ τὰ ἐναντία μεμίσηκεν, ὀλιγοδείαν, ἐγκράτειαν, αὐστηρὸν καὶ ἐπιστημονικὸν βίον, γέλωτος καὶ παιδιᾶς ἀμέτοχον, συννοίας καὶ φροντίδων καὶ πόνων μεστόν, φίλον τοῦ θεωρεῖν, ἀμαθίας ἐχθρόν, χρημάτων μὲν καὶ δόξης καὶ ἡδονῶν κρείττω, ἤττω δὲ σωφροσύνης καὶ εὐκλείας καὶ βλέποντος οὐ τυφλοῦ πλούτου;

These names are very suitable, for who does not look with favour on the pleasures and delights that come through the eyes, or the ears, or through taste and smell and touch? Who has not hated the opposites of these? – frugality, temperance, the life of austerity and knowledge, which has no part in laughter and sport, which is full of anxiety and cares and toils, the friend of contemplation, the enemy of ignorance, which puts under its feet money and mere reputation and pleasure, but

Virtues, 124, ed. Colson, LCL, 341, p. 236–37; *Every Good Man is Free*, 21 (149), ed. Colson, LCL, 363, p. 94; *On the Creation*, 53 (128), ed. Colson and Whitaker, LCL, 226, p. 100.

63 P.R. Bosman, 'Conscience and free speech in Philo', *The Studia Philonica Annual*, 18, (2006), 33–47.

64 This is made quite explicit by Philostratos, *Lives of the Sophists*, 1.24 (528), ed. Wright, 102. It is the opposite of laughter in Gregory of Nazianzos, Oration 5 ('Against Julian'), PG 35:709, 32. Cf. also Michael Psellos, *Chronographia*, 7.24.9, ed. D.R. Reinsch, *Michaelis Pselli Chronographia*, Millenium-Studien, 51 (Berlin, 2014), 217; and 'To his grandson, still a baby', 38.30, ed. A.R. Littlewood, *Michaeli Pselli Oratoria minora*, Teubner (Leipzig, 1985), 153.

is mastered by self-restraint and true glory and the wealth which is not blind but sees.⁶⁵

The semantic range of the phrase *katepheia kai synnoia* is broad, as we have seen. There are, however, a number of cases in which the phrase refers more specifically to situations of powerlessness, self-blame or self-reproach. This semantic shade is particularly evident in Philo's work devoted to the story of Joseph, where the phrase comes to denote the feelings of guilt and self-blame plaguing the father and brothers of Joseph.⁶⁶ Accordingly, Philo uses *kateptheo* to describe the feelings of the wicked man, anguished by his guilty conscience, as well as the frustration of the individual chasing virtue but failing to reach his goal. Tellingly, 'being *katepthes*' is associated with the *syneidesis* of unlawful actions. The treatise *On Special Laws* in particular shows the connection between dejection and the awareness of moral wrongdoing.

διὸ παρ' ἀληθείᾳ δικαζούση τῶν φαύλων οὐδεὶς ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὸν βραχύτατον χρόνον ἑορτάζει, συνειδήσει τῶν ἀδικημάτων ἀγχόμενος καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ κατηφῶν, εἰ καὶ τῷ προσώπῳ μειδιᾷν καθυποκρίνεται. τοῦ γὰρ ἔχει καιρὸν ἀψευδοῦς εὐφροσύνης κακοβουλότατος ὢν καὶ συζῶν ἀφροσύνη καὶ περὶ πάντα ἀκαιρευόμενος, γλῶτταν, γαστέρα, τὰ γεννητικά;

And therefore in the judgement of truth none of the wicked keeps a feast, even for the shortest time, tormented as he is by consciousness of wrongdoing and depressed in the soul, even though he simulates a smile with his face. For where does the wicked man find a season for true rejoicing? He whose every plan is for evil, whose life-mate is folly, with whom everything, tongue, belly and organs of generation, is against what is seasonable.⁶⁷

As happens in medical texts, *katepheia* comes here to denote an emotional trait rather than an emotion proper. It is a state characterising a cluster of people, and it is not elicited by or targeted at a specific event but lasts over time. It is a quiet, silent sadness emerging from meditation and at times it can even be contrasted with tearful (and loud) sadness. In *On Abraham*, it expresses the restrained and moderate expression of grief shown by the patriarch after the death of his wife. It is a balanced sadness, ensuing from the awareness that death is part of God's designs and that, although it fails human desires, it must be accepted. In this respect, it contrasts starkly with loud expressions of grief, as pointed out by Philo.

65 *Who Is the Heir of Divine Things?*, 9 (48), ed. Colson and Whitaker, LCL, 261, p. 306.

66 Cf. *On Joseph*, 17 (89), ed. Colson, LCL, 289, p. 184; 29 (170), ed. Colson, 222; 37 (218), ed. Colson, 244–46.

67 *On the Special Laws*, 2.14 (49–50), ed. Colson, LCL, 32, p. 338.

ὡς δ' ἦκον οἱ ἐν τέλει τῶν κατὰ τὴν χώραν συναλγήσοντες, ἰδόντες οὐδὲν τῶν ἐν ἔθει παρ' αὐτοῖς γινομένων ἐπὶ τοῖς πενθοῦσιν, οὐκ ὀλόφυσιν, οὐ θρῆνον, οὐ κοπετόν, οὐκ ἀνδρῶν, οὐ γυναικῶν, ἀλλὰ τῆς συμπάσης οἰκίας εὐσταθῆ καὶ νηφάλιον κατήφειαν, ἐθαύμαζον οὐ μετρίως καὶ τὸν ἄλλον βίον προκαταπεπληγμένοι τοῦ ἀνδρός.

Now, when the chief men of the country came to sympathize and saw nothing of the sort of mourning which was customary with themselves, no wailing, no chanting of dirges, no beating of breasts either of men or of women, but a quiet sober air of sorrow pervading the whole house, they were profoundly amazed, though indeed the rest of his life had struck them with admiration.⁶⁸

As I argue, this is exactly the meaning that *kateptheia* comes to have in the first Christian texts, where it is more specifically connected with the conscience of human shortcomings and, in particular, with the split conscience of the sinner who finds himself wanting in spite of his or her own better judgement.

The first Christian occurrence of *kateptheia* in a Christian context is in the New Testament and more specifically in the Epistle of James.

ἐγγίσατε τῷ θεῷ, καὶ ἐγγιεῖ ὑμῖν. Καθαρίσατε χεῖρας, ἁμαρτωλοί, καὶ ἀγνίστατε καρδίας, δίψυχοι. Ταλαιπωρήσατε καὶ πενθήσατε καὶ κλαύσατε· ὁ γέλως ὑμῶν εἰς πένθος μετατραπήτω καὶ ἡ χαρὰ εἰς κατήφειαν. ταπεινώθητε ἐνώπιον κυρίου, καὶ ὑψώσει ὑμᾶς.

Come near to God, and he will come near to you. Cleanse your hands, you sinners; and purify your hearts, you double-minded. Be afflicted, and grieve, and weep: let your laughter become grief, and your joy dejection. Humble yourselves in the sight of the Lord, and he shall lift you up.⁶⁹

The Epistle of James has a strong focus on the management of emotions, especially anger and envy.⁷⁰ These negative emotions are depicted as looming large in the community, as desire for worldly and unattainable goods takes hold of the poor believers, ruining mutual relationships within the congregation.⁷¹ Such desires make the congregation arrogant. In contrast, grace is given to the humble along the lines of Proverbs 3:34–35. James exhorts

68 *On Abraham*, 44 (260–61), ed.tr. Colson, LCL, 289, pp. 126–27.

69 Jas 4:8–10, tr. M. Dibelius, *James: A Commentary on the Epistle of James*, rev. H. Greeven, tr. M.A. Williams, ed. H. Koester, Hermeneia (Philadelphia, 1975), 207. On the Epistle of James in general, see *ibid.*, especially pp. 24ff. where Dibelius situates James within the diaspora of Judaism.

70 See Jas 1:10; 4:1–3.

71 W.R. Wall, *Community of the Wise: The Letter of James* (Valley Forge, PA, 1997), 192–209; Dibelius, *James: A Commentary*, 209–10.

his audience – here the teachers – to purification and repentance, alluding to the lamentations always accompanying self-humbling before God in the Old Testament.⁷² The call for purification has clear eschatological and prophetic overtones.⁷³ However, the whole section also presents an emphasis on free will. Everyone is responsible for the path he or she takes and the choice requires a deep awareness of the human condition. Repentance might be achieved and performed through ritual, but sin as construed by James is as much a moral as a religious category. In particular, it is conceptualised as desire that is not pure as it is not always aiming at God but rather at material wealth, thus generating doublemindedness among the believers.⁷⁴

Given the semantic connotations we have explored above, *katepheia* is particularly apt to express the movement of conscience of the Christian community. It is not only the ritual dejection shown through the hanging of the head or the eyes cast down – or tears for that matter. It is gloom ensuing from the awareness of human powerlessness and inborn inclination toward worldly pleasures, that is, toward tainted decision-making and consequently negative emotions such as anger and envy. It is also the thoughtful awareness that human conscience can often be split (*δίψυχος*)⁷⁵ and be full of doubt, often in spite of our better judgement.

Interestingly, the notion of *katepheia* turns up again in the *Shepherd of Hermas* in connection with the idea of sin unwittingly creeping into the heart of the believer. In vision 1, Hermas desires Rhoda in his thoughts, after seeing her bathe in the Tiber. When summoned into the sky, the lady reproaches him for his lust. Hermas is at first taken aback and denies his faulty behaviour. After Rhoda explains that sin does not require one to act on one's thoughts, or even to express them in words for that matter, Hermas realises his mistake and understands that his conscience was not pure. The affective result of this new awareness is gloom and sadness, so much so that when in his vision he encounters an old lady – a representation of the church⁷⁶ – the latter addresses him as follows:

Τί στυγνός, Ἐρμᾶ; ὁ μακρόθυμος, ὁ ἀστομάχητος, ὁ πάντοτε γελῶν, τί οὕτως κατηφής τῇ ιδέᾳ καὶ οὐχ ἰλαρός; κἀγὼ εἶπον αὐτῇ· Ὑπὸ γυναικὸς ἀγαθωτάτης λεγούσης μοι ὅτι ἤμαρτον εἰς αὐτήν.

‘Why are you so sad, Hermas – you who are patient, slow to anger, and always laughing? Why are you so downcast, and not cheerful?’ I

72 L.T. Johnson, *The Letter of James: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary*, The Anchor Bible, 37A (New York, 1995), 284–86.

73 W.L. Blevins, ‘A call to repent, love others, and remember God: James 4’, *Review and Expositor*, 83.3 (1986), 419–26.

74 Cf. also Jas 1:8.

75 Dibelius, *James: A Commentary*, 226–27. On this term, see also O.J.F. Seitz, ‘Antecedents and signification of the term *δίψυχος*’, *JBL*, 66 (1947), 211–19.

76 See D.B. Lipssett, *Desiring Conversion: Hermas, Thecla, Aseneth* (Oxford, 2011), 32.

replied to her, 'Because of a very good woman who has been telling me that I sinned against her'.⁷⁷

We have here once again a contrast between smiling and dejected demeanour. Hermas's sadness in particular comes from the awareness of being still *δίψυχος* (*dipsychos*),⁷⁸ in spite of all his moral efforts. It is to be noted that, until Hermas is requested by others to explain himself, his sadness takes the form of an intimate and silent rumination. It becomes clear here that this sort of concentrated dejected feeling is the emotional prerequisite leading to self-awareness and, as a consequence, to repentance, complete self-restraint and unified conscience. Although painful, dejection ensuing from awareness of failure becomes a pivotal moment in the new Christian emotional regime. James censures negative emotions, such as anger and envy, which are detrimental to the congregation, but extols self-humbling sadness, which serves the purpose of strengthening the ties within the community and between the community and God. Being dejected means to accept that the true Christian cannot take two paths, the path of God and the path of the world. God requires single-minded devotion, and its absence is a 'spiritual failure'.⁷⁹ Dejection is therefore a symptom of a new unity of purpose in the believer's heart and with God.⁸⁰ Hermas, in turn, firmly believes he is a righteous and perfect Christian believer before realising that in fact he has failed to achieve the goal he was aiming at. His dejected demeanour epitomises the acceptance of such failure and is a crucial ethical step toward a new, transparent self, fully complying with Christian norms.⁸¹

Not surprisingly, *katephea* surfaces also in a catena, based on the fifth-century commentary by Cyril of Alexandria, on Paul's letter to the Romans 7:15–17.⁸² The passage is well known. Paul illustrates the conflicted nature of the believing self, as it struggles to stay away from temptation, but eventually yields to sin.⁸³ Romans 7:15–17 does not enlarge on the emotional

77 *Shepherd of Hermas*, 2:3–4, ed.tr. B.D. Ehrman *The Apostolic Fathers*, vol. 2, LCL, 25 (Cambridge, MA, 2003), 178–79.

78 *Shepherd of Hermas*, 10:2–3, ed. Ehrman, 196.

79 Wall, *Community of the Wise*, 210.

80 Johnson, *Letter of James*, 282–89.

81 On emotions and self-restraint in the *Shepherd*, see also the forthcoming essay by P. von Gemünden, 'Methodological issues and issues of content, as exemplified by *δίψυχολία* in the *Shepherd of Hermas*', in D. Cairns, M. Hinterberger, A. Pizzone and M. Zaccarini (ed.), *Emotions through Time: From Antiquity to Byzantium* (Tübingen, 2022), 95–119.

82 Cyril of Alexandria, *Fragments on the Epistle of St Paul to the Roman*, on Rom 7:16, ed. P.E. Pusey, *Sancti patris nostri Cyrilli archiepiscopi Alexandrini in D. Joannis evangelium*, vol. 3 (Oxford, 1872), 206.5.

83 It has been noted time and again that the motif of the 'split I' is redolent of pagan antecedents: see H. Hommel, 'Das 7. Kapitel des Römerbriefes im Licht antiker Überlieferung', *Theologia Viatorum*, 8 (1961–62), 90–116; S. Légasse, *L'épître de Paul aux Romains* (Paris, 2002), 464–72.

state ensuing from divided conscience. The *Catena* supplies the missing bit, commenting as follows:

οὐ γὰρ ὁ θέλω, τοῦτο πράσσω, ἀλλ' ὁ μισῶ, τοῦτο ποιῶ. ὡς πόσοι ποσάκις θεθαυμάκασι μὲν τὴν ἐγκράτειαν· καὶ δὴ καὶ μελέτης τῆς εἰς αὐτὴν ἀρξάμενοι, τοῖς τῆς μυσαρᾶς ἡδονῆς νενίκηθη κέντροις, καὶ ὀκλάσαντος αὐτοῖς τοῦ νοῦ πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον ἐνηργήκασι τὴν ἀμαρτίαν· κατηφείας γε μὴν μεμέστωνται· τούτοις ἂν πρέποι καὶ μάλα εἰκότως μονονουχὶ καὶ ἀβουλήτως ἡσθηνηκόσι τὸ φάναι δὴ πάλιν, “νυνὶ δὲ οὐκέτι ἐγὼ κατεργάζομαι αὐτὸ, ἀλλ' ἡ οἰκοῦσα ἐν ἐμοὶ ἡ ἀμαρτία.

For what I want to do I do not do, but what I hate I do. How many people and how often have admired self-restraint; and although they started by practising it, they have been won over by the goads of loathsome pleasure, and since their mind is inclined towards the worse, they have committed sin, and they were full of dejection; those who have been overwhelmed unwittingly and without wanting it should say again, ‘As it is, it is no longer I myself who do it, but it is sin living in me’.⁸⁴

Here too, dejection is caused by the awareness that sin is a mental attitude and cannot be limited to acts alone.⁸⁵ The Pauline self is split between a clear ethical will and a different course of action, favouring sin.⁸⁶ According to the *Catena* based on Cyril of Alexandria *katepheia* comes from the believer’s awareness that (s)he has failed to become what (s)he wished to be, giving in to more powerful inner forces, in spite of his or her good intentions.

As recently pointed out by Lamb,⁸⁷ although *catenae* might lack originality in the modern sense of the term, they are extremely important documents as they tell us about day-to-day spirituality and understanding of the New Testament in Byzantium. Copied in hundreds of exemplars, *catenae* were ubiquitous and shaped the collective religious memory of the Byzantines. This is quite relevant to our concerns, as the text of the *Catena on Romans* enshrines *katepheia* as the affective state elicited by the realisation

84 *Catena on Romans*, on Rom 7:15, ed. J.A. Cramer, *Catena in Sancti Pauli epistolam ad Romanos ad fidem codd. mss. edidit* (Oxford, 1844), 104.5–13. On *catenae*, see H.A.G. Houghton and D.C. Parker, ‘An Introduction to Greek New Testament commentaries with a preliminary checklist of New Testament *catena* manuscripts’, in H.A.G. Houghton (ed.), *Commentaries, Catenae and Biblical Tradition: Papers from the Ninth Birmingham Colloquium on the Textual Criticism of the New Testament* (Piscataway, NJ, 2016), 1–36; and W. Lamb, ‘Catenae and the art of memory’, in *ibid.*, 107–22.

85 I will not enlarge here on the thorny question of who is the ‘I’ in Paul’s passage. For a survey, see P. Middendorf, *The ‘I’ in the Storm: A Study of Romans 7* (Saint Louis, 1997), 171–84 (who however subscribes to the hypothesis of autobiographical reference); and A.C. Thiselton, *Discovering Romans* (Grand Rapids, MI, 2016), ch. 5. However, I agree with A. Nygren, *Commentary on Romans* (Minneapolis, 1978), 292, that the present tense points to Christian life and not to a pre-conversion self.

86 Nygren, *Commentary on Romans*, 298.

87 Lamb, ‘Catenae and the art of memory’, 84–89.

of one's inevitably sinful nature. In the Christian emotional regime, when the prototypical scenario (sadness from failure) involves moral goals, *kateptheia* is a commendable form of gloom, one that paves the way to ἐγκράτεια (*enkrateia*).⁸⁸ The journey from creative metaphorical usage to polysemy is complete and it shows that not only semantics but also value appraisals can change over time. Heroic dejection elicited by failure turns into Christian sadness, thus becoming a stepping-stone toward a fuller spiritual life and a unified self.

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88 Self-restraint appears associated with dejection, see for instance Gregory of Nyssa, *Homilies on Ecclesiastes*, 6, ed. J. McDonough and P. Alexander, *Gregorii Nysseni opera*, vol. 5: *In inscriptiones Psalmorum; In sextum Psalmum; In Ecclesiasten homiliae* (Leiden, 1962), 389.14; Theodore of Stoudios, *Great Catechesis*, 119, ed. A. Papadopoulos-Kerameus, *Theodorii Studitae Magna catechesis* (St Petersburg, 1904), 890. Given the semantic broadening over time, *kateptheia* can also be connected to other typologies of sadness. This emerges clearly from Evagrius, who by introducing *lupe* in his work *On the Eight Thoughts*, specifies: 'Sadness is a κατήφεια (*kateptheia*) of the soul and is constituted from thoughts of anger, for irascibility is a longing for revenge, and the frustration of revenge produces sadness', PG 79:1156 B–C, tr. R.E. Sinkewicz, *Evagrius of Pontus: The Greek Ascetic Corpus* (Oxford, 2003), 66–90. The negative connotation is given here by the fact that the actual antecedent is anger; in this sense the conceptual framework reminds one of the Letter of James and runs contrary to Evagrius's usual order, placing sadness before anger; see Sinkewicz, *Evagrius of Pontus*, 71. Sadness stems again from failure, and in this respect the hypothesised prototypical scenario of *kateptheia* is maintained. The negative value ensues from the fact that the subject aims for the wrong set of goals in the first place.

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11 Emotional Communities and the Loss of an Individual

The Case of Grief

Maria Doerfler

This child is my only begotten one ... born in labour pains, the only one in my arms, this child is my first and my last one. Whom will we see at our table after him? Who will speak to me in dulcet tones? Who will call me mother? Who will care for [my] old age? Who will prepare [my] burial after death? Who will heap up a grave upon the corpse? ... If you raise the knife against him, grant grace to me, the miserable one: Use the knife first against me, and then do what seems good to you to this one. For both together shall the burial take place, shared dust shall cover the bodies, a shared grave marker tell of suffering.¹

The preceding excerpt from an early Byzantine homily records the lament of a grieving mother, driven to distraction by anticipating the violent death of her only child. Such vocal distress, including a parent's desire to die rather than witness her offspring's death, tends to strike contemporary readers as intelligible, even commendable. As the United Kingdom's Health Education Authority noted in its recent *Guide to the First Five Years of Being a Parent*, 'There's a feeling that children aren't meant to die.'² In its Byzantine context, however, such a display of mourning is striking, inasmuch as it, according to much of contemporary scholarship, ought not to exist, or ought to be at least subject to theological censure. Already Irenée Hausherr, author of *Penthos: La doctrine de la componction dans l'Orient chrétien*, the seminal study on grief in the Byzantine period, delineated his subject by first exclud-

1 μονογενής μοι ὁ τόκος οὗτος, μονογενής ἐν ὡδίσις ὁ Ἰσαάκ, ἐν ἀγκάλαις μόνος· οὗτός μοι τόκος καὶ πρῶτος καὶ ἕστατος. τίνα μετὰ τούτων ἐπὶ τραπέζης ὀψόμεθα; τίς προσερεῖ μοι τὴν γλυκεῖαν φωνήν; τίς ὀνομάσει μητέρα; τίς θεραπεύσει το γῆρας; τίς περιστελεῖ μετὰ τὸν θάνατον; τίς ἐπιχώσει τάφον τῷ σώματι; ... εἰ κατὰ τούτου φέρεις τὸ ξίφος, ταύτην μοι δὸς τῆ δειλαΐα τὴν χάριν· κατ' ἐμοῦ πρῶτον χρῆσαι τῷ ξίφει καὶ τότε ποιήσον τὸ δοκοῦν ἐπὶ τούτου· κοινὸν ἀμφοτέρων γενέσθω το χῶμα, κοινὴ κόνις ἐπικαλυψάτω τὰ σώματα, κοινὴ στήλη διηγείσθω τὰ πάθη. Gregory of Nyssa, 'On the divinity of the Son and the Holy Spirit, and on Abraham', ed. E. Rhein, F. Mann, F.R. Tesón and H. Polack, *Gregorii Nysseni opera*, vol. 10.2: *Sermones, pars III* (Leiden, 1996), 136 (translation my own).

2 *New Birth to Five: A Complete Guide to the First Five Years of Being a Parent* (London, 1994), 105.

ing from it three ‘unworthy’ griefs: that over the loss of a loved one; that over a ‘mishap’, as his anonymous translator renders it; or that over the death of a god – as in the case of the Egyptian cult of mourning and rejoicing at the death and retrieval of Osiris.³ Such occasions might precipitate distress in Byzantines’ non-Christian contemporaries or even among modern readers. Yet none of them, Hausherr avers, was worthy of grief for the Byzantine faithful, for whom the impermanences of this life held only the promise of the glorious resurrection: ‘The *penthos* (grief) preached by the Fathers has nothing to do with this sort of mourning.’⁴ Instead, the only true, indeed the only justifiable grief for the Byzantine Christian was that over his own failings, and, still more appropriately, grief over humanity’s fallen condition more generally.

In the better part of a century since Hausherr’s monograph, his thesis has been modulated, refined and applied to an ever-increasing range of communities across the Byzantine world.⁵ Its primary thrust, however – the assertion that Byzantine grief concerned the realm of the spirit rather than the realm of human relations – has remained largely constant. Such a focus is indeed eminently intelligible in light of the extent and quality of sources available to document this spiritual ‘joy-bearing grief’. By contrast, Byzantine writers tended to regard with scepticism grief over ‘natural’ causes, including the death of a family member, or the loss of political or personal favour. These received comparatively shorter shrift even in non-ascetic writings, although, as Martin Hinterberger has shown, historiographic and autobiographical sources make occasional reference to individuals’ mourning the loss of loved ones.⁶ Even texts addressed to the allaying of such griefs, however, frequently emphasise the importance of setting aside mourning in favour of a theologically informed stoicism. Consolation literature from

3 I. Hausherr, *Penthos: La doctrine de la componction dans l’Orient chrétien*, OCA, 132 (Rome, 1944), 8–9.

4 Hausherr, *Penthos*, 8.

5 See, for example, H.M. Hunt, *Joy-Bearing Grief: Tears of Contrition in the Writings of the Early Syrian and Byzantine Fathers*, TMM, 57 (Leiden, 2004); B. Müller, *Der Weg des Weinens: Die Tradition des ‘Penthos’ in den Apophthegmata Patrum* (Göttingen, 2000); J. Driscoll, ‘Penthos and tears in Evagrius Ponticus’, *Studia Monastica*, 36 (1994), 147–64; G.T. Panicker, ‘Prayer with tears: a great feast of repentance’, *The Harp*, 4 (1991), 111–33; J. Chrysavgis, ‘Χαρμολύπη: joyful sorrow in the Ladder of St. John Climacus’, *Kleronomia* 17.1 (1985), 137–42; idem, ‘Κατάνυξις: compunction as the context for the theology of tears in St. John Climacus’, *Kleronomia* 17.2 (1985), 131–36; J.F.M. Gale, ‘The divine office, aid and hindrance to *penthos*’, *Studia Monastica*, 27 (1985), 13–30; P.T. Mascia, ‘The gift of tears in Isaac of Nineveh’, *Diakonia*, 14 (1979), 255–65; D.A. Lichter, ‘Tears and contemplation in Isaac of Nineveh’, *Diakonia*, 11 (1976), 239–58; M. Lot-Borodine, ‘Le mystère du “don des larmes” dans l’Orient chrétien’, *Supplément à la Vie Spirituelle*, 48 (September 1936), 65–110, reprinted as ‘La douloureuse joie’, *Spiritualité Orientale*, 14 (1974), 131–95.

6 M. Hinterberger, ‘Tränen in der byzantinischen Literatur: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Emotionen’, *JÖB*, 56 (2006), 27–51; see also idem, ‘Emotions in Byzantium’, in L. James (ed.), *A Companion to Byzantium* (Chichester, 2010), 123–34.

across the Byzantine world, in both form and thematic thrust, thus tends to stress the unexceptional nature of human loss, and the concomitantly greater reliability of eternal happiness and reward.⁷

Such data go a long way towards supporting Hausherr's and his sources' wholly counter-intuitive claim that Christians did not grieve, could not grieve over other kinds of bereavement, or, at the very least, that to express grief over these other, worldly matters was fundamentally incompatible with Byzantine Christian identity. Yet when it comes to grief, as Shakespeare famously wrote, each substance casts twenty shadows, discernible only when looked upon 'awry'.⁸ The task of the historian of emotions is at least in part to discern such shadows in the Byzantine record: the traces of grief, their evaluation and consideration, and the glimpses they provide into what Barbara Rosenwein has aptly called the 'emotional communities' in which these texts were generated.⁹ Representations of mourning in Byzantine sources reflect the registers of emotional tonality intelligible to their authors and audiences:

what these communities (and the individuals within them) define and assess as valuable or harmful to them; the evaluations that they make about others' emotions; the nature of the affective bonds between people that they recognise; and the models of emotional expression that they expect, encourage, tolerate and deplore.¹⁰

One of these instructive shadows that *πένθος* (*penthos*) casts in the Byzantine tradition involves its representation in the Greek and Syriac homiletic corpus. Homilists and hymnographers frequently narrated the grief of

7 Consolation letters from the late Roman and early Byzantine period preserved in the Egyptian papyri thus retain many of their characteristic features across the centuries. A particularly interesting illustrative exemplar of the continuities of the genre is a surviving 'form letter', providing instruction by way of exemplar for those wishing to convey condolences to bereaved friends and associates; see '254. Ein Kondolenz-Musterbrief', in B. Kramer and D. Hagedorn (ed.), *Griechische Papyri der Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg (P. Hamb. IV)* (Stuttgart, 1998), 98–104. Nothing about the letter relies upon the recipient's beliefs concerning death and the afterlife; invoked are instead the shared nature of human mortality, and the need to face death with concomitant fortitude. Such themes could be adapted readily for Christian as well as Jewish or Greco-Roman audiences and continue to appear in Byzantine writings to the same effect; the ninth-century patriarch Photios, in a consolation letter to his brother, for instance, urges the latter to consider that '[w]e have not submitted to anything new, strange, or unnatural. [The deceased niece] came as a mortal from a mortal womb, and in the mortal life of natural law to the immortal kingdom she went'; PG 102:970–81, tr. D.S. White, 'Photios' letter to his brother Tarasios on the death of his daughter', *GOTR*, 18 (1973), 41–58, at 51.

8 *The Life and Death of Richard II*, 2.2.14–20, in A.B. Dawson and P. Yachnin (ed.), *The Oxford Shakespeare: Richard II* (Oxford, 2011), 184.

9 B. Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages* (Ithaca, 2006); see also B. Rosenwein, 'Worrying about emotions in history', *AmHR*, 107.3 (2002), 821–45, at 842.

10 Rosenwein, 'Worrying about emotions', 842.

biblical characters, including particularly those valorised by the Christian tradition – the grief of patriarchs, prophets, (proto-)martyrs and other heroes of the faith. Such expositions pushed the boundaries of scriptural interpretation, of the nature that twenty-first-century audiences might expect to encounter in a sermon, in favour of midrashic elaboration of stories. These frequently involved the re-narration of characters, their actions and motives, and, most pressingly, their emotions. As Susan Ashbrook Harvey has observed, in contrast to the ubiquitous exhortations to set aside mourning,

Greek and Syriac liturgical texts from the fourth to the sixth centuries CE seem to offer another perspective on grief, and a different manner of engaging with its very real impact on individuals and communities. Here, in the luminous poetry of late antique and early Byzantine hymns and homilies, we find strikingly emotive portraits of biblical characters confronting anguish and loss. Noteworthy for their literary beauty, such accounts of biblical tragedy were also, apparently, unapologetic as dramas of high emotion and affective quality.¹¹

The lament at the very beginning of this essay is one example of this phenomenon. It stems from a fourth-century homily by Gregory of Nyssa, large parts of which are dedicated to a re-telling of Genesis 22, the so-called *Akedah*. The bereaved mother, eager to die rather than face life without her only son, is Sarah, the wife of the patriarch Abraham and mother to Isaac, who she anticipates will soon die at his father's hand. Sarah, whose voice is completely absent from the biblical narrative, in this context becomes the best-represented, most emotionally charged and most positively valorised narrator. Nor is this text and Gregory's representation of Sarah wholly *sui generis*. In Byzantine hymnody and homiletics, the *Akedah* rather proved a surprising focal point for narratives of grief and loss. This essay focuses on a small and interconnected spate of texts, a selection of homilies and liturgical poetry from the fifth and sixth centuries, that sprang up around the account of Abraham's barely-averted 'sacrifice' of his son as the story of a parent's grief at the death or anticipated death of a young child. After a brief consideration of the role of parental bereavement in studies of ancient and Byzantine emotions, I shall direct three inquiries at the depiction of grief in these expositions on the *Akedah*: first and most basically, concerning the ways in which the central characters are said to manifest grief; second, concerning the underlying theories of grief that emerge from the narratives, including, for example, the commendable or culpable nature of such grief;

11 S.A. Harvey, 'Guiding grief: liturgical poetry and ritual lament in early Byzantium', in M. Alexiou and D. Cairns (ed.), *Greek Laughter and Tears: Antiquity and After*, Edinburgh Leventis Studies, 8 (Edinburgh, 2017), 199–216, at 201. I am grateful to Professor Harvey for her generous willingness to share a pre-publication version of this essay with me.

and, finally, the most interesting and perhaps most elusive question: how these texts may have functioned in the lives of Byzantine audiences.

Parental Grief and the Study of Emotions

Childhood mortality and the response it generated in pre-modern societies engage issues that stand at the very heart of the ongoing conversation in contemporary literature about emotions. They pose the question of whether grief over the death of a child is universal, possible to generalise across times and cultures, or whether such grief – not only in its expressions and external manifestations but also in its inner experience – is, in fact, culturally dependent.¹² Put a bit differently, with a tip of the hat to Mark Golden's seminal article on the subject: did the Byzantines care if their children died?¹³ Or did Byzantine parents, in the light of exceedingly high rates of childhood mortality, experience such loss with greater equanimity than their modern counterparts?

Historically, scholarship on this issue has treated emotions as culturally relative in experience and expression, and has accordingly argued that parental attachment in antiquity and by extension the Byzantine era was entirely more tenuous in light of the sheer likelihood of bereavement. Moses Finley, for example, with greater nuance than many, suggested that 'in a world in which such early deaths and burials were routine, so to speak, the intensity and duration of the emotional responses were unlike modern reactions'.¹⁴ Archaeological evidence, including the arguably careless burial of infants in amphorae, and the relatively sparse and formulaic nature of children's epigraphic commemoration, has been called upon as witnesses for the slackness of the ties that bound parents to children in antiquity.¹⁵ As Lawrence Stone concluded for a considerably later, pre-modern era: 'to

- 12 Emotions have preoccupied historians and cognate disciplines in the humanities and social sciences for some decades, beginning at least with the work of Lucien Febvre and the Annales School more generally. For a survey of trends and discursive themes, see, *inter alia*, A.-C. Trepp, 'Gefühl oder kulturelle Konstruktion? Überlegungen zur Geschichte der Emotionen', in *Querelles: Jahrbuch für Frauenforschung*, vol. 7: *Kulturen der Gefühle in Mittelalter und Früher Neuzeit* (Stuttgart, 2002), 86–103; M.C. Nussbaum, *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions* (Cambridge, 2001); H. Schmitz, 'Die Verwaltung der Gefühle in Theorie, Macht und Phantasie', in C. Benthien, A. Fleig and I. Kasten (ed.), *Emotionalität: Zur Geschichte der Gefühle* (Vienna, 2000), 42–59; and B. Rosenwein, 'Worrying about emotions', *passim*.
- 13 M. Golden, 'Did the ancients care when their children died?', *Greece and Rome*, 25 (1988), 152–63.
- 14 M.I. Finley, 'The elderly in classical antiquity', *Greece and Rome*, 28 (1981), 156–71, at 159. Finley was nevertheless quick to qualify his assertion, noting that 'I confess that I know no way to measure or even to identify the differences'.
- 15 For an assessment of the evidence for this in the Italian realm, including the emphatic conclusion that, evidentiary inconsistencies notwithstanding, dead infants were regarded as 'impure, malign, or taboo' by communities in antiquity, see M. Carroll, 'Infant death and burial in Roman Italy', *Journal of Roman Archaeology*, 24 (2011), 99–120.

preserve their mental stability, parents were obliged to limit the degree of their psychological involvement with their infant children'.¹⁶

Such an approach reflects in part the 'grand narrative' which claimed emotional attachment, especially in its positive, intra-familial forms, as the prerogative of the modern era.¹⁷ According to this narrative, 'the pre-modern family was at best a calculated social institution for reproduction and at worst a theater of violent outbursts'.¹⁸ The death of children could be experienced as grievous inasmuch as it frustrated the family's reproductive aims and cheated parents out of the investment by which they had sought to ensure for themselves a comfortable old age. Genuine, disinterested parental love and concomitantly authentic grief, by contrast, remained beyond the scope of these relationships.

In recent decades, this view has been vigorously critiqued. Scholars continue to deploy archaeological, epigraphic and textual evidence in the service of establishing ancient parents' care for their children,¹⁹ frequently with a helping hand from the social sciences by way of, for example, anthropological data from contemporary societies suffering from high childhood mortality rates.²⁰ This essay does not aspire to settle the debate over the

16 L. Stone, *The Family, Sex and Marriage in England 1500–1800* (London, 1977), 70.

17 The latter appears in various guises in different historians' assessments of the premodern period; see, for example, the portrayal of premodern civilisations as violent, impulsive, and focused on immediate pleasure in N. Elias, *Über den Prozeß der Zivilisation: Soziogenetische und psychogenetische Untersuchungen*, vol. 1: *Wandlungen des Verhaltens in den weltlichen Oberschichten des Abendlandes* (Basel, 1939). Republished and translated into English in the 1970s, Elias's construction of emotion in history proved influential well beyond the German realm. For an analysis of Elias's impact and reception, see G. Schwerhoff, 'Zivilisationsprozeß und Geschichtswissenschaft: Norbert Elias' Forschungsparadigma in historischer Sicht', *HZ*, 266 (1998), 561–606.

18 Rosenwein, 'Worrying about emotions', 829–30.

19 Margaret King, for example, argues, on the basis of epitaphal commemoration of Roman children, that 'for many parents the death of a young child was a real occasion for grief'; see 'Commemoration of infants on Roman funerary inscriptions', in G.J. Oliver (ed.), *Epigraphy of Death: Studies in the History and Society of Greece and Rome* (Liverpool, 2000), 117–54, at 148. Similarly, Maureen Carroll concludes her study of burial practices in Roman Italy by stating that

although infant mortality was high ... the attention paid to rituals and practices ensuring pregnancy and healthy childbirth does not suggest that it made people immune to grief or that they did not care when their children were struck down by illness.

See "'No part in earthly things": the death, burial and commemoration of newborn children and infants in Roman Italy', in M. Harlow and L.L. Lovén (ed.), *Families in the Roman and Late Antique World* (London, 2012), 41–63, at 51.

20 Surprisingly, anthropologists have, in turn, looked to ancient societies to substantiate arguments for limited parental attachment in circumstances of relative crisis. Nancy Sheper-Hughes, for example, compares maternal reasoning about childhood mortality in the slums of Brazil to that of Medea and the women appealing to Solomon's judgement in 1 Kgs 3; see her *Death Without Weeping: The Violence of Everyday Life in Brazil* (Berkeley, 1992), 407–10.

authenticity of parental attachment in antiquity; indeed, to do so appears to be beyond the capacities of historians in the first place. Instead, I shall confine myself to focusing on the external manifestation and rhetorical construction of grief in early Byzantine society – a task to which the death of children and the concomitant grief suffered by families is arguably especially well-suited. Already Menander Rhetor, writing in the third century CE, treats the premature death of a youth as paradigmatic for purposes of the *paramythetikon*, the consolation speech:

One who desires to give a consolation speech must accordingly in the first part of the speech begin with the departed's having been young – if such is applicable – and having died prematurely, not as one would ordinarily desire, and that he has robbed his family, his parents and his city of hope.²¹

Parental Grief in the *Akedah*

One of the most striking things about the *Akedah* in this context is the fact that the text does not involve, *prima facie*, a death, least of all the death of a child. Perched in between the account of Isaac's divinely promised birth and that of Sarah's eventual death thirty-seven years later, the text allows readers to envisage Isaac anywhere between infancy and middle age. He is, however, at the very least old enough to undertake a lengthy journey (Gen 22:3–4); to discourse with Abraham about the impending sacrifice (Gen 22:7–8); and, perhaps most tellingly, to carry wood for the offering up Mt Moriah (Gen 22:6). Abraham's threatened bereavement, moreover, comes at his own hand; as Genesis 22 makes clear, Abraham knows himself to be his son's killer rather than the victim of his untimely passing.

Greek and Syriac homilists nevertheless regularly treat the *Akedah* as a blueprint for parental grief over the loss of a young child or infant, contextual cues notwithstanding. Christian exponents frequently depict Isaac as exceedingly youthful, referring to him as 'the boy', 'the youth', or, simply, '-the child': *paidarios* (παιδάριος),²² *meirakion* (μειράκιον),²³ *talia* (ܬܠܝܐ)²⁴ and

21 Ὁ μέντοι γε παραμυθούμενος επιχειρήσας ἐκ τούτων ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ μέρει τοῦ λόγου, οἷον ὅτι νέος ὢν, ἀν οὕτω τύχη ('περὶ παραμυθητικοῦ' 413, 15–17, in Menander Rhetor, 'On the consolation speech', ed. tr. J. Soffel, *Die Regeln Menanders für die Leichenrede* (Meisenheim am Glan, 1974), 136.

22 See, e.g., Chrysostom's exposition of this term as key in the angel's speech in *On Blessed Abraham*, 2, PG 50:740. For a more extensive examination of the Abrahamic *topos* in the writings of John Chrysostom, see D.E. Tonias, *Abraham in the Works of John Chrysostom* (Minneapolis, 2014).

23 See, e.g., Gregory of Nyssa, 'On the Divinity of the Son and the Holy Spirit and on Abraham', ed. Rhein et al., 132.

24 Most Syriac authors designate Isaac in this fashion. See, e.g., the anonymous homily 'On the sacrifice of Isaac', line 24, ed. tr. S.P. Brock, 'Two Syriac verse homilies on the binding of Isaac', *Le Muséon*, 99 (1986), 61–129, at 118.

sheeri (ܫܥܪܝ).²⁵ Aspects of the text that suggest a more adult age are minimised, or dismissed, as instances of divine intervention. An acephalous Syriac prose homily from the fifth century, for example, treats as miraculous Isaac's physical and mental growth spurt when faced with his impending death, noting that 'Abraham was much astonished at the child's steps and at his load, for all of a sudden his child-like years had acquired strength'.²⁶

Imputation of youth on Isaac's part, however, made additionally conspicuous the absence of his mother, Sarah, in the Genesis 22 account. The Hebrew Scriptures depict Abraham carrying out the task commissioned by God – including a lengthy journey, accompanied by Isaac and a couple of servants – with no reference to his wife, Isaac's mother. Byzantine exegetes, unlike many of their modern counterparts, proved sensitive to this omission.²⁷ Some sought to explain or excuse Sarah's apparent exclusion from the story, reasoning, for example, that Sarah would not have been able to bear the divine command with appropriate tranquillity, and would have spoiled or indeed prevented the sacrifice with her grief. A sermon transmitted as part of John Chrysostom's corpus, for example, discusses at length Abraham's decision

to tell his wife nothing concerning the matter, and not convey even the thing itself to her, and [Abraham] did so wisely, because he believed his wife to not be strong enough for this business, and because he knew her

25 See, e.g., the Bohairic translation of Amphilochios's homily 'On the patriarch Abraham', ed. C. Datema and tr. L. Van Rompay, *Amphilochii Iconensis opera* (Turnhout, 1978), 277. The vocabulary of childhood in the Byzantine world was even more flexible than its modern, English-language counterparts. Different authors divided the human life experience into different stages, occasionally more marked by their commitment to a particularly pleasing increment of years – the number seven, for example, figures prominently in the life-table of Pollux and Pseudo-Hippocrates – than to empirical observation. Most Roman authors nevertheless agreed that the ages of seven and fifteen marked significant transitions in the lives of boys from at least the more elite social strata; while thirteen marked the age at which a girl could be legally married under Roman law. For a discussion of the stages, terminology and characteristics associated with childhood and youth in the Roman empire, see C. Laes and J. Strubbe, *Youth in the Roman Empire: The Young and the Restless Years?* (Cambridge, 2014), esp. 23–48.

26 Syriac homily 'On Abraham', ed. tr. S.P. Brock, 'An anonymous Syriac homily on Abraham (Gen. 22)', *OLP*, 12 (1981), 225–56, at 242 (text), 250 (tr.).

27 For an incipient discussion of this topic in Syriac Christian writings, see, for example, S.P. Brock, 'Genesis 22: where was Sarah?', *The Expository Times*, 96.1 (1984), 14–17. Brock has addressed the topic of women's voices in Syriac exposition in other articles as well, including S.P. Brock, 'Sarah and the Akedah', *Le Muséon*, 87 (1974), 67–77; idem, 'Genesis 22 in Syriac tradition', in P. Casetti, O. Keel and A. Schenker (ed.), *Mélanges Dominique Barthélemy: Études bibliques offertes à l'occasion de son 60^e anniversaire* (Göttingen, 1981), 1–30; idem, 'Creating women's voices: Sarah and Tamar in some Syriac narrative poems', in E. Grypeou and H. Spurling (ed.), *The Exegetical Encounter between Jews and Christians in Late Antiquity* (Leiden, 2009), 125–41. In contemporary scholarship, this issue famously has been taken up by P. Tribble, who reflected on the *Akedah* in terms of 'the sacrifice of Sarah' in 'Genesis 22: the sacrifice of Sarah', in J.P. Rosenblatt (ed.), *Not in Heaven: Coherence and Complexity in Biblical Narrative* (Bloomington, 1991), 170–91.

to be of no use to give advice [just as] indeed Eve's counsel was harmful to Adam.²⁸

Another line of homiletical reasoning, however, sought to remedy Sarah's absence in the Hebrew Scriptures by re-inserting her into the narrative, in the process making her the affective centre of the *Akedah*, and pointing to the role of women as accepted vectors of parental attachment in the authors' emotional communities.²⁹ In these writings, Abraham's stoic mien when ordered to kill his son serves as a foil for his wife's profound emotion. Sarah, suspecting her husband's impending betrayal, is said to groan, her heart mourning, 'her mind and thought ... greatly upset with emotion, her mind dazed as she grieved';³⁰ the loss of Isaac threatens to 'kill her with grief',³¹ the 'radiant joy' she experiences with Isaac's presence 'quickly [turning] to tears' which she then plans to 'pour out over the whole earth'.³² Such dramatic grief stands in pointed contrast to Abraham, whom homilists depict as resolved, or even pleased with the divine command. As one fifth-century Syriac homily claims, Abraham rejoiced more on the day he was ordered to sacrifice Isaac than on the day of his birth. After all, the father's delight over the sacrifice was untainted, whereas his joy over Isaac's birth was marred by fear that he might fall into sin³³ – an attitude that matches perfectly the one prescribed by Byzantine writers from Gregory of Nyssa to Photios for bereaved parents.³⁴

28 Pseudo-John Chrysostom, 'On Abraham and Isaac', PG 56:539: Neque uxori quidpiam ea de re dixit, neque rem ipsi communicavit; idque admodum prudenter, putans mulierem ad id negotii nec sat firmam, nec sat utilem ad consilium dandum fore. Neque enim utile fuit, imo nocuit Adae consilium Evae.

29 The trend towards women mourners is, of course, reflected throughout classical antiquity, and apparent in late ancient and Byzantine homilies as well. As Susan Ashbrook Harvey in her study of such emotionally charged texts has observed, 'such representations allowed women's voices to express the grief of death and thereby to acknowledge its truth as a community's loss'; see Harvey, 'Guiding grief', 206.

30 [Anonymous], 'On the sacrifice of Isaac', lines 123–24, ed. tr. S.P. Brock, 'Two Syriac verse homilies on the binding of Isaac', *Le Muséon*, 99 (1986), 61–129, at 121–22; tr. also in S.P. Brock, *Treasure-House of Mysteries: Exploration of the Sacred Text Through Poetry in the Syriac Tradition* (Yonkers, NY, 2012), 83.

31 Romanos, 'On Abraham and Isaac', *Hymns*, 10.13, ed. P. Maas and C.A. Trypanis, *Sancti Romani Melodi Cantica* (Oxford, 1963), 326, tr. M. Carpenter, *Kontakia of Romanos* (Columbia, 1970), 64.

32 Romanos, 'On Abraham and Isaac', *Hymns*, 10.7, ed. Maas and Trypanis, 325, tr. Carpenter, 66.

33 See, for example, the anonymous Syriac homily 'On Abraham', ed. tr. Brock, 245.

34 For an early exposition of this theme, see Gregory of Nyssa's treatise 'Concerning infants who have died prematurely', ed. J.K. Downing, J.A. McDonough and H. Hörner, *Gregorii Nysseni opera dogmatica minora* (Leiden, 1987), 87–89. Gregory therein likens the death of children to a thoughtful host's removing guests likely to become drunk or disorderly from his banquet early on; the children's removal from the banquet of life in a similar vein displays God's generosity and serves both their and their loved ones' interests.

The scene captures Sarah in a moment not otherwise attested by the Hebrew Scriptures: Abraham has returned from Mt Moriah and seeks to test his wife by giving her the impression that Isaac has indeed been sacrificed. As such, the scene provides a dramatic example of parental grief experienced, incited and appeased by commemorative practices: the preservation of an aspect of the beloved's attire or human remains as a way of anchoring his recollection. The very practices that keep grief alive here are also the practices that promise consolation to the mourning mother, and Sarah's primary complaint against her God and her husband involves being deprived of them. Her portrayal here hints at an active relic cult among Syriac Christian communities that treasured physical mementos of departed holy men and women, as David Eastman has recently argued;³⁷ it also points suggestively at the ways in which the emotional communities in whose context this sermon arose performed mourning and remembrance for loved ones.

Dramatic expressions of grief are not solely the province of women in Byzantine exegesis: a sixth-century verse homily on the sacrifice of Jephthah's daughter, composed by Jacob of Serugh, a near-contemporary of the preceding exponents, describes Jephthah as 'shaken',³⁸ 'weeping with terror',³⁹ and being 'stabbed by pain [such that] he could not endure it'⁴⁰ in the face of having to kill his sole child in accordance with a vow he had made under the influence of the divine spirit. Jacob's account of Jephthah's grief is instructive, inasmuch as the 'sacrifice' of his daughter in Judges 11 is treated as paralleling the *Akedah* by Byzantine homilists. Already Gregory of Nazianzos describes both incidents as 'equally great sacrifices',⁴¹ whereas Chrysostom regards the death of Jephthah's daughter as the *Akedah*'s counterpart inasmuch as in both God 'plainly showed ... that he does not delight in such sacrifices'.⁴² Unlike Abraham in the *Akedah*, however, Jephthah is

37 Eastman, 'The matriarch as model', *passim*. Eastman intriguingly reads Sarah's performance here as a representation of women's role in and desire for participating in the relic cult – a role that is both valorised and, within the context of the homily and in patristic writings more broadly, circumscribed by male authority over women's movements. Aside from Eastman's essay, much of the scholarship surrounding the developing relic cult, already present in, for example, the *Martyrdom of Polycarp* and the *Acts of Judas Thomas*, has focused on its connection with Jerusalem. For the Syriac realm, see, however, J.-N. Saint-Laurent, 'Bones in bags: relics in Syriac hagiography', in M.E. Doerfler, E. Fiano and K.R. Smith (ed.), *Syriac Encounters: Papers from the Sixth North American Syriac Symposium, Duke University, 26–29 June 2011*, *Eastern Christian Studies*, 20 (Leuven, 2015), 439–54.

38 Jacob of Serugh, 'Concerning Jephthah's daughter', line 203, ed.tr. S.A. Harvey and O. Münz-Manor, *Jacob of Sarug's Homily on Jephthah's Daughter* (Piscataway, NJ, 2010), 30–31.

39 Jacob of Serugh, 'Jephthah's daughter', line 203, ed.tr. Harvey and Münz-Manor, 30–31.

40 Jacob of Serugh, 'Jephthah's daughter', lines 204–5, ed.tr. ed.tr. Harvey and Münz-Manor, 30–31.

41 Gregory of Nazianzos, Epitaph 94, PG 38:58.

42 John Chrysostom, *Homilies on the Statues*, 14.3, PG 49:174.

described as responding with distress to the discovery that he is to kill his offspring: he tears his clothes and cries out mournfully (Judg 11:35). Jacob's homily develops fully these expressions of parental grief, explicitly reconciling them with Jephthah's ultimate (gruesome) faithfulness:

:אלא דל כחך, ויגדו לך, ויגדו לך, ויגדו לך
 *מלך אדם וצבא מלחמה וצבא מלחמה
 :מלך אדם וצבא מלחמה וצבא מלחמה
 *מלך אדם וצבא מלחמה וצבא מלחמה
 :מלך אדם וצבא מלחמה וצבא מלחמה
 *מלך אדם וצבא מלחמה וצבא מלחמה
 :מלך אדם וצבא מלחמה וצבא מלחמה
 *מלך אדם וצבא מלחמה וצבא מלחמה
 :מלך אדם וצבא מלחמה וצבא מלחמה
 *מלך אדם וצבא מלחמה וצבא מלחמה
 :מלך אדם וצבא מלחמה וצבא מלחמה
 *מלך אדם וצבא מלחמה וצבא מלחמה
 :מלך אדם וצבא מלחמה וצבא מלחמה
 *מלך אדם וצבא מלחמה וצבא מלחמה

[I]f he had not wept and rent his garments as you have heard, then maybe he did not love his daughter.
 One might say that if he had hastened to the deed, it was because the eagerness for leadership seized him and he fulfilled his vow.
 And since he was puffed up by the victory which had come with him, he sacrificed the child and it did not grieve him when he killed her. [Or,] because he was intoxicated with the blood of the slaughter of the Ammonites, he had cast down her corpse by his own fervor when he entered in. [Or,] he had acquired a taste for blood and destroyed the thousands and became chief, and because of this he killed his daughter and it did not grieve him. [Or,] because he was puffed up with the reputation he took among the ranks, he had met his daughter and in his pride made her into a sacrifice. But there is no reason to say these things about the true man, rather, in all things his truthfulness was seen. Weeping for his daughter he proclaimed the love of fatherhood, he rent his garments and gave to nature what belonged to it.⁴³

43 Jacob of Serugh, 'Jephthah's daughter', lines 354–69, ed.tr. Harvey and Münz-Manor, 46–48.

Grief in the face of the death of a child is here proclaimed as the right response – natural in the best sense of the word, such that a failure to grieve would mar rather than enhance the parental offering. In the *Akedah*, by contrast, any mention of Abraham’s grief at the divine command is absent, and early Byzantine homilists merely hint at emotion: a Syriac liturgical dialogue poem on the *Akedah*, for example, has Isaac complain that his father is gazing at him at length when he should be getting on with the business of sacrificing.⁴⁴ More commonly, however, homilists ascribe emotion to Abraham only as a kind of counterfactual: had he not been as holy, had his devotion to the divine been only that of an ordinary human being, these writers assert, Abraham would surely have grieved, even grieved dramatically.⁴⁵ A Bohairic homily ascribed to Amphilochios of Iconium, for example, treats Abraham as an exception to the law of nature that binds parents to their children:

[T]hose (urges) that impel and constrain every one, had no power over the mind of Abraham. Instead, just as (if he were) a (being) without bowels of compassion, under the appearance of a man, this old man prevailed against them.⁴⁶

Abraham’s response to the divine command, in other words, sets him apart from the rest of humanity – for better or for worse. He remains at the periphery of the emotional communities that exegetes sought to invoke: untouched and untouchable, owing to his particular relationship with the divine. While aspects of the Byzantine homiletic tradition could celebrate Abraham’s stoicism, other writers evidently found the absence of ‘natural’ sentiment troubling. The inclusion of Sarah as a compensatory figure – either as part of Abraham’s reflections or as an actual participant in the story – created an opening for the introduction of grief into an account in which its absence was evidently keenly felt. Neither Sarah’s anger nor her grief over her son’s impending death is censored, even in its most transgressive, accusatory forms. Romanos, for example, in his kontakion, ‘On Abraham and Isaac’ has Sarah flatly demand that her husband hand the child over to her:

‘Whenever [God] who commanded you wishes [to recall] him/He will reveal it to me./Formerly, through an angel, He told me of his birth;/And again whenever He wills it, He will reveal to me his death.’⁴⁷

44 S. Brock, *Soghyatha mgabbyatha* (Glane, 1982), 7–12, at 11; tr. idem, ‘Syriac poetry on biblical themes, 2: a dialogue poem on the sacrifice of Isaac (Gen 22)’, *The Harp*, 7 (1994), 55–72, at 66.

45 See, for example, Romanos’s prefacing of Abraham’s lengthy lament by asking rhetorically, ‘How is it that you (Abraham) did not say ...?’, Hymn 10.3, ed. Maas and Trypanis, 324, tr. Carpenter, 63.

46 Amphilochios, ‘On the patriarch Abraham’, ed. C. Datema, tr. L. Van Rompay, 274.

47 Romanos, Hymn 10.6, ed. Maas and Trypanis, 324–25, tr. Carpenter, 63.

Sarah thus expresses what Abraham in these texts cannot, but what Byzantine homilists evidently felt the situation required: to acknowledge grief as a parent's appropriate response to the death of a child.

Biblical Grief in Communal Context

At this juncture, it behoves us to turn from the grieving parents in the homilies of Jacob, Romanos and their anonymous colleagues, to the grieving families in their congregations. What, if anything, can we say about the ways in which these narratives functioned in their communities? The openly lamenting parent was a powerful and powerfully attractive figure; in their outpourings, the thin line between *Klage* – lament – and *Anklage* – accusation – is crossed and re-crossed and frequently effaced entirely.⁴⁸ The political and performative dimensions of grief highlighted by Gerd Althoff are no less efficacious when directed at a divine rather than a human potentate.⁴⁹ Such grief, publicly asserted, could serve to create a space in which the most fundamental and terrifying questions could be asked – questions of human worth, the power of death, the meaning of existence and the justice of God.⁵⁰

Homilists accordingly treated grieving characters with ambivalence, as the example of Sarah in the early Byzantine tradition readily demonstrates: while some authors preferred to keep her voiceless, excusing or even praising Abraham's apparent failure to share with her the divine command,⁵¹ others permitted her to speak only in hypotheticals – a grief voiced all the more poignantly by being uttered entirely in the subjunctive: had Abraham broken his silence, Sarah might have responded accordingly. Romanos's kontakion in fact demonstrates the slipperiness of the slope between what Sarah might have said in the face of her child's death and what she did indeed say; author and audience alike are swept from self-consciously constructed hypothetical to boldly asserted account – both, of course, rhetorically crafted to give voice to a mother's grief.

48 For the linguistic connection between these terms, see W. Röcke, 'Die Faszination der Traurigkeit: Inszenierung und Reglementierung von Trauer und Melancholie in der Literatur des Spätmittelalters', in *Emotionalität*, ed. Benthien, Fleig and Kasten, 100–18, at 104.

49 G. Althoff, 'Gefühle in der öffentlichen Kommunikation des Mittelalters', in *Emotionalität*, ed. Benthien, Fleig and Kasten, 82–99, esp. 90–91.

50 See Röcke's claim that 'gerade Trauer und Klage für die Reflexion und Erörterung grundsätzlicher Fragen nach dem Sinn von Leben und Tod, nach der Gerechtigkeit des Todes oder ... Gottes, nach der Legitimität oder Illegitimität menschlichen Glücks u.ä. besonders geeignet sind', 'Faszination der Traurigkeit', 108.

51 On the other hand, some authors put the demand for Sarah to be told into either her own voice, in the case of Romanos, Hymn 10.6–11, ed. Maas and Trypanis, 324–26, or Isaac's, as in the case of an anonymous Syriac homilist; see Brock, 'Syriac poetry on biblical themes', 65.

By the same token, however, in the Byzantine liturgy, even the most evocative homily was tightly circumscribed by other performative elements whose message might undermine rather than reinforce the homily's.⁵² In these contexts, the discursive space generated by a homiletic lament needed never intrude into broader Christian discourses about grief and parental bereavement. The grief of patriarchs, much like the grief of kings, might remain *sui generis*: Anna Komnene could argue that there was nothing unmanly in her father's grief,⁵³ yet her very assertion suggests to us that a similar display in a courtier or peasant would have been judged quite differently. In a similar vein, Sarah's and Jephthah's faith, their lament notwithstanding, bore the Hebrews 11 seal of approval, and need never have taken on an exemplary function for ordinary Christians.⁵⁴

Traces of these characters' grief – its characterisation, and its homiletical assessment – nevertheless linger throughout Byzantine reflections on parental bereavement. This is perhaps not entirely surprising; after all, Jacob invites his audience to join Jephthah's lament as a condition of his continued narration: 'Accompany me with voices of suffering', the homilist implores his audience, 'that we may journey with [Jephthah]!'⁵⁵ In a context in which grief was never a wholly private matter, and homilists routinely claimed biblical characters as part of an emotional

52 This point is made particularly effectively in Susan Ashbrook Harvey's discussion of Jacob of Serugh's homily on Jephthah's daughter:

In the case of biblical women, Jacob sometimes granted them speech of unusual boldness or authority in comparison with the expected social norms for late antique society. Yet the impact on the hearer, or the reception by the congregation, would have been strongly mediated. Intoned by the (male) homilist, embedded in the *mimra*'s poetically rendered narrative and expository framework, and contextualised within the larger liturgical structure of the service, such speech was not free standing.

See her 'Bride of blood, bride of light: Biblical women as images of Church in Jacob of Serug', in G.A. Kiraz, *Malphono w-Rabo d-Malphone: Studies in Honor of Sebastian P. Brock* (Piscataway, NJ, 2008), 177–204, at 181. Harvey has further explored this insight in the context of liturgies of lament in 'Guiding grief', *passim*.

53 *Alexiad*, 3.5.6, ed. D.R. Reinsch, *Annae Comnenae Alexias: Prolegomena et textus*, CFHB, 40 (Berlin, 2001), 99.2–4. For a discussion of weeping by generals and heads of empires, see also Hinterberger, 'Tränen in der byzantinischen Literatur', 38–41.

54 Heb 11:32–34 thus mentions Jephthah among those 'who through faith conquered kingdoms, administered justice, obtained promises, shut the mouths of lions, quenched raging fire, escaped the edge of the sword, won strength out of weakness, became mighty in war, put foreign armies to flight' (NRSV). Sarah, by contrast, is noted only in an adjunctive capacity here: she is an accessory to Abraham's faith, her age and barrenness amplifying the patriarch's faithfulness in light of the divine promise at Heb 11:11.

55 Jacob of Serugh, 'Jephthah's daughter', lines 422–23, ed. tr. Harvey and Münz-Manor, 52–53.

community that extended itself across time as well as space,⁵⁶ Jacob's memra draws Jephthah into the midst of a lamenting congregation. He is one bereaved parent among many; yet another father torn between love for his offspring and love for his God; plucked from the biblical narrative to join Jacob's contemporaries in grief, struggle and consolation, if indeed a particularly heroic exemplar thereof. By lending their voices to Jephthah's lament, the community learns not only to join their griefs to his but also to do so in the context of the liturgy – a framework that will guide them through bereavement to consolation and proleptic resolution in the Eucharist.⁵⁷

The other side of the coin that was the inclusion of biblical parents as part of the lamenting congregation, moreover, involved the increasing narration of bereavement through the lens of parental sacrifice. The language of parents' offering a child to God thus comes to pervade discourses surrounding even those children who had died of natural causes. One illustrative example of this discourse comes from a letter of consolation, directed by Photios, the ninth-century patriarch of Constantinople, to his brother on the occasion of the death of his daughter.⁵⁸ Much of Photios's narrative evokes conventions of shared grief and exhortations to pious restraint, particularly in light of the heavenly benefits the virtuous child was sure to enjoy. Yet among the boons of the girl's untimely passing, Photios also notes the reassurance such a death held for her family:

Let us give thanks for those [God] has taken away, so that we may have a sure pleasure in enjoying and rejoicing in those he has given. Because it is good to have living successors, and we have them. Because it is good to offer the first fruits to the common creator and giver of all good things; we have given them.⁵⁹

56 A recent, persuasive discussion of this phenomenon appears in D. Krueger, *Liturgical Subjects: Christian Ritual, Biblical Narrative, and the Formation of the Self in Byzantium* (Philadelphia, 2014).

57 This liturgical framing does not deny grief its place; as Susan Ashbrook Harvey has noted, in Byzantine retellings of these stories of bereavement

the congregation would hear affirmed the horror of unmitigated loss. Again, such narratives affirmed the starkness of grief in human life, even while set in liturgical frames that held up, always, the solace of eucharistic resolution, the promise of life to come,

'Guiding grief', 209.

58 Photios, Letter 63, PG 102:969–81, tr. White, 47–58. For a discussion of this text, as well as other Byzantine examples of parents reflecting on the death of their children, see A.-M. Talbot, 'The death and commemoration of Byzantine children', in A. Papaconstantinou and A.-M. Talbot (ed.), *Becoming Byzantine: Children and Childhood in Byzantium*, DOBSC (Washington, DC, 2009), 283–308.

59 PG 102:977, tr. White, 54.

Photios here exhorts ordinary parents, faced with the death of a son or daughter, to regard their deceased offspring as a divinely ordained sacrifice, brought by them, *ex post facto*, by their cheerful assent to what had occurred. By this attitude, the letter moreover suggests, the family could purchase for themselves the assurance of their other children's well-being. 'Before,' Photios writes,

it was not clear which of the children were offerings to God, and which should be reckoned as the ones to perpetuate the family. But now, if only we bring the offering cheerfully, no longer shall we vacillate between uncertainties and hope, but we shall be confirmed in strength.⁶⁰

The sacrifice of one child – that is to say: parental acquiescence to her death – according to Photios, promised the bereaved the continuation of their family line – surely a strange bargain for those unfamiliar with the stories of Sarah and Jephthah. Photios's letter, moreover, provides readers with an interesting if not at all atypical example of the rhetoric of parental grief in Byzantine literature: the strand of ascetic renunciation of all worldly attachments thrives alongside the recognition of grief as natural, appropriate and calling forth a sympathetic response in all members of one's community who witness it. Yet even the encouragement to set aside grief in recognition of higher realities contains, *in nuce*, the Hebrew Scriptures' (and their exponents') accounts of parental grief. Parents reminded to treat their departed children as rightfully reclaimed sacrifices might welcome the emotional companionship of the weeping Jephthah and the railing Sarah, even if they at times considered their own bereavement superior to that of the patriarchs. Michael Psellos, for example, compares the patriarch Jacob's temporary grief over the supposed death of his son Joseph to his own, 'boundless' and eternal one, in the face of his young daughter's passing.⁶¹

At the heart of these discourses lies the expectation that human grief had the potential to call forth divine sympathy – that Godself, in other words, by virtue of the Incarnation had become part of an emotional

60 PG 102:977, tr. White, 54.

61 Michael Psellos, 'Funeral oration for his daughter Styliane who died before the age of marriage', 47, ed. K.N. Sathas, *Bibliotheca graeca Medii Aevi*, vol. 5, *Pselli miscellanea* (Paris, 1876), 62–87, tr. A. Kaldellis, *Mothers and Sons, Fathers and Daughters: The Byzantine Family of Michael Psellos* (Notre Dame, IN, 2006), 111–38. For a discussion of this text, see also C. Jouanno, 'Michael Psellos: epitaphios logos à sa fille Stylianè morte avant l'heure du mariage; réflexion sur le cadavre défiguré et le rôle du corps dans le travail du deuil', *Kentron*, 10 (1994), 95–107.

community that encompasses all of creation. After all, as Psellos asked, had not Christ entered into every human experience aside from sin, and ought he not therefore to have understood the peculiar attachment parents felt for their children?⁶² In the same fashion, God as heavenly parent had sacrificed his own son, an act that was indeed re-presented in the funerary liturgy, the ‘holy and bloodless’ sacrifice celebrated in remembrance of the no doubt altogether bloodier ‘sacrifice’ of the departed children.⁶³ It is perhaps in this vein that we might read the conclusion of one of the aforementioned Syriac verse homilies, which presents the reader with an unexpected exemplar of human grief prevailing upon divine compassion. At its narrative climax, Sarah welcomes Isaac, proclaiming that

[h]enceforth, my child, from this day on, no one shall call you Abraham’s son, but “child of the pyre” and “offering that his Lord delivered”, [one] whom [God] returned in compassion to his mother, whose mind was grievously pained at his separation from her.

‘And so’, the homilist summarises, ‘God in compassion restored [Isaac], because of the suffering of his mother’.⁶⁴

From a theological perspective, this is certainly an odd, perhaps even a troubling statement. What would it mean for a God to be moved not by a father’s faith, but by a mother’s love? From the perspective of Byzantine audiences, however, it was a claim replete with hope. Few, if any of them, might have been able to emulate Abraham’s piety; Sarah’s bereavement, and her audacious lament, by contrast, surely struck a familiar chord for many mourning parents. If her grief could sway the divine even before Christ’s death – might it not do so again?

62 Psellos, ‘Funeral oration’, 39, tr. Kaldellis, *Mothers and Sons*, 133.

63 The Eucharistic celebration from at least the fourth century onward thus not only presented an opportunity for the commemoration of the dead, but from an early point onward formed part of the Byzantine funerary liturgy. Already the *Apostolic Constitutions*, 8.41, note the celebration of the Eucharist at the grave-side, ed. M. Metzger, *Les constitutions apostoliques*, vol. 3, SC, 336 (Paris, 1987), 257–58. For a discussion of the Eucharist in late ancient funerary rites, see E. Rebillard, *The Care of the Dead in Late Antiquity* (Ithaca, NY, 2009), 140–75; for the later Byzantine context, see E. Velkovska, ‘Funeral rites according to the Byzantine liturgical sources’, *DOP*, 55 (2001), 21–51.

64 ‘On the sacrifice of Isaac’, lines 180–84, ed.tr. Brock, ‘Two verse homilies’, 121–22; tr. Brock, *Treasure-House of Mysteries*, 84.

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12 Grief and Joy in Byzantine Art

Henry Maguire

The Byzantines had a schizophrenic attitude to the display of emotion in art. On the one hand, they often portrayed the vehement expression of feeling, but at the same time, there was an official requirement to show restraint, which was required both by their religious beliefs and by the desired decorum of the state. In each case the two halves of the dichotomy are really two sides of the same coin: restraint has no meaning if there is not also the possibility of its opposite, the unbridled performance of emotion. And vehement expression of emotion loses its impact if it is not breaking the conventions of propriety. Restraint and abandon are both parts of a common language.

The language of emotion in Byzantine art was expressive not only of individual human feeling, but also of group dynamics, political ideology and religious doctrine.¹ Each of these topics could make up a separate study, but this chapter will concentrate on the language itself. First, I shall attempt to summarise the structure of the language, its vocabulary and its grammar. Then, in the second part of the paper, I shall discuss how the Byzantines used the language, and the respective roles played by discipline and by licence. Finally, in the third section, I shall turn briefly to the art of the west, where artists in Italy and in northern Europe adapted the Byzantine language of the emotions to their own purposes, thus proving that the language was cross-cultural, even if the social, political and intellectual contexts in which it was employed were different.

Vocabulary and Grammar

Essentially, emotions were portrayed in Byzantine art through a vocabulary of gestures and a much more limited range of facial expressions. Here it is not necessary to survey the entire repertoire of gestures, which has been

¹ On the relationship of the portrayal of emotions in art to the rituals and experience of mourning in daily life, see H. Maguire, 'Women mourners in Byzantine art, literature, and society', in E. Gertsman (ed.), *Crying in the Middle Ages* (New York, 2012), 3–15; S.V. Moore, 'Experiencing mid-Byzantine mortuary practice: shrouding the dead', in C. Nesbitt and M. Jackson (ed.), *Experiencing Byzantium*, SPBS, 18 (Farnham, 2013), 195–210.




Figure 12.1 Mourning apostles from the fresco of the Koimesis, Kurbinovo, North Macedonia.

Photo credit: Josephine Powell, photograph courtesy of Special Collections, Fine Arts Library, Harvard College Library

done before,² but it will be sufficient to make two observations. First, some of the gestures employed by Byzantine artists are still understood today – that is, they are still part of our own language of the emotions – whereas other gestures are no longer understood. As an example of the latter, a pose that has lost its meaning, we may take the gesture of crossing the hands, as seen in a late twelfth-century painting of the Koimesis of the Virgin in the church of Kurbinovo, where a mourning apostle stands beside the Virgin's bier clasping his right wrist in his left hand (fig. 12.1).³ This gesture can be traced back to antiquity. For example, on a pair of sixth-century ampullae at Monza, the Virgin stands beside the Crucifixion lowering her arms and holding her wrist in her hand as a sign of her suffering.⁴ The pose had

2 H. Maguire, 'The depiction of sorrow in middle Byzantine art', *DOP*, 31 (1977), 125–74.

3 L. Hadermann-Misguich, *Kurbinovo* (Brussels, 1975), 436, figs 178a–b; Maguire, 'Sorrow', 154, fig. 59.

4 A. Grabar, *Ampoules de Terre Sainte* (Paris, 1958), 25–26, nos. 10–11, figs 16, 18; Maguire, 'Sorrow', 153–54, fig. 58.




Figure 12.2 Captives, Battle Sarcophagus, Museo Nazionale, Rome.
Photo credit: German Archaeological Institute, Rome, no. 61.1399

appeared in Roman art, as can be seen on the battle sarcophagus illustrated in fig. 12.2, where a male prisoner standing to the left of the scene makes a similar gesture.⁵ This gesture can be classified as a conventional sign, rather than a universal expression of suffering, because many people today,

5 G. Hamberg, *Studies in Roman Imperial Art* (Copenhagen, 1945), pl. 40; Maguire, 'Sorrow', 154, fig. 60.




Figure 12.3 Peter's remorse after his denial of Christ, detail from an ivory casket, Museo Civico, Brescia.

Photo credit: Hirmer Fotoarchiv

scholars included, are no longer able to recognise it as a sign of mourning. It is no longer in our affective vocabulary.

On the other hand, some of the gestures used by the Byzantines to express grief are still with us, as is shown, for example, by the action of inclining the head and placing the tips of the fingers against the chin. This gesture was used frequently to express thoughtfulness and sorrow in both ancient and Byzantine art.⁶ In Byzantine art, it often represents the idea of *metanoia*, or repentance, accompanied by the painful reflection on past misdeeds. Already in early Christian art, the gesture conveys Peter's remorse for his denial of Christ. On the lid of a fourth-century ivory casket in Brescia, the saint stands with his shoulders hunched and his fingers touching his chin, in front of the maid who has challenged him (fig. 12.3).⁷ In the scene of David

6 Maguire, 'Sorrow', 140–51.

7 J. Kollwitz, *Die Lipsanothek von Brescia* (Berlin, 1933), 15–16, fig. 2; Maguire, 'Sorrow', 147, fig. 44.



Figure 12.4 Advertisement for Special K cereal, illustrating *metanoia*.
Photo credit: copyright Kellogg company, used with permission

and Nathan in the tenth-century Paris Psalter, it is the personification of *metanoia* herself who makes the gesture, this time bringing just the tip of her index finger to her chin, while David grovels in remorse beneath her.⁸

The meaning of this gesture is still generally understood today, as a contemporary advertisement illustrates (fig. 12.4). It is promoting a cereal that is to help people who have been over-eating to lose weight. In this image, a woman looks at herself in the mirror while pinching a roll of fat around her middle; at the same time, she expresses *metanoia* for her self-indulgence by inclining her head and touching her chin with the fingers of her left hand. Her sin is not as severe as David's, but the expressive vocabulary is the same.

The second point to be made about the vocabulary of the emotions in Byzantine art is that the repertoire was almost entirely inherited from ancient art. We have already had occasion to observe this fact in the case of the gesture of the crossed hands. It was also true of facial expression. By and large, the Byzantines expressed facial emotion, both sorrow and joy, by distorting the line made by the eyebrows into an inverted V. In the case of depictions of grief, this expression may be accompanied by lines on the forehead that show the furrowing of the brow and by lines descending from the lower eyelids to indicate tears.⁹ These features, with the possible exception of the tears, were inherited from the

8 Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, MS Gr. 139, fol. 136v; H. Buchthal, *The Miniatures of the Paris Psalter* (London, 1938), 29, fig. 8; Maguire, 'Sorrow', 147, fig. 43.

9 Maguire, 'Sorrow', 166–71.



Figure 12.5 Niobe bewailing her children? Sculpture formerly on the Golden Gate of Constantinople, Archaeological Museum, Istanbul.

Photo credit: author

repertoire of classical art, as a comparison demonstrates. Figure 12.5 shows the head of a suffering woman, possibly Niobe bewailing her children, from one of the ancient sculptures affixed to the exterior of the Golden Gate of Constantinople; figure 12.6 illustrates the late thirteenth-century fresco of the Lamentation in St Clement's church at Ohrid, which portrays the Virgin fainting beside the dead body of her son.¹⁰ Both in the case of Niobe and of the Virgin we see the eyebrows drawn together and the brow furrowed, as well as the hair falling loose, and the upward gaze.

If the Byzantines drew their vocabulary of emotions in art largely from classical antiquity, this was less true of the grammar. Byzantine artists developed techniques of structuring the presentation of emotions which echoed the rhetoric of Christian sermons and hymns, and this grammar of emotion eventually became one of the greatest gifts given by Byzantium to the art of the west, not only in the middle ages but also in the Renaissance and beyond. The grammar is best described with terms derived from rhetoric, such as repetition, emphasis, antithesis and prolepsis. Repetition and emphasis were particularly characteristic of the late Byzantine period, when we find the multiplication of emotive gestures within individual scenes, creating a chorus of emotions. For example, in the painting of the Lamentation at Ohrid a woman standing behind the Virgin makes the dramatic gesture of

10 R. Hamann-MacLean and H. Hallensleben, *Die Monumentalmalerei in Serbien und Makedonien* (Giessen, 1963), 28–29, fig. 168.



Figure 12.6 Lamentation, fresco at St Clement, Ohrid, North Macedonia.

Photo credit: Josephine Powell, photograph courtesy of Special Collections, Fine Arts Library, Harvard College Library

throwing her hands up into the air (fig. 12.6). In the early fourteenth-century fresco of the same scene at Gračanica this gesture is repeated three times, twice by the women mourners and once by an angel.¹¹

For emphasis, we can turn again to the Lamentation at Ohrid (fig. 12.6). On the left side of the scene, immediately behind Christ's feet, a woman is shown pulling at her hair; on the right, by the head of Christ, a second woman repeats the same gesture, but here another mourner, standing behind her, attempts to restrain the violence of the action by grasping her distraught companion by the wrists; thus she both restrains the gesture and emphasises it at the same time.

11 G. Millet, *Recherches sur l'iconographie de l'évangile aux XIV^e, XV^e et XVI^e siècles d'après les monuments de Mistra, de la Macédoine et du Mont-Athos*, 2nd edn (Paris, 1960), 508, fig. 551; B. Živković, *Gračanica* (Belgrade, 1989).



Figure 12.7 Virgin Hodegetria, bilateral icon, Byzantine and Christian Museum, Athens.

Photo credit: author

For examples of antithesis, we can turn to the frequent pairings of the birth and death of Christ that are found in Byzantine art. Such juxtapositions are familiar from bilateral icons, such as an early fourteenth-century panel now in the Byzantine Museum of Athens.¹² It presents the Virgin holding her infant son on one side, and his Crucifixion on the other (figs 12.7 and 12.8). In the latter scene, the Virgin indicates her grief by drawing the edge of her mantle across her face, as if to cover her eyes, while John, with a more dramatic gesture, clasps his hand to his face. The two sides of the panel are brought together into a dialogue, which is similar to the interior monologue of the Virgin expressed in her literary laments. For example, in the popular ninth-century sermon on the Crucifixion and Burial of Christ

12 M. Vassilaki (ed.), *Mother of God: Representations of the Virgin in Byzantine Art*, exhibition catalogue, Benaki Museum, Athens, 20 October 2000–20 January 2001 (Milan, 2000), 152, figs 91–92; A. Drandaki, D. Papanikola-Bakirtzi and A. Tourta (ed.), *Heaven and Earth: Art of Byzantium from Greek Collections*, exhibition catalogue, National Gallery of Art, Washington and the J. Paul Getty Museum, Los Angeles (Athens, 2013), 136–37, no. 56.




Figure 12.8 Crucifixion, bilateral icon, Byzantine and Christian Museum, Athens.
Photo credit: author

by George of Nikomedeia, which was read on the eve of Good Friday, the Virgin describes how in former times she had taken Christ in her arms as her dearest child, only to see him now suspended from the wood, shapeless and without beauty.¹³

Juxtapositions of Christ's birth and death also occur in the monumental decoration of churches. Thus, in the paintings of the eleventh-century *Karanlık Kilise* in Cappadocia, the Nativity (fig. 12.9) and the Crucifixion (fig. 12.10) were placed in the centres of the north and south walls respectively, facing each other.¹⁴ The two scenes are linked by the eloquent gesture of the Virgin, who in each case, at his birth and his death, reaches out to her child with her right hand. In the Nativity scene, there is also a

¹³ George of Nikomedeia, 'On Mary at the Cross', PG 100:1472–88.

¹⁴ M. Restle, *Byzantine Wall Paintings in Asia Minor*, 3 vols (Recklinghausen, 1967), vol. 1, 129–30, vol. 2, pls 229, 237; H. Yenipinar and S. Sahin, *Paintings of the Dark Church* (Istanbul, 1998), 40–41, 76–77.



Figure 12.9 Nativity, fresco at Karanlık Kilise, Göreme.
Photo credit: Mustafa Uysun



Figure 12.10 Crucifixion, fresco at Karanlık Kilise, Göreme.
Photo credit: Mustafa Uysun

subtle prolepsis, for with her left hand Mary holds the edge of her mantle, as if she were about to pull it across her face, a gesture of grief that we have already observed on the fourteenth-century icon in Athens (fig. 12.8), and which also occurs in the earlier eleventh-century Crucifixion mosaic at Hosios Loukas.¹⁵ A better-known example of prolepsis is incorporated into the famous twelfth-century bilateral icon from Kastoria, which shows on one side the Virgin holding her child and on the other Christ as the Man of Sorrows.¹⁶ In this case, the Virgin's deeply drawn eyebrows and her anxious sidelong glance clearly foreshadow the suffering that is to come.

One final example of prolepsis is provided by an equally famous icon on Mt Sinai, which portrays at its centre the Virgin holding a squirming child (fig. 12.11).¹⁷ The pose of Christ in this image recalls the words of a lament of the Virgin that was composed by Nikephoros Basilakes in the twelfth century. In this *threnos* the Virgin relates how Nikodemos placed the dead body painfully in her arms, the same arms that had, in the words of her lament, 'lately lifted you joyfully as an infant'. 'I raised you in a mother's arms', she adds, 'but leaping and jumping as children do. Now I raise you up in the same arms, but without breath and lying as the dead'.¹⁸ On the icon at Sinai a similar antithesis of joy and sorrow is made. At the centre of the panel, the child is leaping in his mother's arms, but at the same time, she turns her head to her right where her gaze falls on Symeon. Symeon is carrying the text of the prophecy that he delivered at the Presentation, in which he foretold Mary's forthcoming sorrow at the death of her son, saying that a sword would pass through her own soul. In another proleptic detail, the bare legs and arms of the Christ-child anticipate his eventual nakedness at his Crucifixion.¹⁹

Through the employment of antithesis and prolepsis, which linked the birth and death of Christ as two poles of the Incarnation, the portrayal of emotion in art was sacralised into a liturgy. The gestures of joy and grief were integrated into the eternal cycle of ritual, just as were the hymns, the

15 E. Diez and O. Demus, *Byzantine Mosaics in Greece* (Cambridge, MA, 1931), 68, fig. 13.

16 *Heaven and Earth*, ed. Drandaki, Papanikola-Bakirtzi and Tourta, 131–32, no. 52; T. Burmand, 'The complexity of the iconography of the bilateral icon with the Virgin Hodegetria and the Man of Sorrows, Kastoria', in A. Eastmond and L. James (ed.), *Wonderful Things: Byzantium through its Art*, SPBS, 16 (Farnham, 2013), 129–37.

17 H. Belting, *Likeness and Presence: A History of the Image before the Era of Art* (Chicago, 1994), 290–96, pls. 174, 176; H.C. Evans and W.D. Wixom (ed.), *The Glory of Byzantium: Art and Culture of the Middle Byzantine Era, A.D. 843–1261*, exhibition catalogue, The Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York (New York, 1997), 372–73, no. 244.

18 Nikephoros Basilakes, 'What the Theotokos would say when she embraces her son, God and saviour when he is being prepared for burial', 13–14, ed. tr. J. Beneker and C.A. Gibson, *The Rhetorical Exercises of Nikephoros Basilakes: Progymnasmata from Twelfth-Century Byzantium*, DOML, 43 (Cambridge, MA, 2016), 218–19.

19 R.W. Corrie, 'Coppo di Marcovaldo's *Madonna del bordone* and the meaning of the bare-legged Christ Child in Siena and the east', *Gesta*, 35.1 (1996), 43–65, esp. 45–49.



Figure 12.11 Virgin and Child with Prophets and Saints, icon, monastery of St Catherine's, Sinai.

Photo credit: reproduced through the courtesy of the Michigan-Princeton-Alexandria expedition to Mt Sinai

sermons and the liturgical laments. Unlike the vocabulary of gestures, this cyclical way of ordering the images, with the beginning anticipating the end and the end returning to the beginning, was an entirely Byzantine development, which owed very little to classical antiquity. But its message of joy, grief and redemption was a powerful one, and, as will be shown below, one that proved very significant to later artistic developments in the west.

Abandon and Restraint

The depiction of emotion in Byzantine art was an area of contention. In broad terms, the gestures that conveyed emotion in Byzantine art can be divided into those that portrayed inner feelings, and those that made a public display. Interior feelings were conveyed by the more passive and contemplative poses, such as veiling the face or raising the hand to the chin, as we have seen in the case of *metanoia* (fig. 12.3). The use of antithesis and prolepsis to structure the images also conveyed the idea of interiority, that is, the mourner's personal contemplation of her sorrow. In rhetorical terminology, the inner expression of emotions in art can be related to the genre of *ethopoeia*, including *threnos*, which took the form of a monologue conveying the feelings of the moment, often through antitheses of the present with the past.

A more public and theatrical kind of display was indicated by such actions as mourners tearing their clothes, scratching their cheeks with their nails, or pulling on their unbound hair. Gestures of this kind were catalogued in ekphrastic descriptions of suffering, such as a mid-twelfth-century sermon on the Raising of the Widow's Son by the South Italian preacher known as Philagathos.²⁰ In this sermon, Philagathos engaged both in *ethopoeia*, giving the words of the widow's lament, and in *ekphrasis*, for he described in detail her actions at the deathbed – that is, the external manifestations of her grief. The preacher relates that while the widow's son still held onto life, she stood beside him in fear and trembling, with her hair shorn, her head uncovered and her breasts bared. But once her son had died, she became deranged by her grief, as if she were in a 'Bacchic' frenzy. She tore at her grey hairs and scraped her cheeks with her nails so that streams of blood and of tears flowed from her at the same time. She beat her head and chest with stones, displaying her naked breasts.²¹

The account by Philagathos of the widow's grief was hyperbolic, but Byzantine artists did not have such a licence. The depiction of sorrow was allowable in religious art because the doctrine of the Incarnation validated the expression of grief – the Gospel states that Jesus himself wept before he raised Lazarus.²² On the other hand, too vehement a display of mourning

20 Philagathos, 'On the widow's son', ed. G. Rossi Taibbi, *Filagato da Cerami, Omelie per i vangeli domenicali e le feste di tutto l'anno*, vol. 1: *Omelie per le feste fisse* (Palermo, 1969), 37–44.

21 Philagathos, 'On the widow's son', 8–10, ed. Rossi Taibbi, 40–41.

22 Jn 11:35.

could be seen as indecorous and implying a lack of faith in the Resurrection. Church writers were especially critical of the more violent displays of grief, which they associated with female mourners. 'Along with other evils', said John Chrysostom, 'this female affliction also prevails. For in lamenting and wailing they make a display, baring their arms, tearing their hair, scratching gullies down their cheeks ... this under the eyes of men'. '[Weeping] I do not forbid', he continued, 'but I forbid beating oneself and immoderate weeping.... Weep, but gently, but with decorum.... If you were to weep thus, you would not weep as one who distrusts the Resurrection, but as one who cannot bear being separated'.²³ Nevertheless, the frequent repetition of such injunctions by later Byzantine homilists and commentators demonstrates that the practices of extreme mourning continued in daily life.²⁴

Only a saint, such as Mary the Younger, could be expected to resist. As we learn from the tenth-century biographer of Mary the Younger, after her firstborn son died at the age of five:

Ἡ δέ, μήτηρ ἦν ἐστρέφετο μὲν ὡς εἰκὸς τὰ σπλάγγνα καὶ ἐσπαράττετο, ἔμμενε δὲ καθ' αὐτήν στεναζοῦσα καὶ εἰς φανερά ἐξέπιπτε δάκρυα, οὐ μὴν καὶ ἄσεμνόν τι ἐπεδείξατο, οὐ τὴν κόμην ἐσπάραξεν, οὐ τὰς παρειὰς ταῖς χερσὶν ἤσχυνεν, οὐ τὸν χιτῶνα διέρρηξεν... ἀλλὰ μικροῦ τὴν φύσιν ἐνίκησε, καὶ ὅσον δεῖξαι ὅτι μήτηρ ἐστὶ τοσοῦτον ἐπιδακρύσασα.

[H]er mother's heart was broken and torn asunder as one would expect; but she kept to herself, sighing and openly weeping, without, however, displaying unseemly behaviour. She did not tear out her hair, nor did she disfigure her cheeks with her hands, nor did she rend her clothes.... She almost conquered nature ... weeping just enough to show she was a mother.²⁵

Violent gestures of this kind were portrayed in Byzantine art, but according to relatively strict protocols. They appeared in Old Testament scenes, and in portrayals of penitents, where lack of faith in the Resurrection of Christ was not an issue.²⁶ Moreover, in spite of the bias of John Chrysostom, in these contexts men as well as women engaged in extreme displays of grief. The eleventh-century Vatican Octateuch, for example, shows Jacob pulling his hair and beard when he is presented with Joseph's blood-stained coat.²⁷ And

23 'Homily 62 on John', PG 59:347–48.

24 Maguire, 'Women mourners', 3–15, esp. 6–7.

25 *Life of Mary the Younger*, 4, ed. in *Acta Sanctorum Novembris*, vol. 4 (Brussels, 1925), 693E, translation by A.E. Laiou, in *Holy Women of Byzantium: Ten Saints' Lives in English Translation*, ed. A.-M. Talbot, Byzantine Saints' Lives in Translation, 1 (Washington, DC, 1996), 258–59. On this passage, see A.P. Kazhdan and G. Constable, *People and Power in Byzantium: An Introduction to Modern Byzantine Studies* (Washington, DC, 1982), 74.

26 Maguire, 'Sorrow', 126–32.

27 Biblioteca Vaticana, MS Gr. 747, fol. 59r; Maguire, 'Sorrow', 129, fig. 4; K. Weitzmann and M. Bernabò, *The Byzantine Octateuchs*, 2 vols (Princeton, 1999), vol. 1, 118; vol. 2, fig. 475.



Figure 12.12 Lamentation, fresco at Nerezi.

Photo credit: Conway Library, The Courtauld Institute of Art

in a late twelfth- or early thirteenth-century copy of the *Penitential Canon*, also in the Vatican, we see monks demonstrating their remorse without restraint, by pulling frantically at their hair, beards and clothes.²⁸

Such extreme expressions of grief were excluded, however, from scenes of the mourning of Christ until the late Byzantine period, when they slowly began to creep into the New Testament repertoire. Thus in the well-known twelfth-century Lamentation fresco at Nerezi grief is intensely expressed through the gesture of the mother's embrace, and through the facial expressions of the Virgin and Saint John, but there is no indecorous pulling of hair or garments (fig. 12.12).²⁹ It is only over a hundred years later, in the fresco of the Lamentation in St Clement at Ohrid, that we find a woman tugging at her unbound locks, as we have seen earlier (fig. 12.6). Here even the Virgin has allowed her dishevelled hair to cascade over her shoulders, as she relapses into a swoon. In the painting of the Koimesis in the church of the Trinity at Sopoćani one of the female mourners even draws her fingers across her cheek, as if to scratch them.³⁰

28 Biblioteca Vaticana, MS Gr. 747, fol. 6r; J.R. Martin, *The Illustration of the Heavenly Ladder of John Climacus* (Princeton, 1954), 133, fig. 253; Maguire, 'Sorrow', 131–32, fig. 10.

29 I. Sinkević, *The Church of St. Panteleimon at Nerezi: Architecture, Programme, Patronage* (Wiesbaden, 2000), 50–53, fig. 48.

30 Hamann-MacLean and Hallensleben, *Die Monumentalmalerei in Serbien und Makedonien*, 25–26, figs 127–28. In a miniature of the Lamentation in a fourteenth-century Gospel book, Vatopedi MS 937, fol. 17v, the Virgin even pulls at her hair; S. Pelekanidis, *Oi thesauroi tou Hagiou Orous*, 4 vols (Athens, 1973–91), vol. 4, 306, fig. 254.



Figure 12.13 An eros in a tree above a putto with a lion and a musician centaur, detail of a bone casket, Musée du Louvre, Paris.

Photo credit: author

A similar distinction between sanctioned and unsanctioned expressions of feeling can be made concerning the depiction of laughter and joy in Byzantine art. Joy was acceptable, and was even an attribute of angels, but laughter was a different matter, and was generally condemned by church writers. With a few exceptions, laughter was only portrayed in secular art in Byzantium, most notably in the form of the putti and winged erotes that gambol, dance and play in the bone carvings decorating domestic caskets. Figure 12.13 illustrates one of the panels on the lid of a tenth-century box in the Louvre, which shows erotes holding garlands and baskets of fruit, dancing, playing musical instruments, and, in the detail illustrated here, perching in a flowering tree above a putto with a lion beside a musician centaur.³¹ Byzantine writers who described the ancient bronze reliefs that covered the Anemodoulion, or weathervane, in

31 A. Goldschmidt and K. Weitzmann, *Die byzantinischen Elfenbeinskulpturen des X.–XIII. Jahrhunderts*, 2 vols (Berlin, 1930), vol. 1, 33–34, no. 26, pl. 11a; E.D. Maguire and H. Maguire, *Other Icons: Art and Power in Byzantine Secular Culture* (Princeton, 2007), 107, 145–53; A. Walker, 'Laughing at Eros and Aphrodite: sexual inversion and its resolution in the classicizing arts of medieval Byzantium', in M. Alexiou and D. Cairns (ed.), *Greek Laughter and Tears: Antiquity and After* (Edinburgh, 2017), 263–87.

Constantinople referred to playing erotes of this kind as laughing. According to Constantine of Rhodes in the tenth century, the naked erotes that were portrayed there were, in his words, ‘laughing softly, and those above laughed at those below’ (fig. 12.13).³² Later, Niketas Choniates described the same reliefs, saying: ‘There were the erotes, shown in pairs and groups of three; naked of clothing, but armed with apples, they shook with sweet laughter as they threw these or were pelted by them’.³³ However, Byzantine canonists strictly forbade humour of this kind, whether it was Zonaras criticising the mimes for inciting guffaws and unseemly laughter with their antics, or Balsamon condemning the ‘erotomaniacs’ who depicted erotes on their walls. These erotes, said Balsamon, ‘bewitch and deceive the sight and cause every kind of evil to enter and invade the soul, being the cause of disgraceful and unseemly deeds, and corrupting what is in the image of God’.³⁴

As for the exceptional appearances of gambolling putti in the religious art of Byzantium, they are to be found especially in the later period in the margins of New Testament scenes, at a time when, as we have seen, there was also a relaxation of the rules concerning violent gestures of grief in passion scenes.³⁵ For example, in the lower border of a fourteenth-century fresco of the Baptism of Christ in the Old Metropolis at Veroia, we can see naked putti disporting themselves in the water, including one who rides on the back of two dolphins.³⁶ This last motif of the dolphin rider had appeared earlier in the bone carvings of secular caskets, as can be seen from an example at the Walters Art Museum in Baltimore.³⁷

Unlike laughter, the depiction of joy in Byzantine religious art was neither unacceptable nor marginal, but absolutely central. Jesus himself, explaining the parable of the lost sheep, had said that ‘there is joy in the presence of the angels of God over one sinner that repents’.³⁸ This saying attracted

32 Constantine of Rhodes, *On Constantinople*, lines 191–92, ed. J. Vassis and tr. L. James et al. in *Constantine of Rhodes, On Constantinople and the Church of the Holy Apostles* (Farnham, 2012), 32.

33 Niketas Choniates, *History*, ed. J.-L. Van Dieten, *Niketæ Choniatae historia* (Berlin, 1975), 648, tr. H.J. Magoulias, *O City of Byzantium: Annals of Niketas Choniates* (Detroit, 1984), 358.

34 Balsamon, *Commentary on the Council of Trullo*, PG 137:861.

35 D. Mouriki, ‘Revival themes with elements of daily life in two Palaeologan frescoes depicting the baptism’, in C. Mango and O. Pritsak (ed.), *Okeanos: Essays Presented to Ihor Ševčenko on his Sixtieth Birthday by his Colleagues and Students* (Cambridge, MA, 1983), 458–88; I. Jevtić, ‘Antiquarianism and revivalism in late Byzantine court culture and visual arts’, in A. Ödekan, N. Necipoğlu and E. Akyürek (ed.), *The Byzantine Court: Source of Power and Culture; Papers from the Second International Sevgi Gönül Byzantine Studies Symposium* (Istanbul, 2013), 209–17.

36 Mouriki, ‘Revival themes’, 461–62, fig. 6; A. Papazotos, *E Beroia kai oi naoi tes* (Athens, 1994), 258, fig. 14; Jevtić, ‘Antiquarianism and revivalism’, 211, fig 4.

37 Goldschmidt and Weitzmann, *Die byzantinischen Elfenbeinskulpturen*, vol. 1, 38–39, no. 40, pl. 22c.

38 Lk 15:10.

considerable commentary from Byzantine writers. Pseudo-Dionysios the Areopagite, for example, wrote in his *Celestial Hierarchy*:

Λοιπὸς ἡμῖν εἰς διασάφησιν ὁ περὶ τῆς χαρᾶς τῶν οὐρανίων διακοσμήσεων λόγος. Καὶ γὰρ ἄδεκτοι παντελῶς εἰσι τῆς καθ' ἡμᾶς ἐμπαθοῦς ἡδονῆς, συγκαίρειν δὲ θεῶν λέγονται τῇ τῶν ἀπολωλότων εὐρέσει κατὰ τὴν θεοειδῆ ῥαστώνην καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ τῇ προνοίᾳ καὶ σωτηρίᾳ τῶν ἐπὶ θεὸν ἐπιστρεφομένων ἀγαθοειδῆ καὶ ἄφθονον εὐφροσύνην καὶ τὴν εὐπάθειαν ἐκείνην τὴν ἄρρητον ἧς ἐν μεθέξει πολλάκις γεγόνασι καὶ ἄνδρες ἱεροὶ κατὰ τὰς θεουργοῦς τῶν θείων ἐλλάμψεων ἐπιφοιτήσεις.

I must explain something about what scripture intends in the reference to the joy of the heavenly ranks. Now these ranks could never experience the pleasures we draw from the passions. The reference therefore is to the way they participate in the divine joy caused by the finding of the lost... They are unspeakably happy in the way that, occasionally, sacred men are happy when God arranges for divine enlightenments to visit them.³⁹

We can find unspeakably happy angels pictured in the two twelfth-century copies of the homilies of James of Kokkinobaphos, where the angels are shown rejoicing in heaven after the Virgin had given Gabriel her final assent to the miraculous conception of Christ.⁴⁰ At this juncture, says the homily: ‘All the intelligible powers leaped when this response reached their ears; heaven above rejoiced, and the clouds received these words like a joyful dew.’⁴¹ In the miniatures, the angels show their joy by pirouetting and waving their arms in the air – and here it may be noted that the gesture of raising the arms was polyvalent; it could represent extremes of sorrow as well as of joy, as we have observed in the fresco of the Lamentation at Ohrid (fig. 12.6).

Jumping and dancing poses were considered by the Byzantines to be characteristic of divine joy. Once again, there were scriptural precedents. As Maximos the Confessor wrote, ‘the chief characteristic of joy is a leaping and rejoicing in God, which we see quite clearly in John the Baptist ... who “leaped in the womb”; we see it also in David ... who “leaped for joy” when the ark “came to its rest”’.⁴²

39 Ps.-Dionysios the Areopagite, *Celestial Hierarchy*, 15.9, ed. G. Heil and A.M. Ritter, *Corpus Dionysiacum*, 2nd rev. edn (Berlin, 2012), vol. 2, 58–59, tr. C. Luibheid, *Pseudo-Dionysius, The Complete Works* (New York, 1987), 190.

40 Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, MS Gr. 1208, fol. 173v; Biblioteca Vaticana, MS Gr. 1162, fol. 127v; I. Hutter and P. Canart, *Das Marienhomiliar des Mönchs Jakobos von Kokkinobaphos, Codex Vaticanus Graecus 1162, Codices e Vaticanis selecti*, 79 (Zurich, 1991).

41 James of Kokkinobaphos, ‘Oration on the Annunciation of the most-holy Theotokos’, PG 127:652–53.

42 Maximos the Confessor, *Ambigua* 6, ed.tr. N. Constatas, *Maximos the Confessor, The Ambigua*, 2 vols, DOML, 28–29 (Washington, DC, 2014), vol. 1, 71.

Before leaving these issues of what was sanctioned and what was not sanctioned in the depiction of emotion in Byzantine art, it is necessary to explore one curiosity that is difficult to explain, namely, the frequent portrayals in Byzantine art of angels showing grief. Although Byzantine literature is full of angelic joy, there is little mention or discussion of angelic grief. The exception is the saints' lives, where we do occasionally encounter weeping angels, such as the beautiful young man seen by Andrew the Fool following the funeral procession of a rich man whose soul was being taken by demons, because of his completely wicked life. The angel explained to the saint that he was lamenting and wailing because he had lost the sinner's soul.⁴³ This story is a logical reversal of the parable of the lost sheep; since the sinner had not repented, the angel was not joyful but wept. But, the saints' lives aside, there are few biblical references to the grief of angels, and a corresponding lack of commentaries on such a phenomenon in Byzantine exegetical texts.⁴⁴

Only in art do we discover grieving angels frequently portrayed in New Testament contexts, and it is only in descriptions of works of art that writers record weeping angels in connection with the passion. For example, an eleventh-century epigram by John Mauropous describes the angels weeping as they witness the Crucifixion:

μήτηρ δὲ θρηνεῖ καὶ σὸς ἡγαπημένος,
μόνοι παρόντες τῶν πρὸ μικροῦ σοι φίλων.
Φροῦδοι μαθηταί· καὶ περωτοὶ δ'οικέται,
μάτην περιτρέχουσι μεστοὶ δακρύων.
Your mother laments and your beloved (disciple),
they alone being present out of the friends you lately had.
Your disciples are fled, and your winged servants
circle you in vain, full of tears.⁴⁵

The twelfth-century Sicilian poet Eugenios of Palermo also refers to the grief of angels in a poem describing an icon of the Crucifixion:

κἂν ἡ ξυνωρις παρθένων τῶν ἐνθάδε
ἔστη καταφής, δυσφοροῦσα τῷ πάθει
καὶ συστενάξει τάξις ἡ τῶν ἀγγέλων.

43 *Life of Andrew the Fool*, lines 1524–64, ed. L. Rydén, *The Life of Saint Andrew the Fool*, 2 vols (Uppsala, 1995), vol. 2, 115.

44 For commentaries on the emotions of angels, including their grief, in the west, see J.F. Ruys, “Tears such as angels weep”, the evolution of sadness in demons’, in M. Champion and A. Lynch (ed.), *Understanding Emotions in Early Europe* (Turnhout, 2015), 51–71, esp. 60–62.

45 John Mauropous, Poem 7, ed. I. Bollig and P. de Lagarde, *Ioannis Euchaitorum Metropolitanæ quæ in codice vaticano graeco 676 supersunt*, *Abhandlungen der königlichen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen*, 28 (Göttingen, 1882), 6.

the pair of Virgins (i.e., Mary and John) stand here with downcast eyes,
bearing with pain the passion,
and the rank of the angels laments with them.⁴⁶

In surviving works of art, lamenting angels appear in scenes of Christ's passion from the eleventh century onwards.⁴⁷ At first they make the more restrained gestures of resting their heads on their hands or of weeping into their garments, as can be seen in a late twelfth-century fresco in the hermitage of St Neophytos on Cyprus (fig. 12.14).⁴⁸ In other twelfth-century frescoes, angels appear with sorrowful expressions on their faces. In a fresco at Lagoudera, for example, two such angels flank an image of the Virgin holding her child, which is labelled *Arakiotissa* (fig. 12.15).⁴⁹ Here the contracted brows of the heavenly beings are explained by the fact that they are proffering to Christ the instruments of his future Passion, the cross, the lance and the sponge.⁵⁰

In later centuries the angels are portrayed in more emphatic poses. In a fourteenth-century Gospel book in the Vatopedi Monastery on Mt Athos the angels attending the Lamentation clasp their bare hands to their faces.⁵¹ In the fresco of the Lamentation at Gračanica one of the angels, flying directly above the swooning Virgin, throws both arms up in the air, thus replicating the gesture of joy seen in the Homilies of James of Kokkinobaphos.⁵² At the very end of the Byzantine period, we encounter angels participating in unbridled scenes of lamentation. For example, in an icon of the second half of the fifteenth century painted by Andreas Pavias on Crete the angels not only make the familiar passive gestures of resting their cheeks on their hands, clasping their wrists and covering their eyes, but in addition, they throw their arms up in the air, pirouette, tear their garments to expose their chests and pull their hair.⁵³ Even if this icon owes a debt to Italy, it comes at the end of a development in Byzantine art that allowed the angels who

46 Eugenios of Palermo, Poem 13, ed. M. Gigante, *Eugenii Panormitani versus iambici*, Testi e monumenti, Testi, 10 (Palermo, 1964).

47 Maguire, 'Sorrow', 145, n. 115.

48 C. Mango and E.J.W. Hawkins, 'The Hermitage of St. Neophytos and its wall paintings', *DOP*, 20 (1966), 136–206, esp. 149–51, figs 32–33.

49 D. Winfield and J. Winfield, *The Church of the Panaghia tou Arakos at Lagoudera, Cyprus: The Paintings and their Painterly Significance* (Washington, DC, 2003), 244–49, pl. 32, figs 226–27; A. Papageorghiou, Ch. Bakirtzis and Ch. Hadjichristodoulou (ed.), *The Church of Panaghia tou Arakos* (Nicosia, 2018), 57–58, 67–68, pl. 95.

50 The sorrowful faces of the angels holding the instruments of the Passion can be contrasted with those of the angels surrounding the Christ Pantokrator in the dome of the church; Winfield and Winfield, *The Church of the Panaghia tou Arakos*, figs 48–59; *The Church of Panaghia tou Arakos*, ed. Papageorghiou, Bakirtzis and Hadjichristodoulou, pls 57–60.

51 Vatopedi MS 937, fol. 17v; Pelekanidis, *Oi thesauroi tou Hagiou Orous*, vol. 4, 306, fig. 254.

52 Millet, *Recherches sur l'iconographie de l'évangile*, 508, fig. 551; Živković, *Gračanica*.

53 *Heaven and Earth*, ed. Drandaki, Papanikola-Bakirtzi and Tourta, 324–25, no. 172.



Figure 12.14 Crucifixion, fresco at the hermitage of St Neophytos, Paphos, Cyprus. Photo credit: copyright Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, Image Collections and Fieldwork Archives, Washington, DC

attended scenes of the passion to indulge in more and more extreme expressions of grief.

The fifteenth-century Cretan painting brings to mind the stricture made by the twelfth-century canonist Balsamon: ‘One should not equate things that are above nature with those that are according to nature, and, as it were, profane them and visualise them according to our own earthly [existence]’.⁵⁴ The question, therefore, is why do weeping angels play such an important role in Byzantine art, when they have no scriptural or patristic

⁵⁴ Balsamon, *Commentary on the Council of Trullo*, canon 79, PG 137:781.



Figure 12.15 Virgin Arakiotissa flanked by angels bearing instruments of the Passion, fresco at Lagoudera.

Photo credit: copyright Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, Image Collections and Fieldwork Archives, Washington, DC

basis, and when they even contravene the church's prohibition of extreme practices of mourning? There are two possible answers. The first is to invoke the liturgical character of the depiction of emotion in Byzantine art. The New Testament cycle, including the gestures of grief, was integrated into the cycle of the liturgy, which was held to be a reflection of the heavenly liturgy

above.⁵⁵ Therefore, if the human participants in the ritual of the passion were depicted in poses of grief, it was natural to imagine that the angels in the heavenly liturgy, whose actions were mirrored on earth, were in poses of mourning also.

We can see this idea illustrated in an epitaphios from Thessalonike, dating to around 1300, which is now housed in the Museum of Byzantine Culture in that city.⁵⁶ Behind the body of Christ, which lies on a shroud as the Amnos, or the sacrificial lamb, four angels attend to him. Two of the angels are equipped with fans as deacons, and two are lamenting. One of the mourning angels holds out his covered hands towards the corpse, while the other holds his right hand to his cheek and clasps his left hand over his mouth as if to stifle his cries. Thus the embroidery combines the ministering of the deacons and the gestures of grief into one angelic liturgy.

The second reason why weeping angels may have been acceptable in Byzantine iconography is that the emotions of angels always were seen as wholly spiritual, and thus their depiction in art was purely symbolic. John Chrysostom said that the joy of angels has nothing to do with our present life,⁵⁷ while at the very end of the Byzantine period Gennadios Scholarios wrote: 'Both the joy and the grief of angels is spoken of metaphorically, inasmuch as the angels have a complete desire for the salvation of mortals'.⁵⁸

The Byzantine Language of the Emotions in the West

The last part of this paper turns from the language of emotions in Byzantine art to its reception by western artists in the middle ages and in the Renaissance. The topic is large, and is only beginning to be explored, but a few preliminary observations may be offered here. Western artists adopted both the Byzantine vocabulary of emotions – that is the repertoire of gestures and facial expressions – and the grammar that structured their presentation. A remarkable painted wooden relief portraying Christ's Deposition by the artist known as the Maestro di Trognano incorporates the same range of mourning gestures as we have seen in Byzantine art (fig. 12.16).⁵⁹ It was produced in the last quarter of the fifteenth century and is now in the Castello Sforzesco in Milan. Here we find, at the upper right, one of the mourners covering his face with his blood-red garment, another mourner with her

55 W.T. Woodfin, 'Celestial hierarchies and earthly hierarchies in the art of the Byzantine Church', in P. Stephenson (ed.), *The Byzantine World* (London, 2010), 303–19.

56 *Heaven and Earth*, ed. Drandaki, Papanikola-Bakirtzi and Tourta, 155–56, no. 74.

57 John Chrysostom, 'Homily 55 on Matthew' (on Mt 16:24), PG 58:547. I thank Father Maximos Constatas for this and the following reference.

58 Gennadios Scholarios, *Epitome*, 113.7, ed. L. Petit, X.A. Siderides and M. Jugie, *Oeuvres complètes de Gennade Scholarios*, 8 vols (Paris, 1928–36), vol. 5, 498.

59 M. Bascapè (ed.), *Opere insigni, e per la divotione e per il lavoro: tre sculture lignee del Maestro di Trognano al Castello Sforzesco* (Milan, 2005).



Figure 12.16 Deposition of Christ, detail of wooden relief by the Maestro di Trognano, Castello Sforzesco, Milan.

Photo credit: author

hair unbound and her arms flung in the air, and yet another, at the far left, tearing at his clothes. Even the closed eyes of some of the mourners had precedents in Byzantine paintings, such as the late twelfth-century *Koimesis* painted in the church at Lagoudera on Cyprus, where one of the weeping apostles is portrayed with his eyes shut.⁶⁰ In the relief, the gestures are presented with a down-to-earth realism that belongs to the Renaissance, but the repertoire is familiar from Byzantium. However, as we have observed, nearly all of this vocabulary was ultimately derived from antiquity, so that it is not easy to determine whether the employment of the individual gestures by western artists was part of a continuing artistic tradition, or whether they were imported anew from the east.

On the other hand, the grammar of emotion, the structuring of the gestures through antithesis and prolepsis, was a Byzantine creation,⁶¹ and its eventual exploitation by western artists was an important contribution of Byzantium to the history of art. For instance, in Tuscan painting of the thirteenth century,

60 Winfield and Winfield, *The Church of the Panaghia tou Arakos*, 231–35, pl. 23, figs 201, 221.

61 Maguire, 'Sorrow', 164–66; H. Maguire, *Art and Eloquence in Byzantium* (Princeton, 1981), 53–83, 91–108.




Figure 12.17 Virgin Eleousa, detail of diptych attributed to Bonaventura Berlinghieri, Uffizi Gallery, Florence.

Photo credit: author

we find antithetical pairings of scenes showing the birth and death of Christ, such as had appeared centuries before in the art of Byzantium (figs 12.9 and 12.10). A good example is a diptych painted by the Tuscan artist Bonaventura Berlinghieri around the year 1255 (figs 12.17 and 12.18).⁶² The left-hand panel shows the Virgin holding her child in the pose of the Eleousa, with her cheek pressed against his. The right-hand panel portrays the Crucifixion, together with the Carrying of the Cross and the Deposition below. To the left of the Crucifixion, the Virgin is seen swooning; she has to be held up by a woman on each side of her. On the right St John and another woman stand in mourning, the woman resting her cheek on her left hand.

This diptych also incorporates prolepsis, in the form of the gesture of the Virgin in the left-hand panel, who holds up the edge of her mantle in her right hand, behind her child. This is the mantle with which she is to dry her

62 M. Boskovits, *The Origins of Florentine Painting, 1110–1270*, Critical and Historical Corpus of Florentine Painting, section 1, vol. 1 (Florence, 1993), 73–74.




Figure 12.18 Crucifixion, detail of diptych attributed to Bonaventura Berlinghieri, Uffizi Gallery, Florence.

Photo credit: author

tears at the Crucifixion, as shown in many Crucifixion scenes from both Byzantium and Italy, such as a tenth-century Byzantine ivory in Hanover,⁶³ or a mid-thirteenth-century Tuscan panel from an altarpiece now in the Yale University Art Gallery (fig. 12.19).⁶⁴ Thus, in the panel by Bonaventura Berlinghieri that shows the Virgin rejoicing in her child, she is already wrapping him in her future tears. Western images of this kind obviously were not in dialogue with Byzantine church literature, but rather with Latin texts, especially those associated with the Franciscans, who promoted an affective spirituality based on meditation on the Passion.⁶⁵

63 Goldschmidt and Weitzmann, *Die byzantinischen Elfenbeinskulpturen*, vol. 2, 37, no. 40; *The Glory of Byzantium*, ed. Evans and Wixom, 146, no. 92.

64 Boskovits, *The Origins of Florentine Painting*, 74–76, fig. 45; *The Glory of Byzantium*, ed. Evans and Wixom, 488–89, no. 322.

65 H. Belting, *The Image and its Public in the Middle Ages: Form and Function of Early Paintings of the Passion* (New Rochelle, NY, 1990), 145; A. Derbes, *Picturing the*



Figure 12.19 Crucifixion, panel painting, Yale University Art Gallery, New Haven. Photo credit: author

An example of such a text is the popular *Stabat Mater* hymn, which was composed in the thirteenth century, probably by a Franciscan author, for the liturgies of Lent and Passion week. It continued to be popular as a devotional text among the laity throughout the middle ages.⁶⁶ Like the Byzantine texts, the hymn links together Mary's pain at the Crucifixion with Symeon's prophecy at the Presentation:

Stabat mater dolorosa
Iuxta crucem lacrimosa,
Dum pendebat filius;
Cuius animam gementem

Passion in Late Medieval Italy: Narrative Painting, Franciscan Ideologies, and the Levant (Cambridge, 1996), 16–24.

66 J. Kayser, *Beiträge zur Geschichte und Erklärung der ältesten Kirchenhymnen*, 2 vols (Paderborn, 1881), vol. 2, 110–92; D.S. Areford, *The Art of Empathy: The Mother of Sorrows in Northern Renaissance Art and Devotion* (Jacksonville, FL, 2013), 32, 42, n. 90.

Contristantem et dolentem
 Pertransivit gladius
 The grieving mother stood
 beside the cross weeping
 where her son was hanging.
 Through her weeping soul,
 saddened and grieving,
 a sword passed.⁶⁷

We can trace the antithetical pairing of scenes from thirteenth-century Tuscany to the fifteenth-century painting of the Netherlands.⁶⁸ Perhaps the most striking pairing of the birth and death of Christ in western art is the great *Miraflores* altarpiece by Rogier van der Weyden, now in Berlin.⁶⁹ In this painting, we find the same juxtapositions as in Byzantine art but rendered in the highly realistic manner of Netherlandish painting that is far removed from the relative abstraction of Byzantine style. The triptych presents three scenes side by side: on the left, the Virgin praying to her new-born son, whom she supports in her lap; in the centre, the Virgin embracing the dead body of her son, again supported in her lap; and on the right, Christ appearing to his mother after his Resurrection. The individual scenes, especially the first two, are linked visually as well as conceptually. Thus both the child and the corpse lie diagonally across the Virgin's lap, and both the baby and the corpse are naked. The scenes are further linked by their traceried arched frames and by their colours, especially by the bright red of Joseph's dress in the birth scene, which is picked up by the red worn by the Virgin in the Lamentation, and, finally, by the red mantle of Christ in the Resurrection.

As Anne Derbes and other scholars have pointed out, even while western artists appropriated techniques of portraying emotion from the Byzantines, they did not respond to the same texts nor did they necessarily have the same motives. The naked body of Christ, for example, which was central to both western and eastern Passion scenes (figs 12.6, 12.8, 12.10, 12.12, 12.16, 12.18), could be interpreted in entirely different ways in the east and in the west. In the lament by Nikephoros Basilakes, the naked corpse becomes a springboard for a series of antitheses that emphasise the redemptive role of Christ. The Virgin exclaims:

Ὡ γυμνὲ νεκρὲ καὶ ζῶντος Λόγε Θεοῦ, ἐκουσίως ὑψωθῆναι κατακεκριμένε
 σταυρῷ ἵνα πάντας ἐλκύσης εἰς ἑαυτόν, ποῖον σου τῶν μελῶν τοῦ σώματος
 διέμεινεν ἀπαθές; Ὡ θεία μοι κορυφή ἀκάνθας δεδεγμένη καὶ ταύτας
 μετεμπήξασα τῇ καρδίᾳ μου! ...

67 Kayser, *Beiträge zur Geschichte und Erklärung der ältesten Kirchenhymnen*, vol. 2, 132.

68 See, in general, B. Coulié (ed.), *Paths to Europe: From Byzantium to the Low Countries* (Milan, 2017).

69 D. De Vos, *Rogier van der Weyden: The Complete Works* (New York, 1999), 226–33, no. 12.

Ὡ σιαγόνες δεδεγμένοι ραπίσματα! Ὡ στόμα σίμβλον ἕτερον μέλιτος, εἰ καὶ χολῆς ἐδέξω πικρότητα καὶ ὄξους ἐποτίσθης δριμύτητα!

Ὡ χεῖρες αἱ τὸν ἄνθρωπον πλαστουργήσασθαι καὶ νῦν προσηλωμένα μὲν τῷ σταυρῷ! ... Ὡ πλευρὰ λογχευθεῖσα διὰ τὴν ἐκ πλευρᾶς πλασθεῖσαν προμήτορα! Ὡ πόδες ἐφ' ὑδάτων πεζεύσαντες καὶ τὴν ῥοώδη φύσιν εἰλικρινῶς ἀγίασαντες!

O naked corpse, and Logos of the living God, willingly condemned to be lifted up high on the cross so that you might draw all to you, which of the limbs of your body did not suffer? O divine crown of your head, which received thorns – and fixed them in my heart also! ... O cheeks that received blows! O mouth, another hive of honey, even if it tasted the most bitter gall! ... O hands that fashioned mankind, and now are nailed to the cross! ... O rib pierced with a spear for the sake of the first mother, who was created from [Adam's] rib! O feet, which walked on the waters and sanctified its flowing nature with their purity!⁷⁰

On the other hand, it has been shown by Derbes that the nudity of Christ on Tuscan crosses can be connected with the ideology of the Franciscans, especially those crosses that had been commissioned by the Franciscans themselves, such as the one in Santa Croce, Florence, painted by Cimabue in the early 1280s. For the Franciscans, the nakedness of Christ at his death associated him with the Order's vow of poverty.⁷¹ In the words of St Bonaventure, who was Minister General of the Order: 'Since he (Christ) desired to end his life in the nakedness of absolute poverty, he chose to hang unclothed upon the cross'.⁷² Thus in the Tuscan context, the nakedness of Christ in scenes of his passion assumed an entirely different meaning from its reception by the Byzantines, expressing not only the suffering of the incarnate redeemer but also the mendicant ideology of renunciation and poverty.

It is a long way from George of Nikomedeia and Symeon Metaphrastes to the Miraflores Altar, but the borrowings show that the language of emotions in Byzantine art was a construct that was not culturally specific. It was appropriated and adapted in the west for different audiences and different purposes and in response to different texts.

Conclusion

In closing, two general observations may be made about the depiction of emotion in Byzantine art. First, the techniques for portraying feelings in images were both a legacy from antiquity and a new contribution to the

70 Nikephoros Basilakes, 'What the Theotokos would say', 5–6, ed. tr. Beneker and Gibson, 210–13.

71 Derbes, *Picturing the Passion*, 27–31.

72 Bonaventure, *Defence of the Mendicants*, tr. J. De Vinck, *The Works of Bonaventure*, 4 vols (Paterson, NJ, 1960), vol. 4, 49; cited by Derbes, *Picturing the Passion*, 31.

history of art. While the Byzantines derived their repertoire of gestures and facial expressions from ancient models, their antithetical and proleptic composition of images for emotive effect was an original development related to the literature of the Byzantine church. These dramatic structures had a major impact on the subsequent Christian art in the west.

The second observation is that the language of emotions in Byzantine art was conventional. It tells us much about the Byzantines' attitudes towards the display of emotion in their art, and their responses to it, but rather less about what the Byzantines felt and how they behaved in daily life outside the sphere of images. The difficulty in separating the language of art from the reality of day-to-day experience is compounded by the fact that in Byzantium there was often a time lag between the texts and the images. We cannot simply say that both Byzantine texts and images were expressions of a common contemporaneous culture⁷³ because the related phenomena belonged to different time periods in literature and in art. It took three centuries until the emotionalism of the sermons of George of Nikomedeia came to be fully matched in paintings such as the Threnos at Nerezi (fig. 12.12). And already in the twelfth century, we have found writers such as Philagathos describing violent gestures of grief in New Testament contexts, but it was only in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth century that such actions came to be illustrated in paintings of the Passion (fig. 12.6). In Byzantium, the visual arts were more conservative than the written word. It is tempting to propose that the relaxation of the rules that permitted more vehement displays of grief in later Byzantine art indicated a more intense devotional engagement with the Passion by the Byzantines, similar to the type of spirituality promoted in the late middle ages in both the western and the eastern Mediterranean by the Franciscans. But since Byzantine Passion literature had already exhibited a deep interest in the expression of emotions many centuries earlier, it seems that in art we are not witnessing changes in wider religious culture so much as specific shifts in the responses of Byzantine viewers to their cult *images*. They were making greater emotional demands on their icons, and their icons were making greater demands on them. Art does not always move in lockstep with wider religious and cultural changes, but it has its own imperatives and dynamic. The portrayal of emotions is no exception to this rule.

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73 As was shown convincingly for Franciscan art and writings in the thirteenth century by Derbes, *Picturing the Passion*, 21.

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13 Liturgical Emotion

Joy and Complexity in a Hymn of Romanos the Melodist for Easter

Derek Krueger

The drama of the early Byzantine liturgical cycle reached its climax with Christ's resurrection. The lamentations for the crucifixion on Great and Holy Friday gave way to Easter joy. Within the hymnographic tradition of the Byzantine Orthodox Church, this joy found its most exuberant expression in the late seventh-century Easter Kanon attributed to John of Damascus and most probably written for Morning Prayer on Easter Sunday at the church of the Anastasis in Jerusalem.¹ For the earlier sixth-century Greek hymnographer Romanos the Melodist, however, the transition from Holy Week to Easter Sunday proved more complex. Writing for the Night Vigil at a suburban basilica in Constantinople, Romanos paid careful attention to the biblical accounts and explored their implications for sustaining appropriate Christian self-regard in response to the Gospel.² In his most important hymn, 'On the Resurrection', surely composed for the Easter Vigil itself, the poet charts the emotions of the biblical characters as they experience and

1 *Paschal Kanon*, ed. in Πεντηκοστάριον χαρμόσυνον την από του Πάσχα μέχρι της των Αγίων Πάντων Κυριακής ανήκουσας αυτό Ακολουθίαν (Athens, 1916), 2–5, tr. E. Lash, 'On the holy and great Sunday of Pascha', <https://web.archive.org/web/20160306191837/http://anastasis.org.uk/pascha.htm>, accessed 22 May 2021. Studies include A. Lossky, 'Le canon des matines paschales byzantines: ses sources bibliques et patristiques', in A.M. Triacca and A. Pistoia (ed.), *L'hymnographie: Conférences Saint-Serge, XLVI^e Semaine d'études liturgiques, Paris, 29 juin–2 juillet 1999* (Rome, 2000), 257–84; A. Louth, *St John Damascene: Tradition and Originality in Byzantine Theology* (Oxford, 2002), 258–68; and D. Krueger, 'The transmission of liturgical joy in Byzantine hymns for Easter', in B. Bitton-Ashkelony and D. Krueger (ed.), *Prayer and Worship in Eastern Christianities, 5th to 11th Centuries* (London, 2017), 132–50. For a broader history of joy, see A. Potkay, *The Story of Joy: From the Bible to Late Romanticism* (Cambridge, 2007).

2 For a discussion of the sources for Romanos's biography, see J. Grosdidier de Matons, *Romanos et les origines de la poésie religieuse à Byzance* (Paris, 1977), 159–98. See also J. Koder, 'Romanos Melodos und sein Publikum: Überlegungen zur Beeinflussung des kirchlichen Auditoriums durch das Kontakion', *AnzWien*, 134 (1997–99), 63–94; H. Hunger, 'Romanos Melodos, Dichter, Prediger, Rhetor – und sein Publikum', *JÖB*, 34 (1984), 16; D. Krueger, *Writing and Holiness: The Practice of Authorship in the Early Christian East* (Philadelphia, 2004), 166–69.

express expectation, discovery, surprise and disbelief.³ Romanos's Easter is not simply an occasion of unadulterated joy but rather a tumultuous drama of great emotional range.⁴

Early Byzantine liturgy offered an affective environment for the expression and shaping of emotions. Hymns in particular cultivated affect, instructing a congregation not only in how to think about the liturgical events but also how to feel about them. Barbara Rosenwein has explored the medieval rhetorics of emotion as a window on shared sentiment and expression, while Teresa Brennan has identified multiple cultural techniques for transmitting emotions.⁵ Academic students of religion have long emphasised how ritual practice produces, articulates and maintains norms for emotional expression, sponsoring what Clifford Geertz called 'moods and motivations'.⁶ Like theatre, rites invite one to play, and ultimately inhabit, the mythic roles of sacred narrative.⁷ The emotions aroused in Byzantine religious ritual, 'liturgical emotions', drew upon and developed emotions experienced also in social, secular and individual contexts. Indeed, the 'emotions of daily life' rendered the affective world of the church intelligible. Nevertheless, scholars have little reliable access to ordinary Christians' emotional lives beyond religious sources. The interior lives of Byzantine Christians remain elusive. But hymns, sermons, ritual spaces and religious artefacts offered templates

- 3 Romanos the Melodist, Hymn 29, titled 'On the Resurrection VI' in the edition of P. Maas and C.A. Trypanis, *Sancti Romani Melodi Cantica: Cantica genuina* (Oxford, 1963), 223–33. See also the edition of J. Grosdidier de Matons, *Romanos le Mélode, Hymnes*, 5 vols (Paris, 1965–81), vol. 4, 355–421, where the hymn is indicated *De la résurrection I* and is numbered 40. I have used the numbering of the Oxford edition throughout. I have employed the translation of E. Lash, *On the Life of Christ: Kontakia* (San Francisco, 1995), 167–79, occasionally modified.
- 4 M. Alexiou, *After Antiquity: Greek Language, Myth, and Metaphor* (Ithaca, NY, 2002), 63, observes, 'On the emotional level, the hymn shifts constantly between fear and joy, lament and rejoicing'. For the mixture of grief and joy in other Christian authors, see K. Paffenroth, 'Tears of grief and joy: Confessions Book 9; chronological sequence and structure', *Augustinian Studies*, 24 (1997), 141–54; H. Hunt, *Joy-Bearing Grief: Tears of Contrition in the Writings of the Early Syrian and Byzantine Fathers*, TMM, 57 (Leiden, 2004).
- 5 B.H. Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages* (Ithaca, NY, 2006); eadem, *Generations of Feeling: A History of Emotions, 600–1700* (Cambridge, 2016); T. Brennan, *The Transmission of Affect* (Ithaca, NY, 2004). See also S. McNamer, *Affective Meditation and the Invention of Medieval Compassion* (Philadelphia, 2010); C. Swift, 'A penitent prepares: affect, contrition and tears', in E. Gertsman (ed.), *Crying in the Middle Ages: Tears of History* (London, 2012), 79–101.
- 6 C. Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays* (New York, 1973), 90. Emotions such as 'collective effervescence' are also central to the formation of religion in Émile Durkheim's *Elementary Form of the Religious Life*, tr. K.E. Fields (New York, 1995). For helpful more recent work, see G.L. Ebersole, 'The function of ritual weeping revisited: affective expression and moral discourse', *History of Religions*, 39 (2000), 211–46; and the various essays in J. Corrigan (ed.), *Religion and Emotion: Approaches and Interpretations* (New York, 2004).
- 7 T. Driver, *Liberating Rites: Understanding the Transformative Power of Ritual* (New York, 2006).

scripting appropriate emotional dispositions.⁸ Attending to what Byzantine Christians sang and heard in church reveals how hymnographers used rhetorical technique to generate a collective experience.

Although the Greek word *pathos* (πάθος) can be translated by a range of English terms, including emotion, affect, feeling and sentiment (and I have used these terms somewhat interchangeably here), Byzantine authors employed a rich vocabulary to describe and distinguish distinct emotions.⁹ The most common term for joy was *chara* (χαρά), a word often contrasted with *lupe* (λύπη, sorrow), *penthos* (πένθος, grief) and *thlipsis* (θλίψις, sadness or affliction). One could take delight in happy events, in accomplishments or in other people. In Christian contexts, writers contrasted joy in spiritual things with joy occasioned by worldly and fleeting things. Christian authors tended to express suspicion of intense forms of *hedone* (ἡδονή, delight or pleasure), which they associated with fleshly enjoyment, even as they emphasised the joy one should take in God. Religious joy could also be part of a mixed emotion, a ‘joyful sorrow’ or ‘joy-bearing grief’ (χαρμολύπη), a state of happiness achieved by Byzantine ascetics who had lamented their sins and yet felt joy in expectation of salvation.¹⁰ Liturgy provided a forum to perform such emotions.

The biblical narratives about the discovery of Christ’s empty tomb and the appearance of the risen Lord provided a theatre to dramatise emotional complexity in response to the Easter declaration, embodied most acutely in the character of Mary Magdalene. In the course of the hymn, Mary herself describes the change in her affect. Before she encountered Christ himself, risen from the dead, Mary had ‘stood weeping near the sepulchre’ (29.13.8). But Christ took pity (οἰκτεῖρας, *oikteiras*) on her tears and appeared to her, immediately shifting her emotions.

Μετεποιήθη ἄθροον εἰς εὐφοροσύνην ἢ λύπη
καὶ γέγονέ μοι πάντα ἰλαρὰ καὶ γεγηθότα.

Instantly my grief was changed to joy
and everything became for me gladness and happiness (29.14.1–2).

8 See, for example, G. Frank, ‘Sensing Ascension in early Byzantium’, in C. Nesbitt and M.P.C. Jackson (ed.), *Experiencing Byzantium: Papers from the 30th Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies*, SPBS, 18 (Farnham, 2013), 293–310; A. Giannouli, ‘Catanyctic religious poetry: a survey’, in A. Rigo (ed.), *Theologica Minora: The Minor Genres of Byzantine Theological Literatures* (Turnhout, 2013), 86–109; eadem, ‘Die Tränen der Zerknirschung: Zur katanyktischen Kirchendichtung als Heilmittel’, in P. Odorico, P.A. Agapitos and M. Hinterberger (ed.), ‘Doux remède ...’: *Poésie et poétique à Byzance; Actes du IV^e colloque international philologique, Paris, 23–24–25 février 2006* (Paris, 2009), 141–55; A. Mellas, ‘Liturgical emotions in Byzantine hymns: reimagining Romanos the Melodist’s *On the Victory of the Cross*’, *Phronema*, 33 (2018), 49–75; idem, *Liturgy and the Emotions in Byzantium: Compunction and Hymnody* (Cambridge, 2020), esp. 71–112 (on Romanos).

9 M. Hinterberger, ‘Emotions in Byzantium’, in L. James (ed.), *A Companion to Byzantium* (Oxford, 2010), 123–34.

10 Hunt, *Joy-Bearing Grief*.

She is bold enough to say that in this vision of God she was ‘glorified like Moses’ (29.14.3), although she saw him not on a mountain but in the grave, not veiled in a cloud but in a body. The excitement came with the duty to report this gospel of the resurrection, to ‘evangelise the children of Noah (ἐκ τοῦ Νῶε εὐαγγελίζου)’ (29.14.11). ‘Mary, hurry’, Christ said to her, ‘and say to those who love me that I have been raised’ (29.14.7–8). As in the Gospels, reactions to this news vary by gender: the women believe while the men doubt and fear.¹¹

In fact, other figures in the hymn fail to make so clean a transition from grief to joy. The women who followed Jesus, whom Romanos calls the ‘choir of devout maidens’ (29.15.1), have been weeping, but declare the words true (ἀληθῆς) (29.15.3) and are soothed (29.16.3). Later they will declare, ‘Truly the Lord has risen (Ἀληθῶς ἀνέστη ὁ Κύριος)’ (29.21.3), quoting the traditional liturgical Easter greeting.¹² They determine to join Mary in spreading the ‘proud boast’ (29.16.11) so that it can be common to all and so that all might share in the ‘delight (τρυφή)’ (29.16.5), a word that invokes both the pleasures of Paradise and the life of the world to come.¹³ Even so, they experience a mixture of emotions, including dread and fear. When they arrive at the tomb, they quail at the sight of the angel (29.18.5, 19.3, 20.3). As they leave the tomb, although even more assured of the truth, in Romanos’s telling, they ‘mingle joy with fear and happiness with grief (μίξασαι φόβῳ τὴν χαρὰν καὶ εὐφροσύνην τῇ λύπῃ)’ (29.22.1). Here, the poet follows the Gospels, which attributed to the women ‘fear and joy’ (Mt 28:8: μετὰ φόβου καὶ χαρᾶς) and ‘trembling and astonishment’ (Mk 16:8: τρόμος καὶ ἔκστασις). Mark 16:8 famously declares of the women, ‘And they were afraid (ἐφοβοῦντο γάρ)’. By contrast, in Luke 24:11, when the women come to the men with a report of the resurrection, ‘these words seemed to them an idle tale, and they did not believe them’, and in the hymn, Romanos will highlight the male disciples’ scepticism.¹⁴

11 Compare Mt 28:8, where the women rejoice, with Lk 24:11 and Mk 16:13, where the men do not believe.

12 On imagining Easter in early Byzantium, see D. Krueger, *Liturgical Subjects: Christian Ritual, Biblical Narrative, and the Formation of the Self in Byzantium* (Philadelphia, 2014), 94–97.

13 For the ‘Paradise of delight’, see Gen 3:23, echoed in the anaphoral prayer of the early Byzantine Liturgy of St Basil, ed. S. Parenti and E. Velkovska, *L’Eucologio Barberini Gr. 336*, 2nd edn, BiblEphL, Subsidia, 80 (Rome, 2000), 65.

14 In the following verse, Lk 24:12, Peter runs to inspect the empty tomb for himself and finds only the linen grave clothes; then ‘he went home, amazed (θαυμάζων) at what had happened’. This verse is lacking in some early manuscripts, including the fifth-century Codex Bezae, although it is secure in other early uncials. This is likely an interpolation on the part of an early copyist uncomfortable with this depiction of the chief of the apostles, and bringing the text into harmony with Jn 20:3; see B. Ehrman, *The Orthodox Corruption of Scripture: The Effect of Early Christological Controversies on the Text of the New Testament* (New York, 1993), 212–17. B.M. Metzger, *A Textual Commentary on the Greek New Testament* (London, 1975), 184, held that the verse is original.

Responding to the variety of the Gospels and the drama of the liturgical moment, Romanos's hymn sequences emotional confusions, inviting his audience to imagine and experience the sentiments of biblical figures as they discover and assimilate news of the resurrection. The hymn's effect depends on dramatic irony: Romanos's congregation of sixth-century Christians already knows the Good News. While a single cantor chanted the hymn's lengthy verses, his audience joined in singing the final line, common to each strophe.¹⁵ The refrain identifies the risen Christ as 'the one who grants resurrection to the fallen (ὁ τοῖς πεσοῦσι παρέχων ἀνάστασιν)'. This tag interpellates the congregants among the sinners and encapsulates their hope in salvation. They understand the historical event, the first Easter, and its eschatological implications for them the whole time that they attend Romanos's retelling of the Gospel. While the precise place of the hymn in the Easter Vigil is unclear, it must have come after the reading of the Gospel and the liturgical declaration of the resurrection.¹⁶ A number of times in the hymn, Romanos quotes liturgical formulas, drawing on the congregation's familiarity with the ritual practice of the church and enhancing the experience of liturgy in light of the resurrection story. His characters repeat the Easter greeting ('The Lord is risen'; 'He is risen indeed!' 29.21.3, 23.6); the opening dialogue of the anaphora of the Divine Liturgy ('Let our hearts be on high', 29.22.5); and the Trisagion of the anaphoral prayer ('Holy, Holy, Holy') together with an invocation of the six-winged angels who sing it eternally in heaven (29.7.8–9).¹⁷ In the final strophe, in his own voice, the cantor varies the opening of the Lord's Prayer (29.24.8). Thus Romanos shapes his listeners' response not only to the lectionary and the liturgical moment but also to the language of the liturgy itself.

Romanos's chanted verse sermon re-enacting the Easter story would achieve canonical status in the cycle of the Byzantine cathedral liturgy. Of Romanos's six surviving hymns on the subject of the resurrection, this hymn (number 29 in the Oxford edition and number 40 in the Sources Chrétiennes edition) is the only one to explore accounts of the resurrection as narrated in the Gospels. In

15 On the refrains, see Koder, 'Romanos Melodos und sein Publikum', 63–69; idem, 'Imperial propaganda in the kontakia of Romanos the Melode', *DOP*, 62 (2008), 288–90; J. Grosdidier de Matons, 'Liturgie et hymnographie: kontakion et canon', *DOP*, 34–35 (1980–81), 40–41. On the structure of the hymns more generally, see also Grosdidier de Matons, *Romanos et les origines*, 37–47, 103–8.

16 For the performance practice of the kontakia, see G. Frank, 'Romanos and the night vigil in the sixth century', in D. Krueger (ed.), *Byzantine Christianity, A People's History of Christianity*, 3 (Minneapolis, MN, 2006), 59–78; A. Lingas, 'The liturgical place of the kontakion in Constantinople', in C.C. Akentiev (ed.), *Liturgy, Architecture, and Art in the Byzantine World: Papers of the XVIII International Byzantine Congress (Moscow, 8–15 August 1991) and Other Essays Dedicated to the Memory of Fr. John Meyendorff* (St Petersburg, 1995), 50–57.

17 See Grosdidier de Matons, *Romanos le Mélode, Hymnes*, vol. 4, 369–70; M. Carpenter, *Kontakia of Romanos, Byzantine Melodist*, 2 vols (Columbia, MO, 1970–73), vol. 1, 313.

the other hymns, Romanos imagined a conversation between Pilate and the men ordered to guard the tomb (24) and had Hades express disappointment at the Harrowing of Hell (25). He composed extrabiblical dialogues for Hades and Adam (26); Hades and Christ (27); and among the various persons of the underworld (28).¹⁸ These other five hymns for the Easter season survive only in the Patmos manuscript of the eleventh century (Patmiacus 212/213), the most complete witness to Romanos's output.¹⁹ By contrast, the hymn restaging the discovery of the empty tomb is Romanos's only Easter composition with broad representation in the manuscript tradition. Its appearance in all manuscript witnesses attests its ongoing popularity and liturgical performance during the Easter Vigil into the middle Byzantine centuries.²⁰

From the outset, Romanos provides his audience with an education in sentiment. The prelude, found in all but one of the manuscripts that preserve the hymn, foregrounds the appropriate responses to Christ's resurrection.²¹

Εἰ καὶ ἐν τάφῳ κατήλθες, ἀθάνατε,
ἀλλὰ τοῦ Ἰαίδου καθεῖλες τὴν δύναμιν
καὶ ἀνέστης ὡς νικητῆς, Χριστὲ ὁ Θεός,

- 18 On these hymns, see variously J.H. Barkhuizen, 'Romanos Melodos: essay on the poetics of his kontakion "Resurrection of Christ" (Maas-Trypanis 24)', *BZ*, 79 (1986), 17–28, 268–81; G. Frank, 'Death in the flesh: picturing death's body and abode in late antiquity', in C. Hourihane (ed.), *Looking Beyond: Visions, Dreams and Insights in Medieval Art and History*, Occasional Papers from the Index of Christian Art, 11 (University Park, PA, 2010), 58–74; eadem, 'Christ's descent to the underworld in ancient ritual and legend', in R. Daly (ed.), *Apocalyptic Thought in Early Christianity* (Grand Rapids, MI, 2009), 211–26; T. Arentzen, 'Struggling with Romanos's "dagger of taste"', in S.A. Harvey and M. Mullett (ed.), *Knowing Bodies, Passionate Souls: Sense Perceptions in Byzantium*, DOBSC (Washington, DC, 2017), 169–82. For a related dialogue hymn, 'On the victory of the cross', see G. Frank, 'Dialogue and deliberation: the sensory self in the hymns of Romanos the Melodist', in D. Brakke, M.L. Satlow and S. Weitzman (ed.), *Religion and the Self in Antiquity* (Bloomington, IN, 2005), 171–74; U.H. Eriksen, 'The poet in the pulpit: drama and rhetoric in the kontakion "On the victory of the cross" by Romanos Melodos', *Transfiguration: Nordic Journal of Religion and the Arts* (2010), 103–23. Carpenter, *Kontakia of Romanos*, vol. 1, 191–92, sees all six hymns as part of a cycle. It is, however, hard to imagine a context in which all six were sung in the same year on the same day.
- 19 See the apparatus for these hymns in Maas and Trypanis, 187, 196, 201, 210; and Grosdidier de Matons, vol. 4, 431, 459, 501, 551, 577. The twelfth-century manuscript Moscow Synod 437 contains the prelude and initial strophe of two of these (Hymns 24 and 26), for intercalation in the kanon hymn at Orthros. The Patmos manuscript assigns Hymn 27 to the third Sunday after Easter.
- 20 Maas and Trypanis, *Romanos*, *Hymns*, 223; Grosdidier de Matons, *Romanos le Mélode*, *Hymnes*, vol. 4, 379.
- 21 Some manuscripts contain a second alternate prelude, or prooimion; Moscow Synod 437 contains only this alternate prelude. Grosdidier de Matons, *Romanos le Mélode*, *Hymnes*, vol. 4, 379.

γυναῖξί μυροφόροις τὸ χαῖρε φθεγγόμενος²²
καὶ τοῖς σοῖς ἀποστόλοις εἰρήνην δωρούμενος,
ὁ τοῖς πεσοῦσι παρέχων ἀνάστασιν.
Though you descended into the tomb, O Immortal,
yet you destroyed the power of hell,
and you arose as victor, O Christ, God,
calling to the myrrhbearing women, ‘Rejoice!’
and giving peace to your apostles, O you
who grant resurrection to the fallen (29, prelude 1).

Calling attention to the moment when Christ himself called on the women to rejoice (Mt 28:9), Romanos casts joy in the resurrection as a response to divine command. He also invokes Christ’s appearance to the male disciples in John 20:16 with the words, ‘Peace be with you (εἰρήνη ὑμῖν)’, authorising a calmer emotional state, an antidote to their fear. The hymn thus opens by upholding two appropriate affects for Easter, joy and peace, both grounded in the biblical narrative. If Romanos strives to instil such feelings in his listeners, he only repeats Christ’s own teaching. Knowledge of the whole story gives the audience more peace and joy than the characters have, as Romanos moves those characters toward the approved festal emotions. Although in the prelude – and the Gospels – the targets for these greetings are segregated by gender, Romanos seems to regard the two emotions as compatible.²³ In the strophes that follow, however, Romanos gives the biblical characters still other feelings, some more appropriate than others, according to their knowledge and understanding at the moment. Charting the emotions’ progression and confusion allows Romanos to explore each affect in sequence and admixture. Because of the variety of the biblical narratives, however, the trajectory is far from simple and has surprising consequences for the sixth-century Christian.

Liturgical Joy in Other Hymns of Romanos

Before offering a close reading of the shifting emotions in the hymn for Easter, it is useful to survey the course of joy in Romanos’s corpus as a whole. Romanos attends to heightened and shifting emotions elsewhere in his explorations of the christological narrative, both following and augmenting the biblical texts. Throughout the liturgical year, he clarifies the drama of the Gospel and provides affective cues to his congregants. In the second hymn ‘On the Nativity’, Mary herself calls out to all humanity,

22 Thus the majority of manuscripts, but one witness and some Pentekostaria read φθεγγόμενος, Χαίρετε, restoring the biblical plural, ed. Maas and Trypanis, 223; Grosdier de Matons, vol. 4, 380.

23 On women at the Night Vigil in Constantinople, see Krueger, *Liturgical Subjects*, 30.

‘O Earthborn ones, set aside your distresses (λυπηρά) as you behold the joy (χαρά).’²⁴ She obeys the angel’s greeting in Luke 1:28, χαίρε (*chaire*), not only ‘hail!’ but ‘rejoice!’, and transmits this command to others. In ‘On the entry into Jerusalem’, the children bearing palm branches shout their biblical line, ‘Hosannah to the Son of David!’ (16.1.3; Mt 21:15); and in a reminder of the general resurrection to come, the cantor explains, in part to the audience and in part to Christ, ‘no longer will infants be slaughtered because of Mary’s babe/But you alone are to be crucified for all children and elders’ (16.1.4–5). The poet then introduces the collective refrain, providing, as it were, expression markings for how their music should be sung: ‘For this reason, exulting (ἀγαλλόμενος) we say, “*You are the blessed one who comes to call up Adam*”’ (16.1.8–9). In the hymn ‘On Ascension’, the poet describes how the disciples came down from the Mount of Olives ‘rejoicing and exulting (γηθόμενοι ἅμα καὶ ἀγαλλόμενοι)’ (32.17.3), following the account in Luke 24:52.²⁵ In the hymn ‘On Pentecost’, Romanos stresses again that after witnessing the Ascension, the eleven disciples ‘returned with joy (ἐν χαρῇ) from the Mount of Olives’ (33.3.1, tr. Lash, 210). Peter addresses his companions with an echo of the opening dialogue of the eucharistic liturgy.

Μερισται τῆς βασιλείας, ἄνω σχῶμεν τὰς καρδίας
πρὸς τὸν ὑποσχόμενον καὶ λέξαντα: “Ἐγὼ ὑμῖν πέμψω
τὸ πανάγιον πνεῦμα’.

Sharers of the Kingdom, let our hearts be on high
with the One who made the promise and said, ‘I will send you
the All-Holy Spirit’ (33.3.7–9, tr. Lash, 210).

Romanos thus urges congregants to hear the opening dialogue of the eucharistic liturgy (‘hearts on high!’) as an invitation to contemplate Christ’s ascension upward to heaven. The description of their lifted hearts provides a cue for appropriate emotional comportment during the opening of the Liturgy of the Faithful. When, however, later in the hymn, the Spirit descends, the disciples will react with amazement and fear (33.8–9), with Romanos adding emotions perhaps left implicit in the spare narrative of Acts 2:1–4.

For the most part, however, the poet draws his emotional vocabulary of joy from the relevant New Testament pericopes and remains within a rather narrow range of nouns and related verbs, participles and adjectives: χαρά (*chara*, joy), τρυφή (*tryphe*, delight), εὐφροσύνη (*euphrosyne*, happiness, gladness), ἀγάλλω (*agallo*, to exult), γηθέω (*getheo*, to rejoice, be happy), ἰλαρός (*hilaros*, glad). All but the last two were reinforced in the language of the Septuagint Psalter, the most important repository for the emotions of

24 Romanos, *Hymns*, 2.2.9, ed. Maas and Trypanis, my tr. For discussion, see Alexiou, *After Antiquity*, 59–62; T. Arentzen, *The Virgin in Song: Mary and the Poetry of Romanos the Melodist* (Philadelphia, 2017), 123–25, 128–31.

25 Romanos, *Hymns*, 32.17.3. See Frank, ‘Sensing Ascension’.

prayer. In the corpus of Romanos the word ἡδονή (*hedone*, enjoyment, or pleasure) is rare and invariably negative. Most occurrences are in the second hymn ‘On Joseph’ (44) in which the hero exercises ascetic prudence and resists the sexual advances of Potiphar’s wife. Thus joy for Romanos remains distinct from sensory pleasure and emerges in the corpus among a liturgically licenced set of emotions.

As Averil Cameron demonstrated, late ancient Christians delighted in paradox.²⁶ In fact, hymnography provided a forum to ponder and revel in the salvific contradictions at the heart of Christ’s story. The crucifixion and resurrection feature as occasions for joy in a number of Romanos’s hymns. In ‘On the Adoration of the Cross’, Romanos instructs, ‘Under the shadow of the cross, let us leap with exultation (σκιρτῶμεν ἀγαλλόμενοι)’ (23.23.1). In another hymn on the theme of the resurrection, a dialogue between Christ and Hades, Jesus himself provides the expression marks for the choral *tutti*: ‘So all with joy recite now the psalms and songs!’ (27.7.4). Elsewhere, it is precisely the joy that the other apostles express in the resurrection that will prompt Thomas to wonder if he is missing something (30.8.3).²⁷ Adam rejoices at the resurrection of Lazarus since it prefigures both Christ’s and his own (15.10.8). The hymn ‘On the Samaritan woman’, assigned to the fourth Sunday of the Easter season, looks forward to the receipt of miracles and the salvation of humanity with in its persistent refrain: ‘*Exultation and redemption (ἀγαλλίασιν καὶ ἀπολύτρωσιν)*’.²⁸ At the presentation of Christ in the temple, when Symeon receives his infant saviour from his mother, Romanos explains, ‘Joy and fear conjoined in the righteous man’ as he saw angels glorifying Christ and prayed not to be harmed by the fire of Christ’s divinity (4.5.5). Most poignantly, perhaps, in the hymn ‘On the lament of the Mother of God’, composed for Good Friday, Jesus tells his mother that her grief is wrong. She will see him ‘living as before’ and ‘will cry out with joy (βοήσιες ἐν χαρᾷ)’ (19.12.8). ‘Put away your grief’, he counsels her, ‘and go in joy’ (19.14.1–2).²⁹ Even before Easter, Jesus instructs the Virgin Mary, and consequently the entire church, in the proper response to his death, a corrective that Jesus will repeat to Mary Magdalene on the third day.

26 A. Cameron, *Christianity and the Rhetoric of Empire: The Development of Christian Discourse* (Berkeley, 1991), 155–88.

27 On this hymn, see Krueger, *Writing and Holiness*, 178–81; idem, *Liturgical Subjects*, 45–46.

28 Romanos, Hymn 9, *passim*. The poem survives only in the Patmos manuscript, which assigns it to the fourth Sunday after Easter. Krueger, *Liturgical Subjects*, 49–53.

29 On this hymn, see Arentzen, *Virgin in Song*, 141–58; G.W. Dubrov, ‘A dialogue with Death: ritual lament and the θρῆνος Θεοτόκου of Romanos Melodos’, *GRBS*, 35 (1994), 385–405; D. Krueger, ‘Christian piety and practice in the sixth century’, in M. Maas (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to the Age of Justinian* (New York, 2005), 298–300.

Plotting and Structure

As José Grosdidier de Matons and Marjorie Carpenter have observed, the peculiar narrative structure of Romanos's hymn 'On the Resurrection' follows from his attempt to remain faithful to each of the disparate Gospel narratives.³⁰ In this respect, Romanos draws even more elements from differing accounts than usual. Perhaps he gives the hymn its eclectic plot because he is dealing with the central proclamation of the Christian story. At the same time, the variety in the Gospels fuels Romanos's remarkable efforts to harmonise the accounts, not through elision but through repetition. He was hardly the first to worry about how to reconcile the resurrection narratives in Matthew, Mark, Luke and John.³¹ But unlike earlier exegetes, Romanos did not so much reconcile the texts as place them in sequence so that they were each accurate, at least to a point.

Romanos's hymn consists of a prelude and twenty-four strophes. He frames the complex narrative with a prologue that rehearses Christ's words of greeting to the apostles and gives context to the plot (prelude) and an epilogue in which the cantor sings in his own voice (strophe 24). The drama within divides into six distinct scenes. In scene 1 (strophes 1–3), the myrrh-bearing women approach the tomb, and Mary discovers that the stone has been rolled away. In scene 2 (strophes 4–6), Peter and the beloved disciple go to the tomb and enter, discovering that it is empty. In scene 3 (strophes 7–12), Mary remains at the tomb (apparently never having left) and encounters the risen Christ, who instructs her to tell the disciples of the resurrection. Scene 4 (strophes 13–15), from which I quoted above, depicts Mary's report to her female companions back in the city and their response. In scene 5 (strophes 17–21), the women as a group go out to the tomb to encounter the angel who declares the resurrection, in which they believe. In scene 6 (strophes 22–23), these women return from the tomb to report to the male disciples what they have learned and now believe. The men are amazed. As we shall see shortly, each scene provides Romanos an opportunity to depict biblical characters' emotional states, reactions and transitions.

Most of Romanos's attention to emotional details and their context in the characters' experience derives from the biblical texts. In its broadest

30 Grosdidier de Matons, *Romanos le Mélode, Hymnes*, vol. 4, 355–62; Carpenter, *Kontakia of Romanos*, vol. 1, 311–13. See also Alexiou, *After Antiquity*, 62–65.

31 Nevertheless, Romanos does not seem to have depended directly on Severos of Antioch's Easter sermon of 515 (PG 46:628–52), itself probably inspired by Eusebios of Caesarea's fourth-century treatise *On Discrepancies in the Gospels*, which survives only in fragments (PG 22:879–1006), and Hesychios of Jerusalem's fifth-century treatment of the Resurrection in his *Harmony of the Gospels* (see PG 93:1433). These men had argued that the various gospels had different points of view pointing toward the same truth. See Carpenter, *Kontakia of Romanos*, vol. 1, 313; and Grosdidier de Matons, *Romanos le Mélode, Hymnes*, vol. 4, 359; M.A. Kugener, 'Une homélie de Sévère d'Antioche attribuée à Grégoire de Nysse et à Hésychios de Jérusalem', *Revue de l'Orient chrétien*, 3 (1898), 431–51.

structure, Romanos's account follows the Gospel of John, chapter 20, where Mary comes to the tomb to find the stone rolled away (scene 1). She runs to Peter and the beloved disciple, to report the possible theft of Jesus's body. These men subsequently rush to find the tomb empty, save for Jesus's linen shroud and head wrap (scene 2). The Gospel states of the beloved disciple that 'he saw and believed' (Jn 20:8), but also stresses that neither he nor Peter 'understood' that Jesus must rise from the dead. When the men leave, Mary stays alone outside the tomb and encounters the risen Lord (scene 3). Thus she is the first witness both to the open tomb and to the resurrection. In John, Mary comes to the tomb twice, once alone and once with the two men. That evening Jesus appears to his male disciples in a locked house where they are holing up 'for fear of the Jews' (Jn 20:19).

In part to harmonise John's account with the stories in the synoptic Gospels (themselves at some variance with each other), Romanos intercuts his staging of the story with elements drawn principally from the Gospel of Matthew. Most important, he follows the synoptics in presenting Mary's first approach to the tomb in the company of other faithful followers of Jesus (scene 1). In Matthew, Mary approaches with one other woman (Mt 28:1); in Mark with two women (Mk 16:1).³² Moreover, Romanos follows Mark 16:1 and Luke 24:1 (but not Matthew) in providing the women with a motivation for their first visit: they bring spices, intending to properly anoint Christ's body for burial. This harmonisation likely reflects common imaginings of the events of Easter morning in sixth-century liturgical experience as reflected in emerging iconographic representations of the women approaching the tomb on reliquaries and in manuscripts.³³ In the synoptic accounts and in the visual depictions, the women approach to encounter an angel (Mt 28:5; Mk 16:5) or two (Lk 24:4). This version of the episode prompts Romanos to expand his narrative and delay the appearance of the angel until he has finished with the Johannine sequence. Only after they hear Mary's report of meeting Christ do the women set off to see for themselves (scenes 4 and 5). Although in the synoptics, the male disciples doubt the women's report (Lk 24:11), in Romanos, they, at least, do not contest it, only querying the source of their information: 'Did an angel speak?' (29.23.4, scene 6).

Interpreting the liturgical function of such a concatenated plot is hampered to some extent by our lack of knowledge about lectionary practice in

32 Lk 24:1–12 apparently includes Mary in a larger group of both men and women. For Romanos, Mary's initial visit is in the company only of other women. For later Byzantine liturgical reenactment of the women's visit to the tomb in the Office of the Myrrhbearers, see V.A. Karras, 'The liturgical function of consecrated women in the Byzantine church', *TheolSt*, 66 (2005), 96–116.

33 Krueger, *Liturgical Subjects*, 94–97; idem, 'Liturgical time and Holy Land reliquaries in early Byzantium', in C. Hahn and H. Klein (ed.), *Saints and Sacred Matter: The Cult of Relics in Byzantium and Beyond* (Washington, 2015), 111–31, with reference to pilgrims' ampullae, a painted reliquary in the Vatican Museums, censers, and a manuscript illustration in the Rabbula Gospels.

Constantinople in the sixth century. The Georgian lectionary witness for late ancient Jerusalem attests that three different Gospel accounts of the resurrection were appointed in the holy city, with Matthew 28:1–20 read at the Divine Liturgy at the end of the Easter Vigil, John 20:1–18 read during Morning Prayer on Easter itself, and Mark 16:1–8 read during the Divine Liturgy later in the day, each at the church of the Anastasis. Luke 24:13–35, the account of Jesus’s appearance on the road to Emmaus, was assigned to a service at the ninth hour on the Mount of Olives.³⁴ Such a conflicting cycle of lections might demand some explanation. However, the *Typikon of the Great Church*, reflecting practice at Hagia Sophia in the tenth century, assigns only Matthew 28:1–20 to the Eucharist on Holy Saturday, after the Easter Vigil. The Gospel assigned for the Divine Liturgy on Easter Sunday is John 1:1–17, which is about the Incarnation.³⁵ No other Gospel account of the resurrection is read. It is unclear whether Romanos’s hymn provides evidence of a greater cycle of resurrection lections in sixth-century Constantinople, and particularly a reading of John 20, perhaps at the end of the Easter Vigil.³⁶ In any case, Romanos’s complex recasting of his harmonised and expanded narrative offers multiple episodes, each displaying a different combination of affects and understandings.

Scene 1: The Approach of the Myrrhbearers and Mary’s Insight

In Romanos’s retelling, before dawn on Sunday morning, the myrrhbearers approached the sepulchre with tears. They adjured Christ to rise from the grave.

34 *Georgian Lectionary of Jerusalem*, ed. M. Tarnichsvili, *Le grand lectionnaire de l’église de Jérusalem (V^e–VIII^e siècle)*, 4 vols, CSCO, 188–89, 204–5/Scriptores Iberici, 9–10, 13–14 (Louvain, 1959–60), at lections 739, 742, 749, 753. See also G. Bertonière, *The Historical Development of the Easter Vigil and Related Services in the Greek Church*, OCA, 193 (Rome, 1972), 7–105.

35 *Typikon of the Great Church*, ed. J. Mateos, *Le typikon de la Grande Église*, 2 vols, OCA 165–66 (Rome, 1962–63), vol. 1, 90–91, 94–95. See J. Getcha, *The Typikon Decoded*, tr. P. Meyendorff (Yonkers, NY, 2012), 228.

36 The evidence from homilies is inconclusive. Of Gregory of Nazianzos’s two fourth-century homilies for Eastertide, Oration 1 (ed. J. Bernardi, *Grégoire de Nazianze, Discours 1–3*, SC, 247 [Paris, 1978], 72–82), does not quote or cite the Johannine account. His Oration 45, which quotes a number of texts possibly familiar from the Easter Vigil, briefly follows the narrative of John 20 (*Orations*, 45.24, PG 36:624–64). Later manuscript traditions assign the liturgical reading of this homily to Easter Monday. See Gregory of Nazianzos, *Festal Orations*, tr. N.V. Harrison (Crestwood, NY, 2008), 57–60, 161–90. None of Proklos of Constantinople’s five fifth-century homilies on the Resurrection quotes from Jn 20, although on the whole these homilies contain remarkably few narrative details. See Proklos of Constantinople, *Homilies*, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 32, PG 65:788–800, tr. J.H. Barkhuizen, *Proclus Bishop of Constantinople, Homilies on the Life of Christ* (Brisbane, 2001), 168–81. For other Paschal sermons preached in the capital, see Leontios the presbyter of Constantinople, Homilies 8 and 9, ed. C. Datema and P. Allen, *Leontii presbyteri Constantinopolitani homiliae*, CCSG, 17 (Turnhout, 1987), 253–78; tr. P. Allen and C. Datema, *Leontios, Presbyter of Constantinople, Fourteen Homilies*, Byzantina Australiensia, 9 (Brisbane, 1991), 95–116.

Τὸν πρὸ ἡλίου ἥλιον δύναντά ποτε ἐν τάφῳ
 προέφθασαν πρὸς ὄρθρον ἐκζητοῦσαι ὡς ἡμέραν,
 μυροφόροι κόραι καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλας ἐβόων·
 ὦ φίλοι, δεῦτε, τοῖς ἀρώμασιν ὑπαλείψωμε
 σῶμα ζωηφόρον καὶ τεθαμμένον,
 σάρκα ἀνιστῶσαν τὸν παραπεσόντα Ἀδὰμ κειμένην ἐν τῷ μνήματι.
 Ἄγωμεν, σπεύσωμεν ὥσπερ οἱ μάγοι,
 καὶ προσκυνήσωμεν καὶ προσκομίσωμεν
 τὰ μύρα ὡς δῶρα τῷ μὴ ἐν σπαργάνοις,
 ἀλλ' ἐν σινδόνι ἐνειλημένῳ
 καὶ κλαύσωμεν καὶ κράζωμεν· “ὦ δέσποτα, ἐξεγέρθητι,
 ὁ τοῖς πεσοῦσι παρέχων ἀνάστασιν.”
 To the Sun who was before the sun and yet had set in a tomb,
 myrrhbearing maidens hastened towards dawn,
 seeking him as the day, and they cried to one another:
 ‘Friends, come, let us anoint with spices
 the life-bearing yet buried body,
 the flesh which raises fallen Adam and now lies in the grave.
 Come, let us hurry, like the magi
 let us adore and let us offer
 sweet spices as gifts to the One who is now wrapped,
 not in swaddling clothes, but in a shroud.
 Let us weep and let us cry, “Be roused, Master,
 who grant resurrection to the fallen” (29.1).

In stating their intention to anoint ‘the flesh which raises fallen Adam’, the women reveal a partial understanding of the events that have transpired and their consequences. They refer to Christ as ‘the Sun before the sun’, attesting the doctrine of the Incarnation and the divinity of Jesus. In bearing myrrh, the women recall the magi who brought gifts, including myrrh, to the Christ child, even as they acknowledge the painful difference between a living, swaddled infant and a dead adult wrapped for burial. Both the myrrhbearers and magi offer the congregation typological models for approaching Christ.³⁷

The women are grieving, but they are also smart. Romanos embeds the shift in their emotions within the drama of discovery and understanding. Although in the Gospels the empty tomb brings surprise, already along the way Romanos has the women reason among themselves that Christ ought not still be dead. ‘Could the One who controls the breath of all that moves/possibly have been held fast until now? Does he lie forever a corpse?’ (29.2.5–6). He

37 G. Vikan, ‘Pilgrims in magi’s clothing: the impact of mimesis on early Byzantine pilgrimage art’, in R. Ousterhout (ed.), *The Blessings of Pilgrimage* (Urbana, 1990), 97–107.

describes the women as ‘intelligent’ or ‘prudent’ (συνεταί) (3.1; compare 2.7, συνήσωμεν). Acting with wise caution, they send Mary Magdalene on ahead. ‘It was dark, but love lighted (Mary’s) way’ (3.4). Once she had seen the stone rolled away from the door of the tomb, Mary returned to the others saying,

Μαθηταί, μάθετε τοῦτο ὃ εἶδον
καὶ μὴ με κρύψητε, ὃ ἂν νοήσητε
ὁ λίθος οὐκέτι καλύπτει τὸν τάφον·
Disciples, learn what I saw,
and do not conceal from me what you have understood.
The stone no longer covers the tomb (29.3.7–9).

She uses the word ‘disciples’ in the feminine plural. These students of Christ have yet another thing to learn, but it would seem that Mary herself already suspects. She asks herself two questions, ‘Could they have taken my Lord away?’ and ‘Can he have been raised?’ (3.9, 10). The first question transposes part of her script in John 20:2, where she speaks to Simon Peter and the beloved (male) disciple, ‘They have taken the Lord out of the tomb, and we do not know where they have laid him’. Here, however, she poses both this incorrect possibility and the better question. The audience, of course, knows the right answers, and enjoys observing Mary weigh the possibilities.

Scene 2: Peter and John Visit the Tomb

Despite the Johannine account in which Mary goes off to tell Peter and the beloved disciple (Jn 20:2), Romanos has Peter and John appear suddenly on the scene, running out as soon as they hear the report, ‘because of what Mary had said’ (29.5.2). This device allows Peter and John to be the first to enter the tomb. While the women had approached weeping, Peter and John’s emotions are more jarring. When they did not find their Lord, they were ‘terrified (πτοηθέντες)’ (29.5.4). While the women engaged in deduction progressing toward an understanding, the men display worry at having committed a faux pas. ‘For what reason did he not appear to us?/Did he consider our boldness too great?’ (29.5.5–6). Should they have stopped outside the tomb and merely peered in? While the men debate whether they have caused Christ some offence, Mary clarifies that this is a false assumption and that the proper emotional cues come from Jesus himself.

Μύσται τοῦ Κυρίου καὶ ὄντως θερμοὶ ἐρασταί, οὐχ ὡς ὑπολαμβάνετε,
ἀλλ’ ὑπομείνατε, μὴ ἀθυμεῖτε
τὸ γὰρ γενόμενον οἰκονομία ἦν,
ἵνα αἱ γυναῖκες ὡς πρῶται πεσοῦσαι
ἴδωσι πρῶται τὸν ἀναστάντα·
ἡμῖν θέλει χαρίσασθαι τὸ ‘χαίρετε’ ταῖς πενθήσασιν
ὁ τοῖς πεσοῦσι παρέχων ἀνάστασιν.

Initiates of the Lord and his truly fervent lovers, do not think like this; but be patient, do not lose heart.

For what has happened was a dispensation, so that women, as those who were the first to fall, might be the first to see the risen One.

He wishes to grant to us who mourn the grace of his ‘Rejoice!’, he *who grants resurrection to the fallen* (29.6.6–12)

Mary’s understanding of the divine economy accounts for the order of Christ’s appearance to the disciples by gender. She explains to the men that Christ himself instructs the women to have joy rather than grief, while she, in turn, tempers her male companions’ feelings of distress. On some level, of course, the men’s distress is predicated on the expectation that they should be treated to a post-resurrection appearance of Christ. Mary also seems to know precisely what will happen next. Romanos grants Mary, Peter and John knowledge beyond what the evangelists accord them. Indeed their understanding of events mirrors the congregation’s own.

Scene 3: Mary Magdalene’s Encounter with Christ

Mary’s encounter with Jesus offers the emotional climax of Romanos’s narrative, both in his staging of the experience and in her subsequent report of it to the women. She has achieved some understanding even before she sees her risen Lord. Peter and John have departed, but Mary’s speech admonishing them in their distress has affected her as well. By her own reasoning, ‘Mary had thus reassured (ἐπιηροφόρει) herself’ (29.7.1). And yet Romanos shifts her mood again. Now alone at the tomb, she worries anew that the body has been removed. She cries out ‘not with words, but with tears’ (29.7.4), introducing a speech within herself. Her lament picks up her misimpression in John 20:13, and compares the hypothetical bearing away of Christ with the eternal heavy lifting of the angels in heaven.

Οἶμοι, Ἰησοῦ μου, ποῦ σε μετῆραν;
 Πῶς δὲ κατεδέξω κекηλιδωμέναις χερσὶ βαστάζεσθαι, ἀθάνατε;
 Ἄγιος, ἅγιος, ἅγιος κρᾶζει
 τὰ ἕξαπτέρυγα καὶ πολυόμματα
 καὶ τούτων οἱ ὄμοι μόνις φέρουσί σε,
 καὶ πλάνων χεῖρες ἐβάστασάν σε;
 Alas, my Jesu, where have they taken you?
 How did you accept to be carried by sullied hands, Immortal One?
 ‘Holy, Holy, Holy’ cry
 the six-winged and the many-eyed,
 and their shoulders can scarcely bear you,
 yet have hands of deceivers carried you? (29.7.5–10)

The focus on Mary's own and private emotions, her interior anguish and confusion, allow Romanos both to mine further elements of the biblical narratives and to heighten the drama of the surprise to come. Referring to the sinful woman of Luke 7:36–50, who anointed Jesus at the home of Simon the Pharisee and bathed Christ's feet with her tears, Mary declares that she has come to the place where Christ was buried that 'like the harlot I might drench with tears/not only your feet, but truly your whole body and your grave' (29.8.5–6). We note that Romanos does not identify Mary with the biblical harlot, but rather calls upon her as a typological precedent for approaching Jesus with weeping.³⁸ She reminds Christ and herself of Christ's power to raise the dead, invoking the widow's son (Lk 7:11–15) and Jairus's daughter (Mt 9:25). Even in her anguish, she adjures Christ: 'Arise, appear, reveal yourself to those who seek you!' (29.8.11). Mary is an emotional wreck, 'conquered by weeping and overcome by longing (νεκικημένην τῷ κλαυθμῷ καὶ ἡττημένην τῷ πόθῳ)' (29.9.1).

The power of her desire for Christ will only grow after he has revealed himself to her when she will be seized 'with ardent longing and the fire of love (ὑπὸ δὲ πόθου τοῦ θερμοῦ καὶ τῆς ἐμπύρου ἀγάπης)' (29.11.1). But first Christ must take pity on her and appear to her in a scene that heightens the dramatic irony of the Gospel of John's account. Drawing attention to her emotional state, Jesus asks her as in the Gospel (Jn 20:13), 'Woman, why are you weeping?' (29.9.4). He extends the biblical question to acknowledge her longing: 'Whom do you wish for within the grave?' (29.9.4). Her response to him shows her partial understanding to an audience already very much in the know. Hewing close to her words in the Gospel (Jn 20:15) and her supposition that this man is the gardener, she explains the reason for her affect: 'I weep because they have taken my Lord from the tomb and I do not know where he lies' (29.9.6). Her tears are the result of her misapprehension, made all the more poignant in Romanos by the accusation that follows:

Πάντως δὲ σὸν ἐστὶν τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον;
εἰ μὴ πλανῶμαι γάρ, ὁ κηπουρὸς εἶ σύ·

38 On the tradition of the sinful woman, distinct from Mary Magdalene, see S.A. Harvey, 'Why the perfume mattered: the sinful woman in Syriac exegetical tradition', in P.M. Blowers, A.R. Christman and D.G. Hunter (ed.), *In Dominico Eloquentio – In Lordly Eloquence: Essays on Patristic Exegesis in Honor of Robert Louis Wilken* (Grand Rapids, MI, 2002), 69–89; Krueger, *Liturgical Subjects*, 152–58; Frank, 'Dialogue and deliberation', 169–71. The identification of the sinful woman with Mary or another of the myrrhbearers is implicit in the ninth-century hymn 'On the sinful woman' attributed to the nun Kassia. See N. Tsironis, 'The body and the senses in the work of Cassia the hymnographer: literary trends in the iconoclastic period', *Symmeikta*, 16 (2003), 139–57; A. Riehle, 'Authorship and gender (and) identity: women's writing in the middle Byzantine period', in A. Pizzone (ed.), *The Author in Middle Byzantine Literature: Modes, Functions, and Identities* (Berlin, 2014), 245–62, which includes the text and translation.

λοιπὸν εἰ ἐπῆρες τὸ σῶμα, εἰπέ μοι,
 κἀγὼ λαμβάνω τὸν λυτρωτὴν μου.
 But without doubt this is your work,
 for, unless I am deceived, you are the gardener.
 So, if you have removed the body, tell me,
 and I will take my redeemer (λυτρωτή) (29.9.7–10).

Of course, she is deceived, and yet this is still very much his work, this empty tomb. The audience takes pleasure watching Mary's slow process of recognition. Like Aristotle watching Oedipus, they experience pity or compassion for her, probably mixed with delight rather than fear.³⁹ This dramatic irony moderates the emotions of the audience in the moment: they are calmer and more delighted than Mary.

In revealing himself to her, Christ rescues her emotion. When he calls her by her name, 'Mary', she recognises him at once as her teacher and her Lord (29.10). She comes to know what the audience has known all along. Although she is thwarted in her ardent desire to touch him, he does not 'reproach her zeal', but rather prefigures his coming ascension:

ἽΩ σεμνή, πέτασον ἄνω τὸ ὄμμα
 καὶ κατανόησον τὰ ἐπουράνια·
 ἐκεῖ ζήτησόν με· καὶ γὰρ ἀναβαίνω
 πρὸς τὸν πατέρα ὃν οὐκ ἀφήκα·
 Holy maiden, make your sight fly up on high
 and consider the things of heaven.
 There look for me; for I am ascending
 to my Father whom I have not left (29.11.7–10).

Perhaps it is surprising that Romanos does not give Mary's emotions voice at this moment. She will only report four strophes later to the women how her grief was changed to joy. Instead, Christ charges her as a messenger, an apostle to the apostles, in a stirring speech:

Ῥητορευέτω δὲ λοιπὸν ταῦτα ἡ γλῶσσά σου, γύναι,
 καὶ διερμηνευέτω τοῖς υἱοῖς τῆς βασιλείας
 τοῖς καρδοκοῦσι τὴν ἔγερσίν μου τοῦ ζῶντος.
 σπεῦσον, Μαρία, καὶ τοὺς μαθητάς μου συνάθροισον·
 σάλπιγγί σοι χρῶμαι μεγαλοφώνω·
 ἤχησον εἰρήνην εἰς τὰς ἐμφοβούς ἀκοὰς τῶν κεκρυμμένων φίλων μου,
 ἔγειρον ἅπαντας ὡσπερ ἐξ ὕπνου,
 ἵν' ὑπαντήσωσι καὶ δῶδας ἄψωσιν·

39 Aristotle, *Poetics*, 13–14, ed. tr. S. Halliwell, LCL, 199 (Cambridge, MA, 1995), 68–79.

εἰπέ· ὁ νυμφίος ἠγέρθη τοῦ τάφου
καὶ οὐδὲν ἀφῆκεν ἐντὸς τοῦ τάφου·
ἀπόσασθε, ἀπόστολοι, τὴν νέκρωσιν, ὅτι ἐγήγηρται
ὁ τοῖς πεσοῦσι παρέχων ἀνάστασιν’.

Now, woman, let your tongue proclaim these things
and explain them to the sons of the Kingdom,
to those who await the rising of me, the Living One.
Hurry, Mary, and assemble my disciples.
I am using you as a loud-sounding trumpet.
Sound peace to the terrified ears of my friends in hiding.
Rouse them all as if from sleep,
that they may come to meet me and light torches.
Say, ‘The Bridegroom has been raised from the tomb
and has left no one within the tomb.
Apostles, banish deadness, for he has been raised,
who grants resurrection to the fallen’ (29.12).

Christ tells Mary to convey both emotion and understanding. She should not only announce but interpret or expound, like a skilled exegete. And yet she becomes not a trumpet of triumph but of peace, waking the sleepy men, drowsy again as at Gethsemane. Mary’s role in the narrative requires spreading the news and the teaching in order to dispel the men’s emotion, namely fear. (Their being at once sleepy and scared seems peculiar, but surely Romanos is singing before a congregation at the Night Vigil that is similarly sleepy and anticipating.) The procession with burning branches approaching Christ evokes the lamps of the wakeful wise virgins of Matthew’s parable (Mt 25:1–13) who await their Bridegroom. In the hands of the men, these lights would prepare the disciples for the Easter morning liturgy as celebrated in Jerusalem (and perhaps also Constantinople) in the sixth century, a procession with torches.⁴⁰ Mary must tell them how to do the proper liturgy.

Scenes 4 and 5: Mary and the Choir of Devout Women

Eventually, Romanos has Mary report her findings to a larger group of women, describing in first-person narration her experience at the tomb and her encounter with Christ. ‘Wondrous, O women, the things I have seen and now tell’ (29.13.2). ‘I have been filled with the sight and words of Christ’ (29.13.6). As we saw above, she highlights the transformation of her affect,

40 Grosdidier de Matons, *Romanos le Mélode, Hymnes*, vol. 4, 401, n.1. T. Kluge and A. Baumstark, ‘Quadragesima und Karwoche Jerusalems im siebten Jahrhundert’, *Oriens Christianus*, n.s. 5 (1915), 231. On the location of the Vigil and the lighting of candles with reference to Egeria and Armenian and Georgian witnesses, see Bertonière, *Historical Development of the Easter Vigil*, 22–39, 56–58.

from weeping, tears and lament to joy, gladness and happiness. It is the last time that Mary speaks in the hymn. Her audience, a ‘choir of devout maidens’ (29.15.1), forms a liturgical ensemble that models appropriate reactions to her news. In Romanos’s ordering of the events of Easter, this group of ‘God-bearing women’ (29.17.1) journeys to the tomb, in response to Mary’s report, where they encounter the angel. It is unclear if Mary Magdalene is with them.

Along their way, the women sing a hymn to the tomb, expressing the paradox of the buried God and the memorial that contained him. ‘See, the place, or rather the unutterable womb (κόλπος ὁ ἄφραστος)!’ (29.17.4), they begin, comparing the miracle of God circumscribed within both the grave and the body of the Virgin Mary.⁴¹

Αἰνός σοι, ὕμνος σοι, ἅγιε τάφε,
 μικρὸ καὶ μέγιστε, πτωχὸ καὶ πλούσιε,
 ζωῆς ταμιεῖον, εἰρήνης δοχεῖον,
 χαρᾶς σημεῖον, Χριστοῦ μνημεῖον·
 Praise to you, a hymn to you, Holy Tomb,
 small, yet very great, poor, yet rich,
 treasury of life, vessel of peace,
 sign of joy, grave of Christ (29.17.7–10).

Now the grave itself indicates the occasion for joy, yet when the women get close enough to see the angel, they experience dread (δειλία, 29.18.5) and worry that they will ‘die from fear’ (φόβος, 19.3) before the angel instructs them that their emotions are the wrong ones, at least for them. ‘You are not to be afraid, but these guards here,/they will shudder, they will tremble and become like dead men/from fear of me’ (29.19.6–8). In a stirring speech, the angel calls on the women to ‘be immortal’ (29.20.1) and invites them to see where he, the Immortal, lay (29.20.11). They should conform themselves to him, to be joined to the resurrected. With courage (θάρσος, 29.21.1) the women repeat the angel’s words, declaring the Easter greeting ‘Truly the Lord has risen!’ (29.21.3), yet when their encounter ends, they begin to return to the city mingling ‘joy with fear and happiness with grief’ (29.22.1). In contrast to Mary’s sudden and unalloyed joy in her report to the maidens (29.14.1), and under pressure from the biblical text (Mt 28:8; Mk 16:8), their heightened emotion conflates extremes, raising questions about the appropriate affect for Easter. How might one properly experience both joy and awe?

41 Literally a ‘bosom’ or ‘declivity’, but compare LSJ, s.v. κόλπος 2. See Lash, *On the Life of Christ: Kontakia*, 255–56. On womb and tomb in late ancient Christian discourse, see P.M. Blowers, *Drama of the Divine Economy: Creator and Creation in Early Christian Theology and Piety* (Oxford, 2012), 255, 277.

Scene 6: The Choir of Women Report to the Men

Despite their complex emotional state, the women declare to the male disciples something rather more confident. ‘Why are you downcast (Τί ἀθυμεῖτε)? Why do you hide your faces?’ (22.4), they chide them, coaxing them to alter their affect.

Ἄνω τὰς καρδίας· Χριστὸς ἀνέστη·
 στήσατε χορείας καὶ εἶπατε ἅμα ἡμῖν· ‘ἐγήγηρται ὁ Κύριος’·
 ἔλαμψεν ὁ τεχθεὶς πρὸ ἑωσφόρου·
 μὴ οὖν στυγνάζετε, ἀλλ’ ἀναθάλλετε·
 τὸ ἔαρ ἐφάνη, ἀνθήσατε κλώνες,
 καρποφορίαν, μὴ δυσφορίαν·
 πάντες χεῖρας κροτήσωμεν καὶ εἴπωμεν· ‘ἐξεγήγηρται
 ὁ τοῖς πεσοῦσι παρέχων ἀνάστασι’.
 Let hearts be on high. Christ has risen.
 Form your choirs and say with us, ‘The Lord has arisen’.
 The One born before the morning star (Ps 109:3) has shone forth.
 So do not be sad, but sprout again.
 The spring has appeared; flower, you branches,
 with a harvest of fruit, not misery.
 Let us all clap our hands (cf. Ps 46:2) and let us say ‘He is arisen,
 the One
 who grants resurrection to the fallen’ (29.22.5–12).⁴²

The call of the women’s choir is rousing and heady, encouraging the men to sing along with the Easter declaration, to abandon sadness and despondence. They sing a pastiche of liturgical tags and psalm verses, performing a liturgy of exuberance.

Once Romanos’s women have finally conveyed the implications of their report to the men, they are ‘filled with joy (εὐφρανθέντες) at the word’ (29.23.1). The hymn then calls for general elation. It is unclear whether this call belongs to the story as the women’s last words to the male disciples or to the frame, the poet’s address to his own congregation. Perhaps Romanos intends the ambiguity since the invitation befits Easter present as well as Easter past. The verses encourage people to share in the joy in a richly embodied if metaphorical way that echoes Psalm 113’s celebration of the Exodus:

Δεῦτε οὖν, ὡς κριοὶ καὶ ὡς ἀρνία
 προβάτων ἅπαντες σκιρτῶντες εἴπωμεν·
 ‘Ποιμὴν ἡμῶν, δεῦρο, συνάγαγε ἡμᾶς
 τοὺς σκορπισθέντας ὑπὸ δειλίας·
 ἐπάτησας τὸν θάνατον, ἐπίστηθι τοῖς ποθοῦσί σε,

42 Psalms are cited according to the Septuagint numbering.

ὁ τοῖς πεσοῦσι παρέχων ἀνάστασιν’.

Come, then, like rams and like young sheep
let us all leap (Ps 113:4–5) and say,⁴³

‘Our Shepherd, come gather us together
who were scattered by cowardice.

You have trampled on Death. Come near those who love you,
who grant resurrection to the fallen’ (29.23.7–12).

The phrase ‘you have trampled on death’ echoes the Easter Troparion, one of the last hymns sung during the Easter Vigil in late ancient Jerusalem, and already in use also in Romanos’s Constantinople.

Χριστὸς ἀνέστη ἐκ νεκρῶν,

θανάτῳ θάνατον πατήσας,

καὶ τοῖς ἐν τοῖς μνήμασι,

ζωὴν χαρισάμενος!

Christ has risen from the dead,

by death he has trampled death,

and to those in the graves he has given life.⁴⁴

Romanos thus integrates elements of the early Byzantine Easter liturgy into his reconstruction of the biblical past, bringing the biblical narrative into the liturgical present. The poet, however, is clear from the beginning of the scene that the women’s own affect is more complex than the simpler emotions they admonish in their listeners. Mixed with their joy is some fear. Is the choir of singing women standing in for the cantor himself? Or does the cantor’s guise lie more with the men they coax toward ebullience? Within the hymn, the women’s efforts largely succeed, transmitting to the men an affect not attributed to them in the Gospel accounts, namely joy. Even so, the men question the women about how they know what they know, suggesting they still have some doubts (29.23.3–4). The poet acknowledges a gap between a singer’s interior disposition and the exuberant words she or he sings.

43 The *Paschal Kanon*, attributed to John of Damascus, will take up this theme; see *Paschal Kanon*, 7.3.

44 *Πεντηκοστάριον*, 1; Kluge and Baumstark, ‘Quadragesima und Karwoche’, 233; *Ancient Iadgari*, ed. E. Metreveli, C. Čankievi and L. Hevsuriani, *Udzvelesi Iadgari* (Tbilisi, 1980), 215 (lines 11–12), 649; A. Wade, ‘The oldest *Iadgari*: the Jerusalem Tropologion – 4th to 8th centuries, 30 years after the publication’, in D. Atanassova and T. Chronz (ed.), *Synaxis Katholike: Beiträge zu Gottesdienst und Geschichte der fünf altkirchlichen Patriarchate für Heinzgerd Brakmann zum 70. Geburtstag*, 2 vols (Vienna, 2014), vol. 2, 739. H. Alfeyev, *Christ the Conqueror of Hell: The Descent into Hades from an Orthodox Perspective* (Crestwood, NY, 2009), 34, suggests, rather ambitiously, a second-century date.

Romanos's Coda and Epilogue

What then were the emotions proper to Easter? Throughout Lent the normative disposition encouraged in Byzantine hymns was penitential. The songs and prayers of the liturgy of the Byzantine Orthodox Church that were cast in the first person singular enacted inwardly directed grief, presenting it to worshippers as fitting. The passages in Romanos in which the cantor sings in his own voice, responding to and reflecting on the stories of the Gospels, offer many examples.⁴⁵ This sentiment was obviously appropriate to Lent. But would the happiest day of the Christian calendar prompt a different affect? An exception that proves the penitential rule, Romanos's 'On the Resurrection' confirms that accusatory self-regard persistently characterised Romanos's sense of appropriate Byzantine interiority, a subjectivity that he modelled and taught throughout his hymns.

In the final strophe of the hymn, Romanos positions himself with respect to the emotional arc depicted in the preceding narrative, or perhaps more precisely, within the emotional arc of Christian expectation of divine judgement and mercy. In the midst of the collective joy, the poet stands apart, supplicating God in his authorial voice and on his typical behalf. He performs the penitential liturgical subject even on Easter, as he prays both for his redemption and for his own change in affect. Having signed and titled the work in the acrostic made of the first letters of each strophe as a 'Psalm of the humble Romanos', he quotes in his own voice from Psalm 50, the penitential psalm par excellence, recited every day at Morning Prayer, rehearsing the humiliating subjectivity of the sinner in need of salvation.⁴⁶ He himself has yet to fully make the transition from grief to joy.

Συναναστήτω σοι, σωτήρ, ἡ νεκρωθεῖσα ψυχὴ μου,
 μὴ φθείρη ταύτην λύπη καὶ λοιπὸν εἰς λήθην ἔλθῃ
 τῶν ἁσμάτων τούτων τῶν ταύτην ἁγιαζόντων·
 ναί, ἐλεήμων, ἱκετεύω σε μὴ παρίδῃς με
 τὸν ταῖς πλημμελείαις κατεστιγμένον·
 ἐν γὰρ ἀνομίαις καὶ ἐν ἁμαρτίαις ἐμὲ ἐκίσσησεν ἡ μήτηρ μου.
 May my dead soul, O Saviour, rise again with you.
 Do not let grief destroy it, and may it not come to forget
 those songs that sanctify it.
 Yes, O Merciful, I implore you, do not disregard me⁴⁷

45 Krueger, *Liturgical Subjects*, 29–44.

46 R.F. Taft, *The Liturgy of the Hours in East and West: The Origins of the Divine Office and its Meaning for Today*, 2nd edn (Collegeville, MN, 1993), 40–41, 79, 87, 277–78; J. Mateos, 'Quelques problèmes de l'orthros byzantin', *Proche-Orient chrétien*, 11 (1961), 216.

47 Reading παρίδῃς with Grosdidier de Matons, vol. 4, 418, not μὴ καταλείπῃς με ('do not abandon me') with Maas and Trypanis, 233. The reading strikes me, however, as uncertain.

who am stained with offences,
For in iniquities and in sins my mother bore me (Ps 50:7) (29.24.1–6).

He casts his song, his entire hymn, and perhaps his entire corpus, as an act of supplication and worship. Unlike Mary Magdalene, his emotions have not been entirely transformed. Like the choir of maidens, he sings joyfully to others while harbouring fear and grief. At this critical moment in salvation history, the first-person subject expresses anxiety about his personal desert.

Πάτερ μου ἅγιε καὶ φιλοκτίρμον,
ἀγιασθήτω σου ἀεὶ τὸ ὄνομα
ἐν τῷ στόματί μου καὶ τοῖς χεῖλεσί μου,
ἐν τῇ φωνῇ μου καὶ τῇ ᾠδῇ μου·
δός μοι χάριν κηρύττοντι τοὺς ὕμνους σου, ὅτι δύνασαι,
ὁ τοῖς πεσοῦσι παρέχων ἀνάστασιν.
My Father, holy and compassionate,
may your name be ever hallowed (Mt 6:9)
by my mouth and by my lips,
by my voice and by my song.
Give me grace as I proclaim your hymns, for you can do so,
who grant resurrection to the fallen (29.24.7–12).

Singing supplication, Romanos ends his hymn for Easter with a return to the mean. God can save him, but he remains penitent. Romanos and all the congregants who join in the refrain should number themselves among the fallen, offering in their liturgical practice a call for divine grace. Easter should leave Christians not only with hope but also with grief or humility because they do not deserve grace. He implores God not to abandon him to a punishment he both fears and has earned. There is some space, then, between the biblical narrative and the emotions that the poet thinks it should inspire.

In the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle defined fear as ‘a pain or disturbance due to a mental picture of some destructive or painful evil in the future’. He explained, ‘Fear is caused by whatever we feel has great power of destroying us’.⁴⁸ When people have done wrong, they fear retaliation (1382b).

‘Abandon’ would echo Ps 22:2 (LXX 21:2), ‘My God, my God, attend to me. Why did you forsake (ἐγκατέλιπες) me?’ and its repetition in Mt 27:46 and Mk 15:34. On the biblical echoes in this passage, see also S. Gador-Whyte, *Theology in Poetry in Early Byzantium: The Kontakia of Romanos the Melodist* (Cambridge, 2017), 175–76.

48 Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 2.5 (1382a), ed. tr. J.H. Freese, LCL 193 (Cambridge, MA, 1926), 206–8, tr. R. McKeon, *The Basic Works of Aristotle* (New York, 1941), 1389. See D. Konstan, *The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks: Studies in Aristotle and Classical Literature* (Toronto, 2006), 129–55. For fear in religious contexts, see A. Chaniotis, ‘Constructing the fear of the gods: epigraphic evidence from sanctuaries of Greece and Asia Minor’, in A. Chaniotis (ed.), *Unveiling Emotions: Sources and Methods for the Study of Emotions in the Greek World* (Stuttgart, 2012), 205–34.

Confidence is the opposite of such fear (1383a). And it is precisely confidence in salvation that the first-person singular Christian on display in Romanos's epilogue lacks.⁴⁹ The Easter declaration does not disrupt the continuity of the Christian subject. Despite the re-presentation of the Gospel, the voice of the poet continues to present and perform penitence and even shame. His emotions dramatise lingering uncertainty about impending judgement, a fear that God might yet overlook him, abandoning him in his sin. This places his mood in some tension with the refrain, which promises resurrection to the fallen, thus confirming Easter as an occasion for mixed emotions. This time dramatic irony works in another way: Romanos knows something about himself that qualifies his emotional response to the triumphant drama of Easter.

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49 In his preliminary rhetorical exercises, a fourth-century student of Libanios, Aphthonios the Sophist, discussed the fear that students have of their instructors and the attendants who mete out punishments: 'Fear anticipates discovery, and punishment follows on fear', *Progymnasmata*, 3, ed. H. Rabe, *Aphthonii Progymnasmata, Rhetores Graeci*, 10 (Leipzig, 1926), 5.

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14 *Apolausis*

Feelings at the Juncture between Body and Mind

Alicia Walker

Introduction: *Apolausis* as an Emotion?

The Greek term *apolausis* (ἀπόλαυσις) is commonly translated as enjoyment or pleasure, sometimes in a spiritual sense, sometimes in a corporeal and mundane sense.¹ As a result of its potential entanglement with the bodily and the material, the status of *apolausis* as an emotion is complicated. In what respects are pleasure and enjoyment emotions? Were they perceived to be so in Byzantium? These questions are difficult to answer conclusively. ‘Enjoyment’ is not ‘joy’. The latter connotes the noetic and the spiritual.² In contrast, ‘pleasure’ and ‘enjoyment’ imply the potential embodiment of feelings, the dispersal of experience from skin and muscle to the mind and soul. They entail desire and sometimes sensual stimulation, making them potentially difficult to control by force of will alone. *Apolausis* represents the potential for feelings to burst beyond the bounds of the intellect, to drive the body without moral or rational regulation. In this respect, *apolausis* exemplifies the emphasis in recent scholarship regarding the complex nature of emotions as being of both the body and mind, experienced internally but

1 H.G. Liddell and R. Scott (ed.), *A Greek-English Lexicon*, rev. H.S. Jones (Oxford, 1996), 205, s.v. ἀπόλαυσις. *Apolausis* is one of several terms that the Byzantines employed to denote pleasure and enjoyment. Other terms included *terpsis* (τέρψις), *psychagogia* (ψυχαγωγία) and *hedone* (ἡδονή). Full analysis of distinctions among these terms and their development over time would be a worthwhile inquiry, but is beyond the scope of this essay. In Christian theology, *apolausis* could connote spiritual pleasure (achieved through the satisfaction of desire for union with the divine) in contrast to *hedone* (physical pleasure). See S. Toiviainen, ‘Gregory of Nyssa on bodily and spiritual pleasure in *In Canticum Canticorum*’, in G. Maspero, M. Brugarolas and I. Vigorelli (ed.), *Gregory of Nyssa, In Canticum Canticorum: Analytical and Supporting Studies*, VChrSupp, 150 (Leiden, 2018), 517–26.

2 Regarding joy (χαρά, *chara*) in Byzantium, see M. Hinterberger, ‘Emotions in Byzantium’, in L. James (ed.), *A Companion to Byzantium* (Chichester, 2010), 123–34, at 125; also see Krueger and Maguire in this volume.

deeply engaged with the external world through corporeal stimulation and response.³

As scholars of the history of emotions have warned, however, assuming parallelism between human experiences in the past and present is problematic.⁴ Indeed, the term *apolausis* does not feature explicitly in any ancient or Byzantine schemas of the emotions, demanding justification for its place in a volume on the topic.⁵ To understand emotions in other times and places, we must attempt to reconstruct how people in those contexts perceived feelings and their expression – what Peter N. Stearns and Carol Z. Stearns have defined as ‘emotionology’ – while being vigilant about how their definitions differ from our own.⁶

The Byzantine word that most closely corresponds to the modern concept of emotion is *pathos* (πάθος; pl. πάθη), but it encompasses a different range of connotations. As Martin Hinterberger observes, *pathos* represents something that ‘happens’ to someone, it emphasises impact on a person, specifically on their soul. Hinterberger proposes that a more proximate term might

3 See S. Tarlow, ‘Emotions in archaeology’, *Current Anthropology*, 41.5 (2000), 213–46; Hinterberger, ‘Emotions in Byzantium’, 123.

4 For discussion of this point as well as methodological reflections on how to study emotions in ‘other’ cultural and historical contexts, see Hinterberger, ‘Emotions in Byzantium’, esp. 123–24; P.N. Stearns and C.Z. Stearns, ‘Emotionology: clarifying the history of emotions and emotional standards’, *AmHR*, 90.4 (1985), 813–36; B.H. Rosenwein, ‘Worrying about emotions in history’, *AmHR*, 107 (2002), 821–45; eadem, ‘Problems and methods in the history of emotions’, *Passions in Context*, 1.1 (2010), 1–32; Tarlow, ‘Emotions in archaeology’; M. Meyer, ‘Towards an approach to gendered emotions in Byzantine culture: an introduction’, in S. Constantinou and M. Meyer (ed.), *Emotions and Gender in Byzantine Culture* (Cham, Switzerland, 2019), 3–32.

5 *Apolausis* is notably absent from the summary of major theories of emotions in Byzantine sources outlined by Hinterberger, ‘Emotions in Byzantium’. It should be noted, however, that Hinterberger frames his discussion as follows: ‘In Byzantium, the theoretical engagement with emotions takes place primarily in the context of theology’ (*ibid.*, 126). While true, Christian sources may entail implicit bias against exploring impulses – like *apolausis* – that did not conform to the priorities of Christian dogma because of their inherent connection with the corporeal and mundane, and their potential connection with behaviours judged to be immoderate or immoral. It may be the case that *apolausis* instead found its place within categories such as ‘vice and virtue’, ‘gluttony’ and ‘chastity and licentiousness’, all of which were named by Byzantine theorists of emotion. For instance, reflecting a typology of the human faculties going back to Plato, the eleventh-century commentator Niketas Stethatos identifies love of pleasure (φιληδονία, *philedonia*; which might be understood as an extreme form of *apolausis*) to be the critical passion behind the *epithumetikon* (ἐπιθυμητικόν), the part of the soul dominated by covetous impulses and localised in the liver. Niketas Stethatos, *On the Soul*, c. 56, ed.tr. J. Darrouzès, *Nicétas Stéthatos, Opuscules et lettres*, SC, 81 (Paris, 1961), 56–153, at 118–19. See Hinterberger, ‘Emotions in Byzantium’, 126, 128.

6 ‘Emotionology’ refers to conventions for the emic definition of emotions in a cultural-historical context. For discussion of the term and its historiography, see Stearns and Stearns, ‘Emotionology’; Rosenwein, ‘Worrying about emotions’, 824–25; Hinterberger, ‘Emotions in Byzantium’, 125.

be ‘passion’, understood to entail a ‘driving force’ that originates beyond the self but has the capacity to influence the soul profoundly.⁷ It is, I suggest, in this area of the Byzantine conception of emotion that *apolausis* might find its place, as a reaction of body and mind that holds the potential to generate fervent, even reckless response.

Because of its connection with corporeal satisfaction, *apolausis* was scrutinised by the early church Fathers.⁸ From their writings emerges a concern for taming and repressing pleasure, for channelling it toward proper ends and circumscribing its intensity. While it was possible for enjoyment to be virtuous, it always held the danger of overpowering a person’s moral and intellectual sensibilities. When it metastasised from enjoyment to pleasure, *apolausis* could cause the body to overtake the soul. To enjoy beauty and luxury responsibly was therefore a mark of refinement and moral strength; allowing pleasure to supersede one’s judgement indicated weakness of mind and spirit as well as a lack of social sophistication and spiritual development.

This chapter explores *apolausis* with special focus on its intersection with artistic and architectural production and reception. The viewing of works of art and architecture has long been identified as a means of enjoyment, and scholars of Byzantine art have noted the role of pleasure in the appreciation of visual and material culture.⁹ I argue that art could also play a role in modelling for the viewer the acceptable limits of aesthetic enjoyment and sensual pleasure. In particular, art could visualise the possibility of moral corruption through *apolausis*, thereby prompting viewers to patrol the boundaries of their own pleasure. In this regard, my study takes a different approach from that found in previous work on the relationship between the emotions and Byzantine art, which tends to focus on the affective power of images and the illustration of emotion through gesture, posture and facial expression.¹⁰ Instead, I examine the

7 Hinterberger, ‘Emotions in Byzantium’, 126.

8 For instance, Gregory of Nyssa co-opted *apolausis* as the ‘spiritual equivalent of bodily pleasure’, that is, *hedone*. Toiviainen, ‘Gregory of Nyssa on bodily and spiritual pleasure’, 523.

9 For instance, see A. Cutler, ‘Uses of luxury: on the functions of consumption and symbolic capital in Byzantine culture’, in A. Guillou and J. Durand (ed.), *Byzance et les images* (Paris, 1994), 287–328; H. Saradi, ‘The *kallos* of the Byzantine city: the development of a rhetorical *topos* and historical reality’, *Gesta*, 34.1 (1995), 37–56; H. Maguire, ‘The good life’, in G.W. Bowersock, P. Brown and O. Grabar (ed.), *Late Antiquity: A Guide to the Classical World* (Cambridge, MA, 1999), 238–57; I. Kalavrezou, ‘Light and the precious object, or value in the eyes of the Byzantines’, in J.K. Papadopoulos and G. Urton (ed.), *The Construction of Value in the Ancient World* (Los Angeles, 2012), 354–69.

10 For instance, see the seminal study of H. Maguire, ‘The depiction of sorrow in middle Byzantine art’, *DOP*, 31 (1977), 123–74; also see Maguire in this volume. In a noteworthy exception to this pattern, Mati Meyer proposes that emotional responses (pleasure, desire, shame, embarrassment, fear, anger) to the portrayals of women in Byzantine manuscripts

role of art in guiding viewers toward the proper response to physical and emotional stimulus – that is to say, how art could help instruct in effective management of emotional response.

A morally didactic role for art may have been especially vital in environments such as the bath and the banquet hall, where physical pleasure had a high potential to excite human passions. Focusing on early Byzantine mosaics that depict personifications of Apolausis in spaces for bathing and dining (see figs 14.1 and 14.2, 14.5–14.9), I propose that these images manifest a range of possibilities for responding to pleasurable physical stimulation. In some instances, Apolausis is portrayed as a woman of emotional restraint, who participates in corporeal enjoyment, but retains control of her body and soul. In other cases, Apolausis is shown in an indecorous state, consumed by unmitigated pleasure. As such, the visual record attests to the spectrum of forms that *apolausis* could assume. These images no doubt captured the attention of viewers, confronting them as they engaged in practices that invited physical indulgence and could lead to moral corruption. In this respect, art can be understood to connect a theoretical understanding of pleasure's risks and rewards with real-life situations that called upon Byzantine men and women to manage their passions. Furthermore, baths and dining rooms were spaces of heightened social exposure and surveillance, where a person's self-control was rigorously scrutinised and the need to measure one's response was crucial. In these emotionally high-risk environments, works of art helped guide the viewer toward proper behaviour.

The conceptual framework informing the decision-making processes of Byzantine viewers can be gleaned from a text that is often overlooked in scholarly consideration of Byzantine emotionology, the treatise *On Human Nature* (*Περὶ φύσεως ἀνθρώπου*) (ca. 400 CE), written by the late fourth-century bishop of Emesa in Syria, Nemesios.¹¹ In this treatise, Nemesios is especially concerned with how feelings bridged a person's corporeal and intellectual selves. By attending to the ways that external stimuli triggered internal responses, Nemesios offers a particularly useful model for understanding the powerful influence of physical pleasure as well as the necessity

are recorded in the targeted destruction of these illuminations by (presumably male) viewers: M. Meyer, 'Stirring up sundry emotions in the Byzantine illuminated book: reflections on the female body', in *Emotions and Gender in Byzantine Culture*, ed. Constantinou and Meyer, 245–79.

11 Nemesios of Emesa, *On Human Nature*, ed. M. Morani, *Nemesii Emeseni De natura hominis* (Leipzig, 1987), tr. R.W. Sharples and P.J. van der Eijk, *Nemesios: On the Nature of Man*, TTH, 49 (Liverpool, 2008). Nemesios's theories exerted significant impact on subsequent theological and philosophical works in both Byzantium and the West, especially via John of Damascus, who borrowed heavily from Nemesios. Sharples and van der Eijk, *Nemesios*, 1–4; S. Wessel, 'Human action and the passions in Nemesios of Emesa', *Studia Patristica*, 48 (Leuven, 2010), 3–13.

to resist its emotional sway by cultivating *paideia* (παιδεία; education and social refinement) and moral fortitude.

Situating *Apolausis* in Nemesios's Emotionology

Nemesios does not employ *apolausis* as a technical term in his analysis of human nature. The word appears only in passing, and pertains, for instance, to the enjoyment of eating meat that was afforded to humankind after the Fall.¹² Instead, 'pleasure' is explored through the term *hedone* (ἡδονή). In one instance, *hedone* and *apolausis* appear in close proximity, and Nemesios sets pleasure and enjoyment in relation to one another, with *hedone* characterised as ephemeral and earthly while *apolausis* is associated with the eternal and divinely ordained.¹³ Indeed, *apolausis* is not once employed as a synonym for *hedone* in chapter 18, 'On Pleasures' (Περὶ ἡδονῶν), in which Nemesios identifies *hedone* as one of the four essential passions and explores at length how it can be understood.¹⁴ Nonetheless, there is a resonance between the mosaics, to be discussed below, and Nemesios's conception of pleasure as an emotion because both his text and these works of art understand pleasure and enjoyment to operate across a spectrum ranging from good to bad, moderate to excessive, mental to physical.¹⁵

12 Nemesios, c. 1, ed. Morani, 7.9 and 7.12, tr. Sharples and van der Eijk, 42.

13 Nemesios, c. 1, ed. Morani, 16.3–4, tr. Sharples and van der Eijk, 51.

14 Nemesios, c. 18, ed. Morani, 76–80, tr. Sharples and van der Eijk, 134–39. Nemesios situates pleasure in his system of emotions as follows:

Διαιρεῖται μὲν οὖν, ὡς ἔφαμεν, τὸ ἄλογον τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ ἐπιπειθὲς λόγῳ εἰς δύο, τὸ τε ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ τὸ θυμικόν • πάλιν δὲ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν διαιρεῖται εἰς δύο, εἰς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας • ἐπιτυγχάνουσα μὲν γὰρ ἡ ἐπιθυμία ἡδονὴν ἐμποιεῖ, ἀποτυγχάνουσα δὲ λύπην.

As we said, the non-rational part of the soul that is capable of obeying reason is divided into two, the desirous and the spirited elements. In its turn the desirous part is divided into two, into the pleasant and the distressing: for a fulfilled desire brings pleasure, an unfulfilled one distress.

Nemesios, c. 17, ed. Morani, 75.8–11, tr. Sharples and van der Eijk, 132. For a full account of the desirous part of the soul (and the relation between desire and pleasure), see Nemesios, c. 17, 18, ed. Morani, 75–80, tr. Sharples and van der Eijk, 132–39; as discussed in Hinterberger, 'Emotions in Byzantium', 128; Wessel, 'Human action', 7.

15 Nemesios acknowledges the breadth and complexity of human pleasure as follows:

καὶ δῆλον ὡς τῶν πολλαχῶς λεγομένων ἐστὶν ἡ ἡδονή • ὅφ' ἕτερον γὰρ καὶ ἕτερον γένος εἰσὶν, ὡς αἰ σπουδαῖα ἡδοναὶ καὶ αἰ φαῦλαι, καὶ αἰ μὲν ψευδεῖς, αἰ δὲ ἀληθεῖς, καὶ αἰ μὲν τῆς διανοίας μόνης κατ' ἐπιστήμην, αἰ δὲ μετὰ σώματος κατ' αἴσθησιν, καὶ αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν κατ' αἴσθησιν αἰ μὲν εἰσι φυσικά, αἰ δὲ οὐ •

It is clear that "pleasure" [*hedone*] is one of those [words] that have many senses: for they fall under different genera, such as good and bad pleasures, or the false and the true, or some that are of thought alone, involving knowledge, and some that are

Nemesios did not propose a simple duality between body and soul. Nor did he insist on an ascetic principle of a reductive power dynamic between the corporeal and the spiritual, with a superior soul called upon to restrain an intractable body.¹⁶ Instead, he argued that the passions, the external forces that affect a subject, serve an essential role in the realisation of humanity by creating the opportunity for the intellect and soul to exercise free will. Nemesios valorised not complete rejection of the passions but rather moderate response to them.¹⁷ As Susan Wessel has noted, the degree to which this system depended on engaging with external stimuli – and exercising choice in response to them – made ‘the passions and emotions intimately connected to the moral formation of the person’.¹⁸

In *On Human Nature*, Nemesios differentiates between human ‘activity’ (ἐνέργεια, *energeia*) and ‘passion’ (πάθος, *pathos*). *Energeia* is considered to be positive because it originates from within the subject (i.e., person) and therefore aligns with nature, whereas *pathos* is judged to be negative because it originates from outside the subject and is therefore contrary to nature.¹⁹ Nemesios also distinguishes between ‘passion’ itself (which is external to a person) and the ‘sensation’ (συναίσθησις, *synaisthesis*) a person feels in response to it (which is generated within the subject).²⁰ Citing the example of a prostitute, who excites a man’s desire and thereby instigates his lust, Nemesios observes that it is the man – not the prostitute – who chooses to succumb to stimulation and

together with the body involving sensation, or among those involving sensation some that are natural, some that are not.

Nemesios, c. 18, ed. Morani, 76.13–17, tr. Sharples and van der Eijk, 135.

16 Wessel, ‘Human action’, 10.

17 Particularly with regard to pleasure, Nemesios distinguishes between what is expected of ‘one who lives a godly life’ (i.e., a monk) versus one ‘in the second rank of virtue’: the former ‘should pursue only those pleasures that are both necessary and natural’ (e.g., food for sustenance, clothing required to protect the body), while the latter might ‘pursue those that are natural but not necessary’ (e.g., lawful sexual intercourse for the purpose of procreation) ‘in a way, to a degree, at a time and at a place which is fitting’. In contrast, ‘drunkenness and lewdness’ are ‘neither necessary nor natural’ and should be avoided by all people in every case. Nemesios, c. 18, ed. Morani, 76.19–25, 77.1–7, tr. Sharples and van der Eijk, 135.

18 Wessel, ‘Human action’, 5.

19 Wessel, ‘Human action’, 5–6. For discussion of other Byzantine commentators who employed similar systems, see Hinterberger, ‘Emotions in Byzantium’, 127.

20 This distinction is first articulated in chapter 8, ‘On touch’ (Περὶ ἀφῆς): οὐδὲν δὲ ἴσως ἄτοπον λέγειν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῶν νεύρων τὸν ἐγκέφαλον ἀναπέμπεσθαι οὐ τὸ πάθος, ἀλλὰ συναίσθησιν τινα καὶ ἀπαγγελίαν τοῦ πάθους. (‘But perhaps there is nothing absurd about saying that what is sent upwards to the brain, the origin of the nerves, is not the affection but some kind of awareness and a report about the affection’.) Nemesios, c. 8, ed. Morani, 64.13–15, tr. Sharples and van der Eijk, 112. For discussion of this aspect of Nemesios’s argument, see Wessel, ‘Human action’, 4–5.

surrender to licentiousness.²¹ If the man had instead elected to respond toward desire with restraint, he would have been restored to a natural and good state of being.²²

By separating external passions from internal responses, Nemesios distinguishes between these influential forces and one's perception of and reaction to them. In this way, he opens the possibility for a person to regulate the impact of the passions even though the passions themselves are external and therefore remain outside a person's control. In so doing, he offers an early Byzantine concept of 'sensation' (συναίσθησις, *synaisthesis*) that is, arguably, close to the contemporary notion of 'feelings' as something generated within the self in reaction to physical and psychological stimuli that originate from without. The essential principles of Nemesios's theory include: (1) recognising that the passions are the instigators of choice; and (2) understanding that response to these external stimuli is voluntary.²³ Although a lack of discipline or education might render an individual ill-equipped to exercise proper judgement, that person is, nonetheless, responsible for his or her decisions and actions.²⁴ Similarly, the works of art considered below engage their viewers in the dilemma of moral choice. They offer models and antimodels for proper response to physical pleasure, arresting the viewer's attention at the moment that he or she must decide how to respond to the unavoidable stimuli of *apolausis* at the bath and banquet.

Apolausis at the Bath

The two extremes of *apolausis* – restrained enjoyment and unmitigated pleasure – are immediately recognisable in three early Byzantine mosaics that portray personifications of Apolausis in the company of other embodied concepts. The well-known fifth-century mosaic from a bath located outside Antioch (now in the Dumbarton Oaks Collection) depicts a female

21 Wessel, 'Human action', 9; Nemesios, c. 30, ed. Morani, 96.2, tr. Sharples and van der Eijk, 172.

22 Wessel, 'Human action', 6.

23 Wessel, 'Human action', 7–9.

24 ἐγγίνεται δὲ τὰ φαῦλα πάθη τῇ ψυχῇ διὰ τριῶν τούτων, διὰ κακῆς ἀγωγῆς, ἐξ ἀμαθίας, ὑπὸ καχεξίας, μὴ ἀχθέντες γὰρ καλῶς ἐκ παιδῶν, ὡς δύνασθαι κρατεῖν τῶν παθῶν, εἰς τὴν ἀμετρίαν αὐτῶν ἐκπίπτομεν. ἐκ δὲ τῆς ἀμαθίας φαῦλαι χρίσεις τῷ λογιστικῷ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐμφύονται, ὡς οἶεσθαι τὰ φαῦλα χρηστὰ εἶναι καὶ τὰ χρηστὰ φαῦλα.

Bad affections come to be in the soul for the following three reasons: bad training, ignorance and a bad state of the body. For if we are not brought up well from childhood so as to be able to master our affections, we fall into immoderation about them. From ignorance bad decisions are implanted into the rational element of the soul, so that we think that bad things are good and good things bad.

Nemesios, c. 17, ed. Morani, 75.21–26, tr. Sharples and van der Eijk, 132–33.

figure wearing a richly finished garment and drawing a pink rose toward her face (figs 14.1 and 14.2).²⁵ To either side of her head, she is labelled ΑΠΟΛΑΥΣΙΣ. Given the context of depiction, she no doubt evokes the pleasures of the bath.²⁶ As Fikret Yegül has described, these pleasures were intensely sensual:

The experience of the bath – the warm, clear water, the shiny, marble surfaces, the steamy atmosphere, the murmuring and echoing of genial sounds, the aroma of perfumed ointments, the intimacy of massage and public nudity – involved the awakening of all the senses.²⁷

The rose recalls the sweet smells associated with this richly scented environment.²⁸ The motif might operate on more allusive levels as well. The flower can be interpreted as an indirect reference to Aphrodite, who was regularly associated with bathing in the Graeco-Roman tradition, and whose attributes included the rose.²⁹

Yet in contrast to Aphrodite, who typically appeared at the bath in a state of brazen nudity (for example, fig. 14.3), the personification of Apolausis is fully clothed. Turned slightly to the left, she wears the conventional attire of a respectable late antique matron, a long-sleeved white tunic richly accented with red and gold embellishments, including *clavi* (vertical decorative bands running down the chest of a garment), *orbiculi* (round decorative appliqués) at her shoulders and bands at her wrists. Elaborate earrings with dangling pearls indicate her wealth and elite status. Her hair is neatly twisted and

- 25 D. Levi, *Antioch Mosaic Pavements*, 2 vols (Princeton, 1947), vol. 1, 304–6; vol. 2, pl. LXVII.d; R. Stillwell (ed.), *Antioch on the Orontes*, 5 vols (Princeton, 1934–72), vol. 3, 183, no. 124, pl. 58; G. Downey, ‘Personifications of abstract ideas in the Antioch mosaics’, *TAPA*, 69 (1938), 349–63, esp. 359–60; K.M.D. Dunbabin, ‘*Baiarum grata voluptas*: pleasures and dangers of the baths’, *PBSR*, 57 (1989), 6–46, esp. 19–20.
- 26 Although personifications of Apolausis are relatively rare in the decorative programmes of late antique baths, the term ‘apolausis’ appeared frequently in their inscriptions. See Dunbabin, ‘*Baiarum grata voluptas*’, 13–14, 19–20, 31–32. Other terms employed in reference to the ‘delights’ of bathing included *terpsis*, *gethosyne* (γηθοσύνη) and variant forms of *euphrosyne* (εὐφροσύνη), *ibid.*, 13–14, 20; S. Campbell, *The Mosaics of Antioch* (Toronto, 1988), pl. 63 (for a personification of Gethosyne). Regarding the importance of the ‘pleasures of the bath’ in Byzantine encomia on cities, see Saradi, ‘The *kallos* of the Byzantine city’, 38, 41.
- 27 F. Yegül, *Baths and Bathing in Classical Antiquity* (Cambridge, MA, 1992), 5.
- 28 Regarding early Christian commentators’ association of aromatic substances with relaxation and luxury – as well as concern about their use and abuse – see B. Caseau, ‘Christian bodies: the senses and early Byzantine Christianity’, in L. James (ed.), *Desire and Denial in Byzantium*, SPBS, 6 (Aldershot, 1999), 101–9, esp. 104–6.
- 29 Dunbabin, ‘*Baiarum grata voluptas*’, 12–17, 23–25; G. Fagan, *Bathing in Public in the Roman World* (Ann Arbor, MI, 2002), 5. Regarding Aphrodite’s association with the rose, also see Levi, *Antioch Mosaic Pavements*, vol. 1, 305–6.



Figure 14.1 Personification of Apolausis, fragment of a floor mosaic from a bath in Narlidja (near Antioch), Dumbarton Oaks Collection, Washington, DC. Photo credit: copyright Dumbarton Oaks, Byzantine Collection, Washington, DC

gathered at the nape of her neck, and her head is covered. Her clothing and adornments bespeak modesty and decorum.

In addition to being sedate, if finely attired, Apolausis is characterised in her posture and gestures as purposeful and restrained. She is clearly the mistress of her own body, exerting moral and mental control over her physical being. In this respect, she epitomises the Byzantine ideal of *apatheia* (ἀπάθεια, without passion, impassivity).³⁰ This state of perfect

30 Hinterberger, 'Emotions in Byzantium', 127. On *apatheia* in the writings of ancient Graeco-Roman authors and its reformulation under the early church Fathers, see R. Sorabji,




Figure 14.2 Detail of fig. 14.1.

Photo credit: copyright Dumbarton Oaks, Byzantine Collection, Washington, DC



Figure 14.3 Aphrodite Anadyomene, Roman marble statue from the Baths of Trajan, Cyrene (modern-day Libya) ca 150 cm (60 in), formerly in the collection of the Museo Nazionale Romano (Terme di Diocleziano), returned to Libya in 2008.

Photo credit: ARCHIVIO GBB / Alamy Stock Photo Figure

composure was often ascribed to saints or the emperor, whose bodies were portrayed in static fashion, rigid like statues, in order to convey their emotional mastery. Their super-human control was perceived as a mark of their God-like or holy natures.³¹ In keeping with these principles, Apolausis turns her gaze upward, indicating her focus on a higher plane of existence rather than the earthly domain that surrounds her. Given the reserved aspects of Apolausis's presentation, the rose might be understood as a symbol of natural abundance. The Byzantines recognised plenty as a necessary precursor to enjoyment; the latter depended on excess to produce the conditions in which basic needs were satisfied and indulgence became possible. Indeed, among the connotations of *apolausis* was the concept of 'fruition', which is effectively evoked by the blooming, fragrant flower.³²

The broader decorative programme of the bath in Antioch supports this reading of reserved indulgence. The mosaic of Apolausis was not the central image in the complex. Rather, it was situated in a secondary location, a lateral apsidal room of the building, to the west of the *frigidarium* (cold room; fig. 14.4). The main space of the *frigidarium* was decorated with a floor mosaic portraying Soteria (Σωτηρία), the personification of Salvation or Well-Being (figs 14.5 and 14.6).³³ In a manner perhaps countering expectation, Soteria is attired in a revealing fashion. Her toga-like garment leaves her left shoulder bare, and the tendrils of her pale brown hair curl seductively down the length of her exposed arm. Her garments are richly hued: a flowing blue outer mantle cascades over her right shoulder and arm; a ruddy gold tunic crosses her upper body to her right shoulder and is cinched high at her waist. In her hair, she wears a thick, leaf-patterned golden fillet with a large, green gem at the centre. Strings of green gems adorn her ears and neck. A gold band encircles her upper left arm.³⁴ Her face strikes a contented expression, with a gentle smile gracing her lips. Yet she is not undone by pleasure, nor does her exposed flesh seem intended to seduce the viewer. Instead, her body is substantial and imposing, and her stance bespeaks confidence and authority. The benefits she offers derive from abundance and strength, and she promises to proffer luxury with vigilance and control.

Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (Oxford, 2000), 181–210, 344–56, 360–62, 387–93.

31 On this point, see H. Maguire, 'Style and ideology in Byzantine imperial art', *Gesta*, 28.2 (1989), 217–31; idem, *The Icons of Their Bodies: Saints and Their Images in Byzantium* (Princeton, NJ, 1996), 66–74.

32 Liddell and Scott, *A Greek-English Lexicon*, 205, s.v. ἀπόλαυσις.

33 Levi, *Antioch Mosaic Pavements*, vol. 1, 305; vol. 2, pl. LXVIII.a and b.

34 For additional analysis of Soteria's clothing and jewellery – with parallels to surviving examples of late antique items of adornment – see S. Pedone, 'The jewels in the mosaics of Antioch: some visual examples of late antique and Byzantine luxury', *Rivista degli studi orientali*, n.s. 85 (2012), 391–410, esp. 395–98.




Figure 14.4 Plan of the Bath of Apolausis, Narlidja (near Antioch) based on the original excavation drawing as published in R. Stillwell and G.W. El-derkin (ed.) *Antioch-on-the-Orontes, III, the Excavations, 1937–1939* (Princeton: Publications of the Committee for the Excavation of Antioch and its Vicinity, Princeton University, 1941), plan 5.

Photo credit: Antioch Expedition Archives, Department of Art and Archaeology, Princeton University

A similarly reserved portrayal of Apolausis is found in a mosaic from a bath in Hagios Taxiarches near Argos, Greece, also dated to the fifth century (figs 14.7 and 14.8).³⁵ The female figure is placed in a tightly cropped roundel and turns to the right at a three-quarter angle. Above her right shoulder is inscribed ΑΠΟΛΑΥΣΙΣ. Her blonde, curly hair is bound around her head and secured with a plain white band embellished with a large jewel at the centre. From her ears dangle drop-pearl earrings. A simple red string – from which is suspended a round, brightly coloured pendant – encircles her neck. Her clothing is understated, consisting of a green tunic covered at the shoulders by a brown cloak. She gazes impassively forward, conveying the impression of *apatheia*.

The reserved demeanour of Apolausis in these mosaics is especially striking given the long-standing opposition to indulgent bathing that was

35 G. Åkerström-Hougen, *The Calendar and Hunting Mosaics of the Villa of the Falconer in Argos* (Stockholm, 1974), 129, pl. 12; Dunbabin, 'Baiaurum grata voluptas', 19–20.



Figure 14.5 Personification of Soteria, fragment of an early Byzantine marble floor mosaic from a bath in Nalidja (outside Antioch), Hatay Archaeological Museum, Antakya, Turkey.

Photo credit: Arco Images GmbH / Alamy Stock Photo

prevalent in critiques from Roman and early Christian commentators alike.³⁶ In the Roman era, the bath was censured as a locus of luxury and ostentation. Already in the first century CE, the Roman philosopher Seneca abhorred baths as dens of immoral behaviour and profligate expense that promoted dissolute qualities such as lassitude, licentiousness, drunkenness,

36 Dunbabin, 'Baiaurum grata voluptas'; E. Schoolman, 'Luxury, vice, and health: changing perspectives on baths and bathing in late antique Antioch', *Studies in Late Antiquity*, 1.3 (2017), 225–53.



Figure 14.6 Detail of fig. 14.5.

Photo credit: Arco Images GmbH / Alamy Stock Photo

disorderly noise and gluttony.³⁷ He implies that excessive bathing cleansed the body but corrupted the character of the Roman people.

Not surprisingly, some early church Fathers continued and expanded these critical opinions. In particular, they cast the bath as a lair of sin, in which demonic forces lurked.³⁸ In this dangerous environment, the soul was made vulnerable through physical pleasure. As the body relaxed, vigilance against sin weakened.³⁹ The late second- to early third-century theologian Clement of Alexandria cited sensual pleasure (ἡδονή, *hedone*) as among the major attractions of the bath and exhorted his followers to

37 Seneca, *Moral Letters*, 51, 56, 86, 107, 122, ed.tr. R.M. Gummere, *Seneca, Ad Lucilium epistulae morales*, 3 vols, LCL, 75–77 (Cambridge, MA, 1917–25), vol. 1, 336–39, 372–75; vol. 2, 312–19; vol. 3, 223, 415, 417. Fagan, *Bathing in Public in the Roman World*, 52; Yegül, *Baths and Bathing*, 40–43.

38 Yegül, *Baths and Bathing*, 314–18; Schoolman, ‘Luxury, vice, and health’, 228–31, 238–39.

39 Indeed, the origin of the Latin noun for luxury, *luxus*, is not, as is often assumed, *lux* (light). Rather, as Kenneth Lapatin notes, *luxus* derives from ‘the verb *luctor*, to dislocate or to sprain.... *Luxus* denotes something overextended, something in excess, and thus indulgence, extravagance, opulence and soft living’. K. Lapatin, *Luxus: The Sumptuous Arts of Greece and Rome* (Los Angeles, 2015), 1–17, at 1.



Figure 14.7 Personification of Apolausis, fragment of a marble floor mosaic, early Byzantine, from a bath in Agios Taxiarches (south-west of Argos, Greece). Photo credit: copyright Hellenic Ministry of Culture and Sports, Ephorate of Antiquities of Argolis, Archaeological Museum of Argos

abstain from this indulgence.⁴⁰ He denounced such establishments as dens of carnality and conspicuous consumption.⁴¹ As Yegül explains, with the

40 Clement of Alexandria, *Paidagogos*, c. 9.46.1, ed.tr. C. Mondésert and C. Matray, *Clément d'Alexandrie, Le pédagogue, livre III*, SC, 158 (Paris, 1970), 100–101.

41 Clement of Alexandria, c. 5 and c. 9, ed.tr. Mondésert and Matray, 70–75 and 100–105. The decline of the bath as a social institution was in part a rejection of the hedonism it had facilitated, although Yegül emphasises that ultimately it was the collapse of the infrastructure for water delivery – not social opprobrium – that led to the demise of Roman bathing



Figure 14.8 Detail of fig. 14.7.

Photo credit: copyright Hellenic Ministry of Culture and Sports, Ephorate of Antiquities of Argolis, Archaeological Museum of Argos

rise of Christianity, bathing continued to be permissible as a necessity, but no longer as a form of entertainment.⁴² Some Christian commentators rejected bathing outright. The fourth-century ascetic Jerome implored his followers that ‘he who once washed in Christ [i.e., has been baptised] needs not to wash again’.⁴³ By the fourth century, Christian holy people

culture in the Byzantine era. See Yegül, *Baths and Bathing*, 314–15; idem, *Bathing in the Roman World* (Cambridge, 2010), 199–200.

42 F. Yegül, *Baths and Bathing*, 314–20; idem, *Bathing in the Roman World*, 213–25.

43 Jerome, Letter 14.10, ed.tr. F.A. Wright, *Select Letters of St. Jerome*, LCL, 262 (London, 1933), 50–51; Yegül, *Baths and Bathing*, 318; idem, *Bathing in the Roman World*, esp. 201–3. This idea is also found in Clement of Alexandria’s writings; he similarly recommends spiritual bathing – i.e., cleansing the soul – in lieu of the physical bath. Clement of Alexandria, c. 9.47.4–48.3, ed.tr. Mondésert and Matray, 102–5.

had developed the concept of *alousia* (ἀλούσια, abstinence from bathing) as a sign of ascetic rejection of luxury.⁴⁴

Part of the objection to bathing was motivated by the lavish decorations that adorned the buildings themselves.⁴⁵ Baths were recognised as a mark of civic or personal status, and great resources were poured into their construction and adornment as a way of celebrating the cities or homes in which they stood and the patrons who commissioned them.⁴⁶ In some instances, early church Fathers condemned the baths specifically because of their decorations, which commonly included mythological paintings and sculptures.⁴⁷ Baths and their sculptures were also feared as the dwelling places of demons. The second- to third-century Christian polemicist Tertullian identified entrances to baths as places where idolaters attracted demons by means of superstitious rituals.⁴⁸

A bath decorated with personifications of Apolausis and Soteria offered a concession to such criticisms. Eschewing the mythological figures of pagan tradition and the un-Christian values they promoted, the patrons of the baths at Antioch and Argos found a way to enjoy the benefits of bathing, but to do so in a fashion that respected Christian decorum: these mosaics made clear that the baths proffered *apolausis*, not *hedone*.⁴⁹ A similar concern for adapting bathing to Christian expectations of regulated pleasure is found at the Bath of Eustolios in Kourion, Cyprus, where a late fourth-century inscription claims that the bath is protected by the sign of Christ and guarded by virtues including *Aidos* (Αἰδώς, Modesty) and *Sophrosyne* (Σωφροσύνη, Temperance).⁵⁰ At Argos, Antioch and Kourion, the bath was recognised as an environment in which the passions were enflamed and immodesty and indulgence were imminent threats. These circumstances required decorations and inscriptions geared at reminding the visitor to maintain caution and exercise sound judgement.

44 See Yegül, *Baths and Bathing*, 318; idem, *Bathing in the Roman World*, 206. Also see F. Yegül, 'Baths of Constantinople: an urban symbol in a changing world', in W.R. Caraher, L.J. Hall and R.S. Moore (ed.), *Archaeology and History in Roman, Medieval and Post-Medieval Greece: Studies on Method and Meaning in Honor of Timothy E. Gregory* (Aldershot, 2008), 169–96, at 170; P. Viscuso, 'Cleanliness, not a condition for godliness: *alousia* as a canonical requirement in late Byzantium', *GOTR*, 46.1–2 (2001), 75–88.

45 Dunbabin, '*Baiarum grata voluptas*', 8–9, 12; Fagan, *Bathing in Public in the Roman World*, 19–21, 176–79; Yegül, *Baths and Bathing*, 317, 322.

46 Dunbabin, '*Baiarum grata voluptas*', 8–10; Yegül, *Baths and Bathing*, 31, 43–46; Schoolman, 'Luxury, vice, and health', 234–38.

47 Dunbabin, '*Baiarum grata voluptas*', 21–31.

48 Tertullian, *On Idolatry*, 15.6, ed. J.H. Waszink, J.C.M. Winden and P. G. van der Nat, *Tertullianus, De idololatria*, VChrSupp, 1 (Leiden, 1987), 52–53; see Dunbabin, '*Baiarum grata voluptas*', 32, 35–36; Yegül, *Baths and Bathing*, 317.

49 Regarding the adaptation of bathing to Christian morality, see Schoolman, 'Luxury, vice, and health', 238–45.

50 T.B. Mitford, *The Inscriptions of Kourion*, MAPS, 83 (Philadelphia, 1971), 354–55, no. 203, also see 353–54, no. 202; Dunbabin, '*Baiarum grata voluptas*', 17–18.

The mosaics of Apolausis at the baths of Antioch and Argos signalled that these environments facilitated not unbridled hedonism, but rather civilised, circumscribed enjoyment, the intended purpose of which was to promote well-being. Scholars have proposed that personifications like Apolausis embodied values of elite late antique society that were celebrated as marks of *paideia*. These values continued earlier Graeco-Roman traditions of philosophical learning and decorous behaviour that were as much – if not more – of the mind as they were of the body.⁵¹ In this way Apolausis evoked a refined tradition of social discourse and practice that originated in the Graeco-Roman world but was adapted to Christian values. While the bath was undoubtedly an institution of physical pleasure, these decorative and inscriptional programmes called upon the visitor to be vigilant against the body's overtaking the soul.

It is essential to note that while the fifth-century personifications of Apolausis and Soteria exemplified the possibility of bathing within moral bounds, the baths in which they appeared did not promote asceticism. Indeed, an excess of resources made possible the well-being and enjoyment that Soteria and Apolausis embodied. In this regard, they represent luxury in the modern sense of the term as 'something that is desirable but not necessary'.⁵² Indeed, the high quality of these mosaics – and the very fact that such elaborate decorative programmes were commissioned – exemplified immoderate wealth and conspicuous consumption.⁵³ At the same time, these images portray the proper way to engage in the enjoyment of excess; they outline the acceptable degree to which one could take pleasure in extravagance while preserving morality. Given the critical attitude toward baths and bathing voiced by some early church Fathers, this was a fine line indeed. Decorative programmes like those at the baths of Antioch and Argos offered guides for behaviour and attitude. They demonstrated how one could participate in an activity that involved physical stimulation and sensual delight without transgressing Christian social and spiritual standards. The personifications of Apolausis and Soteria embodied the privileges enjoyed by those

51 R.L. Newby, 'Personifications of *paideia* in late antique mosaics from the Greek east', in E. Stafford and J. Herrin (ed.), *Personifications in the Greek World*, KCL, 7 (Aldershot, 2005), 231–46; C. Kondoleon, 'Celebrating pleasure and wealth: a new mosaic at the Museum of Fine Arts, Boston', in J.D. Alchermes (ed.), *Αναθήματα έορτικά: Studies in Honor of Thomas F. Mathews* (Mainz, 2009), 216–22, esp. 220 and 222. On the larger question of the connection of late antique decorative programmes to practices and traditions of Graeco-Roman *paideia*, see R.L. Newby, *Silver and Society in Late Antiquity: Functions and Meanings of Silver Plate in the Fourth to Seventh Centuries* (Aldershot, 2004); L.M. Stirling, *The Learned Collector: Mythological Statuettes and Classical Taste in Late Antique Gaul* (Ann Arbor, MI, 2005); R. Ling, 'Inscriptions on Romano-British mosaics and wall-paintings', *Britannia*, 38 (2007), 63–91, esp. 86–88.

52 Cutler, 'Uses of luxury', 294.

53 Regarding the founding of baths as a form of pagan and Christian philanthropy, see Schoolman, 'Luxury, vice, and health', 231–51.

who frequented these establishments, but the mosaics also dictated how to use these spaces – and engage the pleasures they afforded – appropriately.

Apolausis at the Banquet

Bathing was but a prelude to the even greater pleasures afforded by the banquet. The bath uplifted one's spirits and relaxed the body, readying one for the gaiety and consumption of Roman and late antique elite dining.⁵⁴ While the images of Apolausis in fifth-century baths indicate a self-conscious effort to adapt bathing and the pleasures it afforded to Christian values, not all early Byzantine portrayals of Apolausis exercised the same degree of restraint. A more problematic side of Apolausis is apparent in another late antique mosaic, a sixth-century example (now in the Museum of Fine Arts, Boston) that depicts figures at a garden feast (fig. 14.9).⁵⁵

Here Apolausis shows little modesty or control. She is heavily adorned with jewellery, wearing gem-encrusted bands around her exposed upper and lower arms, pearls at her neck and a large crown. Unlike the personifications of Apolausis at Antioch and Argos, whose tresses were bound to their heads, this figure wears her hair in lush curls that swell to either side of her face. Even more noteworthy, her garment clings to her body, emphasising the roundness of her breasts and hips. Apolausis is seated with a male companion on a bench in a garden setting (indicated by branches and leaves at the upper left and right). He is identified as Ploutos (Πλοῦτος, Wealth). True to his nature, Wealth profligately drops coins to the ground.⁵⁶ Apolausis leans toward him, heavily draping her arm over his shoulder in a wanton fashion and absorbing his attention.⁵⁷ Apolausis transgresses the boundaries of proper behaviour that were carefully observed by her namesakes at Antioch and Argos. Rather than embodying the mastery of physical desire by mental fortitude as suggested in the reserved, cerebral character of 'Enjoyment', Apolausis is here better translated as 'Pleasure', a term that encompasses the hedonism implied by Apolausis's languorous pose and sexualised body. Indeed, this presentation of Apolausis has much in common with Hedone (Ἡδονή; Lat. *Voluptas*), the Graeco-Roman personification of Lust, who was said to be the offspring of Eros and Psyche.⁵⁸

54 Yegül, *Baths and Bathing*, 5.

55 Kondoleon, 'Celebrating pleasure and wealth', 216.

56 The casting of coins is a common aspect of personifications of Wealth or Donation. See Cutler, 'Uses of luxury', 295, figs 5–7. Here, however, the secondary attributes and features of the figures suggest the less wholesome nature of the figure's action, evoking the distinction between abundance (which is natural and laudatory) and excess (which corrupted and is condemned). For additional comparanda, see Kondoleon, 'Celebrating pleasure and wealth', 220–21.

57 Kondoleon, 'Celebrating pleasure and wealth', 216–22.

58 R. Vollkommer, 'Hedone', in *Lexicon iconographicum mythologiae classicae*, 4.1 (Zurich, 1988), 468–72.



Figure 14.9 Personifications of Apolauis and Ploutos, fragment of a floor mosaic, early Byzantine, attributed to the eastern Mediterranean (possibly Turkey or Syria), 134.6 x 83.8 cm (53 x 33 in), Museum of Fine Arts, Boston, Gift of George D. and Margo Behrakis, acc. no. 2006.848.

Photo credit: copyright 2021 Museum of Fine Arts, Boston

The source of Apolauis's attraction to Wealth is apparent in the mosaic. While he looks toward her, she casts her eyes downward, at the coins cascading to the ground. Apolauis's reaction suggests her easy vulnerability to corrupting influences. While at Antioch, Soteria kept Apolauis in check, here Ploutos and Apolauis compound each other's weaknesses. The excess of Wealth seduces Pleasure away from any virtuous potential, and she, in turn, promises to lead him further astray. Indeed, with her wanton pose,

money-hungry gaze and eroticised body, Apolausis is portrayed like a prostitute, seeking the purse of her male companion: her avarice encourages his lust.⁵⁹ In these fifth- to sixth-century mosaics at the banquet and bath, we see how Apolausis can manifest as a virtuous or sinful emotion. The distinction centred on whether she was realised as measured enjoyment or unbri-dled pleasure.

Although the provenience of the mosaic depicting Apolausis and Ploutos is unknown, scholars have suggested that it likely came from a domestic context in the eastern Mediterranean.⁶⁰ In this environment, it would have stood for the privileged life enjoyed by the late antique elite.⁶¹ This message is further conveyed by another fragment from the same programme depicting personifications of Tryphe (Τρυφή, Luxury or Delight) and Bios (Βίος, Life) (now in the Royal Ontario Museum, Toronto; fig. 14.10).⁶² As in the mosaic of Apolausis and Ploutos, the couple is intimately intertwined, a clear indication that sexual pleasure is a significant aspect of the good times to be enjoyed. Although she is dressed in a full-length tunic, Tryphe's arms are bare. Like Apolausis, Tryphe wears gem-encrusted arm and wrist bands; a pearl-laced fillet encircles her head, but her curls hang languorously around her face. She leans one arm on her companion and raises the other in a gesture of speech. Tryphe and Bios are locked in an amorous gaze; he gathers her in his right arm as if to pull her down to the couch. In his left hand dangles an empty drinking cup, a clear indication that the over-indulgence

59 Indeed, the Greek words for fornication (πορνεία, *porneia*) and prostitute (πόρνη, *porne*) were cognates. *Porneia* also served to label the personification of Lust, one of the most untamed of pleasures. Evagrius Pontikos, writing in the second half of the fourth century, identified *porneia* (lust, fornication) as one of eight bad thoughts (λογισμοί, *logismoí*) that, when allowed to linger, could inflame the passions and lead to sin. See Evagrius, *Praktikos*, ed. tr. A. Guillaumont and C. Guillaumont, *Évagre le Pontique, Traité pratique, ou, Le moine*, 2 vols, SC, 170–71 (Paris, 1971), vol. 1, 63–84, 90–94; vol. 2, 510–13; Sorabji, *Emotion and Peace of Mind*, 358–62, esp. 359–60; also see Darling Young and Crislip in this volume.

60 Kondoleon, 'Celebrating pleasure and wealth', 216–17.

61 On the construction and display of social prestige through the form and decoration of late antique domestic reception and dining spaces, see S.P. Ellis, 'Power, architecture, and décor: how the late Roman aristocrat appeared to his guest', in E. Gazda (ed.), *Roman Art in the Private Sphere: New Perspectives on the Architecture and Décor of the Domus, Villa, and Insula* (Ann Arbor, MI, 1991), 117–34.

62 N. Leipen, 'A new mosaic in the Royal Ontario Museum', *Archaeology*, 22 (1969), 231; S. Klementa, 'Vom bequemen Luxusdasein zur vergänglichen Lebenszeit: die Personifikation des Bios', in G. Brands (ed.), *Rom und die Provinzen: Gedenkschrift für Hanns Gabelmann* (Mainz, 2001), 209–14, esp. 210–12; Kondoleon, 'Celebrating pleasure and wealth', 216–18. Regarding other late antique mosaics with personifications of Tryphe, see Campbell, *Mosaics of Antioch*, pls. 189–90; F. Tülek, 'The bejewelled lady of Sinope', in M. Şahin (ed.), *11th International Colloquium on Ancient Mosaics, October 16th–20th, 2009, Bursa, Turkey: Mosaics of Turkey and Parallel Developments in the Rest of the Ancient and Medieval World; Questions of Iconography, Style and Technique from the Beginnings of Mosaic until the Late Byzantine Era* (Istanbul, 2011), 921–26.



Figure 14.10 Personifications of Luxury and Life, fragment of a floor mosaic, early Byzantine, eastern Mediterranean, possibly Emesa (modern-day Homs, Syria), 133 x 97 cm, Royal Ontario Museum, Toronto, 967.132.

Photo credit: courtesy of the Royal Ontario Museum, copyright ROM

of hunger and thirst has spurred sexual appetites.⁶³ At this party, Pleasure and Wealth keep company with the Luxurious Life. Safety and Restraint are clearly not on the guest list.⁶⁴

63 Kondoleon suggests that the motif could be understood instead as a wheel of Nemesis, indicating the unpredictability of life and fickleness of fortune. 'Celebrating pleasure and wealth', 216. Regarding the perceived connection between drunkenness and licentiousness, with the former leading to the latter, see M. Perisanidi, 'Entertainment in the twelfth-century canonical commentaries: were standards the same for Byzantine clerics and laymen?', *BMGS*, 38.2 (2014), 185–200, esp. 187–88.

64 Kondoleon observes that depictions of personifications as couples were not an innovation of the sixth century and may indicate a combination of traditions for depicting

Regulating *Apolausis*: The Passions and Free Will

While readers of Nemesios's treatise pondered the mechanics of emotional stimulus and response in the abstract, visitors to early Byzantine baths and banquets encountered these influential forces firsthand. Yet a clear connection can be drawn between the images and the text: both the visual and the written sources bespeak a range of possibilities for how an individual might negotiate powerful passions, and they recognise the crucial role of free will in this process. The late antique mosaics depicting Apolausis at Antioch and Argos epitomise the ideal of reserved emotional response. The figures observe the boundaries dictated by society and nature; feelings are constrained to the mind and soul and do not drive the body, which remains composed and unmoved. These impassive figures feel the enjoyment of natural abundance, symbolised in the mosaic at Antioch by the rose, but indulge responsibly in the pleasures of warm water and clean skin that the bath provides. In contrast, the figure of Apolausis in the company of Ploutos shows no such control. Instead, she is overcome by external stimuli. Lacking the innate temperament or received education to make the proper choice, she succumbs to the power of passion, as revealed in her undisciplined body, gaze and gestures. In all three cases, Apolausis feels the stimulations of the senses that render one vulnerable to corporeal desires, but the figures distinguish themselves by either 'guiding the passions, which belonged to the individual and were an essential part of her person, toward morally excellent ends', or allowing these same forces to control them, leading to reprehensible – if pleasurable – results.⁶⁵

The contexts of these fifth- and sixth-century mosaics may help explain their different conceptions of Apolausis. The personifications situated in baths may have been exposed to a broader range of visitors, especially if the establishments were open to the public, thereby demanding a more conservative message regarding physical indulgence. Furthermore, because baths fell under the sharp scrutiny of early Christian moralists, their patrons and designers might have more actively regulated their decorative programmes. Those involved in their ornamentation would have sought to mitigate potential criticism by employing iconographic motifs that specified the forms of enjoyment purveyed by the establishment and the range of behaviours that its owners condoned.

In contrast, the proposed domestic setting of the mosaic depicting Apolausis and Ploutos offered a private environment in which more daring messages and behaviours could be displayed. Yet we should not assume that the host of dinner parties at this house was promoting the prodigal life to his guests. These images could instead have served much the same purpose

personifications of ideal concepts with the Hellenistic iconography of dining couples. 'Celebrating pleasure and wealth', 220.

⁶⁵ Wessel, 'Human action', 10.

as the mosaics in the baths at Antioch and Argos, visualising the possible forms that ‘the good life’ might take, and instructing viewers to comport themselves in response. Much as some visitors to the bath at Antioch might have exceeded the bounds drawn by the demure and composed Apolausis, visitors to the home in which Apolausis fawns over Ploutos might have seen in these figures a cautionary, negative example, and curbed their own behaviours in response.

Apolausis and the ‘Good Life’

Evidence for a wider tradition of active, ethical looking, interpreting and responding to moralising images – that is to say, of visual *paideia* – is found in a Greek treatise known as the *Tabula of Cebes* (*Κέβητος Πίναξ*) (ca. first century CE).⁶⁶ In the description of a painting purportedly found in a temple of Chronos (Χρόνος, Time), the author details a composition titled ‘The Picture of Life’, which includes a variety of personifications also found in early Byzantine mosaics. One panel depicts a woman identified as Deceit (Ἀπάτη, *Apate*), who offers those who enter her gates a cup of Error (Πλάνος, *Planos*) and Ignorance (Ἄγνοια, *Agnoia*). After drinking, they are led away by women who include personifications of Opinions (Δόξαι, *Doxai*), Desires (Ἐπιθυμίας, *Epithumiai*) and Pleasures (Ἡδοναί, *Hedonai*).⁶⁷ Although initially the author purports that these guides might lead one to salvation or destruction, it is later revealed that only Opinions and Desires, not Pleasures, possess salvific potential.⁶⁸ The reader learns that Luxury (Ἡδυπάθεια, *Hedupatheia*) is not to be trusted. While promising a life of pleasure, she and her minions – who are depicted as courtesans (ἑταῖραι, *hetairai*) – do not provide satisfaction that is deep or lasting, and eventually they reveal their destructive, degrading effects.⁶⁹ Even Fortune (Τύχη, *Tyche*) is fickle in her gift-giving; she will easily take away what she has granted – and more.⁷⁰ Wealth

66 Pseudo-Cebes of Thebes, *Tabula*, ed. K. Praechter, *Cebetis Tabula*, Teubner (Leipzig, 1893), tr. J.T. Fitzgerald and L.M. White, *The Tabula of Cebes*, Texts and Translations, 24 (Chico, CA, 1983), 61–131. Regarding the relevance of the *Tabula of Cebes* to the interpretation of late antique art and architecture, see Kondoleon, ‘Celebrating pleasure and wealth’, 219; Levi, *Antioch Mosaic Pavements*, 254–55; J. Elsner, *Art and the Roman Viewer: The Transformation of Art from the Pagan World to Christianity* (Cambridge, 1995), 40–46.

67 Pseudo-Cebes, c. 4–6, ed. Praechter, 3–6, tr. Fitzgerald and White, 67–71.

68 These manifestations of the ‘true’ Opinion and Desire, which lead to salvation, are distinct from the ‘false’ Opinion and Desire encountered earlier in the text, which lead to Pseudopaideia (Ψευδοπαιδεία, *False Education*). Pseudo-Cebes, c. 11, ed. Praechter, 10–11, tr. Fitzgerald and White, 78–81.

69 Pseudo-Cebes, c. 9 and 32, ed. Praechter, 8–9 and 26, tr. Fitzgerald and White, 74–77 and 110–11.

70 Pseudo-Cebes, c. 7–8 and 30–31, ed. Praechter, 6–8 and 24–26, tr. Fitzgerald and White, 70–75 and 106–11.

(Πλούτος, Ploutos) is also cited repeatedly as a thing deemed desirable by most, but in fact unable to guarantee attainment of a truly good life. Education (Παιδεία, Paideia) alone ennobles and delivers enduring happiness, in part by teaching one how to use Wealth justly.⁷¹

The false desires against which the text warns are presented as unavoidable. One must encounter and engage them in the course of life, be seduced and tricked by them, but then learn from these misjudgements. Eventually one develops the ability to keep false pleasures in check, even to reject them outright, and only then to attain a gratifying existence. Following the wrong path leads to suffering, both physical and emotional.⁷² Despite their contrasting conceptions of Apolausis, the bath mosaics depicting Enjoyment and Well-Being and the domestic mosaics of Pleasure, Wealth and the Luxurious Life can be seen as part of a common concern for forging a path toward a truly good life.⁷³ As stated in the *Tabula*, ‘So, it all comes down to this: it is possible to honour these things as being good or to disdain them as bad’.⁷⁴ The trick, it seems, is to discern the difference and act on this knowledge, in other words, to possess the *paideia* necessary to exercise effective judgement.

With these arguments in mind, the mosaic depicting Apolausis sniffing a rose might be understood to take on new meaning in its current location, the entryway of the Dumbarton Oaks Museum. For modern museums – like Byzantine baths and banquet halls – are also environments where the emotions are stimulated by the beauty and richness of the things on display and the spaces that house them. In a letter dated 1939 to Mildred Barnes Bliss (the co-founder of Dumbarton Oaks), Royall Tyler (the Blisses’ adviser in the assembly of their collection), engages the image of Apolausis in a

71 Pseudo-Cebes, c. 39, ed. Praechter, 32–33, tr. Fitzgerald and White, 123–25.

72 Pseudo-Cebes, c. 32, ed. Praechter, 26, tr. Fitzgerald and White, 110–11. The *Tabula* echoes the roughly contemporaneous writings of the first-century CE Stoic philosopher Seneca. In his letter ‘Pleasure and joy’, Seneca characterises joy (*gaudium*) as ‘an elation of the spirit’ while pleasure (*voluptatem*) is associated with false fulfilments and lack of moderation: it ‘exceeds control and is carried to excess’. He explains that many people think they are pursuing joy, but they are distracted by pleasures that are shallow and fleeting:

One person seeks it [joy] in feasting and self-indulgence; another in canvassing for honours and in being surrounded by a throng of clients; another, in his mistress; another, in idle display of culture and in literature that has no power to heal; all these men are led astray by delights which are deceptive and short-lived – like drunkenness for example which pays for a single hour of hilarious madness by a sickness of many days, or like applause and the popularity of enthusiastic approval which are gained, and atoned for, at the cost of great mental disquietude.

Seneca, *Moral Letters*, 59, tr. Gummere, vol. 1, 411, 418–21.

73 On the function of late antique domestic art in depicting and attracting the ‘good life’, see Maguire, ‘The good life’.

74 Καὶ τὸ σύνολον δέ, ἔστι τὸ τιμᾶν ταῦτα ὡς ἀγαθὰ ὄντα ἢ ἀτιμᾶζειν ὡς κακὰ. Pseudo-Cebes, c. 40.4–5, ed. Praechter, 33, tr. Fitzgerald and White, 125.

manner that is strikingly similar to what I have proposed in this chapter. Tyler writes,

[I]t delights me to think of *Ἀπόλαυσις*, represented as a lady smelling a flower, welcoming visitors to D.O. For what but DELECTATION is the object of art? It would have been bitter indeed to have ΑΠΟΛΑΥCIC go to the people who had not grasped that truth. And who has but the Milrobs [Mildred and Robert Bliss]?⁷⁵

Putting aside for a moment the snobbery and obsequiousness of the note, we might appreciate how Tyler acts as a ‘good user’ of the Byzantine mosaic, celebrating pleasure as the natural reaction to viewing works of art, but also – in a fashion that echoes the argument of the *Tabula of Cebes* – affirming that it is the ‘educated’ viewers (specifically, the Blisses) who are most deserving of the enjoyment these objects carry because they ‘know’ the right way to manage the experience. Indeed, in the same letter, Tyler models how Byzantine works of art can serve as touchstones for correct behaviour and discernment by referencing the mosaic image and the qualities it personifies as a loose paradigm for a wide range of judgements on everything from the best cruise line for crossing the Atlantic (‘The Dutch line for ΑΠΟΛΑΥCIC, every time’) to the characterisation of a competing collector’s new wife.⁷⁶

Conclusion

The early Byzantine works of art considered here do not present *apolausis* as an emotion per se. Yet they suggest that enjoyment and pleasure were concepts closely linked to Byzantine understandings of the passions and of their impact on human experience and moral formation. In his discourse on human nature, Nemesios emphasises the passions’ powerful influence, their ability to move a person toward particular feelings and actions. I propose that in this regard, *apolausis* finds a place in Byzantine emotionology. *Apolausis* can be situated within Nemesios’s system as a

75 ‘Royall Tyler to Mildred Barnes Bliss, July 17, 1939,’ Bliss-Tyler Correspondence, Dumbarton Oaks, <https://www.doaks.org/resources/bliss-tyler-correspondence/letters/17jul1939>, accessed 30 March 2021.

76 In the letter, Tyler described Polly Brown Peirce (wife of the collector and amateur scholar Hayford Peirce), as follows:

She was nice, welcoming, indeed, without effusion. She has a low, quiet voice and a restful manner. Not a bad accent. Eats tidily. She is no beauty, but is neat in appearance. No rouge, tho’ a pasty complexion, no dyed nails. Altogether a studied neutrality of *Erscheinung* [appearance]. Mouse-coloured hair. ECTIA [Hestia, homely goddess of the hearth], rather than ΑΠΟΛΑΥCIC.

Ibid.

‘sensation’ (συναίσθησις, *synaisthesis*) – a response to external passions – that was, in turn, manifested through a person’s exercising of free will. An individual made the judgement to indulge or resist the passions; the kind of *apolausis* they allowed themselves to feel – and display – reflected this choice. Operating at the juncture between the body and the mind, *apolausis* warranted attention as a feeling to be monitored, particularly in sensual environments like the bath and banquet, where it was inevitably encountered and especially potent. The management of the passions that Nemesios describes in nuanced, philosophical terms parallels the messages of the mosaics, which confronted and guided Byzantine viewers in real-life situations. Through the inflection of gesture, posture, dress and expression, personifications of Apolausis communicated the danger of *apolausis* as well as the possibility of controlling it. By offering more than one manifestation, the mosaics recognise the range of potential responses to physical pleasure, from restrained indulgence to unbridled hedonism, and prompted the viewer to exercise his or her own judgement in deciding which model to follow.⁷⁷

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⁷⁷ Versions of this paper were presented at the 2016 International Congress of Byzantine Studies in Belgrade, Serbia, and the 2016 Byzantine Studies Conference at Cornell University. I am grateful for the helpful responses I received on those occasions. In addition to the editors of this volume, I warmly thank Ivan Drpić, Cecily Hilsdale and Amanda Luyster for their thoughtful, generous comments on earlier drafts of this essay, which greatly enhanced both the final product and the pleasure of producing it.

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15 Poetry in Emotion

The Case of Anger

Floris Bernard

No matter how difficult it is to define what an emotion is, most people will agree that anger qualifies as an emotion. Anger occurs in all inventories of emotions, ancient and modern.¹ There is a broadly shared understanding that anger is accompanied by (or results from) distinct bodily characteristics, which seem to be universal: blood pressure, skin colour, facial expression are supposed to undergo noticeable changes when someone is said to be 'angry'. On the other hand, anger is a socially important emotion: anger almost always establishes or alters a relationship with another individual in a significant way.

Anger forces us to consider whether emotions are a good or a bad thing. Perhaps more than any other emotion, anger touches on morality, on questions of how emotional discipline can improve us as human beings and can lead to a better society. Anger is the most obvious emotion that comes to mind when talking about the *control* of emotions. The management of anger is a focal point for thinkers and moralists in any culture or society; hence, this paper will be as much concerned with the (inability to) manage this emotion as with the expression of this emotion.

For our own culture, it may be illustrative to turn to Martha Nussbaum's book on anger.² In this book, the very traditional view of anger as an essentially bad emotion assumes a new, but not altogether unfamiliar form. For Nussbaum, emotions are a question of morality and an important part of the pursuit of a liberal democratic society. In this context, anger is an unconstructive emotion, at best aiding self-love, but socially and politically dangerous. Anger is relocated to the irrational emotional world of the child: responsible adults ought to avoid and resist anger. This view of course leaves aside any possible positive outcome of anger.³ And the emphasis on

1 See B.H. Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages* (Ithaca, NY, 2006), 53–55; and D. Konstan, *The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks: Studies in Aristotle and Classical Literature* (Toronto, 2006), 41.

2 M.C. Nussbaum, *Anger and Forgiveness : Resentment, Generosity, Justice* (Oxford, 2016).

3 For a more sympathetic view, see C. Tavis, *Anger: The Misunderstood Emotion* (New York, 1989).

emotional progress reminds us (either as Byzantinists or medievalists) of a persistent teleological conception: that people in the middle ages were, in a certain sense, children, that is, emotionally less developed individuals.⁴ In the case of Byzantium, the firmly entrenched perception of its culture as static and conformist may also have been damaging to a nuanced account of emotions.

Anger and Cognition

One of the paradoxes of anger is that, on the one hand, it seems to be the most irrational or insane of all emotions, while on the other hand, it implies, or even *is*, a judgement based on thinking and reasoning. As Seneca put it in his delightfully succinct and paradoxical way:

cum sit inimica rationi, nusquam tamen nascitur nisi ubi rationi locus est.

While anger is the foe of reason, it is nevertheless only born where reason dwells.⁵

Anger is bound up with our judgement of the world and people: it results from thought, or, even more radically, it is a form of thought. It is, not coincidentally, in a paper on anger that Robert Solomon developed one of the most influential formulations of the cognitive view of emotions.⁶ In this view, emotion is a system of concepts, beliefs, attitudes and desires, virtually all of which are context-bound, historically developed and culture-specific. We appropriate and imitate certain displays of emotions. Solomon, referring to Aristotle, links anger to mechanisms of responsibility and blame, offence and retribution. These are, in turn, dependent on structures and ideas that govern societies and smaller communities.

For analysing textual displays of anger in the past, we may also look at what connects us to emotions in other cultures. And for this, cognitive theory may open up some new avenues. From this vantage point, all humans, across time and space, share a comparable cognitive apparatus, interacting with similar bodies and an at least similarly structured world. Cognitive theory therefore presupposes that we have certain innate dispositions, created

4 See B.H. Rosenwein, 'Worrying about emotions in history', *AmHR*, 107 (2002), 821–45, offering a critical analysis of a strand of thought going back to Norbert Elias and Johan Huizinga.

5 Seneca, *On Anger*, 1.3.4, ed. E. Hermes, *L. Annaei Senecae Dialogorum libros XII*, Teubner (Leipzig, 1923), 50, tr. J.W. Basore, *Seneca, Moral Essays*, vol. 1, LCL, 214 (Cambridge, MA, 1928), 115.

6 R.C. Solomon, 'Getting angry: the Jamesian theory of emotion in anthropology', in R.A. Schweder and R.A. LeVine (ed.), *Culture Theory: Essays on Mind, Self and Emotion* (Cambridge, 1984), 238–54.

by the history of our interactions with the physical and social environment. Lexical-semantic structures reveal how emotions are structured in the human mind. Figurative language about (or of) anger is part of conceptual metaphors that reveal how certain images are ingrained in our cognitive structure. They are ‘metaphors we live by’: they shape our perceptions and actions without our ever noticing them.⁷

Zoltán Kövecses specifically analysed metaphors by which we express or perceive anger.⁸ Persistent metaphors are all related to the deeply ingrained perception that anger is an entity inside us, imagined as fluid pressurised in a container and able to be released, often as steam. This is the so-called ‘hydraulic’ metaphor that greatly influenced the Freudian interpretation of anger. Fire (or heat in general) is another persistent point of reference, as are the habits and gestures (baring teeth, snapping) that we associate with animals. Anger also involves a prototypical scenario: there is (1) an offending event, which (2) provokes anger, which (3) one attempts to control; but (4) this control is lost, leading to (5) retribution. For all kinds of reasons, this prototypical scenario can change or backfire, but the utterances and acts connected to ‘anger’ are mostly construed along, or contrasted with, this basic scenario. Douglas Cairns has made a cogent case for analysing textual displays of emotions in ancient Greek literature according to these universal metaphorical concepts.⁹ These conceptualisations are indeed deeply ingrained in the use of Greek emotion words: *χόλος* (*cholos*), *ὀργή* (*orge*) and *θυμός* (*thumos*) are frequently compared to, or used in the context of, fire, boiling liquids and madness.¹⁰

The approach of Kövecses and other cognitive theorists is not without its problems. It deals with conventional language, not with literature, and therefore one could argue that it is not at all suited to interpret literary anger texts, especially poetry.¹¹ Metaphors consciously deviate from normal speech and live on enshrined by a learned poetic tradition. Moreover, the universality of these metaphors is of course tenuous: any counterexample (i.e., a culture where these metaphors are absent) directly undoes the claim of a universally shared human cognitive apparatus that is supposed to conceptualise things in the same way across cultures.¹²

7 G. Lakoff and M. Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By* (Chicago, 1980).

8 Z. Kövecses, *Metaphors of Anger, Pride, and Love: A Lexical Approach to the Structure of Concepts* (Amsterdam, 1986). See also Z. Kövecses, *Metaphor and Emotion: Language, Culture, and the Body in Human Feeling* (Cambridge, 2000).

9 D. Cairns, ‘Ethics, ethology, terminology: Iliadic anger and the cross-cultural study of emotion’, in S.M. Braund and G.W. Most (ed.), *Ancient Anger: Perspectives from Homer to Galen* (Cambridge, 2003), 11–49.

10 See W.V. Harris, *Restraining Rage: The Ideology of Anger Control in Classical Antiquity* (Cambridge, MA, 2001), 66–68; and Cairns, ‘Iliadic anger’.

11 Harris, *Restraining Rage*, 67.

12 Solomon, ‘Getting angry’, 79.

Anger in Texts of the Past

With this objection, we have arrived at the overwhelming presence of language. It can be said that our supposed research object, anger, is not there. The only thing that is there is textual anger.¹³ When texts express, represent or report emotions, they are not records of psychological data, but engaged participants in the construction of events and persons. So we need to be careful about how we conceive of the relationship between a textual representation of emotions and historical psychological experiences. Ed Sanders alerts us to the fact that in certain literary genres the peculiar perspective of the author, or of a certain interest group, distorts the representation of an emotion, but he remains positive about other genres (drawing perhaps too optimistically a line between fiction and non-fiction).¹⁴ Susan Matt enumerates several risks involved with the study of historical emotions: the tendency to mistake norms for practices; the inevitability that we end up studying verbal representations of emotions, rather than emotions themselves; and the semantic slippage which can lead us to put the same labels on emotional contents that have radically changed over time.¹⁵

Therefore, an obvious first step in the understanding of emotions in texts of the past is an analysis of its vocabulary. The labelling of anger (the so-called ‘emotion terms’) is in itself an important (but not the only) part of how different cultures experience and express anger in different ways. Some scholars have taken a quite radical view on how linguistic differences engender different perceptions, and indeed experiences, of emotions. For Rom Harré, emotions come into being as emotion words, instead of the latter just being an externalisation of the former.¹⁶ Anna Wierzbicka points out how emotion words across languages relate to different mental concepts and scenarios, so that using the English word ‘anger’ to study (in this case) Greek texts assumes an analogy between both languages which does not exist.¹⁷ For Douglas Cairns, this should not keep us from performing a conceptual analysis when studying emotions in ancient Greek, provided we trace the

13 For hermeneutical problems related to medieval texts specifically, see C. Peyroux, ‘Gertrude’s furor: reading anger in an early medieval saint’s life’, in B.H. Rosenwein (ed.), *Anger’s Past: The Social Uses of an Emotion in the Middle Ages* (Ithaca, NY, 1998), 36–55, esp. 43–44; Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities*, 26–27.

14 E. Sanders, ‘Beyond the usual suspects: literary sources and the historian of emotions’, in A. Chaniotis (ed.), *Unveiling Emotions: Sources and Methods for the Study of Emotions in the Greek World* (Stuttgart, 2012), 151–73.

15 S.J. Matt, ‘Recovering the invisible: methods for the historical study of the emotions’, in S.J. Matt and P.N. Stearns (ed.), *Doing Emotions History* (Urbana, IL, 2014), 41–53.

16 R. Harré, *The Social Construction of Emotions* (Oxford, 1986).

17 A. Wierzbicka, *Emotions Across Languages and Cultures: Diversity and Universals* (Paris, 1999).

exact semantic extent of key concepts in Greek, taking into account that even these can differ according to context and individual speaker.¹⁸

Greek had at its disposal a wide choice of words for referring to anger and related emotions and feelings.¹⁹ From the very beginning of the Greek literary tradition, anger cannot be ignored, as the first book of the *Iliad*, describing the conflict between Achilles and Agamemnon, is already full of speech and action attributed to anger, complete with detailed descriptions of its anatomic and psychological symptoms. *Orge* (ὀργή) perhaps seems closest to English ‘anger’: it refers to an intense emotion and at the same time a propensity for immediate action, perhaps somewhat less enduring or persistent than English ‘anger’. Some of the more long-term aspects of anger are expressed by *cholos* (χόλος). This word often refers to anger that is retained and discharged at a later time. *Thumos* (θυμός) was originally the seat of all emotion, a kind of inner wind, if we base ourselves on the etymology of the word. For Plato, *thumos* is one of the three parts of the soul; it whips reason and propels human actions. Later, however, *thumos* would be associated almost exclusively with anger. All these terms differ slightly in meaning, and none of them exactly coincides with the English term ‘anger’, a problem that is often acknowledged but seldom considered in all its consequences. Moreover, the semantic instability of emotion terms should urge us Byzantinists to use caution when working with definitions from ancient Greek culture: the words may have remained the same, but the radically different cultural and religious context in medieval Byzantium may attribute a completely different semantic value to those words.

One can see the many problems when dealing with emotions from alien cultures or cultures from the past. Certain neuro-anatomical processes seem familiar, but we run the risk of postulating a ‘human essence’ and confusing that essential *universale* with our own (linguistic and cultural) ingrained presuppositions. On the other hand, excessive relativism (defining language as both cause and expression of emotions) may result in a hermeneutical impasse and at the same time underestimate the impact of social roles and shared patterns.²⁰

A way out of this conundrum may be offered by the concept of ‘emotional communities’, as proposed and elaborated by Barbara Rosenwein.²¹ These emotional communities are roughly defined as groups in which people adhere to the same norms of emotional expression and agree on how emotions, and which ones, should be appreciated or repudiated, and in what contexts.

18 Cairns, ‘Iliadic anger’.

19 See Harris, *Restraining Rage*, 50–70.

20 For an overview of scholarship on this question, see J. Plamper, *The History of Emotions: An Introduction* (Oxford, 2015), 1–39. For criticism on the excesses of relativism, see P. Griffiths, *What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psychological Categories* (Chicago, 1997).

21 Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities*.

In other words, within such an emotional community, a habitus is at work which regulates the display and the perception of emotions. Members of an emotional community share a repertory of emotional responses to certain events, within the larger framework of cultural and religious constraints, and, if we are talking about written texts, the resources of a literary or rhetorical tradition.

Not far removed from Rosenwein's perspective is that of Gerd Althoff, who places emphasis on scripted emotional display in medieval society. Emotional displays could assume the form of ritual acts that followed fixed scenarios and signalled clear messages to all concerned so that rulers and subjects reaffirmed their social roles and mutual obligations.²² Thus, Althoff proposes the concept of 'staged anger', especially for rulers, as a message of dominance and power.²³ In this perspective, the question of honesty and dishonesty is largely irrelevant: what matters is to reveal the rules of the game, to study the symbolic meanings attributed to gestures and actions.

Managing Anger

Another path of analysis could focus on how emotional standards are created and implemented, that is, how writings reflect, or construct, negative or positive appreciations of certain emotional behaviour and thereby acquire some normative force. This would fit in with what Peter N. Stearns and Carol Z. Stearns termed 'emotionology': studying the attitudes or standards that a society maintains toward emotions.²⁴ This very quickly (especially in the case of anger) brings us on the path of morality, or at least discourses of *control* of emotions. Studying anger becomes, hence, primarily a study of *managing* anger. In this strand of analysis, we could try to describe the prevalent ethical frameworks and then see how concrete descriptions of emotional episodes value emotions in line with this normative framework.

The roots of moral reflections on anger in the western tradition go back to Greek philosophy. Anger is perhaps the most evident emotion to be analysed with such an approach in mind.²⁵ The Greek interest in controlling or eliminating anger grew out of an ethic of moderation and self-control. 'Restraining rage' or 'taming anger' (echoing the titles of two important books on the subject) is the hallmark of a balanced person in control of his

22 G. Althoff, 'Gefühle in der öffentlichen Kommunikation des Mittelalters', in C. Benthien, A. Fleig and I. Kasten (ed.), *Emotionalität: Zur Geschichte der Gefühle* (Cologne, 2000), 82–99.

23 G. Althoff, 'Ira regis: prolegomena to a history of royal anger', in *Anger's Past*, ed. Rosenwein, 59–74.

24 P.N. Stearns and C.Z. Stearns, 'Emotionology: clarifying the history of emotions and emotional standards', *AmHR*, 90 (1985), 813–36.

25 The centrality of the 'control' of emotions (specifically anger) to Greek thinking about emotions is emphasised in Harris, *Restraining Rage*.

soul.²⁶ Importantly, the ancients also believed that anger *could* be restrained or eliminated, proposing therapeutic solutions, not unlike medicine. Uncontrolled anger could endanger the community, and irascibility was seen as a destabilising element. But anger provoked by a previous wrongdoing (and leading to revenge) was certainly justified in antiquity.

In the Greek tradition of philosophical reflection about anger, Aristotle holds the most important place.²⁷ Aristotle's conception of anger is remarkably similar to the cognitive approach of modern psychologists. Also for Aristotle, emotions were cognitive responses to lived experience in the world. The definition he gives in the *Rhetoric* is well known: anger is a desire for revenge, accompanied by pain, because of a perceived slight.²⁸ He clearly relates anger to the judgement of a situation. Aristotle's approach is also action-oriented: emotions can affect our conduct. And he interprets emotions as based on an appraisal of a frustrated personal objective, although he defines this frustration rather narrowly: a perceived attack on one's status and honour.

It would go too far to summarise all ancient viewpoints on anger; suffice it to say that for later Christian thinking, Stoicism was an important stage.²⁹ Taking a keen interest in emotions, Stoic thinkers embarked on a project to eradicate anger as a guide in our actions, even if Stoic philosophers did not see reason and anger as complete opposites (as is often assumed).

It is telling that it is in the *Rhetoric* that Aristotle gives his fullest treatment of anger. He underlines the effectiveness of anger as a tool to persuade an audience and move it to action. The centrality of emotions to how the ancients (and Byzantines) understood the power of rhetoric is perhaps still underestimated.³⁰ In the case of anger, judicial (or forensic) rhetorical theory and practice showed the need to arouse the anger of the jury when confronted with the outrage of a crime.³¹ Anger gains a surprisingly redemptive force in this context, as it can be interpreted as a marker of truth and as a device to settle the balance of justice.³²

26 Harris, *Restraining Rage*; and K. Kalimtzis, *Taming Anger: The Hellenic Approach to the Limitations of Reason* (London, 2012).

27 On Aristotle and anger, see Konstan, *Emotions of the Ancient Greeks*, 41–76.

28 Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 1378a30–32, ed. W.D. Ross, *Aristotelis Ars rhetorica* (Oxford, 1959), 71.

29 M. Graver, *Stoicism and Emotion* (Chicago, 2008). See also L. van Hoof, 'Strategic differences: Seneca and Plutarch on controlling anger', *Mnemosyne*, 60 (2007), 59–86.

30 R. Webb, 'Imagination and the arousal of the emotions in Greco-Roman rhetoric', in S.M. Braund and C. Gill (ed.), *The Passions in Roman Thought and Literature* (Cambridge, 1997), 112–27.

31 L. Rubinstein, 'Stirring up dicastic anger', in D.L. Cairns and R.A. Knox (ed.), *Law, Rhetoric, and Comedy in Classical Athens* (Swansea, 2004), 187–203; E. Sanders, '"He is a liar, a bounder, and a cad": the arousal of hostile emotions in Attic forensic oratory', in *Unveiling Emotions*, ed. Chaniotis, 359–87.

32 D.S. Allen, 'Angry bees, wasps, and jurors: the symbolic politics of *orgê* in Athens', in *Ancient Anger*, ed. Braund and Most, 76–98.

How does this intense ancient reflection on anger, so deeply rooted in traditions of non-Christian philosophy, relate to the thinking about anger in the Byzantine millennium? There is an evident risk when holding up Byzantine textual evidence against the foil of the rich thinking about anger in antiquity. This approach would ignore the radical shift in the perception and evaluation of emotions brought about by the triumph of Christianity. Christian moral thinking about anger was partly derived from Graeco-Roman traditions, but also radically rethought parts of these traditions.³³ Anger remained an ambiguous and hotly debated subject. The Bible itself presented a double image. Some passages clearly condemn anger: Christ censures unreasonable anger in Matthew 5:22 (though this is a textually problematic passage),³⁴ and anger (both *thumos* and *orge*) is condemned in Ephesians 4:31. But there was also divine anger: the God of the Old Testament surely was often angry, and Jesus shows anger at the Pharisees. This anger is variously called ‘holy anger’ or ‘righteous anger’³⁵ and constitutes a major topic of theological debate in Christianity.

Anger is frequently discussed by the church Fathers.³⁶ Patristic writers incorporated emotions, and especially anger, into a notion of *πάθη* (*pathe*). In the discourse of anger control, anger is no longer viewed as a sickness or a defect, but as a sin.³⁷ The church Fathers prepared the way for a ‘new anger culture’, which echoes the Stoics’ denunciation of anger, but reinterprets it in a Christian framework.³⁸ In this patristic view on anger, some arguments recur time and again: Anger ravages the soul; it is contrary to its true nature. It is a sign of spiritual immaturity. Anger leads us away from prayer and spiritual vision; it alienates us from God. It is a turbulence from which we should be released, and through ascetic practice, we should learn to refrain from anger towards anyone, however much we may suffer at the hands of others.³⁹

In Basil of Caesarea’s sermon ‘Against those who are prone to anger’, the proposition at first sight seems clear: anger is a force that takes sanity and

33 A point stressed by Harris, *Restraining Rage*, 391–99; Kalimtzis, *Taming Anger*, 143–51. Both scholars may have reasons to put into relief the contrast of patristic thinking with ancient (pagan) thinking, so that the middle ages could be bracketed out of the history of emotional control. See Rosenwein, ‘Worrying about emotions’, 827, n. 31.

34 D.A. Black, ‘Jesus on anger: the text of Matthew 5:22a revisited’, *NT*, 30 (1988), 1–8.

35 L. Basset, *Holy Anger: Jacob, Job, Jesus* (London, 2007).

36 Harris, *Restraining Rage*, 391–99; Kalimtzis, *Taming Anger*, 143–51. See also M. Hinterberger, ‘Basil of Caesarea and Gregory of Nazianzus speaking about anger and envy: some remarks on the Fathers’ methodology of treating emotions and modern emotion studies’, *Studia Patristica*, 83 (2017), 313–41.

37 Harris, *Restraining Rage*, 391–99.

38 See especially Kalimtzis, *Taming Anger*, 143–51.

39 D.A. Dombrowski, ‘Anger in the *Philokalia*’, *Mystics Quarterly*, 24 (1998), 101–18, also sees a continuation of the ancient belief that anger can be justified, because it redresses the balance within the soul and society. The problem, however, is more intricate than just making distinctions between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ anger.

humanity away from us.⁴⁰ However, here and there in his discourse (which is against ‘the angry’, not against anger itself, as the title of one English translation misleadingly suggests⁴¹) Basil argues that anger could be justified, on the basis of the model of divine anger in Old Testament texts.

Gregory of Nazianzos wrote a verse treatise ‘Against Anger’ (κατὰ θυμοῦ).⁴² His poem is a clear denunciation of anger as a *pathos*, which is likened to, or even identified with, a disease (line 31 and elsewhere: νόσος, *nosos*). It is a demon overpowering us as victims. To hold it in check, God has given us reason (lines 48–49). Gregory also dwells in detail on the bodily symptoms of anger (lines 93–110) and the aggression it causes and proposes a therapeutic solution to suppress anger from its very inception. All this seems in line with Stoic ideas about anger control. Gregory even states that he is aware of ancient theories of emotions (line 33), and he adopts ideas and terms from medicinal writers and moral philosophers, such as Plutarch. But while the definitions of anger and the methods of structuring a prophylactic discourse are similar, Gregory’s ultimate remedy, based on the message of forgiveness enshrined in the Sermon on the Mount, is radically different.⁴³ It should be emphasised that Gregory’s poem cannot simply be considered as a poetic sermon, still less as a theoretical treatise laid out in verse. Rather than a theory of what anger is, Gregory’s poem is about the ethical question of anger control, considered against the backdrop of his own biography.⁴⁴ This is also why Gregory, in contrast to Basil, only briefly mentions the problem of righteous divine anger.

What is common to Gregory’s and Basil’s texts is their emphasis on anger control as a therapeutic step towards being a spiritually more ‘healthy’ person. Basil explicitly makes the comparison to medical therapy in the beginning of this treatise, and Gregory offers his recommendations as φάρμακα (*pharmaka*, medicines; lines 167 and 304). Both texts describe in detail the physiology of anger, using broadly similar images, many of them partaking of the universal cognitive categories mentioned earlier (fire, wild animal, etc.).⁴⁵ Both texts are exhortatory, that is, ‘paraenetic’. The term *παραινετικός* (*parainetikos*) is mentioned in both Basil’s text (353B) and Gregory’s (line 14). Both texts provide quite precise guidelines, prescriptions, and negative and positive examples to follow.

40 PG 31:353–72, tr. M. Wagner, *Saint Basil, Ascetical Works*, FC, 9 (Washington, DC, 1962), 447–62.

41 N.V. Harrison, tr., *St Basil the Great: On the Human Condition* (Crestwood, NY, 2005), 81–92.

42 PG 37:813–51 (Poem 1.2.25), translation and commentary in M. Oberhaus, *Gregor von Nazianz, Gegen den Zorn (Carmen 1,2,25): Einleitung und Kommentar* (Paderborn, 1991).

43 See the analysis in Oberhaus, *Gregor von Nazianz, Gegen den Zorn*, 21–25.

44 Oberhaus, *Gregor von Nazianz, Gegen den Zorn*, esp. 10 and 12.

45 Hinterberger, ‘Basil and Gregory speaking about anger and envy’, 326, 329–30.

These two examples show the degree to which the works of the church Fathers form a comprehensive and authoritative set of emotional standards. This comprehensiveness and authoritativeness was never again achieved, or aimed at, by later Byzantine authors. However, the tradition of paraenetic literature on emotions did not disappear altogether. A peculiar instance is the paraenetic poems: rather simple and derivative, yet incisive advice literature in verse, often dealing with emotions. The most telling example is the ‘moral poem’ attributed by its modern editor to Constantine Manasses.⁴⁶ The section ‘on anger’ (lines 131–46) is heavily dependent on patristic texts, although one may wonder if the emphasis on the danger of anger for social norms is indicative of changing perceptions towards emotions in the twelfth century.

How far does a study of these prescriptive texts get us? To begin with, these texts may originate from, and be intended for, a limited subgroup of society only.⁴⁷ There is also the problem of the chronology (when we postulate that the phenomena described in fourth-century texts are exactly the same as for middle or late Byzantine authors). But perhaps more importantly, how can we relate prescriptive discourse (as in the works of the church Fathers) to descriptive discourse (as in later historiography, for instance)? To what degree (if at all) did the later Byzantines use the writings of the church Fathers as emotional standards for their own life?⁴⁸ When a certain action or behaviour is censured, can we interpret this as a sign that it was widely known and practised, or quite the contrary? Doing emotionology in Byzantium may thus entail several problems.

Ascribing Anger

For Ramsay MacMullen, the fact that literary texts from the past are not objective records of ‘actual’ emotional experience presents an opportunity rather than a setback: exactly because literature (historiography, ‘fiction’) does not strive at complete verisimilitude, it fleshes out persons and actions with feelings to explain them to their readers, which is, in turn, valuable material for the modern interpreter.⁴⁹ The analysis of how and why authors identify, motivate and attribute anger can then become a fruitful focus. Anger, for instance, can be applied by authors as a motivational force in

46 E. Miller, ‘Poème moral de Constantin Manasses’, *Annuaire de l’Association pour l’encouragement des études grecques en France*, 9 (1875), 23–75, but see important objections in R. Vetschera, *Zur griechischen Paränese* (Smichow, 1912).

47 For this remark, see also Plamper, *History of Emotions*, 57–58, and Rosenwein, ‘Worrying about emotions’, 824–25. For the specific case of Basil’s and Gregory’s discourses, see Hinterberger, ‘Basil and Gregory speaking about anger and envy’, 323.

48 For this problem, see also E. Patlagean, *Pauvreté économique et pauvreté sociale à Byzance, 4^e–7^e siècles* (Paris, 1977), 128–35. For the Byzantine *Nachleben* of Basil’s and Gregory’s texts, see Hinterberger, ‘Basil and Gregory speaking about anger and envy’, 340–41.

49 R. MacMullen, *Feelings in History* (Claremont, CA, 2003).

the narrative they construct. It can be imputed to a person they describe or address, in line with a certain negative or positive characterisation that, in turn, serves the author's own interests. A relevant case, for example, would be the episode in Niketas Choniates' *History* where Manuel I Komnenos fought with bishops over the anathematisation of the God of Islam. Niketas attributes the ill temper of Manuel I Komnenos to a grievous disease that would take his life; the issue is resolved at last because Manuel 'got over his anger'.⁵⁰ Why is Niketas so eager to attribute Manuel's anger to an external source, and is it meaningful that Manuel is said to overcome his own anger so quickly? Other examples abound. Niketas makes it very clear that Asan met his end because he could not contain his anger in a quarrel with a trusted courtier,⁵¹ and anger plays a major role in the bestial characterisation of Andronikos I.⁵² The control of anger, or lack thereof, becomes a major element in bringing out the contrast between Alexios III and his wife Euphrosyne,⁵³ and in explaining their respective powerlessness and power. The last example makes clear that the question is not simply about vilification or praise (for Niketas is not intent on praising Euphrosyne in other respects). Rather, the portrayal of emotions becomes intertwined with ideas of rulership and, in this example, gender as well.⁵⁴

In Michael Attaleiates' *History*, anger (or rather the inability to rein it in) is an important element in the portrayal of rulers and generals.⁵⁵ Michael VII Doukas is blamed for not subduing his anger towards the Norman mercenary Roussel,⁵⁶ and the anger of the rebellious John Bryennios is described as a loss of mental health and a cause for needless destruction, which certainly contributes to the negative appraisal of Nikephoros Bryennios's rebellion.⁵⁷ In addition to internal political and gender issues, ethnic awareness also plays its part. For example, John Skylitzes says about the Norman Hervé that, 'since he was a barbarian, he could not control his anger', when

50 Niketas Choniates, *History*, book 7, ed. J.L. van Dieten, *Nicetae Choniatae Historia*, 2 vols, CFHB, 11 (Berlin, 1975), vol. 1, 215 (the attribution of his anger to a disease), and 217 (his release of anger).

51 Choniates, *History*, ed. van Dieten, vol. 1, 469.

52 Choniates, *History*, ed. van Dieten, vol. 1, 292.

53 Choniates, *History*, ed. van Dieten, vol. 1, 488–89.

54 For anger and rulership, see Althoff, 'Ira regis'. For anger and gender, see S. Westphal, 'Calefurnia's rage: emotions and gender in late medieval law and literature', in L.R. Perfetti (ed.), *The Representation of Women's Emotions in Medieval and Early Modern Culture* (Gainesville, FL, 2005), 164–90.

55 M. Hinterberger, 'Φόβος κατασεισθείς: τα πάθη του ανθρώπου και της αυτοκρατορίας στον Μιχαήλ Αταλειάτη. Το αιτιολογικό σύστημα ενός ιστοριογράφου του 11ου αιώνα', in V. Vlyssidou (ed.), *Η αυτοκρατορία σε κρίση (: Το Βυζάντιο τον 11ο αιώνα (1025–1081)* (Athens, 2003), 155–67.

56 Michael Attaleiates, *History*, c. 26.4, ed. I. Pérez Martín, *Miguel Atalates, Historia* (Madrid, 2002), 152, tr. A. Kaldellis and D. Krallis, *Michael Attaleiates, The History*, DOML, 16 (Cambridge, MA, 2012), 377–79.

57 Attaleiates, *History*, c. 31.10, ed. Pérez Martín, 180–82, tr. Kaldellis and Krallis, 459–61.

Hervé responded to an affront suffered by the emperor.⁵⁸ Different scripts of anger, and attributions of anger in narratives, thus become demarcation lines between social communities, ethnic groups and gender.

Christopher Mitylenaios and Bestial Anger

To test some of these ideas, I shall take a closer look at two poems from the mid-eleventh century: Michael Psellos's lampoon against Sabbaites, and Christopher Mitylenaios's polemic poem against two unknown adversaries. It is safe to say that in these two poems, we intuitively read anger. But the question is how we can use this intuition as a base (or counterpoint) for firmer observations. And it is especially important to see how an understanding of the frameworks of textual anger can lead us to a richer understanding of the cultural dynamics of the period.

The social context of both poems is the Constantinopolitan elite in the middle decades of the eleventh century, consisting of teachers, scholars and high officials. This was a highly competitive elite still in the process of self-definition, caught between the lures of affluence and power emanating from the court, on the one hand, and ideals of meditation and seclusion, on the other. Rhetorical skills and possession of knowledge (that is, *hoi logoi*) are sometimes extolled, but also explained by others as indicators of ostentatiousness and worldly ambition. It was a group eager to self-define itself as an elite, intent on marking out the differences with other groups. Emotions and their display are part of this differentiation, with this elite affirming a culture of refined urbanity (*asteiotes*), rejecting harshness and seriousness, and preferring gentleness and cheerfulness.⁵⁹ A case can be made to describe this elite as an emotional community, sharing these emotional evaluations. At the same time, competition was seen as a necessary ingredient of a meritocratic society, as championed by members of this elite. In the context of literature and education, this acquired a particular shape in the phenomenon of *logikos agon*, a concept that frequently returns in texts of the period.⁶⁰ Students competed with each other in the fields of grammar (in competitions of *schede*) and rhetoric. This competition continued in their

58 John Skylitzes, *Summary of Histories*, Michael, 6.4, lines 47–48, ed. I. Thurn, *Ioannis Scylitzae Synopsis historiarum*, CFHB, 5 (Berlin, 1973), 484: ὁ δὲ Ἐρβέβιος, οἷα βάρβαρος καὶ τὴν ὀργὴν ἀκατάσχετος, οὐ μετρίως ἐνεργῶν τὴν ὕβριν. On Anna Komnene and irascible Normans, see A. Kazhdan, 'Latins and Franks in Byzantium: perception and reality from the eleventh to the twelfth century', in A. Laiou and R.P. Mottahedeh (ed.), *The Crusades from the Perspective of Byzantium and the Muslim World* (Washington, DC, 2001), 83–100, at 91.

59 See C. Cupane, 'Στήλη τῆς ἀστείότητος. Byzantinische Vorstellungen weltlicher Vollkommenheit in Realität und Fiktion', *FS*, 45 (2011), 193–209 and F. Bernard, 'Asteiotes and the ideal of the urbane intellectual in the Byzantine eleventh century', *FS*, 47 (2013), 129–42.

60 F. Bernard, 'Authorial practices and competitive performance in the works of Michael Psellos', in M.D. Lauxtermann and M. Whittow (ed.), *Byzantium in the Eleventh Century: Being in Between* (Abingdon, 2017), 32–44.

later careers, as testified by numerous texts that have a polemic and invective character.

Many of Christopher Mitylenaios's poems bear traces of fierce competition with his intellectual peers.⁶¹ While these poems are sometimes labelled as 'satires', they perhaps rather deserve the name 'invective', since they aim to damage the reputation of a specific opponent. The poem under examination reacts to a pamphlet that an anonymous slanderer had previously written against Christopher. It is part of an exchange of insults and jibes, for which there are other (near-) contemporary examples that likewise revel in insults and violent language.⁶² Christopher represents the exchange as a physical duel, which is happening as we speak. The weapons are paper, ink and pens (lines 9–11), and he uses a 'spear of words' (line 34). Christopher accuses his opponent of being too cowardly to step forward. This may suggest that the opponent concealed his identity. Also, the fact that he sought help is criticised in the beginning of the poem. The opponent clearly does not abide by the rules of an honourable fight. There is language of violence throughout the poem: first, Christopher threatens to drown him in words and thus kill him (lines 24–25); second, in the last lines of the poem, he vows to deal him a final blow that will see him dead (lines 37–39).

Is Christopher angry, or more precisely, does this poem display a recognisable representation of anger in the first person? There are impatient imperatives, an agitated style, there are insults, there are threats of violence. Moreover, this poem clearly reveals a desire to avenge a perceived slight, and it is accompanied by a feeling of pain. But whether this is enough for Christopher's poem to qualify as angry speech in itself remains an open question.

In the crucial passage of the poem (lines 26–31), Christopher describes in detail the emotional state of his opponent:

χολᾶς, γινώσκω, καὶ μέμνηνας ἀσχέτως
καὶ κάπρος οἶα πῦρ ὄρᾶς καὶ πῦρ πνέεις,
χλούνης δὲ μᾶλλον ἢ μονιὸς τὸ πλεόν·
θήγεις δὲ τοὺς ὀδόντας ὡς ὁ θῆρ ὄδε,
φρίσσεις δὲ χαίτην καὶ παταγεῖς μακρόθεν,
ἀφροῦ παραπτύοντα χεῖλη δεικνύων.
I know your bile rises, you rage unbridled,

61 Christopher Mitylenaios, *Poems*, ed. M. De Groote, *Christophori Mitylenaii Versuum variorum collectio Cryptensis*, CCSG, 74 (Turnhout, 2012), 30–31, tr. F. Bernard and C. Livanos, *The Poems of Christopher of Mytilene and John Mauropous*, DOML, 50 (Cambridge, MA, 2018), 63.

62 See E. van Opstall, 'The pleasure of mudslinging: an invective dialogue in verse from 10th century Byzantium', *BZ*, 108 (2016), 771–96; and F. Bernard, 'The Anonymous of Sola and the school of Nosiai', *JÖB*, 61 (2011), 81–88.

your eyes blaze, and you breathe out flames, like a boar –
 or shall we say a hog? A swine, let's say.
 Anyway, you sharpen your teeth like that beast,
 you bristle your mane and you gnash your teeth from afar,
 showing your lips foaming at the corners.⁶³

This seems a clear case of imputed anger, a direct description of an angry episode. The verb *χολάω* (*cholao*) is an undisputed reference to resentful, spontaneous anger. We also see several conceptual metaphors at work as defined by Kövecses. First, there is the metaphor of anger as an aggressive animal, which is carried through by giving three synonyms for 'boar' in Greek. Second, anger is represented as a madness. Anger is situated in the realm of the unreasonable, even the derailed. Third, the facial expressions that are imputed to Christopher's opponent share many universal traits: fire-blazing eyes, gnashing teeth and foaming mouth.

But what is the result of a universal cognitive conception and what is part of a literary tradition? The fire-blazing eyes are as old as Homer,⁶⁴ the bristling mane for an aggressive angry animal is to be found in Theokritos's poem on Herakles' fight with the Nemean lion,⁶⁵ and the gnashing of teeth reminiscent of a boar occurs in very similar wordings in Basil of Caesarea's sermon mentioned earlier.⁶⁶ And the comparison with a porcine animal has many parallels in ancient Greek and Byzantine invective poetry. It is difficult to disentangle the universal from the culture-specific, and textual *mimesis* from an index of an emotion.⁶⁷

If we ask the question of how anger is morally represented, we may distinguish two faces of anger in this poem. Christopher's anger is justified: it is the expression of a rightful retribution; it is situated in the sphere of mythological heroes and ritualised sporting contests, a world where a code of honour holds sway. By contrast, his opponent displays unreasonable, unrestrained anger, which takes away from him all humanity and hence damages his reputation. In connection with this, it seems that Christopher sought to create an opposition between the urban elite of which he was a member and those outside it. The full notion of 'urbanity' comes into play here: rustic images (especially in connection with animals) are popular tags for the non-urban outsider. Control of emotions (and especially anger), or loss of such control, corresponds with this distinction. Although more textual evidence

63 Mitylenaios, Poem 36, ed. De Groote, 31, tr. Bernard and Livanos, 63.

64 *Iliad*, 12.466. See also Cairns, 'Iliadic anger', 41.

65 Theokritos, *Idylls*, 25, lines 243–45, ed. A.S.F. Gow, *Bucolici Graeci* (Oxford, 1985), 108.

66 Basil of Caesarea, 'Against those who are prone to anger', *PG* 31:356D: καὶ παραθήγει τὸν ὀδόντα, κατὰ τῶν συῶν τοὺς ὁμόσε χωροῦντας.

67 See also M. Hinterberger, 'Envy and nemesis in the *Vita Basilii* and Leo the Deacon: literary *mimesis* or something more?', in R. Macrides (ed.), *History as Literature in Byzantium*, SPBS, 15 (Farnham, 2010), 187–203.

should be adduced, one can put forward the hypothesis that the emotional community with which Christopher identifies rejected irascibility, and confined anger to very circumscribed contexts.

Michael Psellos: The Anger of Abuse

The second example is roughly contemporaneous. It is a poem written by the well-known polymath, historian, courtier and self-styled ‘philosopher’ Michael Psellos. The poem is an invective written against a certain monk called Sabbaites,⁶⁸ who was an enemy of Psellos.⁶⁹ Psellos’s invective poem was provoked by a mocking epigram composed by Sabbaites.⁷⁰ This short poem alluded to Psellos’s return to the capital from the monastery of Mt Olympos (Bithynia) in 1055, in order once again to occupy a high and influential position at the court of the empress Theodora. Sabbaites’ poem compares Psellos to Zeus: although just having left the ‘Olympos’, he could not live without his goddesses (referring to the empress). The poem contains sexual innuendos and was clearly alluding to some current rumours about Psellos.

Psellos reacted with a poem that reads as an almost stupefying stream of abuse. The majority of the 321 lines consists of vocatives addressed to Sabbaites, vocatives that range from the less than flattering to the outrageous. The poem can be identified as a *psogos* in a strictly rhetorical definition. But there are more frameworks operating in this poem than just a rhetorical exercise. Among the many insults that Psellos heaps upon Sabbaites, we can detect many issues that lay along some social and cultural fault lines of eleventh-century society. Psellos exploited the facts (or alleged facts) that Sabbaites was a eunuch and connected to the monastery of St Sabas in Jerusalem. The unstable gender identity of eunuchs is a frequent target (lines 97–99 and 145–48), there are hints of anti-Semitism (lines 5–6) and also criticism of populist and democratic tendencies (lines 29, 172). It is in these outbursts that hidden assumptions about politics, ethnicity and gender come to the fore.

68 Michael Psellos, Poem 21, ed. L.G. Westerink, *Michaelis Pselli Poemata*, Teubner (Stuttgart, 1992), 258–69. On the poem, see also F. Conca, ‘La lingua e lo stile dei carmi satirici di Psello’, *Eikasmos*, 12 (2001), 187–96; E. Maltese, ‘Osservazioni sul carme *Contra il Sabbaita* di Michele Psello’, in A.M. Taragna (ed.), *La poesia tardoantica e medievale: Atti del I. convegno internazionale di studi, Macerata, 4–5 maggio 1998* (Alessandria, 2001), 207–14; F. Bernard, *Writing and Reading Byzantine Secular Poetry (1025–1081)* (Oxford, 2014), 280–90; and now also T. Labuk, ‘Gluttons, drunkards and lechers: the discourses of food in 12th-century Byzantine literature; ancient themes and Byzantine innovations’ (PhD diss., University of Silesia, Katowice, 2019).

69 Michael Psellos, Letter 374, ed. S. Papaioannou, *Michael Psellus, Epistulae*, 2 vols, Teubner (Berlin, 2019), vol. 2, 781–82.

70 Ed. Westerink, 270.

What makes poetry especially interesting in comparison to prose (historiography, for example) is that anger is not only represented but also directly expressed. Psellos's poem employs speech acts that can be called emotive speech acts: 'I despise you' (line 202); 'I laugh at you' (line 204), etc.⁷¹ This is aggressive emotional speech, with a clear target. Hence, whereas other texts talk *about* anger, this poem is itself represented as angry speech. Some other performative speech acts can be viewed as parts of ritual cursing.⁷² Throughout the poem, Sabbaites is not only insulted but he is also identified with evil forces, with spectres from mythology and folklore. He is a pest that roams the houses. He is an impossible creature, says Psellos, because he is a eunuch, but also because he is both dead and alive, probably referring to undead creatures or other folk beliefs. As a result, Psellos declares it the task of this very poem to exorcise this evil. After comparing Sabbaites with a series of monsters and devils (lines 287–89), Psellos cries out that he will hit him with a cross and ward him off. Thanks to his poem, Sabbaites is 'done with' (line 207). By means of his iambs, Psellos remarks at the end, 'he is reduced to a laughing-stock' (line 317). This framework of ritual cursing allows Psellos to give expression to anger and to go to extremes in this respect, while the employment of performative speech acts allows the poem to gain directness and aggression.

Similarly to Christopher's poem, Psellos represents his poetic exchange with Sabbaites as a physical duel. The writing tools of the participants in the confrontation are likened to weapons. Sabbaites had used (writing) fingers as arrows, arms that strike as a spear, a pen that cut into the hearts of many, and ink to write a black (i.e., incriminating) lawsuit (lines 171–76). The exchange of poetic jibes is represented as a fight between boxers or wrestlers (lines 298–301). There are many affinities with the threat speeches in Homer, a genre that clearly functions as a subtext in Psellos's poem and that helps to give the expression of anger a respectable pedigree. The *ἐπωμίς* (*epomis*) mentioned in line 301 is a dress known from antiquity. Similarly to Christopher, Psellos refers to a code of honour in which the fighters are required to fight in the open (line 301). With this, he evokes the sphere of an honourable sports contest, but one in which Sabbaites (again likened to an animal, a dog here) is barely admitted, and the eventual victor is allowed some healthy aggression.

At the same time, Psellos clearly intends to draw their altercation into the sphere of an intellectual contest, of a proper *logikos agon*. He does so especially in lines 160–170, where Psellos reproaches Sabbaites of 'being deprived of the knowledge of better things and not having received a more advanced education' (lines 160–61), a clear reference to the perceptions of

71 Psellos, Poem 21, ed. Westerink, 266: καταφρονῶ σου, γελῶ σε.

72 Conca, 'Lingua e stile'. Compare also L.K. Little, 'Anger in monastic curses', in *Anger's Past*, ed. Rosenwein, 9–35.

superiority and inferiority created by education and lack thereof. Sabbaites is accused of being skilled only in those parts of rhetorical art that can bring harm to others. In the passage, we find many technical rhetorical terms, lifting the fight to the level of a rhetorical polemic. Also elsewhere in the poem, Psellos poses as (and proves himself) a superior intellectual: the accusations are peppered with learned allusions, quotes and references to ancient mythology, literature and the Bible, and with various rhetorical and historical references.⁷³

Psellos also channels his anger by framing his invective as the plea in a court case. At lines 35–36, he announces that he will ask questions, urging Sabbaites to give quick answers. Thereupon, he questions Sabbaites' authority to attack superiors. At lines 211–12, after many accusations and much vituperation, Psellos announces that he will return to questions, summoning Sabbaites and demanding that he stand in front of him. Psellos acts as a plaintiff or prosecutor, thus giving their exchange the structure and appearance of an interrogation. In this fictional court case, Sabbaites' speech is characterised as a libel. It is for all intents and purposes a 'slight', warranting rightful anger on the part of Psellos. By doing so, Psellos is able to portray his anger as the rightful retribution for an outrageous insult.

In the epilogue of the poem, Psellos explains some of the intentions and motivations to write his vituperation, as well as to write it in verse (lines 306–21). He places his poem in several literary traditions that may justify angry speech. Iambic metre is the most prominent of these. In Byzantine iambic (dodecasyllabic) poetry, it is rare that the attention is drawn towards the metre itself. But in this passage, it happens repeatedly (lines 306, 317), and iambs and metrical speech are explicitly linked to derision (lines 314 and, especially, 317: 'you are reduced to a laughing-stock by my iambs').⁷⁴ We may connect this to connotations attributed by Byzantine scholars to the ancient iambic metre as used in antiquity, as a metre apt for vituperation; this idea was kept alive even when iambs ('dodecasyllables') greatly expanded in use in Byzantium, going far beyond the poetry of blame.⁷⁵ Also 'comedy' is mentioned by Psellos (lines 310, 321). By identifying his poem as a comedy (also a genre chiefly written in iambs), the colourful insults acquire a more respectable pedigree.

These statements become more understandable if we consider a certain moral uneasiness lurking in the background of this text. At several places, Psellos shows awareness of the questionable ethical status of his own poem. In the final part of the poem we have just discussed, Psellos concedes that the iambs he is now writing are in fact 'defiling his mouth'

73 Maltese, 'Osservazioni'.

74 Psellos, Poem 21, line 317, ed. Westerink, 269: ὡς τοῖς ἰάμβοις τοῖς ἐμοῖς τεθεῖς γέλως.

75 G. Agosti, 'Late antique iambs and *iambikè idéa*', in A. Cavarzere, A. Aloni and A. Barchiesi (ed.), *Iambic Ideas: Essays on a Poetic Tradition from Archaic Greece to the Late Roman Empire* (Oxford, 2001), 219–55.

(line 309). Invective is revealed to be a genre to which he should not lower himself.

But above all, he takes issue with the moral status of Sabbaites' invective. In a passage replete with rhetorical terminology (lines 160–76), Psellos reproaches Sabbaites for being inclined to invective (*καταδρομή*, *katadrome*) and 'wholly ignorant of the art of encomia' (lines 168–70). Admittedly, he is very dexterous, but this is only to the detriment of other people. In other words, Psellos accuses Sabbaites of performing a genre that he himself is obviously performing at this very moment. This points to a moral hierarchy of (rhetorical) genres, in which invective is lower down on the scale. Hence, in an exchange of insults, it matters primarily to ascribe the inclination for invective to the opponent, while the present author is excused because he did nothing other than retorting rightfully.⁷⁶

Any expression of anger in Byzantine texts is always situated in a state of friction with the dominant normative framework, which evaluated anger primarily as negative. This tension is clearly present in Psellos's poem; and, as often in Byzantium, it is related to the ethics of authorship, the status of rhetorical skill, and issues of genre and style. Psellos found a way to cast it into the age-old and thus respectable traditions of 'iambos' and comedy. The *logikos agon*, or the genre of agonistic writing in general, as one of the more important literary-cultural frameworks, provides a convenient, and morally justifiable, framework for the literary expression of anger. By means of metaphors, angry speech is drawn into the domain of sportsmanship, Homeric honour and juridical justice (the latter a context where anger is traditionally seen as potentially positive). Our poets vent and display their anger in a codified, almost ritual, environment and scenario.

Conclusions

The texts we have are not archaeological records of emotions in the past. We can only proceed to identify some traces of cultural frameworks and subtexts that made the literary *expression of anger* possible, impossible, reprehensible or justifiable, and the *discourse on anger* conformist, deviant or ambiguous. Analysing textual and authorial strategies of anger may alert us to cultural processes that otherwise remain hidden for us. We may begin to see social cohesion within communities and the fault lines that demarcate social groups, not so much as direct results of monolithic political and ideological divides, but rather as cultural differentiations refracted through multifarious nuances related to human behaviour. Additionally, we may be

76 This tactic is, for instance, also present in Theodore Prodromos's poem against Barys; see Theodore Prodromos, Poem 59, ed. W. Hörandner, *Theodoros Prodromos, Historische Gedichte*, WByzSt, 11 (Vienna, 1974), 474–83.

able to write a history of the self and self-representation in Byzantium that not only hinges on abstract ideas and classifications, but also on norms and conventions of self-control, bodily expression, gesture and speech. In that way, a study of anger may pave the way for a richer understanding of a culture of the past.

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16 Power and Fear

Awe before the Emperor in Byzantium

Sergey A. Ivanov

Byzantine Fears

Fear is commonly regarded as one of the basic emotions,¹ and the scholarly literature analysing it, both psychological and sociological, is vast. It is also not uncommon to do research on the historical aspects of this phenomenon.² Yet, while fear in antiquity³ and in the middle ages⁴ has been treated relatively frequently, it remains virtually uncharted for Byzantium. It is highly characteristic that in his article on 'Fear' in the *ODB*, Alexander Kazhdan does not cite a single secondary work.⁵ Since then a few, mostly

- 1 P. Ekman, 'An argument for basic emotions', *Cognition and Emotion*, 6 (1992), 169–200.
- 2 J. Palou, *La peur dans l'histoire* (Paris, 1958); F. Gambiez, 'Étude historique des phénomènes de panique', *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, 20.1 (1973), 153–66; J. Delumeau, 'La peur et l'historien', *Communications*, 57 (1993), 17–23; P. Newman, *A History of Terror: Fear and Dread Through the Ages* (Sutton, 2000); C. Robin, *Fear: The History of a Political Idea* (Oxford, 2004); J. Bourke, *Fear: A Cultural History* (London, 2005); M. Laffan and M. Weiss (ed.), *Facing Fear: The History of an Emotion in Global Perspective* (Princeton, 2012); R. Hutton, *The Witch: A History of Fear from Ancient Times to the Present* (New Haven, 2017).
- 3 See, for example, D. Konstan, *The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks* (Toronto, 2006), 129–55; D.L. Munteanu, *Tragic Pathos: Pity and Fear in Greek Philosophy and Tragedy* (Cambridge, 2012); M. Patera, 'Reflections on the discourse of fear in Greek sources', in A. Chaniotis and P. Ducrey (ed.), *Unveiling Emotions II: Emotions in Greece and Rome; Texts, Images, Material Culture* (Stuttgart, 2013), 109–34; S. Coin-Longeray and D. Vallat (ed.), *Peurs antiques* (Saint Étienne, 2015); Ł. Różycki, *Battlefield Emotions in Late Antiquity: A Study of Fear and Motivation in Roman Military Treatises* (Leiden, 2021).
- 4 See, for example, J. Delumeau, *Le péché et la peur: La culpabilisation en occident (XIII^e–XVIII^e siècles)* (Paris, 1983); W.P. Dinzelbacher, *Angst im Mittelalter: Teufels-, Todes- und Gotteserfahrung; Mentalitätsgeschichte und Ikonographie* (Stuttgart, 1996); A. Scott and C. Kosso (ed.), *Fear and its Representations in the Middle Ages and Renaissance* (Turnhout, 2002); A. Gerok-Reiter and S. Obermeier (ed.), *Angst und Schrecken im Mittelalter: Ursachen, Funktionen, Bewältigungsstrategien in interdisziplinärer Sicht* (Berlin, 2007); P. Boucheron, *Conjurer la peur: Essai sur la force politique des images* (Paris, 2015).
- 5 A. Kazhdan, 'Fear', *ODB*, 2 (1991), 780–81.

short works, have appeared.⁶ Nevertheless, what follows is effectively an initial attempt to approach the topic.

It is not an easy task to define the exact meaning of the numerous words for ‘fear’ used by the Greeks. Φόβος (*phobos*) is the most common word. Yet, at different times, the number of emotion words regarded by the Greeks themselves as related to *phobos* varied between six and fourteen,⁷ and to us today it may seem strange to find among them ‘hesitation’ (ὄκνος, *oknos*), or ‘faint-heartedness’ (δειλία, *deilia*). Another, more energetic word for fear was δέος (*deos*). Arethas says that Nicholas Mystikos had an appropriate fear (*deos*) of the patriarchal throne, but no *phobos*.⁸ Ὀρρωδία (*orrhodia*) was a sort of consternation, something more superficial than *phobos*. This can be deduced from a story told by Anna Komnene. Her father, Alexios, used to have his bodyguards dressed in Scythian outfits, thereby causing *orrhodein* in the Byzantine detachments. His intention was not to make them ‘openly frightened (φοβηθῆναι σαφῶς), but rather to play with them without intimidating them, as with children (ἀφόβως ... ἐμορμολύττετο).’⁹ Εὐλάβεια (*eulabeia*) was apprehension of possible harm in the future, but also piety. Δεῖμα (*deima*) was neither an emotion nor a state of mind: Theophylact Simocatta talks about a Byzantine general whom ‘an uncontrollable terror deranged ... and drove in a frenzy to inexplicable flight (οὐκοῦν ὡς εἶχε δέους, ἐπεὶ τοῦ δείματος οὐχ οἷός τε ἦν φέρειν τὴν ἔφοδον, ὄχετο ἀπίων).’¹⁰

- 6 C. Seban, ‘La peur à Byzance aux 13–14 s.’, *JÖB*, 32.1 (1982), 187–93; E. Drakopoulou, ‘Ὁ φόβος της τιμωρίας στη βυζαντινὴ και μεταβυζαντινὴ ζωγραφικὴ’, in S. Adrachas (ed.), *Οἱ συλλογικοὶ φόβοι στην ιστορία* (Athens, 2000), 93–110; M. Vassilaki, ‘Ἀπεικονίσεις του φόβου στη βυζαντινὴ τέχνη’, in C. Boulots and L. Divane (ed.), *Ὁ φόβος στην τέχνη και στην ζωὴ. Πρακτικὰ του ομόνυμου συνεδρίου που οργανώθηκε ἀπὸ την Πανακοθήκη Ε. Αβέρωφ και πραγματοποιήθηκε στο Μέτσοβο στις 30 Ιουνίου, 1 & 2 Ιουλίου 2006* (Athens, 2007), 76–85; N. Tsironis, ‘Desire, longing and fear in the narrative of middle Byzantine homiletics’, *Studia Patristica*, 44 (2010), 515–20; T. Moreau, ‘La peur du signe: les apparitions de la croix au IV^e siècle’, <https://www.academia.edu/4490733/>, accessed 13 March 2021; R.S. Binning, ‘Christ’s all-seeing eye in the dome’, in B. Pentcheva (ed.), *Aural Architecture in Byzantium: Music, Acoustics, and Ritual* (Routledge, 2017), 101–26; and a two-volume Serbian monograph, P. Radich, *Strakh u poznoj Vizantiji, 1180–1453* [Fear in late Byzantium], 2 vols (Belgrade, 2000), which, however, treats fear not so much as an emotion as the circumstances which caused it; the book should have been entitled *The Fearful in Late Byzantium*.
- 7 Cf. Julius Polydeukes, *Onomastikon*, 5.122, ed. E. Bethe, *Pollucis onomasticon* (Leipzig, 1900), 295: φόβος, ὄκνος, δέος, ὀρρωδία, εὐλάβεια, δειλία, ἀθυμία, ἀνανδρία, ἐκπληξίς, φρίκη, τρόμος, πτοία, πτόησις, συστολή, θόρυβος, ταραχή... The ancient Greek word τάρβος (*tarbos*, fear) was for all practical purposes forgotten in Byzantium.
- 8 Arethas, ‘Speech to the pious emperor Leo’, c. 57, ed. L.G. Westerink, *Arethae archiepiscopi Caesariensis scripta minora*, 2 vols (Leipzig, 1968–72), vol. 2, 6.
- 9 Anna Komnene, *Alexiad.*, 8.2.3, ed. D.R. Reinsch and A. Kambylis, *Annae Comnenae Alexias* (Berlin, 2001), 239.
- 10 Theophylact Simocatta, *History*, 2.9.2, ed. C. de Boor, *Theophylacti Simocattae Historiae* (Leipzig, 1887), 86, tr. M. Whitby and M. Whitby, *The History of Theophylact Simocatta* (Oxford, 1986), 89.

Whereas nuances of lexical meaning are sometimes difficult to grasp, visible manifestations of fear in Byzantium were similar to those we experience today: fear was accompanied by sweating,¹¹ a person in fear was unable to take his food in his mouth,¹² his breath was taken away,¹³ he became speechless,¹⁴ his teeth chattered,¹⁵ he grew pale,¹⁶ he stammered,¹⁷ his legs became rubbery,¹⁸ and so on. The most scandalous signs of fear were involuntary urination and defecation. Theodore Prodromos makes fun of the Serbian king, defeated by Manuel Komnenos, by playing on his name Urosh: ‘He was so scared that he urinated on himself’.¹⁹ In the *Life* of the patriarch Tarasios, a spatharios who escaped from prison to St Sophia was accompanied by the patriarch to the toilet, ‘not once, not twice a day, but as many times as it was necessary for a person who was in great danger’.²⁰

When an author does not want to state point blank that this or that situation was frightening, we can learn from indirect evidence that somebody was struck by fear. For example, Gregory, the narrator of the *Life of St Basil the Younger*, once came to visit the saint and found him talking ‘in riddles’ to an unknown visitor named Kosmas, who, it turned out, thought ‘that he was destined to become emperor’. Basil looked at Gregory ‘intently for a long time’, and the latter began to dissuade Kosmas from this folly. The hapless ‘insurgent’ agreed, but later, Gregory relates, ‘after catching up with me at the phiale of the church of the Archangel, he entreated me to explain to him more clearly my previous recommendations.... But I ... only said to

11 Sophronios, *Life of Mary of Egypt*, PG 87.3:3708.

12 Athanasios, ‘Questions on Sacred Scripture’, 63, PG 28:737D.

13 Pseudo-Luciano, *Timarion*, c. 12, ed. R. Romano, *Timarione* (Naples, 1974), 61.

14 *Life of St Andrew the Fool*, c. 21, lines 1342–44, ed. L. Rydén, *The Life of St. Andrew the Fool*, 2 vols, Studia Byzantina Upsaliensia, 4 (Uppsala, 1995), vol. 2, 100.

15 *Life of St Andrew the Fool*, c. 31, line 1893, ed. Ryden, II, 138.

16 Theodore Prodromos, *Rodanthe and Dosikles*, 7.470–71, ed. M. Marcovich, *De Rhodantes et Dosiclis amoribus libri ix* (Stuttgart, 1992), 58–59; Niketas Choniates, *History, on Manuel Komnenos*, 6, ed. J. van Dieten, *Nicetae Choniatae Historia*, 2 vols, CFHB, 11 (Berlin, 1975), I, 187.90. Maurice in his *Strategikon*, 8.1.24, ed. G. Dennis, *Das Strategikon des Mauricius* (Vienna, 1981), 274, says that turning pale before a battle is a sign of cowardly commanders, and that generals should notice such things and use them accordingly. Leo VI, in his *Taktika*, 20.26 ed. G. Dennis, *The Tactica of Leo VI* (Washington, DC, 2010), 544–46, repeats this phrase but substitutes soldiers for commanders. Did armies shrink?

17 Eustathios of Thessalonike, *Commentary on the Iliad*, ad 2.408, ed. M. van der Valk, *Eustathii archiepiscopi Thessalonicensis Commentarii ad Homeri Iliadem pertinentes*, vol. 1 (Leiden, 1971), 378.

18 Eustathios of Thessalonike, *Speeches on Great Lent*, 4, ed. S. Schönauer, *Reden auf die grosse Quadragesima* (Frankfurt am Main, 2006), 92.

19 Theodore Prodromos, *Poems*, ed. E. Miller, ‘Ex Theodori Prodromi carminibus ineditis’, in A. Hase and E. Miller (ed.), *Recueils des historiens des Croisades: Historiens grecs*, 2 vols (Paris, 1875–81), vol. 2, 762.

20 Ignatios the Deacon, *Life of Tarasios*, c. 35.11–14, ed. S. Efthymiadis, *The Life of the Patriarch Tarasios by Ignatios the Deacon* (Aldershot, 1998), 113.

him: "... I do not know you, nor do I know who you are, nor from where, nor do I know what I said to you".²¹ Even in private, Basil had preferred to speak in riddles and, with relief, conceded the floor to Gregory. But for the latter also, discussing usurpation plans in a crowded square, and thus revealing to any denouncer that he knew about the conspiracy but did not report it to the authorities, was too fraught! In these circumstances, the narrator acted in the only way possible. The scene is permeated with sickening fear, but on the surface, nothing is called by its real name. This case is more or less obvious, but in other instances, the fear can remain invisible to us, while unmistakably recognisable to the Byzantine reader. And now, after this extended foreword, we can turn to our main subject.

Awe in Byzantium

In this chapter we shall focus on fear in the face of power.²² Fear of death, enemies, natural disasters, heretics, diseases, women, etc. is a fear of danger, real or imagined. The fear inspired in a subject by a ruler may be excessive, as in the case of John Angelos who died of fear (δειλιάς οὔτος βέλει τρωθελίς ἐτεθνήκει) simply because he was summoned to the new emperor Michael Palaiologos,²³ or exaggerated, like that of Belisarios, who was beset by 'slavish fears (φόβοι τε ἀνδραποδώδεσι)' after being ridiculed in the palace.²⁴ In any case, the fear they experienced was a fear of danger, and such cases are not of interest to us here. What we are interested in now is the emotion of a loyal subject, who prostrates himself before the overwhelming might of the benevolent sovereign. He feels fear, but also reverence, admiration, trepidation. This emotion is best rendered in English by the word 'awe'.²⁵ The Greek term that is closest in meaning is probably σέβας (*sebas*). It was applied both to God and to rulers but implied the ritual of adoration rather than the emotion that accompanied it.²⁶

21 Gregory, *Life of Basil the Younger*, c. 1.45, ed. T.V. Pentkovsky, L.I. Shchegoleva and S.A. Ivanov, *Vita Basilii Iunioris* (Moscow, 2019), 298–300, tr. D.F. Sullivan, A.-M. Talbot and S. MacGrath, *The Life of Saint Basil the Younger* (Washington, DC, 2004), 159–61.

22 On 'timor regis' under the Merovingians, see R. Le Jan, 'Entre amour et haine du roi: quelques réflexions sur les émotions politiques à l'époque mérovingienne', in J. Barbier, M. Cottret and L. Scordia (ed.), *Amour et désamour du prince: Du haut moyen âge à la révolution française* (Paris, 2011), 15–26, esp. 18–21.

23 George Akropolites, *History*, c. 77, ed. A. Heisenberg, *Georgii Acropolitae opera*, vol. 1 (Leipzig, 1903), 160.

24 Prokopios of Kaisareia, *Secret History*, 4.22, ed. J. Haury, *Procopii Caesariensis opera omnia*, vol. 3 (Leipzig, 1963), 27.23.

25 Cf. N. Kemp Smith, 'Fear, its nature and diverse uses', *Philosophy*, 32 (1957), 3–20, esp. 8.

26 Cf. John Stobaeus, *Precepts on Kingship*, 4.7.20, ed. O. Hense and C. Wachsmuth, *Ioannis Stobaei Anthologium* (Leipzig, 1974), 254; Leontios, *Against the Jews*, 3.24, ed. V. Déroche, 'L'apologie contre les Juifs de Léontios de Néapolis', *Travaux et mémoires*, 12 (1994), 67; Barlaam and Joasaph, c. 1, ed. R. Volk, *Historia animae utilis de Barlaam et Joasaph*

The emotion of awe, characteristic of the human attitude to deity, may have been first engendered by the earliest rulers of the Near East,²⁷ but in the Greek-speaking world secular power only began to inspire awe as late as in the Hellenistic period. As Plutarch wrote of Demetrios, ‘he had features of rare and astonishing beauty, so that no painter or sculptor ever achieved a likeness of him. They had at once grace and strength, dignity (*phobon*) and beauty, and there was blended a certain heroic look with their youthful eagerness and a kingly majesty that were hard to imitate. And in like manner his disposition also was fitted to inspire in men both fear and favour (ἐκπληξιν ἀνθρώπων ἅμα καὶ χάριν).’²⁸ Roman emperors naturally acquired the same status and inspired the same awe in their Greek panegyrists. Aelius Aristides writes at the beginning of the second century,

τοσοῦτος ἅπασιν ἐνέστακται φόβος τοῦ μεγάλου ἄρχοντος καὶ τὰ πάντα πρυτανεύοντος... ὥστε μᾶλλον μὲν ἐκεῖνον εἰδέναι νομίζουσιν ἢ πράττουσιν ἢ σφᾶς αὐτοῦς, μᾶλλον δὲ δεδίασι καὶ αἰδοῦνται ἢ τὸν δεσπότην ἂν τις τὸν αὐτοῦ παρόντα καὶ ἐφεστηκότα καὶ κελεύοντα.

So much respect has been instilled in all men for him... They think that he knows what they are doing better than they do themselves. Accordingly they fear his displeasure and stand in greater awe of him (δεδίασι καὶ αἰδοῦνται) than one would of a despot, a master who was present and watching and uttering commands.²⁹

By the fourth century, secular power looked divine, mysterious and awe-inspiring.³⁰ Numerous papyri contain the words φόβος σου (*phobos sou*), ‘Your Dreadfulness’, as a form of address to the ruler.³¹

Of course, such an emotion resembles the fear of God, which is expected of any Christian. The paradigm of commendable fear trickled down from heaven to earth and pervaded Byzantine culture. When Theodoret

(Berlin, 2006), 11; Michael Psellos, *Chronographia*, 7.103, ed. D.R. Reinsch, Michael Psellos, *Leben der byzantinischen Kaiser (976–1075): Chronographia* (Berlin, 2015), 710.

27 Cf. R.H. Pfeifer, ‘The fear of God’, *Israel Exploration Journal*, 5.1 (1955), 44; S. Kipfer, ‘Angst, Furcht und Schrecken. Eine kognitiv-linguistische Untersuchung einer Emotion im biblischen Hebräisch’, *The Journal of North-West Semitic Languages*, 42.1 (2016), 17–79.

28 Plutarch, *Demetrios*, 2.2, ed. K. Ziegler, *Plutarchi Vitae parallelae*, vol. 3.1, 2nd edn (Leipzig, 1971), 3, tr. B. Perrin, *Plutarch’s Lives*, vol. 9 (London, 1959), 7.

29 Aelius Aristides, *Encomium of Rome*, ed. W. Dindorf, *Aristides*, vol. 1 (Hildesheim, 1964), 335, tr. J. Oliver, ‘The ruling power: a study of the Roman empire in the second century after Christ through the Roman oration of Aelius Aristides’, *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society*, n.s. 43.4 (1953), 899.

30 R. Smith, ‘Measures of difference: the fourth-century transformation of the Roman imperial court’, *AJP*, 132.1 (2011), 125–51, at 148.

31 Examples are collected in F. Mitthof, ‘Remigius comes primi ordinis et praefectus Augustalis’, *ZPE*, 109 (1995), 116–17.

reproaches Julian for having lost his ‘beneficial fear (ὀνησιφόρον δέος),’³² he means the fear of God; likewise, John Chrysostom exclaims, ‘Nothing is more useful than the fear (χρησιμώτερον φόβου) of Gehenna.’³³ Yet Kekaumenos uses exactly the same language to extol earthly, everyday fear: ‘Let your household fear you, but you also should feel awe before those who are above you, since fear is useful (χρήσιμον γὰρ φόβος).’³⁴

Fear of the emperor is openly equated with the fear of God by Chrysostom,³⁵ John of Damascus³⁶ and others.³⁷ The same equivalence can be found in Theodore Stoudites, who himself suffered from the persecutions of the iconoclastic emperor, but does not call into question the right of the sovereign to torture, exile and even kill; it seems entirely legitimate to him that all others ‘live in fear and conduct themselves with trembling’. ‘Nobody protests’, he says, and his only desire is that people treat God with the same degree of fear.³⁸ Michael Choniates in a panegyric exclaims, ‘Who would not be petrified by such a saintly and awesome autocrator (ποῖος οὐ πέφρικεν ἄγιον οὕτω καὶ φοβερὸν αὐτοκράτορα)?’³⁹ The biblical story of Esther does not specify her feelings when she appeared in the presence of the king, but John Zonaras easily visualises what she must have felt: ‘She was seized by paralysis because of fear, and she grew speechless.’⁴⁰ The *Disputation between Gregentios and Herban* (of the tenth century?) draws a frightening picture, which, however, is pitched as an idyll: the newly enlightened king ‘was feared, and all were full of awe for him. For when his noblemen went to him in fear because of some administrative matter of the kingdom, they entered trembling and terrified, mute and looking downward, praying in their heart that they would leave safely from his face again.’⁴¹ The awe instilled into all those who entered the audience hall of the imperial palace was embodied in the automata of roaring lions on both sides of the throne. Liutprand says that he was not afraid of them (nullo sum terrore, nulla admiratione

32 Theodoret of Kyrrhos, *Ecclesiastical History*, 3, ed. L. Parmentier and F. Scheidweiler, *Kirchengeschichte*, 2nd edn, GCS, 44 (Berlin, 1954), 178.

33 John Chrysostom, ‘To the people of Antioch’, PG 49:154.

34 Kekaumenos, *Strategikon*, c.64, ed. G. Litavrin, *Sovety i rasskazy Kekavmena* (Moscow, 1972), 240.

35 John Chrysostom, ‘On Anna’, PG 54:648; *Homilies on Genesis*, 14.2, PG 53:112.

36 John of Damascus, *Sacra parallela*, PG 95:1208–9.

37 *Apostolic Constitutions*, 7.16, ed. M. Metzger, *Les constitutions apostoliques*, vol. 2, SC, 329 (Paris, 1986), 57; *Symeon the New Theologian, Ethical Treatises*, 6.1, ed. J. Darrouzès, *Symeon le Nouveau Theologien, Traités théologiques et éthiques*, SC, 129 (Paris, 1967), 150.

38 Theodore Stoudites, *Katechesis* 5, ed. E. Auvray, *Parva catechesis* (Paris, 1891), 16.

39 Michael Choniates, ‘Encomiastic Speech’, c.75, ed. S.P. Lampros, *Μιχαήλ Ακομινάτου τοῦ Χωνιάτου Τὰ σωζόμενα*, 2 vols (Athens, 1879), vol. 1, 250.

40 John Zonaras, *Epitome of History*, 4.6, ed. Dindorf, vol. 1, 279.

41 *Life of Gregentios of Taphar*, *Dialexis*, 5, ed.tr. A. Berger, *Life and Works of Saint Gregentios, Archbishop of Taphar* (Berlin, 2006), 800–1.

commotus), since he was informed beforehand by experienced people⁴² – which means that all others were properly frightened. Even the inkpot of the emperor instilled fear, symbolised by its lid in the form of a Gorgon's head.⁴³ It is quite understandable that the term εὐλάβεια (*eulabeia*), which normally means 'piety towards God',⁴⁴ sometimes renders 'awe before the emperor'.⁴⁵

Just like love for God, love for the emperor is also mentioned next to fear.⁴⁶ Attaleiates praises those people who 'not only respected (αἰδῶ) him, but both feared and desired the emperor's divine ascent to the throne'.⁴⁷ Mouzalon, as related by Pachymeres, says that he 'served Theodore II loyally and, combining love with fear (ἀγάπην φόβῳ μὴ γνύντες), fulfilled all his orders'.⁴⁸ In acclamations addressed to the emperor cited in the *Book of Ceremonies*, 'love overcomes fear (ὁ γὰρ πόθος τὸν φόβον ἐκνικήσας)'.⁴⁹ Nicholas Lampenos praises Andronikos II: 'Those who see him are filled with fear not because of his cruelty and the grandeur of his power, but because of the scale of his intelligence'.⁵⁰ Michael Attaleiates even coins a special term: τὸ αὐτοκρατορικὸν δέος; he speaks of 'the attendants of the emperor ..., who live constantly (διηνεκῶς) in the awe of imperial power'.⁵¹

An emperor who failed to inspire awe was reproached as unfit for the throne.⁵² The *Paschal Chronicle* uses the combination φόβος βασιλικός (*phobos basilikos*),⁵³ which applied to the whole population. According to

42 Liutprand, *Antapodosis*, 6.5, PL 136:895.

43 P. Chatterjee, 'The gifts of the Gorgon: a close look at a Byzantine inkpot', *Anthropology and Aesthetics*, 65–66 (2014–15), 212–23.

44 On the nuances of this term, cf. E. Rasco, 'La oración sacerdotal de Cristo en la tierra según Hebr. 5,7', *Gregorianum*, 43.4 (1962), 751, n. 97.

45 Makarios Makres, 'Encomium on our father among the saints, David of Thessalonike', ed. A. Argyriou, *Μακαρίου τοῦ Μακρῆ συγγράμματα, Βυζαντινὰ Κείμενα καὶ Μελέται*, 25 (Thessalonike, 1996), 97.

46 The Byzantines would not have understood the dichotomy posed by Niccolò Machiavelli, *Il Principe*, 17, tr. J. Atkinson, *The Prince* (Cambridge, 1976), 271: 'A question arises: whether it be better to be loved than feared or feared than loved? It ... is difficult to unite them'.

47 Michael Attaleiates, *History*, 27.5, ed. tr. A. Kaldellis and D. Krallis, *Michael Attaleiates, The History*, DOML, 16 (Cambridge, MA, 2012), 394–95.

48 George Pachymeres, *History*, 1.16, ed. tr. A. Failler and V. Laurent, *Georges Pachymères, Relations historiques*, vol. 1, CFHB, 24 (Paris, 1984), 65.

49 Constantine Porphyrogenetos, *Book of Ceremonies*, 1.78, ed. G. Dagron and B. Flusin, Constantin VII Porphyrogénète, *Le Livre des cérémonies*, 6 vols (Paris, 2020), vol. 2, 233.

50 Nicholas Lampenos, 'Encomiastic Speech', ed. J. Polemis, *Ο λόγιος Νικόλαος Λαμπηνός καὶ τὸ ἐγκόμιον αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸν Ἀνδρόνικον Β' Παλαιολόγον* (Athens, 1992), 71; cf. Manuel Palaiologos, *Ethical Dialogue, or, On Marriage*, line 786, ed. A. D. Angelou, *Dialogue with the Empress-Mother on Marriage*, ByzVind, 19 (Vienna, 1991), 104.

51 Attaleiates, *History*, 36.15, ed. tr. Kaldellis and Krallis, 578–79.

52 Sokrates, *Ecclēsiastical History*, 3.1.53, ed. P. Maraval and P. Périchon, *Socrate de Constantinople, Histoire ecclēsiastique*, vol. 3, SC, 505 (Paris, 2004–07), 258–60: ἐπαινοῦσι μὲν ὀλίγοι, οἱ πλείους δὲ ψέγουσιν, ὅτι παυομένη ἡ ἐκ τοῦ βασιλικοῦ πλοῦτου τοῖς πολλοῖς ἐγγινομένη κατάπληξις εὐκαταφρόνητον ἐποιοεῖ τὴν βασιλείαν.

53 *Paschal Chronicle*, ed. L. Dindorf, *Chronicon paschale*, 2 vols, CSHB (Bonn, 1832), vol. 1, 628.

Theophanes the Confessor, fear before the emperor could be highly beneficial: ‘The emperor introduced harsh laws against licentious behaviour, and many were punished. This produced considerable fear and security (καὶ ἐγένετο φόβος πολλὸς καὶ ἀσφάλεια),’⁵⁴ which implies that if people were properly awe-struck, then everything was as it should be. Eustathios of Thessalonike even derives the word *despotes* from the phrase δέος ποῶν.⁵⁵ He finds it natural that people are ‘transfixed with fear just by seeing the emperor’.⁵⁶ In an official panegyric, the emperor is extolled for ‘the awe of your power (τὸ φοβερὸν τοῦ κράτους σου).’⁵⁷ The obsequious poet Manuel Philes extols the harnessing of an ‘insolent mob’ with the bridle ‘of fear before the emperor’.⁵⁸ Awe before the authorities is a mundane reality, a natural element of everyday life: John of Damascus cites it along with gossiping, taking care of children ‘and thousands of other things’.⁵⁹

Overcoming Fear

Although a state of awe before the ruler seems to be constant and ubiquitous in Byzantium, it would be incorrect to say that everyone took it for granted.⁶⁰ George Pachymeres does not hide his contempt when he mentions ‘the habitual timidity (τὴν ἐκ συνηθείας ὑποστολήν)’⁶¹ of the courtiers. In one of his declamations, he repeats: ‘The politicians are overwhelmed by great awe and unbearable timidity (φόβος εἰσῆει τοὺς πολιτευομένους δεινὸς καὶ δειλία ἥκιστα φορητή).’⁶² In a first-person account, John Mauroπους, having been invited to the court by the emperor himself, describes him as ἄκουσμα φρικτὸν (*akousma phrikton*), ‘something whose very mention makes you shudder’.⁶³ The word *phrikton* is reserved for things related to God only. And yet, he tries to overcome his awe with self-deprecating irony.

54 Theophanes, *Chronicle*, ad AM 6021, ed. C. de Boor, *Theophanis Chronographia*, 2 vols (Leipzig, 1883–85), I, 177, tr. C. Mango and R. Scott, *The Chronicle of Theophanes Confessor: Byzantine and Near Eastern History AD 284–813* (Oxford, 1997), 269–70.

55 Eustathios of Thessalonike, Oration 5, ed. P. Wirth, *Eustathii Thessalonicensis opera minora (magnam partem inedita)* (Berlin, 1999), 67.

56 Eustathios of Thessalonike, Oration 9, ed. Wirth, 167.

57 *Eiseterioi*, ed. J. Strzygowski, ‘Das Epithalamion des Palaeologen Andronikos II’, *BZ*, 10 (1901), 555.

58 Manuel Philes, *Verses*, 3. 132, ed. E. Miller, *Manuelis Philae Carmina*, 2 vols (Paris, 1855–57), vol. 1, 167.

59 John of Damascus, *Sacra parallela*, PG 96:133.

60 Emancipation from awe does not necessarily suppose ‘Kaiserkritik’.

61 George Pachymeres, *History*, 7, ed. I. Bekker, *Georgii Pachymeris de Michaele et Andronico Palaeologis libri tredecim*, 2 (Bonn, 1835), 577.

62 George Pachymeres, *Declamations*, 4, ed. J.F. Boissonade, *Georgii Pachymeris Declamationes 13* (Amsterdam, 1966), 61–62.

63 John Mauroπους, *On Large Paintings of the Lord’s Feasts: In the Manner of an Ekphrasis*, ed. tr. F. Bernard and C. Livanos, *The Poems of Christopher of Mytilene and John Mauroπους*, DOML, 50 (Cambridge, MA, 2018), 426.

ἀλλ' ἔν δέδοικα (καὶ τὸ σὸν θεῖον κράτος αἰτῶ βοηθὸν προσλαβεῖν εἰς τὸν φόβον), μὴ που με δεινὸν ὄμμα Γοργοῦς ἀγρίας πρὸ τῆς πύλης βλέψειεν ἠγριωμένα, μὴ Κέρβερός τις ἐξυλακτῆσοι μέγα, μηδὲ Βριμῶ τις ἐμβριμωμένη δάκοι· καὶ πῶς γὰρ οἴσω δῆγματος πληγὴν μίαν, ἄνθρωπος ἰσχνόσαρκος ἐκτετηγμένος; ἐγὼ δὲ δειλὸς εἰμι καὶ πρὸς ἄλλο τι. λειτουργικῶν γὰρ πνευμάτων ὄψεις τρέμω, καὶ τῶν πτερωτῶν ἀγγέλων σου τὴν θεάν· ψυχὰς γὰρ ἀρπάζουσιν ἐκ τῶν σωμάτων. ἐξ ὧν με ρῦσαι, ψυχοσῶστα προστάτα, καὶ μῆτε τούτων ἐκταραξάτω μέ τι, μηδ' ἄλλο μηδὲν προσβάλοι τῶν φασμάτων. ἢ τῶν φοβήτρων τῶν πρὸ τῶν προαυλίων. ἐπὰν δὲ ταῦτα σὸν θεῶ διαδράσω, καὶ που γένωμαι πλησίον τοῦ σοῦ θρόνου, μηδὲν Χερουβείμ ῥομφαίαν πυρὸς φέρον κατὰ στόμα τρώσοι με καὶ φλέξοι πάλιν.

But there is one fear I have (and I ask your divine power to help me in this fear): let not the terrible eye of an angry Gorgon look at me savagely, in front of the gate, or let a Cerberus bark loudly at me, or a snorting Brimo bite me; for how could I endure just one blow or bite, being a thin-skinned and emaciated man? Above all, I am cowardly; I tremble at the sight of your ministering spirits (Hebr 1:14) and of your winged angels, for they steal the soul from the body. Protect me from them, soul-saving protector, and let none of them pester me, and let no one other terrifying apparition from the forecourts attack me. And when I can pass through them, with God's help, and approach your throne, let no Cherubim holding a flaming sword pierce my mouth and set me ablaze.⁶⁴

Let us look more closely at how the phenomenon of political awe is treated by Michael Psellos, a man who was reputed to be notoriously 'Byzantine' in his cowardice. This savvy bureaucrat readily displays his own reverence:

ὁ μὲν ἄρρητος πόθος ... παρακελεύεται μοι πολλάκις γράφειν πρὸς τὴν θεοκυβέρνητον βασιλείαν σου. Ὁ δὲ συνεζευγμένος τούτῳ φόβος, καὶ τὸ ὑποστέλλεσθαι τὸ σὸν μεγαλεῖον, καὶ τὸ δειλιᾶν ἀναφανδὸν τε ὄρᾶν... Λέγειν δὲ καὶ γράφειν πρὸς τὸ σὸν κράτος ὀκνῶ... Πῶς ... τὸν φόβον ἀφοσιώσομαι;

My admiration ... urges me to write to Your God-guided Majesty frequently, but the concomitant awe and abashment before your greatness make me dread the thought of coming face to face with you.... I am shy to talk and to write to our Majesty.... How shall I free myself from this fear?⁶⁵

64 Ibid., 433–35.

65 Michael Psellos, Letter 138, ed. S. Papaioannou, *Michael Psellus, Epistulae*, 2 vols, Teubner (Berlin, 2019), vol. 1, 367–68.

Nor does he object when clerks are disciplined with fear.⁶⁶ The emperor's ceremonial appearance, according to Psellos, should instil natural awe:

οὐδ' εἴ τις τοῖνυν βασιλέα ὀρῶν πορφυρίδι καὶ μαργαρίταις συναποστίλβοντα καὶ ἀπὸ σκῆπτρου, ὃ φασι, θεμιστεύοντα, καὶ τῇ χρυσεῖ τῶν λόγων σειρᾷ ὡσπερ ἐξ οὐρανιας ἀκρότητος πᾶσαν ἀπαιωροῦντα φύσιν καὶ δύναμιν, εἴτα ὑποπτῆσει καὶ σέβεται, καινόν τι ποιεῖ καὶ ἀσύνηθες ταῖς τῶν πολλῶν διαθέσεσι.

If someone sees an emperor who is radiant in his purple mantle adorned with pearls, and pronouncing laws from the height of his sceptre, that is, so to say, as he hangs suspended from the sky on a golden chain of words, exceeding all might and nature, it is not strange or unheard of, from the habits of the multitude, that he would tremble and adore such a person.⁶⁷

In his panegyric to the empress Theodora, Psellos writes:

χρηματίζεις τε πᾶσι κατὰ τὸ πρέπον, καὶ τοῖς μὲν ὀμιλοῦσι χαρίεσσα τις φαίνη καὶ εὐπροσήγορος, τοῖς δὲ τὸ βῆμα περιεστηκόσι καταπληκτικὴ τε καὶ φοβερὰ, καὶ τοῖς μὲν ὑπηκόοις ἡμερος καὶ εὐπρόσιτος, τοῖς δ' ἐναντίως ἔχουσι δεινὴ τις καὶ λεοντῶδες πνέουσα.

You treat everyone as they deserve: you show yourself to be charming and accessible to those with whom you converse, dazzling and awe-inspiring to those who stand around the throne, soft and kind to your subjects, terrifying like a lion to your enemies.⁶⁸

And yet Psellos condemns Basil II, that 'the great reputation he built up as a ruler was founded rather on terror than on loyalty (καὶ οὐκ εὐνοίαις μᾶλλον ἢ φόβοις τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐναυτῷ σοβαρωτέραν ὡς ἀληθῶς διετίθετο).⁶⁹ In Psellos's opinion, 'something that is achieved through fear cannot be lasting (τὸ κατὰ φόβον γεγρονὸς οὐκ ἔστιν ἐρρωμένον).⁷⁰ Emperors should defuse the fear surrounding their power. The ideal, imagined Constantine IX of Psellos's panegyric 'opened himself to the public to such an extent that none of the visitors is scared, tongues are not fettered by fear before imperial gravitas (ἀρχικοῦ ὄγκου).⁷¹ Psellos says to Constantine Doukas:

66 Psellos, *Chronographia*, 4.12, ed. Reinsch, 178.

67 Michael Psellos, *Chrysoboullus*, no. 7 = Actum, 4, ed. G.T. Dennis, *Orationes forenses et acta* (Stuttgart, 1994), 169–75, at 170.12–17.

68 Psellos, 'On the despoina', ed. G.T. Dennis, *Michaelis Pselli orationes panegyricae* (Stuttgart, 1994), 122.

69 Psellos, *Chronographia*, 1.29, ed. Reinsch, 92, tr. E.R.A. Sweter, *Fourteen Byzantine Rulers: The Chronographia of Michael Psellus*, Penguin Classics (Baltimore, 1966), 71.

70 Psellos, *Synopsis of Laws*, ed. L.G. Westerink, *Michaelis Pselli Poemata* (Stuttgart, 1992), 168.

71 Psellos, 'To the emperor', ed. Dennis, *Michaelis Pselli orationes panegyricae*, 96.

Ὅρᾱς ὅπως κατατολμῶ σου, θειότατε βασιλεῦ, καὶ οὔτε σου τὸν ὑπερφαῖ κύκλον δέδοικα, οὔτε σου τὸ μέγεθος τῆς ψυχῆς πέφρικα ... καὶ σοῦ τις, δειλιῶν τὸ τῆς λαμπηδόνοσ ὑπερφυές, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς μῶν τὰ ὄμματα, θαρρεῖ πως τὴν ἐπιείκειαν.

You see, how boldly I behave toward you, O most divine Emperor, I am not afraid of your radiance, I do not freeze with awe before the greatness of your soul... Even though one feels timorous and cannot gaze directly on your dazzling light, one can still test your clemency.⁷²

In his panegyric to Michael VII, Psellos not only extols the emperor's condescension towards his subjects, but also mocks the latter's excessive cowardice:

τοῖς δ' ὑπηκόοις τοῖς σοῖς ἀντ' ἀπειλῆς ... προβάλλη τὰ μειδιάματα, κᾶν τις τύχη τῷ δέει προτεθηκῶσ καὶ αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ τὰ πάνδεινα καταψηφισάμενος, μέχρι τοῦτου σκυθρωπάζει καὶ ἀπολέγεται τὴν ζωὴν, μέχρι τοῦ παραχθῆναι καὶ ὀφθήσεσθαι τῷ προσώπῳ σου ... καὶ ὁ πρὸ μικροῦ δεδακρυμένος, ὁ κατηφῆς, σκιρτῶν γεγηθῶσ ὡς ἀναβεβιωκῶσ περίεσι.

Instead of menace, you offer to your subjects a smile; somebody who was already dead of fear, who had already sentenced himself to the most dreadful [punishment], who, before being brought into your presence and granted an audience ..., bore a sad countenance and had already bidden farewell to his own life, [afterwards] sees his fate completely changed; he who was crying, his eyes downcast, is leaping in happiness.⁷³

Even more, irony can be detected in Psellos's pictures of life in the palace. This is how he describes the courtiers' attitude towards the Empress Zoe: 'In fact, they were exceedingly afraid of her (ἐδεδοίκεσαν αὐτὴν σφόδρα), as if she were a lioness'.⁷⁴ The most vicious caricature is found in his description of the imperial audience: as Isaac Komnenos sat silently on his throne,

δέος οὐ τι βραχὺ τῷ συγκλητικῷ καταλόγῳ ἐπέσειεν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐπεπήγεισαν, καὶ ὡσπερ ἀστραπῆ βληθέντες ἐφ' οὐ ἐπλήγησαν εἰστήκεισαν σχήματος, ξηροὶ καὶ ἄνικμοὶ γεγονότες καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ὡσπερ ἀποτεθειμένοι, οἱ δὲ, ἄλλος ἄλλο τι ποιῶν ἡρέμα ἐδείκνυτο· ὁ μὲν γὰρ τῷ πόδε ἡσυχῆ συνεβίβαζεν, ὁ δὲ ἐπὶ πλέον ταῖς χερσὶν ἐδέσμευε τὸ στήθος, καὶ ἄλλος πρὸς τοῦδαφος ἔνευε, καὶ αὐθις ἕτερος, καὶ ἐφεξῆς σύμπαντες φρικώδους ἐμπιλάμενοι δείματος, τὰ σώματα ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἡσυχῆ καὶ κρύβδην

72 Psellos, Letter 86, ed. Papaioannou, vol. 1, 181.

73 Psellos, 'To the emperor', ed. Dennis, 110–11.

74 Psellos, *Chronographia*, 3.17, ed. Reinsch, 188, tr. Sewter, 149.

συνέστελλον· ἐπεὶ δὲ ποτε ἐκεῖνος τοῖς προκειμένοις ἐπανανεύσειε, βραχύ τι τὸ ἀναπνεῦσαν ἦν, καὶ ἡ ἀλλοίωσις ἀριθμητικοῖς ἐγνωρίζετο λόγοις.

[This silence of his] struck no little fear into the hearts of the senate. Some stood frozen to the ground as if struck by lightning, in the same position as when the thunderbolt fell, dry and bloodless, like men without souls. Others reacted differently: one stood stiffly to attention, another folded his arms more tightly than usual across his chest, a third stared at the ground. Another – and this was true of them all, for they were all filled with terror – repressed a desire to move by sheer willpower, shifting his posture as quietly and unobtrusively as he could ... and you recognised the change in them by the beating of their hearts.⁷⁵

The majority of such sceptical views are doomed to remain unknown to us – and yet we do have another example in the caricatured depictions of the emperors by Niketas Choniates. The many instances of scoffing and mockery that we find in his work are obviously a matter of collective joking and buffoonery. Choniates' guess that 'the dotard' Andronikos 'defecated in his breeches (κεχοδέναι τὴν βράκα τὸ γερόντιον)' at the very moment of his coronation⁷⁶ arose from the soft chuckles of the courtiers right in the middle of this most solemn Byzantine ceremony.

Above, we mentioned the pompous court ritual of the Byzantines as being intentionally aimed at inspiring awe. The *Book on Ceremonies* by Constantine VII is universally perceived as the epitome of Byzantine ritualism. Yet, the very first sentence of this immense treatise reads as follows: 'Some other people would probably find this undertaking superfluous (ἄλλοις μὲν τισιν ἴσως ἔδοξεν ἂν τοῦτὶ τὸ ἐγγεῖρμα περιττόν)'.⁷⁷ The emperor may have been thinking of his immediate relatives when he wrote this, but his text was intended for courtiers, and such an introduction would not have left a trace of awe in their souls. So, perhaps τὸ αὐτοκρατορικὸν δέος (*to autokratorikon deos*) was not so overwhelming? Alexander Kazhdan regarded fear as the dominant emotion of the Byzantines.⁷⁸ But maybe some of them, or even all of them, in different circumstances, found ways to manage the emotion which is believed to be the mightiest among humans.

75 Psellos, *Chronographia*, 7.47, ed. Reinsch, 640, tr. Sewter, 513, with emendations.

76 Niketas Choniates, *History*, on Alexios Komnenos, ed. van Dieten, vol. 1, 272, tr. H.J. Magoulias, *O City of Byzantium: Annals of Niketas Choniates* (New York, 1984), 151.

77 Constantine Porphyrogenetos, *Book of Ceremonies*, preface to book 1, ed. Dagron and Flusin, vol. 1, 3.

78 A. Kazhdan and G. Constable, *People and Power in Byzantium: An Introduction to Modern Byzantine Studies* (Washington, DC, 1982), 26–45.

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Index

Note: *Italic* page numbers refer to figures and page numbers followed by “n” denote footnotes.

- Adkins, A.W.H. 50
Aelius Aristides 431
Aetios 72
affective psychology 6
affects 8, 19, 39, 53, 152, 155, 191, 272, 353, 358; core affect 10
Agamben, G. 245, 253–4
agape 21, 22, 186
Agapitos, P.A. 14
Akedah 295, 298–305
akedia 252–61
akolouthia 75
Alexiou, M. 11, 16
Althoff, G. 305, 410
Anastos, M. 1
Angelidi, C. 14
anger 405; abuse 419–22; ascribing 414–16; bestial 416–19; and cognition 406–8; management of 410–14; neuro-anatomical processes 409; textual 408
Anna Komnene 83, 306
Antioch 15n89, 99n32, 356n31, 381, 382n25, 385, 385n34, 391–4, 397, 398
apatheia 226, 227
Aphrodite Anadyomene 382, 384
Aphthonios 9–10
aphthonos 81
apolausis (enjoyment) 19, 24, 376n5, 383; at banquet 393–6, 394, 396; at bath 381–3, 385–93; 383–4, 386–90; as an emotion 375–9; and Good Life 398–400; in Nemesios’s emotionology 379–81; regulation 397–8
Apolausis (Personification) 24, 375–401, 383, 386, 389, 394
Apollinaris 105–7
Archaeological Museum of Argos 389, 390
Archaeological Museum, Istanbul 319
archaeology 7
arete 100n36
Arethas 428
Aristophanes 118
Aristotle 9, 10, 51–4, 93, 100–2, 115–17, 186–8, 224–5, 250–51, 411
art 12, 13, 15–18, 193, 196, 222, 254, 378, 379, 381, 400; Byzantine 24, 199, 206, 314–43, 377, 400; eastern Christian 197; emotion in 12, 13, 15, 17, 137, 159, 191, 202, 206, 314, 318, 319, 324, 326, 332, 336, 337, 341, 343, 378, 400; hunter-gatherers, in Australia 7; Italian 137, 159; post-iconoclastic 198; pre-iconoclastic 203
asceticism 18, 234, 255, 256, 392
Asinou (church at) 11, 145, 146
Athanasios of Alexandria 81n62, 94, 94n15, 95, 105, 106, 226
Augustine 95, 96, 215, 216, 218
Austin, J.L. 9, 40, 48
awe 430–4
Barbalet, J. 259
Barcelona, A. 271
Barrett, L.F. 4
Barr-Zisowitz, C. 251–3
baths and bathing 378, 381–93, 395, 397, 398, 399, 401
Benaki Museum, Athens 160n76, 321n12
Bernard, F. 24
Blowers, P.M. 120
bodily posture 12, 203, 262

- brain imaging 1
 Byzantine and Christian Museum,
 Athens 148n35, 321, 321, 322
- Cairns, D. 4, 5, 9, 16, 17, 18, 50, 407, 408
 Cameron, Averil 355
 Cancrini, A. 280–81
 Carpenter, M. 356
 Carr, A.W. 22
 catena (ae) 74, 280–7
 chara 19, 26, 349, 354
 charmolupe 15
 Christopher Mitylenaios 416–19
 Cicero 117–18
 Cioran, E.M. 243
 Clement of Alexandria 93, 94n14,
 96n25, 97n26, 99n33, 225, 226, 242,
 242n11, 388, 389n40, 389n41, 390n43
 Coakley, S. 14
 cognition: dissonance 275; distributed 4,
 6, 8, 26; science 7; theory 13
 cognitive-evaluative approach 5, 53
 Colombetti, G. 4
 compassion 21–2, 90–110, 114–15
 compunction 230
conquestio 117, 118n19
consolatio 14, 20
 Constantinou, S. 16, 194
 constatives 40
 court 18n103, 20, 71–4, 77, 78, 83, 85,
 92, 93, 103, 131, 132, 141, 205, 416,
 419, 421, 434, 438
 Crucifixion 24, 140, 159, 196–9, 201,
 226, 268, 315, 321–4, 322, 323, 332,
 334, 338, 339, 340, 347, 355
 Cyprus 25n125, 109, 137, 145, 147, 159,
 198, 198n52, 333, 337, 391
- Damasio, A.R. 190, 192
 Darwinians 43
 Deesis 197
 Derbes, A. 341
 Descartes, R. 186
despotes 434
diabole 70, 82
 Dionysios the Areopagite (pseudo-) 331
 divine economy 361
 Dodds, E.R. 50
 Dover, K.J. 50
 Drpić, I. 13
 Dumbarton Oaks 1, 17, 18, 26n132,
 55n146, 147n34, 334, 335, 381, 383,
 384, 399
- Easter 347–70; Easter Troparion 367
 Ecclesiastical Museum of Paphos 139
 Ekman, P. 4, 10
ekphrasis (*eis*) 22, 24, 119, 120, 121, 131,
 206, 326
elaion 94
eleemosune 109
eleos 19, 21, 22, 90–7, 99, 100–3,
 115, 126
 Eleousa 137–62
 Elias, N. 43
 emotions 9, 10, 19, 21, 25, 38–40, 46,
 376, 410; ascetic construction of
 240–61; basic 4, 19, 22, 24, 38, 42, 46,
 63, 192, 427; Byzantine 24, 67–9, 378,
 400, 414; collective emotion 4, 5, 7,
 15, 26; communities 12–13, 17, 21, 23,
 24, 43–7, 50, 257, 409, 410, 416, 419;
 emotives 8–10, 40–2; history 5, 13,
 14, 16, 21, 36–8, 42–5, 48–55, 60, 85,
 260, 376; hydraulic theory/model 20,
 43, 407; and individual loss 292–309;
 navigation 40–2; Nemesios 379–81;
 pneumatic model and 43; reciprocity
 49; regimes 20, 21, 40–2, 47, 269, 285,
 287; Schnell, R. 5; scripts 47; ‘scripts’
 approach 9, 62; systems theory 192;
 universalism 10, 62
 empathy 6–8, 10, 20, 27, 114, 116, 122,
 192, 253
 emperor 71, 72, 7, 83, 84, 85n73, 151,
 154, 155, 170, 177–83, 385, 416,
 427–38
 enactivism 8, 21
enargeia 114, 119, 123
 entrainment 8, 27
 envy 60–86; begrudging 62, 67, 85;
 covetous envy 62
 Epistle of James 283–84
Epitaphios 205
epi tou kanikleiou 72
ethopoeia 22, 24, 119–21, 131, 326
eunoia 100n36
eusplanchnia 22, 115, 148, 155
 Evagrius of Pontos 231–35, 240–61
exemplum (*a*) 74, 79
- facial expression 3n15, 10n63, 12, 202,
 203, 252, 268, 314, 318, 328, 336, 343,
 377, 405, 418
 fear 427–30; overcoming 434–38
 Febvre, L. 14, 36, 43, 214
 Ferngren, G.B. 95

- Finlay-Jones, R. 260
 Finn, R. 124
 fMRI *see* functional magnetic resonance imaging
 Follieri, E. 148, 150, 166–70
 Foucault, M. 44
 Freudians 43
 functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) 1
- Gambero, L. 160
 Geertz, C. 41, 348
 gender 14, 16, 18, 37, 120, 254, 279, 350, 353, 361, 408, 415–16, 419
 gesture 8, 11, 12, 46, 48, 118, 120, 203, 314–22, 324, 326–38, 343, 377, 383, 395, 397, 401, 407, 410, 423
 George Sphrantzes 77–8
 Gerstel, S. 12
gnome (ai) 69, 76
 Grabar, A. 140
 Gregory of Nazianzos 16, 22, 81, 81n63, 82n66, 93, 93n12, 95, 101, 102, 102n42, 106, 107n52, 107n53, 107n55, 107n56, 109, 114, 122, 122n47, 123, 123n48, 131, 281n64, 302, 302n41, 358n36, 413
 Gregory of Nyssa 16, 22, 98, 98n29, 98n30, 98n31, 102n43, 104, 104n46, 121, 122, 123, 154, 154n61, 154n62, 155, 155n67, 155n68, 156n69–71, 158, 188n12, 225, 247, 272n25, 292n1, 295, 298n23, 300, 300n34, 375n1, 377n8
 grief 268–69, 292; in the *Akedah* 295, 298–305; biblical 305–9; Bohairic homily 304; in Byzantine art 314–43; joy-bearing 293–94; parental 296–305; Syriac homily 301; unworthy 293
 Grosdidier de Matons, J. 356
 guest-friendship 48–9
 Guillaumont, A. 259–60
- Habinek, T. 3
 Harré, R. 260, 408
 Harris, O.J.T. 7, 10, 15
 Harvey, S.A. 17, 194, 295, 306n52
 Hatay Archaeological Museum, Antakya 387
 Hausherr, I. 15, 292–93
 Hawley, N. 216
 healing 90–110
hedone 349, 379
 Herman, G. 48
- Hermas 241–42, 246, 384
 Hermogenes 9–10
 Hinterberger, M. 13, 15, 21, 194, 293, 376–77
 Hippokrates 10, 43
 Hobbes, T. 186
 Hogan, P. 6
 homily 22, 67, 121, 130, 188, 189, 191, 204, 206, 267, 292, 295, 299–306, 331
 Huizinga, J. 43
 Hume, D. 186
hybris 22, 219
 hymnography 14, 22, 114, 125, 132, 148, 199, 355
hyperephania 22, 219, 225, 228, 229, 235
- icon 12, 12n4, 22, 24, 137, 137n3, 140, 141, 142, 142n22, 143, 147, 148n35, 150, 157, 159, 161, 197, 198, 198n52, 203, 206n77, 207, 301n35, 321, 322, 324, 324n16, 325, 332, 333, 343; Virgin Kykkotissa 140, 161, 161n82; Virgin of Vladimir 206, 207
- Jacob of Serugh 205, 302, 306n52
 James, L. 194
 James, W. 187, 190
 James-Lang theory 187
 Jamison, L. 249
 jealousy 60–86; sexual jealousy 66
 Jesus Christ 74, 85, 92, 94, 95, 99, 103–9, 113, 125, 153, 195n49, 197, 225, 240, 240n3, 241, 242, 267, 326, 330, 350, 355, 357, 359, 360, 361, 362, 412; Christ Antiphonetes 145, 147; Christ Philanthropos 143, 144, 144; healing 90–110; Prodomos 150
 John Cassian 9
 John Chrysostom 16, 99, 103, 109–10, 121, 124, 132, 188–89, 200, 299, 327, 336, 432
 John Geometres 160
 John Kamateros 72
 John Mauropous 22, 152, 158, 166, 332
 John Stobaios 68
 John Therakas 22, 157, 171–76
 John Tzetzes 277–78
 Judaism, Hellenistic 220
- kanon (hymn form) 22, 149–53, 155–62, 166, 347; Marian kanons 158, 159
 Karanlık Kilise (church) 322, 323
 Kaster, R. 9

- katadrome* 422
katanyxis 15–17, 19, 24, 26
katapheia 23, 266–87; Homer, heroic
dejection in 273–80, 286–87
Kazhdan, A. 12, 25
Khanenko Museum, Kiev 197
kinaesthetic empathy 8
Koimesis 11, 141, 315, 328, 337
Konstan, D. 4, 14, 51, 53–4, 66, 187, 193
kontakion 22, 24, 114, 125, 128, 199,
304, 305
Kövecses, Z. 9, 407, 418
Krueger, D. 14, 24, 156–57
Kurbinovo (church at) 315, 315

Lagoudera (church at) 145, 145n28, 146,
147, 333, 335, 337
Lakoff, G. 9
LeDoux, J.E. 3
Lepenies, W. 256
Lewis, C.S. 184
Leyerle, B. 17
liturgy 17, 18, 148, 150, 160, 306, 307,
309, 324, 335, 336, 348, 349, 351, 354,
364, 366–68
Livingston, J.G. 279
Locke, J. 186
logismos (oi) 14, 19–21, 231, 232,
234, 244
logothetes tou genikou 72
lupe 19, 23, 26, 96, 268, 269, 349

MacMullen, R. 414
madrasha (e) 199
Maguire, H. 11–13, 18, 23, 24, 26, 243
Manolopoulou, V. 15
Manuel Philes 434
manuscripts 10n65, 117n16, 149, 150,
161n82, 235, 286n84, 350n14, 352,
352n19, 352n21, 353n22, 357, 357n33,
358n36, 377n10
Mary Magdalene 361–64
Matt, S.J. 408
Maximos Confessor 108, 229, 231, 331;
Pseudo-Maximos 68
McConachie, B. 8
medical theory 10, 25
megalopsychia 22, 225
Meineck, P. 8
Mellas, A. 17
memra (e) 130, 307
Menander Rhetor 20, 298
metanoia 15, 241, 317, 318, 318, 326
metaphors 269–73
metonymy 5, 9, 24, 42, 269–73
Metropolitan Museum of Art, New
York 324n17
Meyer, M. 16, 194
Michael Attaleiates 76, 415
Michael Choniates 84–5
Michael Palaiologos 430
Michael Psellos 419–22, 435
misericordia 96
monastery 44, 74, 79n55, 141, 142n22,
143, 144, 150, 205n75, 236, 247, 255,
256, 333, 419
monastery of St Neophytos 333, 334
Moore, S.V. 15
mosaic 141, 198, 202, 324, 378, 379, 381,
383, 385, 386, 387, 389, 391–401
Mt Moriah 298, 302
Mt Olympos 419
Mt Sinai 324, 325
Mount of Olives 354, 358
Muellner, L. 4
Musée du Louvre 329, 329
Museum of Byzantine Culture,
Thessalonike 336
Museum of Fine Arts, Boston 392n51,
393, 394
Museum of the monastery of St
Neophytos 143, 144
Myrrhophores/Myrrhbearers 358–60

narratology 6
National Museum of Beirut,
Lebanon 185
Nativity 22, 198, 198n53, 199, 201, 203,
322, 323, 353
Nerezi (church of) 11, 328, 328, 343
neuroscience 1, 3, 4, 7, 21, 22, 184,
187, 193
Nikephoros Basilakes 113–14, 341
Niketas Choniates 72, 154, 330, 415, 438
Nilsson, I. 14
Niobe 319, 319
Nouwen, H.J.M. 92
Nussbaum, M.C. 116, 405

Oatley, K. 6
Ohrid 160, 319, 320, 328, 331
oiktirmos 21, 90, 91, 96, 99–101, 148, 155
oiktos 22, 98, 99, 115
orality 13
Origen 216
Orthodox theology 13

- paideia* 379, 392, 392n51, 398, 399
 panel painting 147, 340
pannychis 150
 Panksepp, J. 192
 Papadogiannakis, Y. 14, 16
 Papaioannou, S. 14, 19
 Papamastorakis, T. 14
parresia 83
Paschal Chronicle 433
 passions 6, 11, 17n102, 19, 67, 77, 93,
 96, 99, 153, 159–61, 222, 242,
 260, 332–34, 339–43, 377, 378, 380,
 381, 397
pathos (*e*) 19, 20, 85, 96, 97, 100, 187,
 216, 222, 224, 225, 227, 229, 231, 233,
 234, 235, 279, 349, 376, 380, 413
 Patroklos 274
 Peden, J. 130
 Péguy, C. 54
penthos 15, 19, 23, 258, 292, 293,
 294, 349
 performance 3, 7, 8, 157, 206, 243, 254,
 302n37, 314, 352
 performatives 40
phantasia 19
philanthropia 22, 115, 155, 228
philia, philos 22, 51, 186, 187, 189, 222
 philosophy 4, 5, 18, 22, 61, 98, 107,
 186, 190, 193, 214, 219–26, 232, 244,
 410, 412
phronesis 100n36
 Photios, patriarch 267–68, 307–8
phthonos 9, 13, 15, 21; argumentative
 power of 83–5; Byzantine concept 60,
 61, 63–4, 67–9, 85; characteristics 62;
 devil's and God's 79–83; emotional
 episodes of 69–74; in scripture 74–9;
 semantics 65–7
 pity 113–32
 Plamper, J. 2, 39, 41
 Plato 9, 186, 188, 224
 play 8, 19, 190, 244, 247, 259, 329, 334,
 348, 377, 418, 428
 Plutarch 431
 poetry 7, 18, 24, 199, 201, 295; emotion
 in verse 405–23
 positron emission tomography (PET) 1
pothos 13, 14
 Potter, E. 18
 predictive processing 9
 Presentation of Christ in the Temple 355
 pride 214–36
progymnasma (*-ta*) 113, 120, 370n49
 Prokopios of Caesarea 71–2
 psychological constructionism 4, 5
 rapid eye movement (REM) sleep 1
 Reddy, W. 9, 37, 40–2, 47, 55
 Remorse of St Peter, denial of Christ
 317, 317
 rhetoric 9, 18, 19, 101, 113, 231, 308,
 319, 369, 411, 416; Byzantine 24;
 management of affect through 113–32
 ritual 8, 11, 48, 150, 184, 196, 205, 217,
 244, 284, 324, 336, 348, 351, 410, 420,
 422, 438
 Rocchi, M. 150–51
 Romanos the Melodist 186, 196, 196n50,
 199–201, 203, 204, 205, 350–55,
 368–70
 Rosenwein, B.H. 20, 24–5, 37, 43–7, 55,
 294, 348, 409
 Royal Ontario Museum, Toronto 395,
 396
 Russell, J.A. 4
 sadness 247–52, 247n31, 257, 258, 266,
 269–73; and Christian conscience
 280–87
 Sanders, E. 62, 65–7, 408
 Scherer, K. 4
 Schmemmann, A. 201–2
 sculpture 319, 319, 391
sebas 25, 430
sententiae 69, 75, 235
 Ševčenko, N.P. 150
 Shoemaker, S.J. 160
skythropotes 23
 Smith, W. 247
 social binarism 47
 social cohesion 422
 social constructivism 40, 41, 44
 socio-historical sources 39
 Sokrates 118
 Solomon, R. 43, 406
 Sørensen, T.F. 7, 10, 15
 speech-act theory 9
 Spinoza, B. 186
splanchna 21, 90–2, 99–101, 126
 St Clement's church, Ohrid 319–320, 320
 St John Prodromos 150
 Stanford, W.B. 14
 Stearns, C.Z. 38, 55, 376, 410
 Stearns, P.H. 37, 38, 55, 69, 376, 410
 Stewart, C. 14, 231–32
 Stock, B. 45

- Stone, L. 296–97
storge 22, 184–207; affection 184, 200;
 affective science and 186; Byzantine
 hymnography in 199; Byzantine
 sources 185; James-Lang theory and
 187; in Nativity 199–201, 203; parental
 protection 186; reciprocity 187, 195
sukophantia 70
superbia 215
 Sullivan, E. 55
sympatheia 21, 90, 91, 98–101, 109,
 148, 155
 sympathy 114
synnoia 281
- Tarlow, S. 7, 10
 Tatić-Đurić, M. 138–40, 159
 Theodore Agallianos 78
 Theodore II Laskaris 22, 158, 177–83
 Theory of Mind 6, 8
therapeia 225, 226
thlipsis 349
threnos (lament) 11
 Threnos/Lamentation (scene of) 11,
 122, 199, 284, 319, 320, 328, 331, 333,
 341, 347; St Clement's church, Ohrid,
 Lamentation 319–320, 320
thumos 229, 252, 407, 409, 412
 Tomkins, S. 9
 transculturality 5, 6, 8n53, 10n63, 24,
 249n46, 314, 342, 409
 typikon 142n22, 149n40
- Vassilaki, M. 12
 Virgin Mary 185, 185, 197, 197;
 Arakiotissa 333, 335; Eleousa
 137–62; Enthroned Virgin and
 Child 202, 202; Episkepsis 147;
 gender 184–207; Glykophilousa 186;
 Gorgoepikoos 147; Kecharitomene
 147; Marian kanons 158, 159; Mother
 of God Eleousa (so inscribed) 137,
 138, 139, 142, 143, 146, 149, 162;
 Paraklesis 147; *Theotokos* (Mother
 of God) 12, 137, 150, 166, 171, 173,
 175–77, 181, 183, 355, 365; *storge*
 184–207; Virgin *Hodegetria* 197,
 321, 321; Virgin of Tenderness 197,
 203, 204
- virtues and vices 9
- wall painting 11, 11n67, 12, 144
 Walters Art Museum 204, 330
 Webb, R. 14, 21
 Wessel, S. 21, 121–22
 Wierzbicka, A. 4, 408
 Winfield, D. 11
 Woolf, V. 6
- Xenia, xenos* 48, 49
- Yegül, F. 382, 389
- zelotupia* 64, 67
 Zunshine, L. 6